


Cole-H02733 -60-P02600

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

FOUNDED BY BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE, 1880



✻ SPRING 1982 VOLUME 103 NUMBER 1 ✻

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS



Georg Luck, James W. Poultney, John Pollini, Michael L. McCormick
Frank Romer, Book Review Editor
Candida Allanbrook, Secretary

Benjamin D. Meritt, *Honorary Editor*

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY • Volume 103 • Number 1 • Spring 1982

ISSN 0002-9475

Copyright © 1982 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

All rights reserved. No portion of this journal may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the formal consent of the editors and publishers. For copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law, the copier must pay a fee of \$1.00 per copy through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, Massachusetts 01970. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. It is the journal's policy to require the assignment of copyright from all authors.

The *American Journal of Philology* publishes original contributions in Classical Studies, particularly in the fields of Greek and Roman Literature, Textual Criticism, Classical Linguistics, Ancient Philosophy, History, and Greek and Latin Epigraphy. It is published quarterly: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, in issues of about 128 pages of text each. Subscription price: \$30.00 Institutions, \$14.00 Individuals. Foreign postage is \$2.50 additional. Single issues: \$8.00 each.

Subscriptions, address changes, advertising, and other business correspondence should be sent to The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Division, 34th and Charles Streets, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A. Claims for replacements of missing issues must be received within three months (six months for foreign subscribers) following publication of the issue.

Postmaster: please send form 3579 to the above address.

Indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals and in Book Review Index.

Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland, and at additional mailing offices.

Composition by Bet Sha'ar Press, Inc.

The Printers' devices appearing on the front cover of *AJP* have been selected from among the ones especially created in stained glass for the Hutzler Undergraduate Reading Room on the Homewood Campus of The Johns Hopkins University. They represent the devices by Aldus Manutius (Spring), Robert Estienne (Summer), Joannes Frobenius (Fall), and Christopher Plantin (Winter).

405
002

(60)

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 103, No. 1

WHOLE No. 408

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

DISKIN CLAY

Georg Luck and a Decade of *AJP*

1

JOSEPH RUSSO

Interview and Aftermath: Dream, Fantasy, and Intuition
in *Odyssey* 19 and 20

4

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN

Achilles on the Islands of the Blessed:
Pindar vs. Homer and Hesiod

19

F. E. ROMER

The *Aisymnēteia*: A Problem in Aristotle's
Historic Method

25

GEORG LUCK

Notes on the Text of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*

47

RONALD SYME

The Marriage of Rubellius Blandus

62

INTERPRETATIONS


86

LLOYD W. DALY

Aristophanes and Sophron?

WILLIAM M. CALDER, III

Artemidorus Daldianus, *Oniromantica* 3.24



J. LINDERSKI

Two *Cruces* in Seneca, *De vita beata* 25.2

LLOYD W. DALY

A Greek Palindrome in Eighth-Century England

ERIC P. HAMP

The Anaphora **ei* in Latin

ERIC P. HAMP

hic and *ibi* in Latin

REVIEWS

JASPER GRIFFIN

Homer on Life and Death (J. Strauss Clay)

JOHN BUCKLER

The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 B.C.

(Jennifer Tolbert Roberts)

CHARLES D. HAMILTON

Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy

in the Corinthian War (Jennifer Tolbert Roberts)

M. PAPATHOMOPOULOS

Nouveaux Fragments d'Auteurs Anciens

(George Leonidas Koniaris)

BOOKS RECEIVED

P2600
102

115

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

GEORG LUCK AND A DECADE OF *AJP*

The American Journal of Philology is a journal that has been quite observant of its past, its founder, Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve, and of the anniversaries and transitions that have made up its *fasti* for 102 years now. The appearance of the Winter issue of 1981 (102.4) marks still another event in its carefully kept annals, for it marks a decade of the journal under the editorship of Georg Luck, who surely and firmly directed it through a period of great and rapid changes, both within and without his university and his field of Classical Studies. Indeed, the first volume he edited was a volume of *Studies in Honor of Henry T. Rowell* (93.1, 1972)—*vir profecto heroicis connumerandus ingeniis*—and, as heroically, editor of the journal for 26 years. And, to turn Ammianus Marcellinus' praise from Julian, once again, *auctoritas* and *liberalitas* were his two great virtues as an editor, and to them Georg Luck added the *felicitas* of his own writings, as well as a *pietas*. With the assistance of three guest editors, he celebrated the journal's centenary with TEKMERION, a special issue in Honor of James Henry Oliver. To the epigrapher and Greek historian, he offered "Notes on Propertius" (100.1 [1979] 73–93) and to the Roman historian he offered an interpretation of Petronius' *Bellum Civile* (93.1 [1972] 123–41); and to the journal throughout the decade of his editorship he offered articles which were themselves proof of the breadth, depth and careful attention to significant detail that he prized and encouraged in others.

The reader of *AJP* who has come to appreciate that 102 years represent extreme old age in the life of a quarterly, and even a crow, will appreciate that this, the first issue of its 103rd year, is not a testimonial volume of *Studies in Honor of Georg Luck*. Rather than finding a suitably solemn photograph of its editor for the last decade, the reader will find him vigorously engaged with the text of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. But the 40 volumes and 10 years of his editorship call

for some reflection and, with reflection, appreciation on the part of a colleague on his editorial board who has become his successor. What impresses is the sheer range of the materials the editor has succeeded in bringing under two covers. In a decade and an age whose device might well be the enlargement of the miniaturization of the computer chip, Georg Luck maintained a broad vision of the complexity, diversity and potential unity of Classical Studies and refused to limit the journal to any single field or perspective on his discipline. A comparison of the last decade of *AJP* with its first seems, at first, to betray a vast change in the make-up of the journal symptomatic of a specialization of inquiry which has found its expression in specialized journals. But what a comparison shows is that the journal, under Georg Luck's editorship, has helped to keep together a field which has grown as large and diverse as Gildersleeve's original conception of "the whole cycle of Philological study" (1.1 [1878] 2). And it should show that if 102 years represent extreme old age in the life of a journal, a journal maintains its life only by keeping close to what is vital in its own time. In *AJP* 1.1, 1878, we find as fellows on the printer's bed Gildersleeve's "Encroachments of $\mu\eta$ on $\omicron\upsilon$ in Later Greek"; an interpretative piece on Goethe's *Das Jahrmarktsfest zu Plundersweilen*; "French Verbs in -eler and -eter"; "Problems of General Semitic Grammar." And we find the reason why Gildersleeve capitalized Philology.

The range of contributions over the last decade is, for this age of specialization and sub-particulate research, as great, and includes pieces of literary interpretation and history; textual criticism; historical investigation; epigraphy; religion; linguistics and philosophy. The journal has been a constant reminder of all there is to know and learn about the world of Greece and Rome. If there was something missing in this decade it was not a field, but a movement. Structuralism, which made its American beachhead in Baltimore, passed the journal by, as if it were a *vague*. And if there was a field which held any pride of place in the journal it was textual criticism. Significantly, George Luck's last contribution to the journal he edited and formed was an essay on textual criticism informed by a long practice of editing, the connoisseurship that sets an editor above an emendator, and a love for the literature behind our ancient manuscripts. The literary study of ancient poetry held its place, not as second, but as the $\omicron\upsilon\ \xi\upsilon\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ of textual criticism. Textual criticism and the criticism of texts: neither could do, nor did, without the other. And the text beyond the ms. and apparatus was the object of the interpretive essays that

matched the editor's textual notes in range and quality: "Notes on Propertius" (100.1, 1979) were matched by "On Petronius' *Bellum Civile*" (93.1, 1972); "Aratea" (97.3, 1976) by "Virgil and the Mystery Religions" (94.2, 1973); and the editor's philosophical bent and training find their expression in "On Panaetius and Menander" (96.3, 1975) and a piece on Cicero's *De Fato* (99.1, 1978). There is even a review of a *translation* (Lattimore's version of *The Four Gospels and the Revelation*, 101.4, 1980).

Readers of another generation and historians trained in the art of prosopography could find something significant in the last decade of the journal that mere titles do not reveal. Articles have authors and more women Classicists published their research in *AJP* during the last decade than in the monastic period during which Henry Rowell was editor. And readers of still another generation will never appreciate from the bound volumes of the journal in their libraries that another major change occurred when Georg Luck was editor of *AJP*; but those who were young enough to receive their copies of vol. 100.1 saw the change. Instead of a cover which, in its buff brown respectability made the journal seem antique the day it appeared, *AJP* was transformed at its centenary in a salmon and epigraphic cover. We will never know Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve's reaction to a salmon *AJP*, but he would, I believe, have been proud to know that his tradition has passed to a scholar whose origins are in Switzerland, whose training was, in part, in the United (Northern) States, and who has helped make the *American Journal of Philology* the international journal it has become.

DISKIN CLAY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

INTERVIEW AND AFTERMATH: DREAM, FANTASY, AND INTUITION IN *ODYSSEY* 19 AND 20

I

As the action of the *Odyssey* moves toward the climax in which Odysseus slays the Suitors and is reunited with Penelope, Homer makes increasing use of omens, prophecies, and dreams to intensify the sense of impending crisis.¹ Within this network of signals from a world beyond that of ordinary experience, the poet has given special attention to a specific kind of phenomenon: the sudden access, for both Penelope and Odysseus in Books 19 and 20, to states of abnormally heightened awareness which are unusual in being located somewhere below the threshold of full consciousness. For this husband and wife in their time of greatest need and danger, the capacity of the mind to work creatively through what we today call fantasy and intuition is expanded to an exceptional degree. Normally in Homeric epic, moments of inspiration are straightforwardly presented as the product

¹ A fine appreciation of Homer's use of these supra-rational devices is Anne Amory, "The Reunion of Odysseus and Penelope," in C. Taylor, Jr., ed., *Essays on the Odyssey* (Bloomington 1963). Cf. also her dissertation summary, "Omens and Dreams in the Odyssey," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 517-19. The poet's taste for such devices has not always been shared by his critics. See K. Hirvonen, "Cledonmancy and the Grinding Slave Woman, *Od.* XX, 91-121," *Arctos* NS 6 (1969) 5-21, who, while arguing that this passage is not an interpolation, echoes years of Analyst tradition when he states "It is B, the creator of the latest stratum and compiler of the final version in its entirety, who can be blamed [!] for the profusion of omens" (13). Cf. P. Von der Mühl, *Odyssee, R-E Suppl.* Band VII (1940) 678, 751-52, and R. Merkelbach, *Untersuchungen zur Odyssee* (Munich 1951) 5f. and 11f. on Penelope in Bk. 19, 104-6 on Bk. 20, to cite only the most influential of the Analysts who saw as terrible blemishes many of the same scenes that critics of the New Unitarianism now praise in the Reunion Story. Eloquent opposition to the Analysts within the German tradition itself has rarely been lacking: cf. O. Seel, "Variante und Konvergenz in der Odyssee," *Studi in Onore di U. E. Paoli* (Florence 1955) 643-57; W. Büchner, "Die Penelopeszenen in der Odyssee," *Hermes* 75 (1940) 146-59; H. Vester, "Das 19. Buch der Odyssee," *Gymnasium* 75 (1968) 417-34, esp. 427f. on Penelope's dream and decision to hold the contest; H. Eisenberger, *Studien zur Odyssee* (Wiesbaden 1973) 267-92, to cite only a few of the scholars who defend the literary artistry of Books 19-20.

of an external stimulus, the "psychic intervention"² of divine forces that take over the mind and impart insight, strength, courage and good or bad judgement. When the inspiration is not on the level of full consciousness, a common way of presenting it in narrative terms is to have a god send, or appear in the form of, an apparition to a person who is asleep.³ Again the source is external to the mind of the person involved. But once Homer has brought Odysseus into contact with Penelope in *Odyssey* 19, the expansion of consciousness that he attributes to each of them derives not from the traditional epic mechanism of the intervening deity but from an intensification of *internal* psychic resources. It is as if the quality of *homophrosynē*, "like-mindedness," that Odysseus earlier extolled to Nausikaa as the cornerstone of the perfect marriage (6.180-85), is now being demonstrated at a level and with a finesse not hitherto attained in the interaction of epic characters.⁴

Any investigation of the heightened mental activity of Penelope and Odysseus will have to take account of Anne Amory's important study, "The Gates of Horn and Ivory,"⁵ with its claim that their characteristic intellectual styles are fundamentally different: Odysseus sees reality clearly and unblinkingly while Penelope is portrayed as viewing it intermittently (cf. 19.478, 23.106f.), or as if through the veil

² This term is coined by E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Boston 1957 [Berkeley 1951]) 5, and illustrated throughout Ch. I. See also J. Russo and B. Simon, "Homeric Psychology and the Oral Epic Tradition," *JHI* 29 (1968) 483-98, reprinted in J. Wright, ed., *Essays on the Iliad* (Bloomington and London 1978); H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, tr. M. Hadas and J. Willis (New York and London 1975) 68-75.

³ Familiar examples are *Il.* 2.5ff., the "negative inspiration" of Agamemnon's harmful dream; *Od.* 4.795ff., Athena sending an *eidōlon* to Penelope in the image of her sister; *Od.* 6.20ff., Athena appearing to Nausikaa in the guise of a close friend. Dodds, 104f. with n. 8, lists these as dreams treated by the poet as "objective fact," following Joachim Hündt's *Der Traumglaube bei Homer* (Greifswald 1935), which made the useful distinction between "Aussenträume" and "Innenträume." The dreams in Books 19 and 20 that I am concerned with are classic examples of "Innenträume."

⁴ This emphasis on *homophrosynē* and an intensified mental and spiritual "wakefulness" characterizes the approach of Norman Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon* (Berkeley 1975) Ch. IV and esp. 211-35 on Book 19, whose original and imaginative book is the very antithesis of the Analytic fault-finding tradition. Although not immune to interpretive excesses, his treatment of the figures of Penelope and Odysseus is generally convincing. If Austin had extended his detailed examination of the Odysseus-Penelope relationship to the opening scenes of Book 20 (a surprising omission), my own study might not have been necessary.

⁵ YCS 20 (1966) 1-57, esp. 48-57. Cf. also "Reunion," 104f.

she often holds up to her cheek, and to rely strongly on intuition. Amory went on to connect these two ways of seeing with the symbolic values of the horn and ivory that appear as the two gates of dreams at 19.562ff. and are mentioned elsewhere in the poem, often associated with the figures of Odysseus and Penelope. Amory's symbolic interpretation can be argued over,⁶ but her distinction between the "Odyssean" and "Penelopean" modes of facing reality seems generally valid. My concern here is not to negate this interesting distinction between what I agree are the main characters' *customary* modes of awareness, but rather to assert that Homer, in his description of their interview in Book 19 and its aftermath in 20, is doing his utmost to show *both* characters in the grip of an unusually powerful unconscious tug toward the full mental union that will not be possible for several books yet, not until their full reunion in Book 23. In order to dramatize this mental agitation at a level below that of full consciousness, Homer portrays Penelope's behavior as more deeply influenced than usual by her unconscious hopes and fears—with a concomitant increase in her apparently "irrational" activity—and portrays Odysseus in a rare moment uniquely engaged in the common human activity—but so uncommon for this master of strategem and conscious intelligence!—of solving problems in his sleep that are too difficult to solve in waking life.⁸

⁶ See A. B. Lord's attack on Amory's "literary" interpretation of symbolism, "Homer as Oral Poet," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 1–46, esp. 34ff., and Amory's strong rejoinder, "Homer as Artist," *CQ* 21 (1971) 1–15.

⁷ Penelope's "irrational" behavior begins in 18.158ff., with the impulse, sent by Athena, to show herself to the Suitors, with the result that she fans their ardor and extracts gifts from them. The whole scene (158–303) was much attacked by Analyst critics. The best treatment of this complicated episode is that of U. Hölscher, "Penelope vor den Freiern," in *Lebende Antike: Symposion für R. Sühnel* (Berlin 1967) 27–33, who demonstrates that the deception of the Suitors is not so much Penelope's express purpose (as some readers have mistakenly thought) as it is the outcome of all the forces at work in the scene. Büchner, *op. cit.* 143–45 also convincingly attributes the intention to deceive the Suitors to Athena not Penelope. A good recent discussion is that of T. Van Nortwick, "Penelope and Nausicaa," *TAPA* 109 (1979) 269–76, esp. 273, n. 16. He improves on the interpretation of Austin, 208–10, who thinks it is Penelope's own purpose (not Athena's) to extract gifts and "raise her esteem in the eyes of her husband and son" (18.161 f.). Since Penelope cannot know her husband is in the room, Austin's reading wanders unconviningly from the text.

⁸ In none of my discussion of Homer's interest in portraying the effects of his characters' unconscious mind upon their conscious thought and their behavior do I mean to suggest that the poet understood this connection in the way that we do today. My assumption is that he understood human nature, and was aware, as all great story-

II

That Odysseus and Penelope have a rare and special rapport is a commonplace of Homeric criticism. But I believe we can enhance our understanding of how Homer conceives this rapport and renders it in narrative terms by focusing on the sequence of interactions that runs from the latter part of Book 19 to the early part of Book 20, from the second and final stage of Penelope's interview with the beggar to the aftermath as seen in the agitated minds of both participants.

In Book 19, after Eurykleia has recognized her master and Penelope has been prevented by Athena from noticing this revelation of the beggar's hidden identity, the queen and her disguised visitor resume their dialogue. They have already had a lengthy discussion (lines 96-348, the first stage of the interview) in which the beggar established his genuine knowledge of Odysseus with such vivid detail that the queen was driven to passionate weeping. Then comes the offer of a footbath, the intervention of Eurykleia, and the long passage on her recognition of the scar and the flashback it triggers to the birth, naming, and first hunting exploit of Odysseus (349-504, an interruption of the interview). Now, with the old nurse having completed her washing of her master's feet and Penelope having been prevented by Athena from noticing the revelation of the beggar's identity,⁹ Odysseus draws his chair closer to the fire and Penelope begins a discussion in which she will unfold her deepest concerns to this stranger who has impressed her so greatly with his tact, his noble background and manner, and his former guest-friendship with her husband (505-604, the second stage of the interview).

tellers are, that people's behavior seems sometimes to spring from sources that are not clearly understood but buried deep and apparently irrational; and that dreams seem to arise from this same mysterious source.

⁹ Any interpretation of these scenes must take into account the brilliant but misguided essay of P. W. Harsh, "Penelope and Odysseus in *Odyssey* XIX," *AJP* 71 (1950) 1-21, whose entire argument is built upon the assumption that Penelope realizes early in the interview who the beggar really is, and therefore their dialogue is full of cryptic references to strategies for dealing with the Suitors. Such an interpretation, while enlivening the interview with some rich *double entendre*, runs up against the insurmountable obstacle of making sense of Penelope's confession of hopelessness at 20.61 ff. (her fervent wish to be dead so she can meet Odysseus under earth!), and in Bk. 23, of her anger at Eurykleia, her total surprise when she learns who the beggar is, and her reluctance to accept him fully as her husband.

It is not only because the queen has been reassured by this stranger's good sense, but also because she feels, on a less conscious level, that he is the closest tie she now has to her husband—let us say he is “the kind of man” her husband was—that she decides to reveal her last night's dream to him and to ask for his interpretation. She dreamed that she had twenty geese, whose sight delighted her as they fed at her trough. Then a large eagle swooped down and killed them all, leaving them piled up in her halls, and flew off (535–40). “Then I wept and lamented, even in my dream, and the fair-haired Achaean women gathered around me as I piteously bewailed the fact that the (my?) eagle killed the (my?) geese” (541–43):

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κλαῖον καὶ ἐκώκυον ἔν περ ὀνείρῳ,
ἀμφὶ δ' ἐμ' ἠγερέθοντο ἐϋπλοκαμίδες Ἀχαιοί,
οἵ κτρ' ὀλοφυρομένην ὃ μοι αἰετὸς ἔκτανε χῆνας.¹⁰

There is some ambiguity as to how to construe μοι in line 543.¹¹ If a dative of possession (cf. χῆνές μοι, 536), position requires “my eagle” rather than “my geese.” An ethical dative or dative of (dis)advantage is more likely, hard to capture in English but close to “he did that to me, killed the geese”—but there is no way to avoid the subtle suggestion conveyed by the phrase-unit ὃ μοι αἰετός, placed immediately after the caesura, of the underlying or secondary sense “(that) my eagle.” This latent meaning is strengthened by the lines immediately following, 544–50: the eagle returns, sits on a jutting roof-beam, and speaks to Penelope identifying himself as “formerly the (your?) eagle but now your husband returned.” The τοι of the phrase ἐγὼ δέ τοι αἰετὸς ὄρνις, 548, can be heard subtly (if secondarily) as a personal pronoun, whose force is repeated more emphatically in the τέος of 549:

ἄψ δ' ἐλθὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔζετ' ἐπὶ προὔχοντι μελάρῳ,
φωνῇ δὲ βροτῇ κατερήτυε φώνησέν τε' 545
'θάρσει, Ἰκαρίου κούρη τηλεκλειτοῖο·
οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὃ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται.
χῆνες μὲν μνηστῆρες, ἐγὼ δέ τοι αἰετὸς ὄρνις
ἦα πάρος, νῦν αὖτε τέος πόσις εἰλήλουθα,
ὃς πᾶσι μνηστῆρσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφήσω.' 550

Thus is it revealed that the geese were the Suitors and Penelope's eagle-husband will give them all an “unseemly doom.” The dream

¹⁰ All quotations of the *Odyssey* are from T. W. Allen's Oxford Classical Text.

¹¹ Austin, 122–23, noted this ambiguity but did not expatiate on its possible meanings.

ends, sweet sleep releases Penelope, and she looks around the halls and sees the geese still eating at their accustomed trough (551–53):

ὥς ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ μελιηδῆς ὕπνος ἀνῆκε·
παπτήνασα δὲ χῆνας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι νόησα
πυρὸν ἔρεπτομένους παρὰ πύελον, ἦχι πάρος περ.

Penelope's grief was so emphatically presented (κλαῖον, ἐκώκυον, ὀλοφυρομένην) that we may fairly infer that her unconscious mind is considerably less hostile to the Suitors than her often voiced conscious attitude. On a level that she cannot acknowledge, she enjoys (λαίνομαι, 537) being courted, and thereby renowned throughout Greece for her loyalty and cleverness (for her *kleos* cf. l.125f., 19.108).¹² The description of her release from sleep suggests the relief one feels upon realizing that the upsetting events of a dream did not really happen. The verb παπτήνασα suggests cautious or tentative surveying of a scene that may not be safe or welcome; and the full detail of line 553 is used to convey the reassurance Penelope finds in the fact that her geese still continue their familiar eating, and in the accustomed location.

Because there is some ambivalence in Penelope's complex state of mind, her answer, when the stranger points out how obvious the dream's meaning is ("Odysseus himself has shown the outcome: all the Suitors will meet their death," 556–58), is far from straightforward. Her defenses are strong and she has no intention of abandoning them prematurely. She therefore creates an elaborate picture, almost an allegory, of the nature of dreams, the famous description of the gates of horn and of ivory through which all dreams must pass; and she concludes with the assertion that her dream must have been of the deceptive kind that belong to the ivory gate. The exact value of horn and ivory as symbols remains difficult to gauge, but more important is the contextual significance of this picture: Penelope spins out this description in order to discredit her dream's apparently incontestable validity. Its meaning has been confirmed both by the Odysseus in the dream and the increasingly authoritative stranger outside of the dream, the old

¹² Penelope's weeping in her dream as evidence for some unconscious liking for the Suitors was first pointed out, as far as I can determine, by G. Devereux, "Penelope's Character," *Psycho-analytic Quarterly* 26 (1957) 378–86, where he properly rejects Dodds' misinterpretation of the grief as "inversion of affect" (Dodds, op. cit. 123, n. 21). Devereux's own view of Penelope is marred by eccentric interpretations, but on this one issue he was right, and often unacknowledged or unnoticed by others who later came to the same conclusion (e.g. Van Nortwick, n. 7, Rankin, n. 15).

friend of Odysseus. Against such a combination of authorities there is little ground for refusing to believe, so that Penelope is forced to elaborate what looks like a novel aetiology of dreams, drawing no doubt on old folk-belief and perhaps on her own ingenuity.¹³ Why is Penelope so strongly committed to refusal of the dream's message? Should not this news of Odysseus' imminent return be the most welcome news she could possibly have, his return the event she has been anticipating hopefully for almost twenty years? In fact, at line 569 she explicitly states that such a meaning as the stranger has given to her dream would be "indeed welcome to me and to my son": ἤ κ' ἄσπαστόν ἐμοὶ καὶ παιδὶ γένοιτο.

It is clear that the queen is afraid of the emotional vulnerability that would ensue if she gave an open welcome to what must be very good news. The small pleasure she takes in the attentions of the "geese" pales before the intensity of the very idea of her husband's return. The dream's message is so much what she wants that she fears to let herself go and believe it, as long as there remains the slightest risk that she might be wrong. Therefore Penelope will continue to maintain her "official" view, that her husband is probably dead and not likely to be about to return. Yet she cannot help being influenced by the stranger's confident insistence that Odysseus will soon be back; and that is why she decides, finally, after years of delay and evasion, to face up to the unpleasant choice that she has so skillfully put off until now. She tells the stranger that she is intending to stake the issue of her re-marriage to one of the Suitors on the outcome of the bow contest that she will propose for tomorrow. What this means is that she knows she has used up her tricks and excuses, that the Suitors have seen through them and grown more irritable and impatient, and they have now even grown dangerous enough to have attempted the assassination of Telemachus. Surely it is time to abandon the old strategies and take a risk that may pay off. Since Penelope is a woman of strong intuitions, as Amory and Austin have nicely shown us,¹⁴ she now

¹³ Bk. 4.809 shows that "gates of dreams" were part of standard archaic belief. But the elaboration of the gates into a set of opposites seems composed especially for this moment in Bk. 19. Amory, "Gates," and E. L. Highbarger, *The Gates of Dreams: An Archaeological Examination of Vergil, Aeneid VI.893-99* (Baltimore 1940) shed little light on cultural or historical traditions that could have led to the choice of the substances horn and ivory and their opposition.

¹⁴ Amory, "Reunion," 104f., "Gates," 55f.; Austin, 206-38. It is amazing to note, with Austin (278f., nn. 27, 28) how many good scholars have fallen into the mistake of judging Penelope's decision to hold the bow-contest badly motivated and a faulty piece of storytelling.

decides to take a certain leap into the unknown, because she "feels" the time has come. Perhaps Odysseus will arrive in time, or no one of the Suitors will be able to string the bow and match Odysseus' famous shot.

From this description of Penelope's thoughts and feelings, it is obvious that she must be seen from this point on as a character in a highly wrought state of expectancy. The game she has been playing with the Suitors has ceased being a game, the next day may force her to marry one of these unwanted guests, and yet she has been hearing prophecies of Odysseus' imminent return from both Theoklymenos (17.151-61) and from the beggar-turned-friend this evening. She has even begun to imagine this return symbolically in her dreams. Now, after having reached a surprising state of intimacy and trust with this newcomer, she disengages herself from him reluctantly and goes to bed, to dream again about her husband, as we learn in Book 20.

III

In the opening scenes of Book 20 we are shown how Penelope and the stranger, having formed a strong bond and having discussed and planned the critical stratagem governing Penelope's re-marriage, have so excited one another that they cannot control their seething emotions, both conscious and unconscious. The sheer amount and intensity of mental activity depicted in this section of the *Odyssey* is unique in the Homeric poems. It is therefore surprising that although Homerists have made much of the involved emotional or "affective" patterns that run through Book 19, they have failed to emphasize that Book 20 continues the description of the rich flow of psychic energy that was released by the *homophrosynē* of beggar and queen in the latter half of their interview.¹⁵

¹⁵ Austin, who is attentive to the close harmony of mental "rhythms" in the eighteenth and nineteenth books, refers to the opening of 20 in a surprisingly cursory manner and makes no mention of Penelope's second dream or Odysseus' vision (235). A. H. Rankin's "Penelope's Dreams in Books XIX and XX of the *Odyssey*," *Helikon* 2 (1962) 617-24, is largely an interpretation of the dream in 19, with little to offer about the dream in 20 except the odd notion that Amphinomos resembles the young Odysseus of memory and may therefore be the object of Penelope's partly submerged wish to re-marry! J. H. Finley, Jr., *Homer's Odyssey* (Cambridge, Mass. 1978) 16-19, 26f., is aware that Penelope's two dreams are connected and part of Homer's larger design, but he does not develop their connection in any detail and does not include Odysseus' own psychic activity (his vision at 20.92ff.) as part of the whole design. Amory, "Reunion" 107f., while brief, is perceptive on the importance of Odysseus' vision.

We find Odysseus at the opening of Book 20 unable to sleep, anxious and so agitated is he by the complex situation that he has been instrumental in creating. Specifically, Homer says, Odysseus is kept awake anxiously pondering (*mermērizōn*) the problem of how possibly to defeat the Suitors, being only one against so many.¹⁶ He sees some servant woman go past, those who have been disloyal and are sleeping with the Suitors. He suppresses with difficulty the impulse to spring up and kill them on the spot, and this effort of self control is so taxing for the renowned master of endurance that the strain makes his heart bark like a dog. He quiets his surging heart with a little speech, but cannot begin himself to calm down. Finally Athena appears to comfort and reassure him that she will stand by him tomorrow, and she pours sweet sleep over his eyelids.

As Odysseus goes to sleep, Penelope is waking up. It is important to note that there is a striking complementarity in their physiological and psychological rhythms. As he finally relaxes into sleep, she awakens to lamentation, *klaiousa*. She reveals the degree of her upset in a long prayer to Artemis, wishing that the goddess might relieve her of this misery by shooting her with her arrows, or that a storm wind might snatch her to oblivion. But at the end of the prayer we learn the important fact that while Penelope slept she had been dreaming that Odysseus slept at her side. But not exactly Odysseus. To be precise, it was the *likeness* of Odysseus that she dreamed of: the phrase is *eikelos autōi*.

τῆδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἵκελος αὐτῷ,
τοῖος ἔων οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῷ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἦδη.

On this very night there slept at my side the likeness of him,
looking just as he did when he went off with the army; and my heart
rejoiced, since I thought it was not a dream but already a vision of what
is true.

(20.88-90)

More than one detail of this passage recalls the language of the preceding book. The salient verbal echo is *ouk onar all' hypar* (20.90 ~ 19.547), recalling Penelope's first dream with the same claim that a dream was so vivid and its message so important that it seemed not "a

¹⁶ For an analysis of this scene, emphasizing its rare recombination of components normally found in simpler type-scenes of pondering and decision, see J. Russo, "Homer Against his Tradition," *Arion* 7 (1968) 275-95, reprinted in German in J. Latacz, ed., *Homer: Tradition und Neuerung* (Darmstadt 1979).

(mere) dream" but a "vision of truth" (the nearest I can come to translating the elusive contrast of the Greek). Each true vision is the return of Odysseus, so that Penelope's wish-fulfillment dreams are strongly consistent. But there is a more subtle carry-over from Book 19 in her description here in 20 of *who* slept at her side. Not literally Odysseus, but "one who looked like him," or "his likeness," however we prefer to render *eikelos autōi*. This phrase is further glossed with "just the way he looked when he went off with the army," which refers to the Odysseus of twenty years ago. Now the image of an Odysseus of twenty years ago was offered recently in the preceding book when the beggar established his credibility by giving Penelope an exact picture of the Odysseus he supposedly entertained as *xeinos* on Crete. The guest's very garments and ornamental brooch were described so accurately (19.220–48) that the vividness of the picture reduced Penelope to tears for the second time in that interview. Homer's word for describing what the beggar-Odysseus was doing in fabricating this speech was *iske*:

ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα (19.203)

which I translate as, "he made a likeness, speaking many falsehoods that resembled truth." *Iske* has been a disputed word,¹⁷ but is now agreed to be from the same root as the adjective *eikelos* just mentioned. In other words, the *eikelos autōi* of 20.88, the person who resembles Odysseus in Penelope's new dream in Book 20, is the person evoked by Odysseus in his fabrication, signalled by the word *iske*, in Book 19. Penelope's dream-content has been taken directly from the imagery suggested to her by the disguised Odysseus shortly before she went to sleep.¹⁸

¹⁷ The V scholia to 19.203 begin τινες βούλονται τὸ ἔλεγε σημαίνειν. ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ ἥϊσκε, τὸ εἵκαζεν, ὡμοίου, but go on to interpret the line as πολλὰ ψευδῆ λέγων εἵκαζεν. The false equation with ἔλεγε almost certainly arose from a misunderstanding of *Od.* 22.31, ἴσκειν ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ, "each man conjectured," where ἴσκειν was taken to equal ὡς φάτο because it follows and describes a speech. All other Homeric uses of ἴσκω (*Il.* 11.799, 16.41; *Od.* 4.279) support the assumption that it is a variant of ἔϊσκω and means primarily "to liken one thing to another," secondarily "to conjecture." The use of ἔϊσκεῖς at *Od.* 4.148 to refer back to ἔοικε at 143 shows the secondary meaning emerging from the primary one. ἴσκω is from *Γικ-σκω as ἔϊσκω is from *Γε-Γικ-σκω, with the same (Γ)ικ- as in ἵκελος. The apparently similar doublets εἵκελος/ἵκελος represent a different phenomenon, the *eI*- resulting either from metrical lengthening or analogy to the verb εἵκω ("yield") according to P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque*, II (Paris 1970) s.v. ἔοικα.

¹⁸ It is common knowledge in psychiatry that dream-contents come from what is technically called the "day's residues," which are connected to the unconscious wish that

Another way of understanding the suggestive use of the phrase *eikelos autōi* is that it may refer, in a manner still more subtle, to the disguised Odysseus, the vagabond figure, who we are told in very clear terms resembles Odysseus. Although we are never told, explicitly, that Penelope sees in him a likeness to her husband, the point emerges easily from her comment that her husband, if alive, was probably now grown *like* (*toiosde*) this man in hands and feet, since all men age similarly in adversity, followed immediately by Eurykleia's comment that this stranger looks more like Odysseus than any of the other wanderers who have passed through before. Penelope remained present for the exchange between the stranger and Eurykleia, and she would have heard the stranger's answer:

ὦ γρη῏ οὕτω φασὶν ὅσοι ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
 ἡμέας ἀμφοτέρους, μάλα εἰκέλω ἀλλήλοισιν
 ἔμμεναι, ὥς σύ περ αὐτῇ ἐπιφρονέουσ' ἀγορεύεις.

"Old woman, this is what people say who have seen the two of us
 with their own eyes, that we are very alike one another,
 just as you yourself noticed and told me.

(19.383-85)

The word "alike" at 19.384 is the same *eikelos* singled out for emphasis at 20.88. It would not be unreasonable to interpret the final scene of Book 19, with Penelope's speech about how nice it would be to spend the night sitting together in conversation, in the light of this much-noted resemblance. It is clear that Penelope has grown more and more attracted to this stranger. She feels a certain satisfaction in his company. One good reason for this—besides his flattery and his guest-host relationship to her husband—is simply that the man *looks* like her husband. And so in analyzing the dream that Penelope recounts in Book 20, we may say that the *eikelos autōi* figure in the dream is not only the original, young Odysseus that she seems to intend, but simultaneously (as dreams will often collapse two or more layers of meaning into one image) he is the stranger who has so captured her fancy.

At this point in the story the anxiously awaited dawn finally comes. Odysseus becomes aware of Penelope's lamentation in prayer to Artemis. The passage is remarkable, both for what it says and for what it implies:

is fulfilled in the dream. See e.g., J. Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, tr. D. Nicholson-Smith (New York 1973) 96.

τῆς δ' ἄρα κλαιούσης ὅπα σύνθετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς·
 μερμήριζε δ' ἔπειτα, δόκησε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμόν
 ἤδη γινώσκουσα παρεστάμεναι κεφαλῇφι.
 χλαῖναν μὲν συνελών καὶ κώεα, τοῖσιν ἐνεῦδεν,
 ἐς μέγαρον κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ θρόνου, ἐκ δὲ βοεῖην
 θῆκε θύραζε φέρων, Διὶ δ' εὖξατο χεῖρας ἀνασχών.

Brilliant Odysseus heard her voice as she lamented.
 He pondered, and she seemed to him in his spirit
 as if she was already recognizing him and standing at his head.
 He took up the mantle and the fleeces in which he slept,
 set them down in the hall on a chair, carried the ox-hide
 outdoors, set it down, and raised his hands to Zeus and prayed.
 (20.92–97)

We have here a very interesting psychological observation on Homer's part. What process going on inside Odysseus' head is Homer describing when he says that Penelope "seemed to him in his *thymos* to be recognizing him already and standing by his head"? The epic poet lacks the equivalent of a modern sophisticated vocabulary for abstract conceptualization and for certain mental activities only recently categorized by modern behavioral science. He cannot, for example, say that someone "fantasizes," using a single precise term, but he has no trouble accurately describing the young Telemachus in Book 1.114–16 absorbed in fantasies of his father's return: "He sat among the Suitors, distressed in his heart, seeing in his mind his good father, if he might come some day and scatter the Suitors": the key phrase is ὁσοόμενος πατέρ' ἐσθλὸν ἐνὶ φρεσίν (1.115) and "fantasizing" is a fair translation. Here in Book 20 in the description of Odysseus' waking fantasy, we have a very similar circumlocution. Odysseus, just waking up, hears his wife's voice, *opa syntheto*, ponders on it, *mermērizo*, and has the impression or illusion, *dokēse de hoi kata thymon*, that she is standing at his head recognizing him. The fantasy is like a wish-fulfillment dream in that it envisions a situation at present unobtainable, but possible once the obstructing Suitors have been eliminated and Penelope is finally to be allowed to know her husband. Since this is only a fantasy, the phrase *dokēse de hoi*, "she seemed to him," is inadequate in itself and must be qualified—uniquely for Homeric diction—by the addition of *kata thymon*, which performs the same explanatory function as *enī phresin* in 1.115, cited above. The whole phrase might be translated freely but fairly as "she seemed in his imagination."

Homer is describing a level of thinking that is no longer dream-thought but not yet fully conscious thought; it is somewhere in between. There exists no terminology yet in early Greek to describe this phenomenon in any scientific way, although Aristotle makes a good start when he speaks of the images that appear to a sleeper (τὰ φαινόμενα εἶδωλα καθεύδοντι) in a context that shows that they appear to us both when we are falling into sleep and awakening from sleep (ὁ πάσχομεν καταφερόμενοί τε καὶ ἐγειρόμενοι, *de Somno et Vigilia*, 462a 10–11). Psychologists today identify the same two states of partial consciousness, one that passes from sleep into wakefulness and one that is the reverse, calling the first *hypnopompic* (“sending from sleep”) and the second *hypnogogic* (“leading into sleep”). Vivid imagery is characteristic of both states, imagery of a free-floating kind, not structured in a narrative sequence as are dream images. Imagery is about twice as common when falling into sleep (hypnogogic) as when coming out of sleep (hypnopompic),¹⁹ as we may realize from personal experience. A modern authority describes these two kinds of imagery as follows (note how well the description fits Odysseus’ situation in Book 20):

Both hypnogogic and hypnopompic images are notably autonomous, in the sense that they occur suddenly and are not under voluntary control. Very often they are vivid and realistic, although their content may be bizarre. Hypnogogic images can occur in any sense modality, but auditory and visual images are the most common . . . hypnopompic images often have reference to the subject’s anticipations about his forthcoming day. So it is not surprising that they are often interpreted as examples of *precognition* by those who are interested in ESP, or as *premonitions* by the superstitious.²⁰

This description suits our Homeric passage admirably: the vividness, the combination of the auditory and the visual (actually the external stimulus is auditory and physically real, and it provokes the internal visual image), the anticipation of what Odysseus intensely longs for on the forthcoming day—that Penelope will recognize him—all are there. I also think that Homer means us to take it as a premonition of what is to come, as those whom our psychologist calls “the superstitious” would take it. All ancient peoples are superstitious, by our sometimes narrow modern standards.

¹⁹ Graham Reed, *The Psychology of Anomalous Experience* (Boston 1974) 37.

²⁰ Ibid. 37, 39.

After his hypnopompic imaging, Odysseus is described as fully awake and performs the tasks of rolling up his bedding and going outdoors. But in taking time to describe a mental state that reveals active unconscious processes at work, Homer has given us a picture consistent with what he was showing us in the preceding description in this book and in Book 19. He wants us to understand that Odysseus and Penelope are reacting to the growing momentum of the plot, to the growing sense of impending crisis and possible resolution of the problem of the Suitors' courtship and Odysseus' absence. The hints, signs, and clues of a final climax have been more and more frequent. Signs, like the chance verbal sign that reveals a deeper, wished-for truth, called a *klēdōn* or *phēmē* in Homeric Greek, the good omen of Telemachus' sneeze in Book 17, and the omen called a *teras* represented by the flash of lightning that Zeus grants to Odysseus early in Book 20, have been piling up. Besides these various signs, we have had outright prediction of Odysseus' return by the disguised beggar, by the professional prophet Theoklymenos in Book 17 when he first meets Penelope, and by him later in 20 when he foretells the Suitors' doom directly to them. In addition, we have had two important revelations of Odysseus' identity, first to Telemachus in Book 16, then to Eurykleia in 19; and so the scene is filled increasingly with more people who know or have had some hint of the truth. In this setting of growing revelation and mounting supernatural signals, Homer has created a context within which Penelope's yearning for some end to her impasse receives more support and is nearer to fulfillment than ever before. She has no clear knowledge, but she is caught up in a swelling current of intuitions, intimations, and half-believed hopes. It is the force of that current that led her to decide suddenly on the test of the bow.

IV

Let me summarize and conclude my argument. As the master story-teller moves through the end of Book 19 and into the early scenes of 20, approaching the triple climax of the stringing of the bow, the slaughter of the Suitors, and the reunion with Penelope, he intensifies his efforts to reveal the growing excitement inside each main character through a rather sophisticated integration into the narrative of mental activity that belongs to the lower levels of consciousness. The poet pays unusual attention to what the characters reveal of themselves through mental activity other than the purely rational and voluntary.

This means, essentially, through intuition and the process called fantasy, which manifests itself here specifically in two modes, in dreams and in hypnopompic imagery.

Intuition is what leads Penelope to decide, rather suddenly, to trust this beggar implicitly. He may well remind her, unconsciously, of her husband. She also decides, by intuition and seemingly abruptly—in fact her lack of patent motivation has bothered critics for centuries—to make tomorrow the day of the win-all, lose-all gamble with the bow.

The two *dreams* reveal Penelope's strongest unconscious wish, the return of her husband. And these dreams of Odysseus returning are stimulated, I would claim, by her strong intuitive feeling that the stranger is absolutely right in predicting Odysseus' return, or perhaps that he brings with him such a strong "aura" of Odysseus that he has the power to make Odysseus somehow appear. Certainly the image or likeness of Odysseus has been much in evidence lately, and the stranger is closely associated with the creation of that imagery.

The *hypnopompic imagery* is wonderfully used by the poet to give Odysseus a fantasy that corresponds perfectly to Penelope's. Her fantasy, in the dream mode, is that he is with her; and his fantasy, in the hypnopompic mode, is that she is with him. This series of lively unconscious mental activities is portrayed as taking place at evening, during the night, and towards dawn, times when the unconscious is most free to expand and express itself. In this manner the poet is able to show in rare detail how the long separated husband and wife are attuned to one another's presence long before they can share a full and conscious enjoyment of this presence. They "know" and express much more on sub-conscious levels than they can process consciously and state explicitly. It is because Homer has understood and described so much, that is so subtle, so well, enhancing and refining an ancient and familiar story, that he is ranked as our first great poet.²¹

JOSEPH RUSSO

HAVERFORD COLLEGE

²¹ This paper first came into being as the Procope S. Costas Memorial Lecture given at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York on May 14, 1979. I am grateful to my colleagues at Brooklyn College for giving me the opportunity to begin this investigation, and for their warm hospitality on that occasion.

ACHILLES ON THE ISLANDS OF THE BLESSED

PINDAR VS. HOMER AND HESIOD

More than one reader of Pindar may have been surprised at the company and the place in which Achilles appears in the Second Olympian Ode. The passage to which I refer (vv. 79f.) concludes the description of what Pindar calls τὸ μέλλον (v. 56), the fate to be expected after death (vv. 57–80). The section as a whole has been the subject of many scholarly discussions¹ and the only reason why we briefly stop for a comment is to emphasize its “syncretistic” character. It has not gone entirely unnoticed yet I do not recall finding anywhere a clear-cut distinction between three basically unrelated beliefs which are here brought together: 1) the judgment in the Underworld by which “someone” (τίς, v. 59) separates the ἑσθαλοί destined for an existence free of toil and trouble from the sinners who are to endure unspeakable pain (vv. 58–67), 2) three successive incarnations (vv. 68f.),² 3) the blissful condition awaiting those who have lived three stainless lives, on the Islands of the Blessed where Kronos and Rhadamanthys rule (vv. 68–80). It seems rather astonishing that in an Ode composed for Theron of Acragas, reincarnation is treated far more briefly than the two other beliefs (the two line-clause seems almost limited to the function of separating one delightful condition from another painted with even brighter colors). And yet Sicily and Magna Graecia are the areas where this belief enjoyed a particular vogue³ and it is from Acragas that we receive a report of migration from body to body, which is not

The substance of this paper was read on April 8, 1981 in Urbana, Illinois as a part of a celebration of Alexander Turyn's 80th birthday. It is in sadness that I dedicate its present form to his memory.

¹ See esp. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 248 ff.; E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Engl. tr. by W. B. Hillis, New York 1905) 414 ff.; L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar*, vol. 2 (London 1930) ad loc.; Erich Thummer, *Die Religiosität Pindars* (Innsbruck 1957) 120 ff. Gordon Kirkwood's commentary on Pindar (prepared for the American Philological Association) has been available to me through the author's kindness before publication and has proved very helpful.

² Cf. K. von Fritz, *Phronesis* 3 (1957) 85 ff.

³ See esp. Walter Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft, Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Plato* (Nürnberg 1962) 177 ff; also Guthrie *HGPh* 1.4, 172 and pass. 2.130f.

only the first but first-hand since its author professes to record his own experience.⁴

The Islands of the Blessed which now receive individuals of persistently blameless conduct had previously been reserved to some very few heroic personalities:

Πηλεὺς τε καὶ Κάδμος ἐν τοῖσιν ἀλέγονται
 Ἀχιλλέα τ' ἔνειακ', ἐπεὶ Ζηνὸς ἦτορ
 λιταῖς ἔπεισε, μάτηρ.

The reasons why Peleus and Kadmos are there (vv.78–80) are not hard to discover. Peleus is the husband of Thetis, the Nereid whom Zeus and Posidon had wooed, as Pindar himself recounts in *I.* 8 (26a–47) and Kadmos is the father of Semele who enjoyed the love of the supreme god and gave birth to another great god.⁵ Achilles' presence could not so readily be assumed. Pindar evidently sees the need for an explanation and we may regard it as highly probable that he himself has devised this explanation and presents it to his audience as something new.⁶ He must have expected it to be convincing, since otherwise it could not have replaced the authoritative version of Achilles' fate after death. In the Homeric "Nekyia" when Odysseus encounters Achilles' shade in the Underworld and compliments him on the pre-eminent status which he enjoyed among the living and presumably continues to have after death, he receives a most discouraging answer: Achilles would prefer to be alive as a day-laborer employed by a poor peasant than to rule as king over all of the shades (*Od.* 11, 477 ff., esp. 482–91). To visualize the ἀριστος Ἀχάϊων in such gloomy surroundings and in such an unhappy state of mind must have been very distressing. A more pleasant alternative would be welcomed, but to prevail against the tremendous authority of Homer a mere assertion would not suffice. Pindar has made the new version acceptable by resorting to a motif—and a motivation—which in addition to its intrinsic attraction gained force by a Homeric precedent. Thetis' capacity to sway the heart of

⁴ See Empedocles B 115, 117 (cf. 136 f., 146 f.) Diels-Kranz. Note Wilamowitz's reference for Pindar, *Ol.* 2 to Empedocles (op. cit 251 f.) and for Empedocles' *Katharmoi* to Pindar *Ol.* 2 (*SBBA* 1929, 660).

⁵ Cf. *Od.* 4.561–69: Menelaos as a son-in-law of Zeus will go to Elysium at the shores of the Ocean where "fair-haired Rhadamanthys" is and where life is "easiest" and full of delight.

⁶ Plato, *Symp.* 179c may be influenced by Pindar, although details have been changed to fit the erotic argument. The cult of Achilles on an island in the Black Sea (Paus. 3.19.11) is an entirely different subject.

Zeus by her λιπαί was proved in the First Book of the *Iliad* (vv. 493-530). If her pleadings succeeded in securing for Achilles his τιμή among the living she would be able to win him also a place of honor among the dead.⁷

If Homer could help against Homer, we must yet not fail to consider Pindar's reaction to the other great epic authority, his Boeotian countryman Hesiod, whose poems he seems to have known by heart. Admittedly, the *Works and Days* which was not composed for the aristocracy, means less to him than the *Theogony*,⁸ and it is in the former that Hesiod presents the story of the five races or (more accurately) generations and indicates what has become of the *heroes*, or *hemitheoi*, who form the fourth generation (vv. 156-73). Unfortunately Hesiod's opinion is a problem for us and may even not have been entirely clear or certain in Pindar's days.

It will be necessary to quote the entire passage and for reasons which will presently become apparent I use Wilamowitz's text of 1928 (with which West's of 1978 agrees in everything that matters for our purpose):⁹

Zeus creates a γένος which is δικαιοτέρον καὶ ἄρειον.

v. 159 ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῶν γένος, οἳ καλέονται
 ἡμίθεοι, προτέρη γενεῇ κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.
 καὶ τοὺς μὲν πόλεμός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνὴ
 τοὺς μὲν ὕφ' ἑπταπύλῳ Θήβῃ, Καδμηίδι γαίῃ

⁷ Rather surprisingly the designation τίμιοι θεῶν ("honored by the gods") is used vv. 65f. of those who after one blameless life are rewarded by a very pleasant kind of existence which yet falls short of the ultimate bliss. There may after all be some validity to Wilamowitz's impression (op. cit. 250) that "der Unterschied kommt doch nicht voll heraus" (scil. between the two conditions of bliss). I have argued (*Hermes* 96 [1968] 503ff.) that in the earlier account negative statements dominate (no tears, no toil on land or sea for one's livelihood). Also the connotations of μακάρων νῆσος should make enough difference.

⁸ An adequate substantiation of these statements would require a separate article (the last study of the subject appeared a hundred years ago: E. Lubbert, *De Pindari studiis Hesiodicis et Homericis* [Diss., Bonn 1881]. The Pindar scholia (see the "Index" s.v. Ἠσίοδος in A. B. Drachmann's edition, vol. 3, p. 315) refer to surprisingly many passages in the *Op.* but usually as parallels, not as a presumptive source. However *I.* 6.67 does quote *Op.* 412.

⁹ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hesiodos Erga* (Berlin 1928); M. L. West, Hesiod's *Works and Days* edited with *Prolegomena and Commentary* (Oxford 1978). Like Wilamowitz, Nilsson and others I do not regard the "Days" as authentic; see *TAPA* 94 (1963) 293ff. and *Gnomon* 52 (1980) 211. V. 169, an unHesiodic line now generally discarded owed its presence to a mistake of early modern editors.

P2600

- ᾠλεσε μαρναμένους μῆλων ἔνεκ' Οἰδιπόδασ,
 τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐν νήεσσιν ὑπὲρ μέγα λαῖτμα θαλάσσης
 165 ἐς Τροίην ἀγαγὼν Ἑλένης ἔνεκ' ἠυκόμοιο.
 ἔνθ' ἦ τοι τοὺς μὲν θανάτου τέλος ἀμφεκάλυψεν,
 τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίον καὶ ἥθε' ὀπάσσας
 168 Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐν πείρασι γαίης,
 170 καὶ τοὶ μὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
 ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι παρ' Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδίνην·
 ὄλβιοι ἥρωες, τοῖσιν μελιδέα καρπὸν
 τρις ἔτεος θάλλοντα φέρει ζεῖδωρος ἄρουρα.

The crucial question is which heroes are getting to the Islands of the Blessed? or to put it in strictly philological terms, how are we to understand the significance of τοὺς μὲν—τοῖς δὲ in vv. 166/7? Wilamowitz in the commentary of his edition (ad v. 168) decided peremptorily that, "alle Heroen auf die Inseln der Seligen kommen, natürlich, denn sie erfahren jetzt alle Heroenkult," even if not all of them in Boeotia. West refuses to be so generous. Hesiod, he thinks, cannot have the whole race in mind, for "epic is constantly telling us that they went to Hades"¹⁰(by "epic" he must mean the Homeric epics). Finally Walter Burkert in his monumental *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche*¹¹ declares that in Hesiod the heroes who have been killed around Troy and at Thebes are given a life on the Islands of the Blessed. Evidently the text allows not only different but even contradictory interpretations.

It is fortunately not necessary to review all arguments for and against the positions taken by these scholars. Two items however call for clarification: To die or to be killed (and go to Hades which is after all only an epic formula for dying) does not stand in the way of an august fate. Rather, as a glance at the account of the golden and silver generation shows, death is the prior condition for an elevated status.¹² Moreover inferences from Homer to Hesiod are precarious, if only because the idea of a *psyche* departing at death seems to be alien to Hesiod. Regarding the cult of heroes, Wilamowitz's view simplifies matters unduly. This cult has diverse roots and even if, under the influence of Homer, all or most of his heroes received cult, this devel-

¹⁰ Op.cit (n. 9 above) ad v. 166; see also his comments on v. 167.

¹¹ Stuttgart, Berlin, etc., 1977, p. 306.

¹² See vv. 121–26, 140–42. Only for the hopelessly wicked third generation death is the end and as νόνημοι they enjoy no τιμή (vv. 154f.; contrast v. 142).

opment can hardly yet have been completed when Hesiod composed his poems.¹³

Some recent changes in the textual basis of our section help us toward recovering Hesiod's meaning. Within the last twenty years two papyri have come to light which contain this portion of the text without v. 166.¹⁴ Another *subsidiū* which Wilamowitz lacked and which has in the meantime been supplied is a respectable edition of the scholia to the *Works and Days*. Thanks to the careful investigations of Augusto Pertusi we can see that v. 166 did not exist for scholia that are sure to be ancient.¹⁵ Most probably the line was in some ancient texts—including those to which our mss. go back—but not in all. In cases of this kind the chances are far better that the line was interpolated than that it was omitted. Nor is it difficult to diagnose the nature and motive of this interpolation. It is one of the rather numerous explanatory lines composed by early rhapsodes to assure the right understanding of their audience.¹⁶ For we need not doubt that the problem which heroes are meant to go to the Islands of the Blessed troubled early audiences no less than it does modern classicists. For them the problem was made acute by the opposition of τοὺς μὲν (v. 161) where the predicate is ὤλεσε, (v. 163) and τοῖς δὲ (v. 167), and it stands to reason that a further τοὺς μὲν—τοὺς δὲ (vv. 162, 164) construction was apt to increase the confusion or uncertainty. Yet clarity was badly needed; what for us is a problem of philological interpretation was for them a subject of belief on which they expected assurance from the poets as their principal teachers. Thus it is not astonishing if we find textual variations that go back to elaborations and explanations in the

¹³ See Burkert, *op. cit.* (note 11 above), 312ff. for whom the epic heroes are important objects of this cult, but not the only ones. In B. C. Dietrich, *The Origins of Greek Religion* (Berlin-New York 1974) 191ff. Mycenaean civilization itself, rather than its reflection in the epics is the basis of hero cult. Nilsson, *GGR* 1.170ff. allows various origins, leaving little or nothing for the epic. For an admirable orientation about the question see Charles Fuqua, *Traditio* 36 (1980) 3ff.

¹⁴ Π38 (Berol. 21107) and Π40 (Strasburg 2684) published in 1967 and 1969 respectively. Both belong to the early imperial age. Cf. West, *op. cit.* (note 9 above) 76f.

¹⁵ See Augustinus Pertusi, *Scholia Vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies* (Milan 1955) 66, where it appears that the ancient commentators including Proclus did not know v. 166.

¹⁶ I discuss this type of "explanatory" interpolation in a paper: "The earliest stages in the history of Hesiod's text" (forthcoming in *HSCP*). Some would be considered erroneous today, others are barely relevant but may have served their purpose with the audience.



passages specifying the status after death of several generations.¹⁷ There must have been many more; for we have no right to think that every improvisation of every rhapsode has reached us in mss., papyri or quotations. In the passage which engages our attention someone—presumably a rhapsode—solved the problem by limiting the heroes on the Islands to those not killed in the wars. He may have satisfied some audiences and some readers but he need not satisfy us.

In fact as soon as we remove the well-meant explanatory addition we are free to discover behind the somewhat confusing surface a rather simple thought which is supported by Hesiod's analogous treatment of the two first generations.¹⁸ Ignoring the relatively few who survived the wars as well as those who did not participate in either, Hesiod speaks of some heroes as meeting their death at Thebes, of others as meeting theirs at Troy and in the end makes Zeus settle all of them on the happy islands. Any other decision would violate the demands of justice.

On Pindar's reaction to Hesiod we do not reach so confident an opinion. If the text which he knew included v. 166 Homer and Hesiod were for him at one in allowing Achilles no privileged position after his death, hence the need for a special divine action to secure him what he deserved. If v. 166 was unknown to Pindar and if he understood Hesiod as admitting all heroes to the Island we are driven to the conclusion that he ignored Hesiod on this occasion, preferring to limit the original inhabitants of the Islands to a very few and to deal with Achilles on an exclusively Homeric basis and with the help of Homeric motifs.¹⁹

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

¹⁷ A glance at the variation in the text of vv. 122f. and at the interpolations of vv. 124f., 173a-e and (I should think also) 148f. shows to how much speculation the description of the four generations and especially their fate after death gave rise. In vv. 122f. West may be right in preferring the simpler version of the mss., though I do not believe that Plato himself is responsible for the decorations which the passage has acquired in his quotations.

¹⁸ The μέν of v. 161 which is preceded by καί and a demonstrative pronoun would, like that of v. 170, be in the category of "emphatic" or "assertory" employment of the particle (see J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles*, 2nd ed., [Oxford 1966] 359f.).

¹⁹ The possibility that Hesiod's text, or different versions of it which he had heard, had left him bewildered should not be altogether discounted. We easily underrate the degree of fluctuation to which Hesiod's text was exposed.

THE *AISYMNĒTEIA*: A PROBLEM IN ARISTOTLE'S HISTORIC METHOD

During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the appearance of historical writing among the Greeks both preserved and altered the memory of their past. This mix of preservation and alteration is a shortcoming of scholarly historians generally, and we should not be surprised when it occurs. In the present discussion I should like to treat Aristotle's remarks on Pittacus' *aisymnēteia* in sixth-century Mytilene. Despite the omnipresent danger of lost texts, our information about the *aisymnēteia* shows a uniformity that suggests the authority Aristotle's theoretical model had in antiquity (and which it has not lost today). My purpose is not to discredit or denigrate either Aristotle or his method. Theoretical history remains as much a valid genre today as in Aristotle's time. Instead, understanding or attempting to understand how Aristotle came to his interpretation may suggest other ways of viewing Pittacus' regime and may also illustrate how Aristotle proceeded in historical reasoning. In fact, if this argument proves acceptable, Aristotle's definition of the *aisymnēteia* originated with him or his school and reflected the sense he made out of scantily documented traditions from Mytilene. It will have been Aristotle's interest in typology that led him to frame his definition, as the implicit parallel with Solon makes clear.

No single piece of evidence proves this point conclusively. That is too much to ask of our scattered record for archaic Greece. Rather our conclusion emerges from a careful examination of what evidence still exists, of how neatly the *aisymnēteia* suits the terms of Aristotle's political theory, and, to some extent, of how Aristotle's description of the *aisymnēteia* was received in antiquity. My purpose is, as far as practicable, to reconstitute Aristotle's thinking about the *aisymnēteia* and related ideas. Passages from other writings of Aristotle, especially from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Prior Analytics*, illuminate the force his philosophy had in shaping his conception of past events. This overall approach should offer a significant means of discovering how Aristotle applied his theories about men and society to historical problems.

Once this process is understood, other parts in our uneven record of the archaic period may become clearer. The immediate gain for the

constitutional history of Mytilene will be slight;¹ but there will be implications for others to follow in reading Aristotle's (or his student's²) *Constitution of Athens* as well as Plutarch's *Solon* which draws heavily on peripatetic sources and ideas. Still others may find implications to pursue, for example, in the overlapping typologies of the seven wise men and of the legislators (*nomothetai*).

The *aisymnēteia* itself needs investigating for two reasons. First, Aristotle's formulation apparently dominated thinking on the subject throughout antiquity; and neither Aristotle nor anyone else successfully produced any other *aisymnētēs* than Pittacus, though Aristotle thought there were others. Secondly, modern writers have too often relied on Aristotle's theory without examining its foundation or scope.

To our first point: Even if all the evidence available to Aristotle cannot be known with certainty, still it is noteworthy that our surviving discussions of the *aisymnētēs*' role depend literally on Aristotle's formulation. The tyrannical *aisymnētēs* is never alluded to, in this technical sense, in other than an Aristotelian context. Yet even a later peripatetic writer like Nicolaus of Damascus may use the term freely (below, p. 30 and also note 22); and Diogenes Laertius, writing a brief biography of Pittacus (1.74–81), could omit the term entirely. On the other hand, Strabo, following Alcaeus, describes Pittacus as a tyrant (13.2.3); and Plutarch, heavily influenced by peripatetic traditions, writes as though Solon's contemporaries at Athens could speak of Pittacus as an elected tyrant without using the term *aisymnētēs* (*Sol.* 14.4).

Our second stimulus comes from modern writers who have not yet come to terms with Aristotle's remarks about Pittacus' office and role. J. Toepfer, writing in the *Real-Encyclopädie*, adds names to the list of the *aisymnētai* without examining the literary tradition behind the concept.³ Other writers follow a clue from Dionysius of Halicar-

¹ In the archaic period constitution or *politeia* means little more than the way things were done in a particular *polis*. Our evidence is slender for this period, and any emendation of Mytilene's constitutional history necessarily produces small gain.

² M. Chambers and J. Day, *Aristotle's History of the Athenian Democracy*, Univ. of Calif. Publ. in History 73 (1962) 3 give the familiar view that Aristotle wrote the work. P. J. Rhodes suggests with more restraint that the absence of certain Aristotelian expressions and the infrequency of characteristically Aristotelian passages point to a pupil, not Aristotle, as author. I thank Prof. Rhodes for kindly showing me a manuscript of his introduction to the new commentary he has prepared for this work.

³ *RE* I (Stuttgart 1894) s.v. Aisymnetes. He is followed by A. Mannzmann in *Der Kleine Pauly* I (Stuttgart 1964) s.v. Αἰσυνήται.

nassus, call Pittacus Dictator (on the Roman analogy), and misconstrue Aristotle as suggesting that Pittacus was leading a democratic revolution against an aristocratic clan or clans.⁴ This interpretation is perhaps reinforced by writers who misuse, or use loosely, the notion of δᾶμος in Alcaeus' poetry, though the proper scope there of δᾶμος as "the entire populace including the noble families, contrasted with the ruling power," is well enough known.⁵ On the other hand, H. Berve further restricts that notion of δᾶμος and thinks that the word "dürfte wie in archaischen Sparta die gesamte Oberschicht bezeichnen, höchstens noch die nichtadligen freien Grundbesitzer mitumfassen"; he asserts that Pittacus is, "soweit wir erkennen können, auch nicht als Führer der unteren Volksschichten den auf diese Weise emporgekommen Tyrannen an die Seite zu stellen"; and finally, he attempts to validate Aristotle's definition of an *aisymnētēs*, though he neglects to observe that Aristotle, recognizing the *aisymnēteia* as an historical form of tyranny, merely avoids the pitfalls of nominalism by classifying it under kingship in accordance with theory, not factual history.⁶ R. Sealey, in passing, may speak briefly and simply of Pittacus' tyranny; and we are reminded of the need others have seen to re-evaluate our evidence for tyranny in the archaic period.⁷ As far as Pittacus is concerned, A. Andrewes has stated the problem succinctly

⁴To take the most obvious examples, cp. the writers in *CAH* IV (Cambridge 1930) 57 (F. E. Adcock), 98 (P. N. Ure), and 495 (J. B. Bury); but cp. also *CAH* III (Cambridge 1929) 516–17 where D. G. Hogarth acknowledges that Pittacus' regime "was, however, in effect, a Tyranny," though he adds that it "was preceded by stages typical of the progress by which the democratic process developed contemporaneously in most cities of Greece, and therefore, in all likelihood, in Ionia."

⁵D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 177 gives the basic description of the δᾶμος in Alcaeus' poetry; and he is followed by A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London 1956) 95. Writers who seem to me not to have fully developed their understanding of the imagined electoral process include: A. R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (London 1963) 243; R. J. Hopper, *The Early Greeks* (London 1976) 205 and 217–18; L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* (London 1976) 47 and 240; and O. Murray, *Early Greece* (Atlantic Highlands, N. J. 1980) 151–52.

⁶H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* I (Munich 1967) 94; cp. II 574–75.

⁷R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City-States 700–338 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976) 56: "Scarcely anything substantial is known about Pittacus, the tyrant of Mytilene. He was attacked in the poems of his contemporary, Alcaeus; later tradition said that he made laws for Mytilene and laid down his tyranny after ruling for ten years." Recent calls for re-evaluating the evidence in one way or another have come from Cl. Mossé, *La tyrannie dans la grèce antique* (Paris 1969) 6–8; H. W. Pleket, "The Archaic Tyrannis," *Talanta* I (1969) 19–61; R. Drews, "The First Tyrants in Greece," *Historia* 21 (1972) 129–44; and A. Ferrill, "Herodotus on Tyranny," *Historia* 27 (1978) 385–98.

and judiciously: "Pittacus may perhaps have had the title *aisymnētēs*, but no other authority says he had, and there was no normal magistrate with this name at Mytilene, as there was at Miletus."⁸

The propriety of Aristotle's terminology should be as open an issue to us as it was to the ancients. Despite the elusiveness of our evidence, and despite the danger of lost works that mentioned or discussed this notion of the archaic *aisymnēteia*, enough may be deduced from Aristotle's various writings to justify examining his formulation, and even perhaps to call it into question. The general looseness with which the terms *aisymnētēs* and *aisymnēteia* came to be employed outside the Aristotelian tradition, and the preservation of Aristotle's technical discussion virtually intact within that tradition suggest the nature of our problem.

I

The words αἰσυμνήτης and αἰσυμνητεία may not be indigenous to Greek. A. Andrewes thinks them Anatolian in origin like Homeric *anax* and later *tyrannos*; and he also holds that, again like *anax* and *tyrannos*, *aisymnētēs* originally denoted someone in the royal family or a ruler of some kind.⁹ Against this origin É. Boisacq and A. Mannzmann, writing separately, accept a Greek derivation from αἶσα and μνησκεῖν; and for them the meaning of *aisymnētēs* approximates "an individual who records what is fair."¹⁰ The point need not detain us since we are concerned with the term's acquired significance.

Before Aristotle's lifetime, the word *aisymnētēs* occurs only in the *Odyssey* (8.258) where it designates an umpire or referee:

αἰσυμνηται δὲ κριτοὶ ἐννέα πάντες ἀνέσταν
δῆμιοι, οἳ κατ' ἀγῶνας ἔϋπρήσσεσκον ἕκαστα,
λείψαν δὲ χορόν, καλὸν δ' εὖρυναν ἀγῶνα.

⁸ Andrewes (above, note 5) 97.

⁹ A. Andrewes (above, note 5) 96-97, cp. 9-11 and 21-23. He agrees with P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968) s.v. αἰσυμνάω where Chantraine reports that "si l'on part non de αἰσυμν-, mais de αἰσυμν- . . . , on pourrait penser qu'il s'agit d'une formation asianique, finalement rapprochée de αἶσα par étym. populaire." But see also H. Frisk (below, note 10).

¹⁰ E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*⁴ (Heidelberg 1950) s.v. αἶσα; cp. A. Mannzmann (above, note 3) *ibid.* See also H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* I and III (Heidelberg 1960 and 1972) s.v. αἰσυμνάω; but cp. αἶσα also for the problem. Attempts to connect the etymology to Latin (Etruscan?) *aerumna* do not help.

A related word denotes or connotes something like prince or young nobleman in the *Iliad* (24.347):

βῆ δ' ἰέναι κούρω αἰσυμνητῆρι ἑοικώς,
πρῶτον ὑπηγήτη, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἤβη.

From Aristotle's time on *aisymnētēs* and *aisymnēteia* occur in three different contexts—cultic, epigraphic, and literary. We may make note, but exclude discussion here, of a cult of Dionysus *Aisymnētēs* existing at Patrae and known to Pausanias.¹¹ Secondly, in some Ionian cities, though not at Mytilene, an ordinary civic office is known by this name from inscriptions spanning more than 300 years and written in the various dialects of the region.¹² At Teos the inscriptions show the *aisymnētai* as a standing public commission like the *euthynoi* and *timouchoi*, both of whom are mentioned on the stones side by side with the civic *aisymnētai*. A scrap of literary information quoted in a scholiast's note to Euripides' *Medea*, line 19, also attests the civic *aisymnētai*: Aristotle is there quoted as saying that in Kyme (which?) the *aisymnētai* were equivalent to archons (Rose F 524).¹³

Except for this scholiast the literary tradition ignores the civic office mentioned in the inscriptions. In our extant literature Aristotle first used *aisymnētēs* to designate a special class of tyrant, the elected tyrant, for which he adduces but one example, Pittacus of Mytilene (*Pol.* 1285A29–B3); and these remarks from the *Politics* will form the basis of discussion in Part II below. When Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch appeal to the notion of an archaic *aisymnētēs*, they clearly follow Aristotle's formulation. As far as I know, barring the

¹¹ For this occasion I exclude discussion of Paus. 7.20.1–2: "The epithet of the god within the chest is *Aisymnētēs*. His special attendants number nine men whom the citizenry (δῆμος) choose from their aggregate on the basis of personal worthiness. There are an equal number of female and male attendants." J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece* IV (London 1898; reprint, New York 1965) ad loc. is silent. L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* vol. 5 (Oxford 1909) 137–38 recognizes the political significance of the appellation; but I see no demonstrable connection between these cult procedures at Patrae and Aristotle's analysis of Pittacus' special office. Homer's language at *Od.* 8.258–60 is echoed here as the Homeric scholia show (W. Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam* I [Oxford 1855; reprint, Amsterdam 1962] ad 8.259, cp. also ad 258; see too Aristotle's fragments, Rose F 524). Homer has no women and nine men, though the men are not attendants to the *aisymnētēs* but *aisymnētai* themselves. To be sure, Homer is describing attendants of some sort, regal or otherwise.

¹² The standard inscriptions attesting the civic *aisymnēteia* are SIG 38 (Teos), 57 (Miletus), 272 (Miletus), 642 (Aegina), 955 (Arcesina).

¹³ See above, note 11, and below, note 14.

cult information of Pausanias (above, note 11) and the Aristotelian tradition apparent in Dionysius and Plutarch (to be discussed below), only two post-Aristotelian usages are significant.¹⁴

Nicolaus of Damascus, a peripatetic writing during the principate of Augustus, described Epimenides of Miletus as an *aisymnētēs* elected by the people, one who wielded arbitrary power of life and death over his subjects.¹⁵ Few would now believe Nicolaus about this application of the term, and his phraseology must reflect either non-Aristotelian influence or a hypothesis of his own. In fact, Nicolaus was writing about legendary, not historical, times and seems to use *aisymnētēs* in a deliberately anachronistic way (perhaps because he knows the term from Aristotle). He writes very much like some modern scholars as if everyone could accept Aristotle's definition.

Two centuries after Nicolaus, Diogenes Laertius quotes (1.100) a literary forgery of a common type, viz. a fictitious letter from Thrasybulus to Periander which contains both *aisymnētēs* and *aisymnēteia*. Here the words simply mean autocrat and autocracy as Thrasybulus' imagined advice makes clear. To reinforce his *aisymnēteia*, Periander should execute all the eminent at Corinth, whether friend or foe, because to an *aisymnētēs* even a friend is suspect.¹⁶ Though the words are not used as Aristotle meant them, these meanings take their coloring from the idea of tyranny. It is impossible to say whether this

¹⁴ We should note the problematic report of Aristotle's assertion that at Kymē (again which?) the tyrants were previously called *aisymnētai* (Rose F 524). If this is not simply the commentator's misunderstanding, it could reflect the difficulties of finding a single principle of *aisymnēteia* for the archaic tyranny.

¹⁵ *FGrH* II A 90 F 53: ὅτι Ἐπιμένης μετὰ ταῦτα αἰσυνήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονεῖται λαβὼν ἐξουσίαν κτείνειν οὓς βούλεται. καὶ δς τῶν μὲν παίδων Ἀμφιτρήτος οὐδενὸς οἰός τ' ἦν ἐγκρατὴς γένεσθαι (ὑπεξήλθον γάρ παραχρῆμα δέισαντες), τὰ δὲ ὄντα αὐτοῖς ἐδήμυσεν καὶ ἀργύριον ἐκήρυξεν, εἰ τις αὐτοὺς κτείνειεν. τῶν δὲ κοινωνῶν τοῦ φόνου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινε, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φυγὴν προεῖπεν· οἱ δὲ ὤχοντο. οἱ μὲν δὲ Νηλεΐδαι κατελύθησαν ὥδε. (See also below, note 22.)

¹⁶ Diogenes patterned his version after Hdt. 5.92 in which Thrasybulus instructs Periander; Aristotle (*Pol.* 1284a26–34; cp. 1311a20–22 and 1313a37–41) reversed their roles. The meaning of the *logos* for both Herodotus and Aristotle transcended the roles assigned to particular characters. If a reason is needed for considering the letter in Diogenes' version a forgery, its content makes much too explicit the point of the *logos* and by its exposition defeats the purpose of the story. The forgery need not be late since Hellenistic parallels exist. If the letter should be roughly contemporary with Aristotle, it might perhaps show the tradition he thought he was correcting. R. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* (Paris 1873) 787 does not comment on the forgery. Ancient suspicions about such letters as these found voice in Demetrius of Magnesia who discussed a supposed letter of Epimenides the Cretan (Diog. Laert. 1.112–13).

shade of meaning has been derived from Aristotle's definition of *aisymnēteia* as a specific, albeit benevolent, form of tyranny or whether it reflects another origin entirely.

II

We come next to Aristotle's treatment. The passage in question (*Pol.* 1285A29–B3) is brief and deserves to be quoted in full before we comment on it:

δύο μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα μοναρχίας· ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις
 "Ἕλλησιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἰρετὴ
 τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ
 μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἤρχον δ' οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ
 μέχρι τινῶν ὠρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἶλοντό ποτε Μυτιλη-
 ναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ
 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἶλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν
 ἐν τινι τῶν σκολίων μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γάρ ὅτι

τὸν κακοπάτριδα
 Πιττακὸν πόλιος τᾶς ἀχόλῳ καὶ βαρυδαίμονος
 ἐσάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀολλέες.

αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί, διὰ
 δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικαί.¹⁷

Like Solon, Pittacus is best known from contemporary poetry; unlike Solon, those poems came not from his own hand, but from the hand of his enemy in civil war. Although *tyrannos* is the most tech-

¹⁷ This passage deserves to be translated: "These then are two kinds of monarchy. There is still another which existed among the archaic Greeks and whose holders they call *aisymnētai*. Simply put, this is elective tyranny; and it differs from barbarian kingship not in being non-constitutional but only in being non-hereditary. Some men held this office for life, others for fixed periods or special purposes, as the Mytileneans long ago elected Pittacus to deal with the exiles whom Antimenidas and the poet Alcaeus led. And Alcaeus clearly shows that they elected Pittacus tyrant in one of his banquet-songs; for he berates them since 'they all set low-born Pittacus as tyrant over the city, meek and doomed, and praised him greatly.' To the extent, therefore, that they are autocratic, these offices have always been tyrannical; but to the extent that they have been elective and accepted by a willing populace, they are like kingship."

My translation aims to avoid tendentiousness. Others may translate the passage with different force, e.g. εἶλοντο . . . Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας in the interpretation of O. Murray (above, note 5) 152: ". . . they chose Pittakos as elected leader (*aisymnētēs*) against the exiles for a ten-year period." Murray echoes C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford 1961) 152.

nical name Alcaeus calls Pittacus (and he calls him many things!), Aristotle modifies its force, alleges an *aisymnēteia* for him, and distinguishes this *aisymnēteia*, which he describes as an elective tyranny, from both kingship and ordinary tyranny. If Pittacus was *aisymnētēs*, then his office differed considerably from the later civic office by the same name attested in the inscriptions from Ionia.

Aristotle began his discussion from the excerpt—presumably not a fragment for him—of Alcaeus which he cites and which I repeat here in the Aeolic version of Lobel-Page (L-P 348):

τὸν κακοπατρίδαν
Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς ἀχόλῳ καὶ βαρυδαίμονος
ἑστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες.

When he introduced these lines with the words δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἶλοντο τὸν Πίττακον ἐν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν, Aristotle signalled his best evidence. Clearly Alcaeus never used the word *aisymnētēs* or anything like it; otherwise Aristotle would have reassured his audience with a more appropriate citation. What is at stake in these lines is not the tyranny of Pittacus, for that is plainly stated by Alcaeus. Rather Aristotle is attempting to demonstrate that Pittacus was elected: εἶλοντο probably glosses ἑστάσαντο.

ἑστάσαντο and ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες are the operative words. ἑστάσαντο has no necessary sense of election and may mean no more than that a certain group, here unspecified, established Pittacus in power. Though ἐπαίνεντες may have the technical sense of agreeing to or approving (ratifying? simply accepting?) an elected magistrate, Liddell-Scott-Jones cite this fragment to define the verb as meaning "to praise, commend in any way" anyone or anything.¹⁸ ἀόλλεες seemingly supports Aristotle's argument but may be only a polemical allusion to the apparent unity in the city when Alcaeus' faction had been forced into exile. Aristotle's interpretation then is not a necessary one.¹⁹

¹⁸ This is also its common Homeric meaning; cp. *Il.* 3.451: "Ὡς ἔφατ' Ἀτρεΐδης ἐπὶ δ' ἦνεον ἄλλοι Ἀχαιοί.

¹⁹ Cp. W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* III (Oxford 1902), 269: "Aristotle evidently anticipates that his statement that Pittacus was elected tyrant by the Mytileneans will hardly be credited by his own contemporaries—an elective tyranny would seem to be a contradiction in terms—and he supports it with the strongest testimony he can find, that of the foe whom Pittacus was elected to put down . . . Alcaeus, however, can only have known of Pittacus' election by hearsay, for he was in exile when it took place." Modern audiences may remain sceptical as well, cp. W. Rösler, *Dichter und Gruppe* (Munich 1980) 26–27, note 3.

The Aristotelian interpretation of Pittacus' office circulated intact in the Age of Augustus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus knew Theophrastus' *On Kingship* and cited its authority both for his own characterization of the Roman dictatorship as elective tyranny and for his own apparently novel comparison of the office to the Greek *aisymnēteia*. Dionysius wrote (*Rom. Ant.* 5.73.2–3):

ἐπεὶ τό γε τῆς ἐξουσίας μέγεθος, ἥς ὁ δικτάτωρ ἔχει, ἥκιστα δηλοῦται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετὴ τυραννὶς ἢ δικτατορία. δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ τοῦτο παρ' Ἑλλήνων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὸ πολίτευμα λαβεῖν, οἱ γὰρ αἰσυνῆται καλούμενοι παρ' Ἑλλήσι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἰρετοὶ τινες ἦσαν τύραννοι· ἥρουντο δ' αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις οὐτ' εἰς ὀριστὸν χρόνον οὔτε συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, ὅποτε δόξειε συμφέρειν, καὶ εἰς ὅποσονοῦν χρόνον· ὥσπερ καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι ποθ' εἶλοντο Πιπτακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκαῖον τὸν ποιητήν.

The authenticity of Theophrastus' *On Kingship* was already questioned by ancient critics, but Dionysius thought he had a genuine work of Theophrastus and certainly one he considered peripatetic.²⁰ The verbal parallels between Dionysius' and Aristotle's versions are obvious and were transmitted through the text of Theophrastus or pseudo-Theophrastus. From that source Dionysius drew on (a) Aristotle's description of *aisymnēteia* as an elective tyranny, (b) its restriction to the archaic Greeks, (c) its length of tenure, and (d) the example of the Mytileneans electing Pittacus to deal with the exiles led by Alcaeus and his brother.²¹ Although Theophrastus is represented as speaking in the plural of αἰρετοὶ τινες . . . τύραννοι just as Aristotle

²⁰ Its authorship is not a central issue here. If Theophrastus did not write the treatise, still it was sufficiently peripatetic to attract his name. In the absence of decisive evidence to the contrary, I should prefer to consider the work his and to identify it with one of those listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue (5.42–50) where we see two relevant entries labelled *On Kingship*, one comprised of a single book (5.42) and the other of two (5.49).

²¹ That the Romans adapted the Greek *aisymnēteia* may be fanciful, though influence from the practices of the Greek colonies in the West cannot be ruled out. W. Newman (above, note 19) III 268–69 contrasts the *aisymnēteia* and *dictatura*. The general comparison of the two offices, however, seems not inapposite, at least given the definition of *aisymnēteia* Dionysius had to work with; see E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1946) 138–39, note 1. I am reminded *per litteras* by Lionel Pearson that the word *aisymnētēs*, meaning a man who records what is fair, as well as its supposed history “is rather like Latin *dictator*, which in earliest usage should have meant something like δικαστής, before it came to mean ‘elected autocrat.’” (Cp. above, notes 9–10.)

spoke of οὗς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας, none is adduced but Pittacus.²² The case for a tyrannical *aisymnētēs* at Mytilene could have been made in more detail in the Μυτιληναίων Πολιτεία (though this title does not appear among the 68 titles indicated by the fragments, cp. Rose F 381–603); but the treatment of Athenian history in the *Constitution of Athens*, the only one of 158 such constitutions to survive in any considerable degree, suggests not.

Aristotle's interpretation of Pittacus' office turns up again with Alcaeus' lines in an allusion by Plutarch who does not, however, employ the words *aisymnētēs* or *aisymnēteia* (Mor. 763E). Plutarch, it should be noted, is here interested only in the divinity of Eros and not at all in political questions. His use of Alcaeus is merely incidental and allusive:

... οὕτως αἱ τρεῖς στάσεις αἱ περὶ θεῶν διχοφρονοῦσι καὶ ψῆφον ἄλλην ἄλλη φέρουσαι καὶ μὴ δεχόμεναι ῥαδιῶς τὸν ἐξ ἑτέρας περὶ ἑνὸς βεβαίως ὁμογνωμονοῦσι καὶ κοινῇ τὸν Ἑρωτα συνεγγράφουσιν εἰς θεοῦς ποιητῶν οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων ἄθροά φωνᾷ μέγ' ἐπαίνεντες, ὥσπερ ἔφη, "τὸν Πιπτακὸν" ὃ Ἀλκαῖος αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς Μυτιληναίους "τύραννον."

Plutarch takes what he wants from both Alcaeus' poem and from Aristotle's ideas, ἄθροά φωνᾷ (Reiske's probably correct emendation)

²² Nicolaus of Damascus (above, note 15) added Epimenēs of Miletus to the tradition; but his information is late, otherwise unattested, and generally suspect. A. Andrewes (above, note 5) 97 alludes to the story of Epimenēs as doubtful, though D. L. Page (above, note 5) 239 appears to accept Nicolaus' account; Page escapes the implicit difficulties by observing that "The title varied in significance from time to time and place to place." Nicolaus may have been influenced by Miletus having had the later civic *aisymnēteia* whose precise origin was, and is, unknown. If Nicolaus meant χειροτονεῖται with etymological, not generic, force, the type of election he imagined may suit Aristotle's ideas about tyranny (Pol. 1310a39–b34) better than Pittacus' Mytilene or Epimenēs' Miletus. Electoral practices in Ionia are masked; and though a law from Chios ca. 575–550 B.C. speaks of a βολή ἢ δημοσίῃ ἀσλεκτή, nothing is indicated about the mode of election (cp. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* [Oxford 1969] no. 8, C 5–8). Aristotle's generic terms (αἰρετή, εἶλοντο) circumvent the question; and V. Ehrenberg is firm that χειροτονία is a characteristically democratic mode of election (cp. his "Origins of Democracy," *Historia* 1 (1950) 515–48; now reprinted in *Polis und Imperium* [Zürich and Stuttgart 1965] 264–97, from which I cite pp. 270–71). Archaic forms of election were commonly less sophisticated than the *cheirotomia*, and one may compare the Lycurgan method at Sparta (Plut. Lyc. 26.2–3). The only sure antecedent for Alcaeus' ἐπαίνεντες is Homer's usage (above, note 18). But see J. A. O. Larsen, "The Origin and Significance of the Counting of Votes," *CP* 44 (1949) 164–81.

recalls ὁλλῆες which Plutarch omits, and clarifies an aspect of the poem and its interpretation that jeopardizes Aristotle's historical information. Plutarch's use of the quotation depends upon his assumption of the absolute unanimity among Pittacus' supporters. Even were ἄθροα φωνᾷ not simply a slip of memory but a poetic transition of Plutarch's own from the unanimous enrollment of Eros among the gods to the analogy of the Mytileneans and Pittacus, Plutarch would still be concerned to show the absolute, not relative, unanimity among the best poets, nomothetes, and philosophers. He understands that the Mytileneans elected Pittacus tyrant without a dissenting vote and that they were acting at their best in so doing. These subordinate ideas are suitably Aristotelian, as will become clear, and we may suppose that Plutarch got his information directly from the *Politics* or, more likely, from a compendium of peripatetic materials.²³

Plutarch's stressing of this absolute like-mindedness illuminates Pittacus' role at Mytilene as Aristotle understood it. When analyzing φιλία as the cohesive force in the city-state (*Nic. Eth.* 1155a22-28), Aristotle says that nomothetes strive after (ἐφίενται) unanimity (ὁμόνοια), which is akin to φιλία, and that they also expel faction (στάσις). If *stasis* exists in the city-state, its expulsion is a prerequisite of *homonoia* since the two conditions are diametrically opposite.²⁴ *Homonoia* is complex, and should not be mistaken for simple unanimity of opinion (ὁμοδοξία).²⁵ Theoretically, states may be identified as having *homonoia* only when their citizens share the same opinions regarding what will benefit the state, and when they vote unanimously to effect these benefits, and when they act on those voted decisions.²⁶ Nor are we concerned with relative unanimity such as might be glossed by an expression like τὸ πλῆθος. Two individuals or

²³ A glance at W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (American Philological Association 1959) suggests that Plutarch does not use this quotation from Alcaeus again and that he does not directly make use of our passage from Aristotle's *Politics*.

²⁴ The word ὁμόνοια perhaps originated in the fifth century to describe a city-state from which *stasis* had been eliminated; cp. J. de Romilly, "Vocabulaire et propagande, ou les premiers emplois du mot *homonoia*," *Études et commentaires* 79 (1972) 199-209, though her discussion of Heraclitus *apud* ps.-Arist. *De Mundo* 396b-397a and of the Themistocles Decree will not satisfy all.

²⁵ Cp. *Ar. Nic. Eth.* 1167a22-26.

²⁶ *Ar. Nic. Eth.* 1167a26-28: . . . ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνῶμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. This concept effectively eliminates the idea of "unopposed votes" as contributing to Pittacus' imagined electoral support.

more must not only have the same intentions (τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν) but hold them in regard to the same individual (τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ).²⁷ This principle is illustrated by three kinds of unanimous public decision (ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ); these decisions are to establish all civic offices as elective, to make an alliance with the Lacedaimonians, or to elect Pittacus at a time when he himself was also willing.²⁸

Antimenidas and Alcaeus' faction had already been exiled, Aristotle thought, when the poem we have been discussing was written (cp. *Pol.* 1285A36–38: οἷον εἴλοντό ποτε Μυτιληναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας, κτλ.). For Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *homonoia* requires the expulsion of faction; that *homonoia* came into existence in Mytilene is proven to Aristotle's satisfaction by Pittacus' election (as he calls it). Interestingly, the *Nicomachean Ethics* speaks only generally of Pittacus' election to an unspecified position at Mytilene (ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ . . . ἄρχειν Πιττακόν). This generality is partly to be accounted for by the fact that the forms of *politeia* are more briefly discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1160A31–1161A10) than in the *Politics* where Aristotle intends to explicate the relationships among these forms; and perhaps partly because the available information—of varying reliability—about Pittacus as one of the seven sages did not jibe with Aristotle's theory of tyranny.²⁹ He knew well enough that Pittacus' rule had ended *stasis* at Mytilene, and he had his own vision of how Pittacus accomplished this goal.

Two degrees of explanation may be offered for Aristotle's process of definition. The less important for our present purposes may be treated first. The hidden parallel with Solon suggests that typology

²⁷ Ar. *Nic. Eth.* 1167A34–B2: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδῇποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται.

²⁸ Ar. *Nic. Eth.* 1167A28–32: περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὲ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ᾔθελεν.

²⁹ There is a tendency for the written record, as it develops, to conform to its writers' expectations. We may note, for example, that Plato *Rep.* 335e–336a implies that for his wickedness some might exclude Periander from a place among the seven sages; and Periander is absent from the seven in the list at *Protag.* 343a (and cp. also Plut. *Sol.* 12.4). Diogenes Laertius noticed (1.30) that Periander nevertheless appeared in most lists. Still it is interesting that Aristotle distinguished between kingship and tyranny on the basis of the ruler's ἀρετή and actions stemming from it (*Pol.* 1310B9–34) and that Pittacus is one of only four names that turn up on all lists. For a brief summary of the traditions about the seven, see Burn (above, note 5) 207–9.

and the process of analogy are at work.³⁰ Solon resisted tyranny and acted as mediator (διαλλακτής) to end, or to prevent, *stasis* at Athens.³¹ Yet Aristotle never makes this comparison explicit. This process is complicated by Aristotle's belief that Solon, apart from the usual enablement of the archonship, held extraordinary power as arbiter (διαλλακτής = αἰσυμνήτης) and that, having resisted tyranny, Solon made an *apodēmia* from Athens that lasted ten years (Plut. *Sol.* 25.5). Like Pittacus, Solon resigned his extraordinary powers at the end of his term or on completion of his special purpose.³² Similarly, a period of ten years elapsed for Pittacus between leaving office and death.³³ For the Greeks, counting by tens or multiples of tens was a commonplace of historical technique in writing about their remote past. Where the evidence is scarce, typology tends to inform historical narrative more

³⁰ Cp. A. Andrewes (above, note 5) 97: "Apart from Alcaeus, we have no personal tradition about [Pittacus] except what comes through descriptions of the Seven Wise Men, a group which included Pittacus as well as Periander and Solon. The writers about this group were not much concerned with history, but used the figures of the Seven to convey moral ideas of their own later ages: they transmit in the process a few facts which may be historical (e.g. the length of Pittacus' rule), some sayings which may be authentic, and some impressions of character." On the hidden parallel with Solon, see also R. J. Hopper, *The Early Greeks* (London 1976) 140. Modern arguments depend on it as well, cp. A. W. Gomme, "Interpretations of Some Poems of Sappho and Alcaeus," *JHS* 77 (1957) 257. A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1980) 94–95 distinguishes the economic circumstances of Athens and Mytilene; but he thinks the Mytileneans may have followed "the recent Athenian example" in electing "Pittakos with powers of arbitration" (though for a decade, not a single year).

³¹ Prominent politicians of the archaic period are too easily stereotyped by Aristotle. In his own poetry Solon describes himself as stationed between two opposing parties (West 5; cp. *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 11.2–12.1) and also as refusing tyranny when it was proffered (West 32–33; cp. Plut. *Sol.* 14.5–6). *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 5.2 describes Solon as elected to be mediator and archon (ἐἴλοντο κοινῇ διαλλακτὴν καὶ ἄρχοντα Σόλωνα) while Plut. *Sol.* 14.2 has him elected as ἄρχων . . . καὶ διαλλακτὴς καὶ νομοθέτης. Aristotle imagines Solon as coming from οἱ μέσοι πολῖται (*Pol.* 1296a19–21), which of course guarantees his virtue (*Pol.* 1294a35–b1). For a more specific assessment of Solon's being in the middle ground (ἐν μεταξίῳ, West 37), see T. C. W. Stinton, "Solon, Fragment 25," *JHS* 96 (1976) 159–61 (though a greater sense of metaphor will obviate the emendation he proposes).

³² Solon's role as διαλλακτής may only describe what he has intended to accomplish as archon and may not be the name of an official position. Alternatively, it may indicate an office separate from, and even subsequent to, his archonship during which he presented most of his legislation.

³³ On Pittacus' ten-year rule and its nearly ten-year sequel, cp. Diog. Laert. 1.75. The traditional dates of Pittacus' rule, ca. 590–580 B.C., approximate the usual date for Solon's archonship at Athens in 594/3 B.C.

strongly than usual. Secondly, the definition of this archaic *aisymnēteia* appears to originate in Aristotle's desire to ground political theory in historical events even when, as here, the events are themselves not well enough known to generate a substantial theory of their own. Even the most efficient totalitarian regime cannot enforce more than token conformity to the principle of *homonoia* advanced in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and we are led to conceive of this *homonoia* as a moment that exists in theory, not in time. Aristotle there expounded what would happen in his theoretical model if *homonoia* is achieved. Unfortunately, this belief in a world where *homonoia* of this kind is attainable led Aristotle to look for proof of its attainment which he then found in the scant evidence about what Pittacus did as tyrant.

In avoiding the nominalist trap of insisting that Pittacus' regime should be listed under tyranny simply because of its name, Aristotle is hard pressed to deny that, in Antony Andrewes' words, "an elected tyrant is still a tyrant."³⁴ Here is the problem of time's passing. Tyranny survived to Aristotle's day as a particular type of constitution though it had changed from its original form. Its relationship to archaic tyranny was not clearly understood in large measure due to the rhetoric of the fifth century.

The bulk of our extant theorizing about the nature and function of the ancient Greek city-state comes directly from Athens or from Athenian-influenced circles; and at Athens in the fifth century tyranny ceased to be a feasible constitutional option. (Presumably this occurred in the early years of the century after the introduction of ostracism.) From that moment forward, tyranny became an increasingly metaphorical term of political abuse, and we may point to Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and Thucydides' *Histories* as important texts for mapping this progress. Thucydides is particularly important for the subtlety and cogency with which he describes imperial Athens as a tyranny over its subject states.³⁵

³⁴ Andrewes (above, note 5) 97: "An elective tyrant is still a tyrant, an absolute ruler who supersedes the constitution, and to say that he was elected for a set term or special purpose tells us only that his rule was accepted in the expectation that he would lay it down when his term was ended or the purpose fulfilled."

³⁵ Though a bit later, Xenophon's *Hiero* adds a dimension to the ancient evidence. Helpful discussions treating the *polis* as *tyrannis* are B. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven and London 1957) chap. 2; W. R. Connor, "Tyrannis Polis," in J. D'Arms and J. Eadie, eds., *Ancient and Modern* (Ann Arbor 1977) 95-109; and K. Raaflaub, "Polis Tyrannos: Zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher," in G. W. Bowersock et al., eds., *Arktouros* (Berlin and New York 1979) 237-52.

In any event, we should now examine how Aristotle's ideas about Pittacus fit our evidence for sixth-century Mytilene.

III

To speak straightforwardly of Pittacus' *tyrannis*, not his *aisymnēteia*, should offend no one. *Stasis* had characterized political life at Mytilene for half a century before Pittacus came to power. Though our details are obscure, names and indications of violence occur. Aristotle briefly summarized the origins of this violence in the *Politics* (1131b26–30) with a sentence describing events about whose details we may never know more. The philosopher wanted to illustrate there the tendency of the abused to overthrow the abusers. "For example at Mytilene," he wrote, "Megacles attacked the Penthilids for going round beating up (people) with clubs and, together with his friends, he overthrew them; and later, beaten and hauled off from beside his wife, Smerdis slew Penthilus."³⁶ We may see here two incidents and infer that the Penthilids' first expulsion by Megacles was not permanent because in a separate incident on a later occasion Smerdis frustrated a new domination by Penthilus. Alcaeus appears not to have been directly involved in the causes of Megacles and Smerdis, for in the extant verses he does not mention them by name. Nor, unfortunately, does anyone else.

For the sequel we have little else than Alcaeus' list of tyrants—in succession Melanchrus, Myrsilus, Pittacus.³⁷ The Penthilids nearly drop from sight except for two things. They are mentioned in several abusive contexts in the poems of Alcaeus, and they remained prominent enough for Pittacus to have married into the clan. It is conceivable, and has been suggested, that the Penthilus slain by Smerdis was Pittacus' father-in-law. Whether this is true or not, D. L. Page accurately summarizes conditions at Mytilene:³⁸

³⁶ Page (above, note 5) 150. Revolt was a predictable reaction to the legendary cruelty of the Penthilids. Cp. Plut. *Mor.* 984e: the Penthilids, in obedience to the oracle of Amphitrite, threw the daughter of a certain Smintheus into the sea (though she was saved). For recent discussion and a somewhat different approach, see Rösler (above, note 12) 26–33.

³⁷ R. Drews (above, note 7) 136, note 25 suggests: "We know only the names of a few seventh-century Ionian tyrants. Pittacus' father, Hyrrhas, was perhaps the first tyrant of Mytilene (scholion on Dionysius Thrax, 368, 13), and was succeeded by Melanchrus and Myrsilus, both of whom ruled before 600." But also see Page (above, note 5) 170, note 7 for a text of this scholion and his remarks.

³⁸ Page (above, note 5) 150.

. . . evidently it was still useful, however disreputable, to join forces with the Penthilidae against their principal enemies, the numerous clans of lesser nobles impatient of subordination. It is quite clear that the government of the city in the past had not been as it is often called, an aristocracy; it had been the rule not of the nobles but of one clan, the noblest. And just as the leader of the clan had been reduced by his peers, so the clan itself must now be reduced by its peers, from eminence to equality.

One fact emerges: the situation is not comparable to that in contemporary Athens. We are not dealing here with the rise (gradual or otherwise) of an underprivileged commons that threatened an end to aristocratic rule.³⁹ The basic democratic or, better, democratizing institutions, viz. the *agora* and *boulē*, already existed as Alcaeus attests; and Mytilene retained its essentially aristocratic government until the flourishing of the Athenian empire in the latter part of the fifth century.⁴⁰ With whatever balance of liberal and conservative elements, Pittacus' faction represented aristocratic compromise. One aspect of the compromise is clear: at a certain point Pittacus switched allegiance from Alcaeus' party to Myrsilus'. In Aristotelian terms this switch is enough to put Pittacus in the middle, to make him in a sense *ὁ μέσος* who, like Solon, by definition mediates between diametrically opposed factions. The nature of Pittacus' actual "mediation" may be gleaned from his continuing application of force against Alcaeus' party. What distinguished Pittacus from other tyrants—and Aristotle perceived this well enough—was his voluntary abdication after ten years in power. His remaining in retirement until he died nearly ten years later attests the stability of the solution he achieved.

Pittacus' accomplishment shows widespread willingness among aristocratic leaders to end the long period of *stasis* at Mytilene. It does not point to the kind of strict unanimity required by Aristotle's theory of *homonoia*. A compromise was struck—probably compromises—but an absolute like-mindedness, no.

Aristotle, who had more of them, should have been able to make at least as much sense out of Alcaeus' poems as we think we do. The process of compromise or mediation envisioned by Aristotle perhaps suggested to him—and here I am going out on a limb—another kind of mediation between the Homeric concept of the *aisymnētēs* as

³⁹ *Contra Pol.* 1310b12–23 if these criteria are relevant to the origins of an institution Aristotle refuses to categorize under tyranny.

⁴⁰ Even in the late fifth century it is difficult for us to comprehend the leanings of the *δῆμος* at Mytilene, cp. H. D. Westlake, "The Commons at Mytilene," *Historia* 25 (1976) 429–40.

umpire or referee⁴¹ and the historical civic *aisymnētai* in the Ionia of his own lifetime. The point of this mediation, then, is the interpretation of Pittacus' role as that of the unique tyrannical *aisymnētēs*. As a result of his interpretation, though Aristotle never explicitly connects the two in this way, modern writers have accepted that the later civic office evolved from the special elective tyranny of the archaic period. For reasons that we have been examining this should not necessarily be the case. Rather Aristotle seems to have originated the definition of archaic elective tyranny, and he may have had the further desire to illuminate a contemporary civic office of obscure origin.

Aristotle probably did not invent the use of the term *aisymnētēs* to describe Pittacus, though he seems to have originated the technical definition of that term. Both because he himself spent some time at Mytilene and because his student Theophrastus came from Eresos on Lesbos, Aristotle had good access to conflicting traditions of local history which were just coming to be written down in the fourth century.⁴² Presumably these traditions connected, even debated the connection of *aisymnēteia* with Pittacus since over time his rule seemed only more attractive for having ended the long period of *stasis* at Mytilene. Aristotle had arguments, of course, to support his definition; and they could have been indicated in the Μυτιληναίων Πολιτεία—if it existed, as I think likely. In the passage from the *Politics* which lies at the heart of our problem, Aristotle produced the clearest indication of his own ideas as found in Alcaeus' poetry. Having made what sense he could out of the scattered and legendary information about Pittacus, Aristotle classified the tyrannical *aisymnētēs* as the paradigm of one type of benevolent monarchy or kingship.

IV

The *Politics* is a work of political theory, not strictly of history. At the very beginning of the work, the author's implicit wrangling with Plato shows that his interest will be theoretical, not factual history and that his chief interest lies with institutions rather than individuals. Occasionally such writing may create difficulties, and it is not

⁴¹ This process of analogy would have been facilitated by information, if well known, about the cult of Dionysus *Aisymnētēs* at Patrae and certainly by common wisdom about Hom. *Od.* 8.258–60 (for both cp. above, note 11).

⁴² Cp. *FGrH* IIIA pp. 435 ff. for histories of Lesbos. The famous work-song about Pittacus' grinding reflects oral tradition which calls him βασιλεύς (30D.).

objectionable to identify and discuss these difficulties when they arise. The introduction to Book I of the *Politics* also advises his reader of the author's "regular mode of inquiry" (ἡ ὑφηγημένη μέθοδος), i.e. to analyze the composite whole and subdivide it into its indivisible elements.⁴³ Aristotle's syllogistic or propositional logic should attract our attention, then, because these rules of logical analysis demonstrate the analyst's connections among the indivisible elements within the composite whole that makes up his subject.⁴⁴

In the *Prior Analytics* (70a3–39) Aristotle concerns himself with probabilities and signs and with syllogisms built from them. It is, of course, accidental that he chose to illustrate his third class of syllogism with a statement about Pittacus; but it is not accidental that, having so decided, he gives the proposition itself the specific form he does. (It is irresistible, in fact, to think of Aristotle as almost literally playing here with his audience's expectations and familiarity with the typology of the seven sages.) "The wise are good (σοφουδαῖοι) because Pittacus was good (σοφουδαῖος)" has two premises, one stated and one tacit, to which Aristotle draws our attention: (1) "Pittacus is good" which he says we formally assume by building it into our proposition, and (2) "Pittacus is wise" which goes unstated because we know it. For Aristotle, as for Plato and the Greek tradition generally, wisdom implies goodness; therefore if we posit goodness of Pittacus or anyone else, then it is a sign of his wisdom and we need not formally assume his wisdom by

⁴³ Aristotle's method is most visible when it misses the mark. In confronting Plato's ideas about property, he blurs distinctions among kinds of ownership *Pol.* 1263b15–29). Aristotle's method can intrude dramatically; cp. *Meta.* 1056a3–32 where Aristotle rewords and misrepresents what Anaxagoras said to meet his own expectations so that he may refute Anaxagoras. (The difficulty about Aristotle's interpretation of χρεῖστοι reported at *Plut. Mor.* 292b [= Rose F 592] may also be relevant.) It is enough to say that Aristotle's understanding of the past reflects semantic and syllogistic operations defined by his own rules.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle and Logical Theory* (Cambridge 1980) 10–11 neatly describes the dual aspects of Aristotle's syllogistic reasoning: "There is, first, the use of 'syllogism' in the broad sense of definition as a *logos* in which, certain things being posited, something other than what is posited follows of necessity from their being so (*An. Pr.* 24b18). This corresponds to our use of 'deduction' in the general sense of an informal argument in which the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premisses, the number of inferences or their form. Second, there is the use of 'syllogism' in the narrow sense, used to describe the formal inferences that Aristotle isolated. In a similar fashion, we use 'deduction' to refer to formal deductions of a particular logical system. This ambiguity is tolerable since the value of the formal syllogistic is supposed to derive from the fact that a syllogism in the broad sense can be represented as a syllogism or chain of syllogisms in the narrow sense."

building it into the syllogism. Syllogisms of this sort, with only one premise stated, are always refutable, regardless of whether they are true or not, since the syllogism does not rest on a universal premise nor does the syllogism satisfy the question at issue, viz. whether the wise are good. For neither Pittacus' goodness nor his wisdom informs us about these qualities in others.⁴⁵

By understanding this process we may return to *Pol.* 1285A29-B3 and suggest that the following sort of syllogistic reasoning is at work. Before writing these lines, Aristotle had a proposition something like this in mind: "Pittacus was tyrant because the Mytileneans elected him." This time our formally assumed and expressed proposition is "the Mytileneans elected Pittacus." Our unstated premise, the one we somehow know, is that "the Mytileneans elected tyrants." In dealing with the Mytileneans and their elective process, Aristotle is outside the *logos* of the seven sages and cannot depend on the form of his story to make his point. It is clear that this proposition will also have to be demonstrated by inference from signs. If Aristotle can provide evidence that the Mytileneans elected Pittacus and that Pittacus was tyrant, then he does not have to show that the Mytileneans *could* elect tyrants which, in fact, remains a tacit assumption of Aristotle's whole position on the historical Pittacus.⁴⁶ (No other archaic tyrant, it should be said, is known to have been elected.) Whatever the exact details of the syllogism, and whether we have exactly imagined it or not, it or something like it describes Aristotle's conception as he framed his argument for the *aisymnēteia* at Mytilene. In any case, Aristotle knew that the system of syllogisms demonstrating the existence of elective tyranny rested on signs. Therefore, these syllogisms were refutable because they followed from no universal premise, stated or implied.

More important, Aristotle knew that Pittacus had ended *stasis* at Mytilene. The tradition about this was absolutely universal. Aristotle not only knew, but explicitly stated, that Alcaeus and his party were in

⁴⁵ Let me be more explicit: I use this passage from the *Prior Analytics* merely to illustrate Aristotle's logical method. What he says about Pittacus in this passage is less important than how he says it. (But see above, note 29 for other implications.) Pittacus was, of course, used by Aristotle in this example because of his typological appeal and not because of his historical individuality. For this part of my argument the subject of the premise, whether Pittacus or another, does not matter.

⁴⁶ Cp. Newman (above, note 19) for the expected criticism of Aristotle's audience about the elective tyranny. The assumption of this implicit or unstated premise presumably would have aggravated that audience.

exile at the moment this poem was composed. As far as Aristotle could tell, the period of *stasis* had ended. He did not know, as we do not, of any further trouble ensuing on Pittacus' abdication. The surviving stories and legends give every indication that in fact peace persisted, for there is even a rumor that Alcaeus and his party were welcomed back by Pittacus before he resigned.

With what we know about Aristotle's theory of *homonoia* and *stasis*, it is possible to suggest how he was able to hold with conviction his propositions both about *aisymnēteia* and about Pittacus. The elimination of *stasis* from turbulent Mytilene occurs at the moment its citizens have achieved *homonoia*. At last we are in the realm of a universal premise: "The expulsion of *stasis* always implies *homonoia*." This *homonoia* in Aristotle's conception means, as we saw earlier, that the citizens of the city-state with *homonoia* have the same opinions regarding what will benefit their city and vote unanimously to effect those benefits and act on those voted decisions. (It is in this *homonoia* that Pittacus' situation differs so radically from that of Solon, the διαλλακτήης.) The attendant circumstances required by this theory give authority to Aristotle's interpretation of the *aisymnēteia* at Mytilene and the situation there allows a general extrapolation about archaic elective tyranny. Since the relationship between *homonoia* and *stasis* is a universal one, the secondary features that attach to both concepts are necessary. We have two juxtaposed systems of syllogisms, one universal and irrefutable, one particular and refutable. The weakness of Aristotle's argument lies in the link between these systems. The universal can never guarantee the particular unless the particular is directly derived from the universal, as it is decidedly not here.

In his *Poetics* (1451A37-B13) Aristotle clarifies the difference between ἱστορία and ποίησις. *Poiēsis* is more philosophic and somehow worthier than *historia*. *Poiēsis* deals with the universal, what is likely or necessary in certain circumstances; history with the particular, what has happened or is happening and what is necessary only by virtue of its occurrence. *Poiēsis* deals with what good or evil men do or suffer in certain kinds of circumstances; *historia* with what Alcibiades, for example, did or suffered. Even when the ποιητής treats historical subject matter, nothing, of course, prevents these events from being likely or possible; on the contrary, their potentiality, their likelihood or possibility in their narrative context, distinguishes the author as *poiētēs*. In this scheme, the historian "clarifies a single period and everything that happened in that period, to one individual or more,

each incident having a relationship to the others as it happened" (*Poet.* 1459A22–24). On the other hand, even when dealing with historical material, the *poiētēs* seeks to clarify a single action or chain of actions (πρᾶξις) which is whole and complete and which has a beginning, middle, and end (*Poet.* 1459A17–21). What makes *poiēsis* more philosophic and worthier than historical investigation is that philosophers aim at universality in speaking about things that exist just as the *poiētēs* does when he uses historical material. In this sense, the *poiētēs* stands midway between the philosopher and the historian, for the historian bogs down because he is only "seeking the particularity of actual events."⁴⁷

What bridges the gap, then, between Aristotle's syllogistic reasoning about *stasis* and *homonoia* on the one hand and that about Pittacus on the other is an act of *poiēsis*, of imaginative creation or re-creation. This might have surprised Aristotle; it should not surprise us.

* * *

Though my argument may have produced but a small gain for constitutional history, as I warned at the outset, its conclusions are important in other ways. Aristotle, like Plato, has often been thought a poor source of historical information; but almost never has anyone been concerned to illustrate or reconstitute his historical reasoning despite the extensive body of his writings that either apply directly or allow inference on the subject. We may now have further access to Aristotle's historical method based on his own writings and the ideas they contain.⁴⁸

However that may be, Aristotle's specific definition of the tyrannical *aisymnētēs* appears questionable. Aristotle never doubted that Pittacus was technically a tyrant but was pressed to distinguish the apparent benevolence of Pittacus' rule from still more repressive regimes. The need to classify separately the good and bad autocrat

⁴⁷ So K. Telford, *Aristotle's Poetics* (Chicago 1961) 93. At this point the reader may also be referred to H. D. F. Kitto's essay on Thucydides in *Poiesis: Structure and Thought* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966) chap. 6.

⁴⁸ I have learned much from R. Weil, "Aristote et l'histoire," *Études et Commentaires* 36 (Paris 1960), though we disagree on points of detail regarding Pittacus. Weil is firm on the tyrannical aspect of the *aisymnēteia* (293, 345) but suspects that the research on constitutions informed Aristotle's sense of Pittacus (293) less than I do.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF OVID'S *METAMORPHOSES**

Hugo Magnus whose edition of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* appeared in 1914, and Franz Bömer whose learned commentary has been published, volume by volume, since 1969 (the latest one, covering Books 10 and 11, in 1980), seem to believe that the text of the work is solidly based on good and ancient MSS. In his new Teubner edition (1977), William S. Anderson advocates (Praefatio, pp. xxif.), in principle at least, the eclecticism practised by D. A. Slater whose critical apparatus, without a text, has been available since 1927.¹ My own experience in working with Anderson's text and some of the older editions, has convinced me that the consensus of the main MSS (A in Anderson) is very often misleading and that the truth has to be pieced together from other sources, e.g. Heinsius' codd., whether 'deteriores' or 'recentiores,' from early editions or by conjecture in so far as these sources can be clearly distinguished.

It should be said that Anderson faced a difficult task, but his edition is not as useful as might be expected, and one is bound to disagree with his choices again and again.² What really astonished me, as I was working with his edition over the last months, is the necessity

*I am very grateful to D. R. Shackleton Bailey and Wendell Clausen, Harvard University, and to E. J. Kenney, Peterhouse, Cambridge, for their comments. Mrs. Elizabeth Carter, one of my students at Johns Hopkins, has also given the paper the benefit of a critical reading.

¹ See also E. J. Kenney, *CR* 8 (1958) 253; 29 (1979) 326. I agree with Kenney on the merits of G. M. Edwards' editions in Postgate's *Corpus* (1893). Edwards was clearly a very good critic, and two distinguished Latinists of that period, Housman and Postgate, gave him their advice. One wishes that Anderson had consulted Edwards, but he does not even mention him in his 'Conspectus Editionum.' Other fairly important editions that he omits (p. xxiv): the Lugdunensis of 1518, with commentaries by R. Regius and P. Lavinius (the copy used by Burman is for sale in New York at this moment); the Gryphiana of 1563; the volumes in the Lemaire series (see n. 3).

² J. B. Hall's critical review in *ProcAfrClassAss* 15 (1980) 62-70 is a very fine piece of work and will prevent future editors of the *Metamorphoses* from making the same mistakes as A.—or so one hopes. Hall's main points: (1) more of the older MSS should have been collated; (2) the reports of the London MSS are inaccurate; (3) Heinsius' principles in constituting the text should have been followed in practice, not only in theory; (4) spelling is inconsistent or false; (5) many readings which Burman, often following Heinsius, printed in his text are not even found in the apparatus of the new

for conjectural emendation, even today. One would expect a work such as the *Metamorphoses*, edited so many times by first-rate scholars, to be cleaned up, on the whole. The opposite is true. Apparently we have now reached the point where many good readings have become obsolete because the post-Heinsius vulgate, with its advantages and disadvantages, was slowly replaced by a text constructed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This text was based on principles that are now recognized as being wrong (except by Bömer, among others), but the texts themselves as they are printed today (A. G. Lee's edition of Bk. I, 1953, is excellent, and much can be learned from A. S. Hollis' edition of Bk. VIII, 1970) still show the influences of the old principles. The case of the *Heroides*, incidentally, is analogous, as the work of Dörrie shows.

Reading the *Metamorphoses* in Anderson's edition, I jotted a number of ideas in the margins, only to find out, later on, that most of them have been anticipated by others; one would wish that the editor had at least recorded them in the apparatus, saving the reader time and trouble. I should like to discuss a few of those here, adding a few that, to my knowledge, have never been suggested before. If some of them find favor, I will have made my point; for the very fact that it is possible, in 1981, to emend Ovid without looking at a single uncolated MS would seem to show that there is something very peculiar about the textual tradition of the *Metamorphoses*.

But before discussing individual passages I feel I ought to describe the main areas in which A (the consensus of the main MSS) is particularly untrustworthy.

1) Greek names. The way in which Greek names (and there are many in this poem!) have been handled by the medieval scribes reveals a remarkable ignorance of Greek spelling and Greek mythology. No Augustan poet could have possibly made so many mistakes. Some of the fragments occasionally preserve the truth, but in very many cases it has to be recovered from Planudes' Greek translation³ or by conjecture.

Teubneriana; (6) many plausible conjectures are not recorded, others are mentioned but assigned to the wrong scholar; (7) even where the material necessary for the constitution of the text is assembled in the apparatus, the wrong choice is made far too often. One looks forward to Hall's further discussion of these passages.

³ One still has to use Boissonade's edition, published as vol. 5 (1822) of Lemaire's series. Boissonade was a great scholar, and his work on the text of Ovid deserves recognition, but Anderson says nothing. Planudes may have emended many Greek names because he knew Greek mythology, not because his Latin codex preserved the truth, but

A few examples: 2.69 *tethys* ε π : *thetis* A; 4.168 *leuconoe* P W Plan. : *leucothoe* A; 7.399 *Phene* Jahn : *phineu* A; 15.20 *Myscelos* Heinsius : *micilus* A; etc. There are more controversial cases than Anderson would seem to indicate.

2) Wrong prefixes: 1.261 *demittere* ε M W : *dimittere* A (a very frequent type of corruption; cf. 3.695; 4.367; 5.186; 8.334, etc.); 4.260 *impatiens* M² N³ U³, etc. : *patiens* A. *Ad-* and *ab-* are confused, also (10.591) *ob-* and *ab*; etc.

3) Wrong endings: this also is very common; everything seems possible here; over a hundred striking cases are recognized by Anderson, but there are many more: just recently, E. J. Kenney, *CQ* 72 (1978) 471 emended 5.454 *cum liquido mixtae* (-a codd.) *perfudit diua polentae* (-a codd.). Some typical examples: 7.380 *seruato* Heinsius : *seruatum* A; 435 *suis* e : *suam* A; 11.615 *fugeres* F L M etc. : *fugiens* A, etc. Time and again the main MSS do violence to sense and syntax in the most curious manner.

4) Look-alike words, very common; cf. 3.39 *urnae* α N³ : *undae* A; 45 *fontibus* M² N³ h : *frondibus* A; 7.152 *gramina* F M² U⁴ e : *carmine* A, etc. To these one might add *et* for *at* (or *ut*); see below. An interesting sub-species: Look-alike words with somewhat similar meanings: 1.15 *aer* α L W e h : *aether* A; 199 *confremuere* Vat. 11457 : *contremuere* A (cf. 4.136); 7.506 *sceptri* e² : *regni* A, etc.

5) Certain pronouns or particles are frequently misunderstood: *quo* for *qua*, *haec* for *hoc*, *quae* for *quoque*, *quid* for *quod*, etc. Again, there seems to be considerable room for error, regardless of syntax and sense.

6) There is some evidence, not much, for 'double recensio' (cf. J. B. Hall, quoted n. 1a, p. 70) or 'unrelated variants' (Edwards, *CR* 3 [1953] 143) within A, e.g. 1.70 *fueraut caligine caeca* α : *massa latuere sub illa* A; 7.763 *immittitur altera* F M : *immissa est bestia* (vel *belua*) A; 8.412 *fatum* Cantabr., Guelf. Gud. 4427 : *figit* A, etc. In such cases—and some of them are remarkable—the truth seems to survive in one or two witnesses while the broad tradition represented by A is wrong.

7) A is guilty of relatively few transpositions or omissions of lines: 6.200 post 203 A: recto ordine U, Fragm. Voss., Menardi codex., Gronovius ex coni.. Because of the homoeoteleuton *meorum* . . . *duorum* a line was accidentally omitted in an early copy and then added,

that codex was far from worthless, I think, and Planudes was, on the whole, a careful translator. "If the *Heroides* version is anything to go on, Planudes was, indeed, accurate, though sometimes overreaching himself" (E. J. Kenney, *per litteras*).

either at the bottom of a page or the end of a paragraph (which would actually correspond to the end of a paragraph in modern editions). Five lines omitted by A altogether (12.434–38) are found in the margins of P U h v, but rejected by most editors.

8) On the whole, A respects metre and even interpolates syllables in order to save it (e.g. 8.146; 751).

What main features of A emerge from this survey? One can only guess—and I say all this with due reserve—but it would seem that, at one time in antiquity, a copy of the *Metamorphoses* was made in a hurry, in an unusual script, using a number of unfamiliar abbreviations (prefixes, endings, frequent words)⁴ and, possibly, Greek letters for Greek names.

The ingenious method developed by Otto Ribbeck (in his edition of Virgil, vol. I [1866] 231 ff.) to explain errors in the oldest MSS might work for the *Metamorphoses*, too. Today, thanks to Latin papyri, graffiti, etc. we know more about individual variations of the 'écriture commune' (Jean Mallon) which was widely used between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D., for legal as well as literary texts, Greek as well as Latin.⁵

It would seem possible to think of A as a private copy of a formal 4th or 5th century *exemplar*. On the other hand, since the unfinished autograph of the work was made available to the public under very unusual circumstances, and considering the probability of author's variants, one could even think of A as a copy of a copy of the poet's autograph which may have been hard to decipher. Thus the process of 'emendatio'⁶ began in antiquity, was practised (not with great success) throughout the Middle Ages and has continued ever since. It is by no means over.

⁴ There are traces of ancient shorthand, e.g. 2.275 *omps* (e) which could stand for *omniparens* or *omnipotens* or, possibly, *omniparos* (Heinsius); cf. 720 *auis* (e) = *auidus* (M N P W); cf. also 820 *non lit* (e) for *non lenius*.

⁵ Cf. R. W. Hunt and others, *The Survival of Ancient Literature* (Oxford 1975) 26ff.

⁶ When Ovid says, *Tristia* 1.7.39f. *quicquid in his igitur uitii rude carmen habebit, / emendaturus, si licuisset, erat*, he may refer not only to stylistic changes but to the preparation of a legible copy that could be entrusted to a reasonably competent scribe. Virgil may have had the same kind of fear when he ordered his autograph of the *Aeneid* to be destroyed. The poets could read their own handwriting, but they probably shuddered at the thought of what might happen when they no longer had any control over the copying process.

I should like to turn to a number of passages that can be restored, in my opinion, and should be restored, although the new Teubner text does not always offer clues. It is only a selection: more suggestions could be made. Some of these readings are actually found in Edwards' text, some in his app., but it cannot hurt to draw attention to them and try to justify their value. I shall first quote the text as Anderson prints it and then try to reconstruct the true reading.

- 1.91 *poena metusque aberant nec uerba minantia fixo
aere legebantur*

read probably: *minacia* F² N², ut uid. (not mentioned by Anderson); cf. 5.669 *minacia uerba*, where β has *minatia*, while E F L etc. have *minantia*; 15.793 *minacia* (Heinsius: *-ntia* codd.) *uerba*; *Trist.* 2.135 *edictum . . . immite minaxque*. The same type of mistake appears 1.333 (see below) and 2.779 *uigilacibus* (*-atibus*, *-antibus* pars codd.) *curis*; cf. also 13.442; 14.21.

- 1.98 *non tuba directi, non aeris cornua flexi,
non galeae, non ensis erat*

read *derecti* with Housman, Edwards and Lee (1953). Planudes translates εὐθεία. Bömer notes from *Thes.* 6.897:68ff. that *directi* is unique, but does not use this observation to change the vulgate. The OLD throws *derigere* and *dirigere* into the same entry, but are we really dealing with variant spellings of the same verb? Cf. 8.400. The contrast is between the *straight* tuba and the *curved* horn.

- 1.190 *cuncta prius temptata, sed inmedicabile corpus
ense recidendum est*

read *uulnus* (or probably *uolnus*) with π E e etc. Planudes translates ἀνίατος πληγή. Cf. 2.825 *malum . . . inmedicabile*; 10.189 *inmedicabile uulnus*. It seems that, in A, *corpus* serves as a kind of 'passe-partout' word where the context demands *pectus*, *tergus*, *uulnus*, etc.; see below, p. 54.

- 1.331 *mulcet aquas rector pelagi supraque profundum
exstantem atque umeros innato murice tectum
caeruleum Tritona uocat conchaque sonanti
inspirare iubet*

There is nothing demonstrably wrong with *sonanti*, but I read *sonaci* with Beroaldus; it is the type of mistake discussed above (ad 1.91). Planudes translates εὐήχῳ κόγχῃ and Apuleius, *Met.* 4.31 has this very



passage in mind when he writes *hic* (sc. Triton) *concha sonaci leniter bucinat*. As an editor of Apuleius, Beroaldus must have remembered this particular adjective. Incidentally, Ovid may refer to the Triton fountain, one of the landmarks of Rome, also mentioned by Propertius 2.32.15f.

1.438-47 The sex of the Python snake must be determined one way or the other; it cannot change from male to female within the same context. Bömer says "Es besteht kein Grund, den Wechsel des Geschlecht in der Ueberlieferung nicht anzuerkennen", but this instant sex change seems far less acceptable than the simple change of an ending; hence read *perdomiti* in v. 447; cf. 3.38 and Planudes who treats the snake as male throughout (though the Python is female in Lucan 6.407).

1.601 *Interea medios Iuno despexit in agros*

Read in *Argos* with L. Müller (recorded by Anderson); cf. 14.476 *patriis sed rursus ab agris* (*Argis* E F W etc. recte) / *pellor*; 15.164 where Planudes found *agris* in his MS or MSS. (*Argis* A). Cf. also *Amores* 1.10.5; Propertius 2.16B, 47.

1.711 *atque ita disparibus calamis compagine cerae
inter se iunctis nomen tenuisse puellae*

tenuisse which seems impossible (but cf. A. G. Lee ad loc.) could be an intruder from v. 706; it has been emended many times; read perhaps *cecinsisse* (Shackleton Bailey *per litteras*; I had suggested a form of *canere*): Pan sings the name of his beloved, as he blows into the syrinx.

2.60 *uasti quoque rector Olympi,
qui fera terribili iaculatur fulmina dextra,
non aget hos currus: et quid Iove maius habemus?*

aget A : *agit* ε : *agat* E, but *agere currus* is hardly idiomatic; read *regit* with the *Fragm. Vossianum Heinsii* (*reget* cod. Moreti); cf. 2.86; 8.34; *Ibis* 470 *ut temere optatos qui male rexit equos*. E. J. Kenney proposes *regat*. But there may be a deliberate variation—*rector* . . . *agit*—, as W. Clausen suggests.

2.144 *poscimur, et fulget tenebris Aurora fugatis*

effulget Heinsius : *ecfulget* Housman; read perhaps *en fulget*. Bömer postulates '*et fere i.qu. nam*' which seems to stretch it too far; elsewhere (see below, p. 56) he considers *et* = *sed*, disregarding other

options. 'But it is common for Ovid to use connectives with colour according to context.' E. J. Kenney.

2.309 *unde mouet tonitrus uibrataque fulmina iactat*

read *librataque*; cf. 312 *libratum fulmen*; 624; Virg. *Aen.* 9.417 *summa telum librabat ab aure*.

2.377 *fit noua Cycnus auis nec se caeloque Iouique
credit ut iniuste missi memor ignis ab illo
stagna petit*

read perhaps: *at iniuste*. Here and there in the *Metamorphoses* it is difficult to decide between *et* and *at*; cf., e.g. the following:

7.487 *tristis abit 'stabunt'que tibi tua foedera magno
dixit et utilius bellum putat esse minari*

read perhaps: *at utilius*.

8.60f. *et, puto, uincemur. quis enim manet exitus urbem?
cur suus haec illi reseret mea moenia Mauors
et non noster amor?*

read: *at, puto* (Markland) . . . *qui si E, Naugerius . . . reserabit* (Heinsius ex Gronoviano Primo). Hollis, in his 1970 edition, with a commentary, of Book VIII, has a good discussion of this passage, and his reference to 11.425 is apt, cf. also 3.266 (below, p. 54).

9.554 *quid liceat, nescimus adhuc et cuncta licere
credimus et sequimur magnorum exempla deorum*

read probably *adhuc, at*, because there is a contrast between *nescire* and *credere*. The adversative force of καὶ in Koine Greek is well established (cf. Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the NT*⁴, p. 393 b (g)), but this may not apply to *et* which is closer paleographically to *at* than καὶ to ἀλλά..

10.354 *pius ille memorque est
moris- et o uellem similis furor esset in illo!*

read probably: *at* (ἀλλὰ γάρ Planudes).

3.48 *hos morsu, longis complexibus illos,
hos necat adflatu funesti tabe ueneni.*

afflatu hos E U : *afflat* (i ex u) W p v / *funesti* α P h : *funesta* A. Read *afflatos funesta* with Heinsius. Bömer's defense of the vulgate is a little

There are several problems here. In v. 479 read almost certainly *furoris*; cf. 6.480 *omnia pro stimulis facibusque ciboque furoris / accipit*, also Walter of Châtillon, *Alexandreis* 4.377 *mandunt alimenta furoris*.⁷ (Bömer documents *miser . . . amor* and equates *amor* and *furor*, but all this does not explain *miser . . . furor*.) In v. 480 read *diduxit*; cf. *Amores* 1.7.47, as restored by E. J. Kenney (CQ 12 [1962] 56), *aut tunicam <a> summa diducere turpiter ora*, where the MSS have *summa . . . deducere*. Cf. also *Met* 6.404f. *suas a pectore postquam / diduxit uestes* (*deduxit* A, corr. U³, Const. Fanensis). Finally, in v. 482 we have to make a choice between *tenuem . . . ruborem* and *roseum . . . colorem*; the former is supported by Planudes' ἐρύθημα λεπτόν (λευκόν codd., em. Boissonade.) A similar dilemma appears three lines later: *purpureum . . . colorem* (*ruborem* pars codd.). Shackleton Bailey objects: "Is *tenuis* used of colours? I should have thought that vigorous pounding would produce more than a faint flush."

3.519f. *namque dies aderit, quam non procul auguror esse,
qua nouus huc ueniat, proles Semeleia, Liber*

read: *iamque* with Heinsius (cf. *Hor. Sat.* 1.5.20) . . . *ueniet* (E² W e); Planudes has ἐπιδημήσει. '*iamque* puts *quam* . . . *esse* out of business' (Shackleton Bailey).

4.276 *'uulgatos taceo' dixit 'pastoris amores
Daphnidis Idaei, quem nymphe paelicis ira
contulit in saxum: tantus dolor urit amantes:
nec loquor, ut . . .*

(*tantus dolor urit amantes*) is best taken as a parenthesis, like 3.447 (*tantus tenet error amantem*), where E. J. Kenney made the same point (CR 20 [1970] 291). A parenthesis of this type is found in 6.18 (dist.

⁷ Edited by Marvin L. Colker (*Thesaurus Mundi* vol. 17 [Padua 1978]). The 'auctores' collected by Colker with great diligence, shed light here and there on the text of the *Metamorphoses*. Walters' *exemplar* must have been quite good; he never seems to have a corrupt reading, and here, at least, he helps us to restore the truth. Shackleton Bailey prefers *misero . . . furori*, because "surely it is more natural and straightforward, hence more like Ovid, to say 'furnish fuel to miserable passion' than 'furnish fuel of passion to miserable self.' For *miser* as epithet of *furor* see *Thesaurus*. On top of that there is the tendency to have an epithet before the caesura agreeing with a noun at the end." It is true that Martial 12.49.7 writes *succurras misero, precor, furori*, but the context in *Paneg. Lat.* 10 (2), 5.1 Mynors and in Claudian, *Carm. Min., App.* 3.43 seems different. The agreement between epithet and noun, frequent as it is, could have helped to produce a corruption. For the thought cf. *Rem.* 138 *haec sunt iucundi causa cibusque mali*; *Prop.* 3.21.4 *ipsa alimenta sibi maxima praebet amor*.

Read: *demetit* U³, Heinsius, Gierig (1804²), Boissonade (1822); cf. Val. Flacc. 3.157; Sil. Ital. 16.102. Again, Walter of Châtillon, *Alexandr.* 3.47 had access to the genuine tradition. Bömer declares the phrase *decutit ense caput* "als Junktur singulär," but adopts it without hesitation.

7.27

*quem non, ut cetera desint,
ore mouere potest? certe mea pectora mouit.
at nisi opem tulero, taurorum adflabitur ore
concurreretque suae segetis tellure creatis
hostibus aut auido dabitur fera praeda draconi.*

ore (28) . . . *ore* (29) seems hardly possible, but it is difficult to decide between *ore* . . . *igne* (h², Ciofani ex codd., Heinsius) or *forma* (P U³ a, Heinsius) . . . *ore*. In vv. 30f. the sense demands *concurreretque suae segeti, tellure creatis* / *hostibus*, and *segeti* is well supported (N² W d). There is still the problem of *fera praeda*, as Slater saw: how can the victim be fierce or savage? Bömer, as usual, operates with the magic term 'enallage' (the savage nature of the dragon is transferred to its victim). Planudes translated οἰκτρὰ λεία which makes one suspect a form of *miser* in his MS; Slater conjectured *mera praeda*, but *noua praeda* might also be considered. Shackleton Bailey: 'I can't track it down, but I feel sure that there are examples of *crudelis* = οἰκτρός (of the victim).' E. J. Kenney can only think of a much more drastic remedy, e.g., *rapietur* (31).

7.510

robora non desunt: superat mihi miles et hostis.

Something is probably missing before this line, as Riese suspected, but the line itself is curious. Aeacus is glad to offer all the help he can, and he boasts with the number of soldiers at his disposal; hence one would expect *superest* (cf. *Trist.* 2.69) *mihi miles in hostem* (Burman), but *supero* can be used like *supersum* (E. J. Kenney).

9.9

*quondam pulcherrima uirgo
multorumque fuit spes inuidiosa procorum;
cum quibus ut soceri domus est intrata petiti*

In v. 10 *ambitiosa* (Bentley) should be mentioned, and in v. 11 one might consider (*mihi*) *petenti*; *petere* is 'to seek the hand of a woman in marriage'; cf. 2.571 *diuitibus . . . procis . . . petebar*; Virg. *Aen.* 7.54; OLD 1370, s.v. 'peto,' 10 c. Although Bömer postulates a 'double enallage,' *socer . . . petitus* seems strange.

9.638 *iamque palam est demens inconcessamque fatetur
spem ueneris*

Read: *inconcessaeque* (Heinsius); cf. Planudes τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς ἀπειρομένης . . . μίξεως; 10.153f. *inconcessis* . . . *ignibus*; *Amores* 3.4.31 *inconcessa uoluptas*; Hor. *Carm.* 3.6.27f.; Virg. *Aen.* 1.651; Val. Max. 2.1.5; 7.3.10. Bömer's note is surprising: "Es ist nicht nötig, eine Gedankenverbindung durch Konjektur herzustellen, die sich durch einfache Enallage von selbst ergibt." That would be the end of textual criticism. See also E. J. Kenney, *CR* n.s. 29 (1979) 226.

9.687 *Inachis ante torum pompa comitata sacrorum
aut stetit aut uisa est*

Read: *suarum* (P); Heinsius found *suorum* in some of his MSS (L? p?); but cf. 2.725 *ibat eratque decus pompae comitumque suarum*; 6.594 *turba comitante suarum*; 6.96 *pars o Telethusa mearum*. Isis considers the women who worship her as 'her own'; they might be her *comites* (9.77), but *sociusque comesque sacrorum* (cf. 11.94) is different again: it would mean 'fellow-initiate,' συμμύστης.

11.20 *ac primum attonitas etiamnum uoce canentis
innumeras uolucres anguesque agmenque ferarum
Maenades Orphei titulum rapuere theatri.
inde cruentatis uertuntur in Orphea dextris
et coeunt, ut aues, si quando luce uagantem
noctis auem cernunt, structoque utrimque theatro
ceu matutina ceruus periturus harena
praeda canum est*

The Thracian women first kill the birds and beasts listening to Orpheus; then they concentrate on him. In v. 21 *innumeras* seems corrupt: one would expect the participle of a verb meaning 'to kill,' but I cannot find a solution. In v. 22 read probably *triumphi* (Plan., edd. vet.). In v. 25 another simile is introduced, hence one should read *structoue* for *structoque* (the *-que* was probably influenced by *utrimque*); for two or three similes connected by *-ue* cf., e.g., 9.659f. *ut sectae piceae de cortice guttae / u t u e* (*utque* U V) *tenax grauida manat tellure bitumen, / u t u e* (M v¹: *utque* A) . . .

11.172 *iudicium sanctique placet sententia montis*

read, perhaps, *placent*, i.e. *iudicium et sententia sancti montis placent*; unless this is taken as a form of hendiadys, or the singular stands 'by anticipation.' There are many similar cases in the *Metamorphoses*

where the MSS vary between singular and plural (e.g. 1.199; 2.688, etc.), and a systematic study should be made. E. J. Kenney thinks that Ovid more often than not followed the principle of making the verb agree with the nearest part of a compound subject. See his n. on *Lucret.* 3.66.

11.174

nec Delius aures

*humanam stolidas patitur retinere figuram,
sed trahit in spatium uillisque albetibus implet
instabilesque imas facit et dat posse moueri;
cetera sunt hominis: partem damnatur in unam
induiturque aures lente gradientis aselli.
ille quidem celare cupit turpique pudore
tempora purpureis temptat uelare tiaris*

In v. 177 I would suggest *ima* (sc. parte) for *imas*, though I cannot produce a good parallel for this kind of ellipse. In v. 178 *damnari in c. acc.* cannot be paralleled (Bömer ad loc.); phrases like *damnatus in metallum* (Pliny, *Epist.* 2.11.8) are clearly different. Read: *parte est damnatus in una*, and this is actually what Planudes translates, ἐνὶ δὲ τοῦτω τιμωρεῖται τῷ μέρει. *Turpique pudore* (180) arouses suspicion, as Anderson notes; he might have mentioned C. Schenkl's *torpensque pudore*.

11.365

*inde fragore graui strepitu loca proxima terret
belua uasta, lupus, uluisque palustribus exit
oblitus et spumis et crasso sanguine rictus,
fulmineus, rubra suffusus lumina flamma*

Of all the variants recorded by Anderson, *strepitans* U⁴ ex corr., Constantius Fanensis ex conl.,⁸ is the most attractive (*strepita* S points in the same direction). In vv. 367f. read probably *et sparsus* (M) *sanguine rictus* / *fulmineos* (P²); cf. 3.74; 4.97; 10.550 *fulmen habent acres in* (W in ras. : *et A*) *aduncis dentibus apri*. Prudentius, *Psychom.* 113f. has Ovid in mind, *spumanti feruida rictu / sanguinea intorquens suffuso lumina felle*.

11.525

*ut miles . . .**cum saepe adsiluit defensae moenibus urbis*

Read perhaps *urbi*.

11.552

unda uelut uictrix sinuataque despicit undas

⁸ It seems that Constantius Fanensis had access to U, because his emendations tend to agree with U³ or U⁴.

The repetition *unda . . . undas* is so pointless that one is tempted to think of *unda* as a 'passe-partout' word in this kind of description, like *corpus* (see above). Read with Burman *sinuatas . . . alas* and cf. Virg. *Aen.* 3.520 *uelorum pandimus alas*. An *ala* is a "section or reef of a sail" (OLD) that hangs from a horizontal bar in such a way as to suggest the neckline (*sinus*) of the *tunica* or *toga*, and the wave is towering over the highest *alae* of the ship.

- 11.681 *percutit ora manu laniatque a pectore uestes*
 pectoraque ipsa ferit; nec crines soluere curat,
 scindit et altrici, quae luctus causa, roganti
 'nulla est Alcione, nulla est' ait

The syntax would seem to demand *curans* for *curat* (v. 682), an easy change considering the way in which endings are treated in A. For *scindit* Heinsius suggested *caedit*, but cf. *Tr.* 3.3.52; *Petron.* 124. 1.271, etc.

- 11.718 *et, quamuis aberat, corpus tamen esse liquebat,*
 qui foret, ignorans, quia naufragus, omine mota est

quia S alii : *qui* E P e alii : *quis* F L W alii : *quid* h v alii. Read *nisi*. Alcione sees a body floating towards the shore; she does not know whose body it is, but he is obviously shipwrecked.

- 12.86 *'nate dea . . . ' inquit*
 ille 'quid a nobis uulnus miraris abesse?'
 (mirabatur enim) 'non haec, quam cernis equinis
 fulua iubis cassis neque onus caua parma sinistrae
 auxilio mihi sunt

Read: *quod . . . miraris abesse,* / *(mirabatur enim) 'non haec' . . .*

- 13.40 *optima num sumat, quia sumere noluit ulla?*
 num M : nunc A / quia M U : qui E F N P W e p / ulla M
 P E F N : illa U W e p

Read: *optima nunc sumet qui sumere noluit ulla?* E. J. Kenney considers *nunc* not necessarily better than *num* and points out that *quia* is followed up by *quia* (A2). To me the phrase rings like something of a *Controversia*.

- 13.780f. *huc ferus ascendit Cyclops mediusque resedit;*
 lanigerae pecudes nullo ducente secutae.

mediusque E N U h alli : *medioque* P W alii. Read: *mediusque resedit* / *lanigeræ pecudis*; cf. *Heroides* 6.13 and for *medius* c. gen. *Met.* 8.182.

- 13.966 *talìa decentem, dicturum plura reliquit*
Scylla deum: furit ille inritatusque repulsa
 . . . *petit . . . atria Circes.*

Read: *fugit*; there is a contradiction between *furit* and *inritatus*. '*Fugio* does not seem to be *uov propria*' (E. J. Kenney).

- 14.372 '*per, o, tua lumina*' dixit,
 '*qua mea ceperunt . . .*'

Read: perhaps *me*; cf. 378f.; Prop. 1.1.1 *Cynthia prima suis miserum me cepit ocellis*; *Am.* 1.10.10 (adduced by Kenney) could support the *paradosis*, but is slightly different: *facies tua oculos meos capit* vs. *oculi tui oculos meos capiunt*.

- 14.656 *adsimulauit anum cultosque intrauit in hortos*
pomaque mirata est. 'tanto' que 'potentior!' inquit

peritior E N² (*peri* in ras.) U W v : *petitior* Schepper. Read perhaps *beatior*, cf. 4.325 (*beatior* A : *potentior* e).

- 15.768 *solane semper ero iustis exercita curis?*

Read: *ego iniustis*. Planudes' ἔγωγε λύπαις ἀδίκαις points in this direction, as Slater recognized. The change *ero/ego* is easy (cf. 9.20), and *in-* could drop out before *iu-* by haplography.

I hope that these examples show how much more work remains to be done on the text of the *Metamorphoses*.

GEORG LUCK

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

THE MARRIAGE OF RUBELLIUS BLANDUS

In all the principate of Tiberius Caesar one of the blackest years was A.D. 33. Rome mourned for Agrippina, the widow of Germanicus, for her son Drusus and for the illustrious consular Asinius Gallus.

Confined to state custody for several years, they ended their lives by starvation, voluntary or imposed. To fill the tale of public woe came the marriage of the Emperor's grand-daughter Julia. The historian Tacitus, whose indignation could scarcely find the words to denounce the misconduct of her mother Livia Julia (the wife of Drusus Caesar)—the affair with Aelius Seianus, that 'municipalis adulter'—now goes on to disclose the melancholy fate of the daughter. She married beneath herself. The husband elected for a princess of the line of Julii and Claudii was a senator of municipal extraction, Rubellius Blandus. Men recalled his grandfather, a person of mere equestrian rank from Tibur.¹

They might have derived instruction, but no consolation, if they reflected that a proud disdain for the claims of blood and birth was no new thing among the patrician Claudii. Tiberius was running true to form.

If there was in the bridegroom Rubellius a disparity of years as well as of station, that was less to be reprehended, if at all, being a common feature of dynastic matches: the elderly Quirinius, a successful upstart who united diplomatic talent with military capacity, found himself rewarded more than a dozen years after his consulate with the hand of Aemilia Lepida, who was to have married Lucius Caesar, the adopted son of Augustus.² Not that Julia, the bride of Rubellius, was in her first youth, as the Romans reckoned these things. She had already been married, as long ago as the year 20, to Nero, the eldest son of Germanicus. A second match, to no less a person than Seianus, had recently been forestalled by a political catastrophe.³

¹ Tacitus, *Ann.* 6.27.1, cf. (for Livia) 4.3.4.

² *Ann.* 3.23.1.

³ *Ann.* 3.29.3. Julia's birth is put in A.D. 3 in PIR², J 636. Better, 5 or 6. Nero had just assumed the toga virilis, born presumably in 5. For the betrothal to Seianus, Dio 58.3.9 (Boissovain = Zonaras 11.2).

II

To introduce the year 33 the historian had selected two other weddings. It was high time for the head of the family to find husbands for two daughters of Germanicus, namely Julia Drusilla and Julia Livilla. The former he consigned to L. Cassius Longinus, the latter to M. Vinicius: the consular pair who opened the year 30.

Now aged seventy-three, the recluse on the island Capreae had given long and anxious thought to the matter: 'diu quaesito.'⁴ Five years previously he awarded Agrippina (the eldest of the three sisters) to Domitius Ahenobarbus (to be consul in 32). Ahenobarbus stood close to the power, being the son of the elder Antonia. Not perhaps a judicious choice, as Tiberius might be coming to see.

Of close kin to the dynasty, there was a Junius Silanus, now aged about nineteen.⁵ Also his coeval, the son of that excellent Lepidus (*cos.* 6) who is designated 'nomini ac fortunae Caesarum proximus.'⁶

This time the Princesps decided on extraneous husbands. Cassius, the brother of the jurist, of the plebian *nobilitas*, was a descendant of the tyrannicide, while Vinicius belonged to the new imperial aristocracy, grandson of M. Vinicius (*cos. suff.* 19 B.C.). Both were congenial to Ti. Caesar, on various counts, notably their age, although his despatch to the Senate was couched 'levi cum honore iuvenum.'

The young senator takes his first bride when about twenty-two, not long before his quaestorship. Matrimony invites speculation, and sometimes repays it.⁷ By a contrary phenomenon, marriages earlier and earlier had become manifest in the 'domus regnatricis.' Nero, the eldest son of Germanicus was united to Julia in 20, when he assumed the 'toga virilis.'

In the past Tiberius Caesar had himself fallen victim to matrimonial arrangements in the dynasty; and after the decease of his son Drusus in 23 he suffered under the exacerbating presence and discords

⁴ *Ann.* 6.15.1. Drusilla was born in 16 or 17, Livilla in 18 (PIR², J 664; 674). For 'diu quaesito' compare 'saepe apud se pensitato' (3.52.3): taken by Tacitus from the exordium of the Tiberian missive to the Senate (53f.).

⁵ M. Junius Silanus (*cos.* 46), whose father (*cos.* 19) had married Aemilia Lepida, the great-granddaughter of Augustus.

⁶ Velleius 2.114.3 (writing in 30). For the son, PIR², A 371.

⁷ For the peculiar case of Paullus Fabius Maximus, the consul of 11 B.C., still a bachelor about five or six years earlier (Horace, *Odes* 4.1), see *History in Ovid* (1978) 143ff.

of four widows.⁸ A decade later he hoped to obviate vexations by selecting for the princesses three husbands of mature years, no obtrusive ambitions, and no previous attachment to the dynasty. For a time at least. For himself, he had no expectations of near extinction.⁹

So far motives nowhere documented but not evading rational conjecture. Cassius and Vinicius raise no problem. But what of Rubellius Blandus, over twenty years their senior (as will emerge in this enquiry), singled out to take over the grand-daughter of Caesar?

Discredit adhered from Julia's adulterous mother (the mistress of Seianus) who committed suicide after the catastrophe of October 18, A.D. 31. It was expedient to excise Julia from the succession. Two ways of disposal offered. Either seclusion or an inconspicuous marriage to a tranquil man well on in life. Parallels occur in the annals of dynasties before or since.

III

It remains to investigate the extraction of C. Rubellius C. f. Blandus, his career as a senator, the identity of relatives and the history of a municipal family through four generations. Hence a variety of problems, some of them resolved as epigraphic evidence accrues.¹⁰

First of all, the year of Blandus' consulship, giving a clue to his age. The gravestone of Calpurnia Donata registered September 3 under 'Blando et Pollione': Borghesi assigned the pair to the early years of Tiberius.¹¹ Blandus spoke in the Senate as a consular towards the end of the year 21; and for the colleague C. Anniius Pollio was attractive, certainly a consul before 32.¹²

The *Fasti Ostienses* have now disclosed C. Rubellius Blandus, entering office on August 1 of 18, with M. Vipstanus Gallus (the first consul in a new family destined to long duration).¹³ 'Blandus et Pollio' therefore recede. Where Anniius Pollio should go remains a question: 21, 22 or 28.¹⁴ As for the consular pair, Borghesi was moved by the

⁸ Hence one reason for departing in 26, 'certus procul urbe degere' (4.57.1).

⁹ The forecast of the astrologer Thrasyllus is recorded, but at a later date, by Dio 58.27.2 (cf. Suetonius, *Tib.* 62.3).

¹⁰ For Blandus and his father see the succinct account of U. Weidemann, *Acta Classica* 7 (1964) 64ff., with a valuable table of the epigraphic documents (66f.).

¹¹ CIL VI 14221, cf. Borghesi, *Oeuvres* IV, 479.

¹² *Ann.* 3.51.1; 6.9.3. For C. Anniius Pollio, PIR², A 627.

¹³ FO VI = Degrassi, *Inscr. It.* XIII 1, p. 104 (first published in 1930).

¹⁴ In any event a place has to be found for Q. Sanquinius Maximus, suffect for the second time in 39 and *praefectus urbi*.

dating by *suffecti* which on funerary inscriptions quickly faded out in the early imperial epoch. However, a sporadic instance crops up in the reign of Hadrian.¹⁵ Nothings debars a consulship for a son of Blandus.¹⁶ The cognomen is not found in any other family, senatorial or high equestrian.

IV

Next, the Rubellii. The grandfather, the Roman knight from Tibur, passed into literary and social history as the first person of his rank to adopt the profession of teaching rhetoric.¹⁷ He belongs with the first generation of the famous Augustan orators and declaimers who stand on abundant show in the pages of Seneca: coeval perhaps with Passienus, who died in 9 B.C., or with Q. Haterius, born about 63, and perhaps a dozen years older than Seneca and his friend Porcius Latro.

A further identity has been discovered and accepted for this Rubellius Blandus. Early in the year 43 Cicero commended to the good offices of Q. Cornificius, governing the province Africa Vetus, a group of six persons, left heirs by the businessman Q. Turius. He was a 'vir bonus et honestus,' and they bore the same stamp.¹⁸ One of the company was a C. Rubellius.¹⁹ Another, Sex. Aufidius, earns praise in a second letter: 'splendore equiti Romano nemini cedit.'²⁰ Finally, a third letter concerning L. Aelius Lamia, otherwise known as 'equestris ordinis princeps' and a person of consequence already in 58 when the consul Gabinius ordered him to leave Rome.²¹

Rubellius and Lamia both left a firm imprint on their operations in Africa. An estate in the upper valley of the Bagradas is on ample attestation, known as the 'saltus Blandianus' adjacent to the 'saltus Lamianus.'²²

¹⁵ ILS 7912, in December, to be assigned to 125.

¹⁶ That is, perhaps the Rubellius Blandus of Juvenal 8.39 ff. On whom see below, sub fine. But Blandus may have had a different son, by an earlier marriage.

¹⁷ Seneca, *Controv.* 2, praef. 5.

¹⁸ *Ad fam.* 12.26.1. For remarks on the whole group, *Historia* 13 (1964) 162f. = *Roman Papers* (1979) 612.

¹⁹ In his text (1977) Shackleton Bailey prefers 'Rubellinum' (the best mss.), citing in his commentary Schulze, LE 220 (three sporadic instances: CIL VI 25501; IX 1738 (Beneventum); X 7212 (in Sicily)).

²⁰ *Ad fam.* 12.27

²¹ *Ad fam.* 12.29

²² CIL VIII 25943, cf. 26416.

These knights of substance and repute were well qualified to be the founders of senatorial families.²³ Nor was business acumen incongruous with the teaching profession.²⁴ So far therefore an impeccable equation.

V

A small fact can overturn the obvious or the plausible. Tacitus gave no hint of any rank or occupation for the consul's father: 'patre praetorio' would not add anything of value. Two inscriptions reveal a C. Rubellius Blandus as proconsul of Crete and Cyrene. The first at Gortyn, calls for no comment.²⁵ The second is on the eastern part of the propylaeum of the Caesareum at Cyrene.²⁶ A recent revision produces 'C. Rubellius L. [f. Blandus].'²⁷

The consequence is noteworthy. Acquiring the praenomen 'Lucius,' Rubellius the 'rhetor' is disjoined from C. Rubellius the 'negotiator.' The latter will be regarded as his brother, quite a lot older perhaps—at least some of that African congregation were well on in years.²⁸ The praenomen now acquires a further interest. At Marruvium was discovered a base dedicated to 'C. Rubellio L. f. / Cam. [B]lando.'²⁹ Perhaps the Augustan senator and proconsul. Not that it matters. Marruvium in the Marsian country avows more significant links with the Rubellii (see below).

VI

Their own *patria* furnishes three dedications.³⁰ First, to Argive Juno, made by 'C. Blandus procos.' By suppressing the *gentilicium*,

²³ Senatorial in the next generation, the Lamiae (from Formiae) advance to the excellent L. Aelius Lamia (*cos.* 3).

²⁴ As witness the versatile Remmius Palaemon, profitably investing in vineyards (Suetonius, *Gram* 23).

²⁵ AE 1930, 62 = I Cret. IV 293.

²⁶ J. M. Reynolds, *PBSR* XXVI (1958) 30, whence AE 1960, 266. The editor argued for Blandus the consul (*suff.* 18). Against, U. Weidemann, *op. cit.* 67f.; W. Eck, *RE*, Supp. XIV, 588.

²⁷ L. Gasperini, *Quad. Arch. Lib.* 6 (1971) 7, with figs. 8 and 9.

²⁸ Q. Considius Gallus (*Ad fam.* 12.26.1) may be identical with Q. Considius, the high-minded capitalist who refrained from calling in his loans in the crisis of 63 B.C. (Val. Max 4.8.3).

²⁹ AE 1975, 305.

³⁰ ILS 3908; 3401; 196.

the man affects the aristocratic style of nomenclature, as did M. Agrippa and L. Plancus; and his brief title was the best a senator could manage if he had not reached a consulship. Second, the renovation of an ancient altar set up by the great god of Tibur: 'Iovi Praestiti / Hercules Victor dicavit / Blandus pr. restituit.' Whether the father or the son may be waived. The third, to 'Diva Drusilla,' carries the name and filiation of the son, followed by his career '[q.] divi Aug., tr. pl., pr., cos., [pr]ocos. pontif.' The enumeration is sober and dignified. It omits minor magistracy and military tribunate if he held either or both of those posts. Some may conceive surprise that in this season (the summer of 38 or not much later) Blandus chose not to specify Asia or Africa as the proconsulate.

The parent had not gone further than the governorship of Crete and Cyrene. Not on high estimation, avoided by *nobiles* and almost furnishing a guarantee that the man would never become consul. Of seventeen during the reigns of Augustus and his successor only one achieved it.³¹

However, C. Blandus L. f. was amply endowed and he had done well otherwise, through socially resplendent matrimony. The facts emerge from later evidence, to combine and furnish a complicated family tree that extends to the epoch of Hadrian.³² The cardinal documents are

(1) *ILS* 281 (Rome): Sergiae/Laenatis f./Plautillae/matri/imp. Nervae/Caesaris Aug.

(2) *ILS* 952 (Tusculum): [Rub]elliae/[Bla]ndi f. Bassae/Octavi Laenatis/Sergius Octavius/Laenas Pontianus/aviae optimae.

The construction is briefly as follows. Rubellius Blandus, the parent of the consul, had annexed a Sergia, presumed a daughter of the patrician L. Sergius Plautus. The Sergii, an ancient house, had not shown a consul for more than four centuries—and not to be retrieved by the desperate ambitions of L. Sergius Catilina. The next Sergius is disclosed by the dedication set up by a distant city: 'L. Sergio Regis f./ Arn. Plauto q. /salio Palatino/patrono.'³³

Something further is known about Sergius Plautus. He wrote about the doctrines of the Stoics.³⁴ Like the study of Roman legal and

³¹ For the list, W. Eck, *Zephyrus* 23–24 (1972/3) 245 f. The exception is Cornelius Lupus (*suff.* 42), a personal friend of Claudius—and not likely to be one of the patrician Cornelii, cf. *PIR*², C 1400.

³² E. Groag, *Jahreshefte* 21–22 (1924) 425 ff., with stemma (435 f.). The results are resumed in *Tacitus* (1958) 627 f.

³³ *ILS* 2922 (Urso, in Baetica).

³⁴ *PIR*¹, S 378.

religious antiquities, philosophy (though in a lesser measure) provided consolation for the decayed patriciate during evil days, not abandoned under the peace of the Caesars and before long to be enhanced. Plautus bequeathed a tradition to the grandson, Rubellius Plautus.

His time of life concerns the family tree. He might be identified as '[Sergius] Plaut(us),' *praetor peregrinus* in A.D. 2.³⁵ If so, perhaps the brother rather than the father of the Sergia who married the father of Rubellius the consul.

That is not all. Another Sergia married an Octavius Laenas, otherwise not on record. He is the father of C. Octavius Laenas, consul suffect in 33. In that year died the jurist M. Cocceius Nerva (*suff.* 21 or 22). Laenas took his place in the charge of the Roman aqueducts.³⁶ Not inappropriate. Laenas had given his daughter Sergia Plautilla to the son of Cocceius Nerva.³⁷

Finally, the nexus with the Rubellii. Through his mother Sergia, Rubellius Blandus (*suff.* 18) was first cousin to Octavius Laenas (*suff.* 33). He duly tightened the link by bestowing his daughter Rubellia Bassa on a son of Laenas.³⁸

Hence a large company of persons, known only from inscriptions or as necessary postulates in a stemma. They illustrate the transmission of maternal nomenclature, and sometimes its predominance. It is no surprise that the *novus homo* Octavius Laenas preferred to exalt his daughter by the style 'Sergia Plautilla.'

The phenomenon is frequent enough—and useful for indagating maternal ancestry.³⁹ Another device of the new imperial nobility was ostentatious indeed. The latest character on the stemma is Sergius Octavius Laenas Pontianus (*cos.* 131). An earlier specimen of the *gentilicium* exploited in this fashion has turned up: Sergius Rubellius Plautus on a lead pipe at Rome.⁴⁰ No evidence attested a praenomen for Plautus, the son of Blandus and Julia.

* * *

³⁵ *Inscr. It.* XIII 1, p. 297. Groag, however, preferred to assume a son of the philosopher (op. cit. 432, n. 22).

³⁶ Frontinus, *Aq.* 102.

³⁷ As shown by ILS 281. There is no sign that this Nerva (PIR², C 1226) held a consulship.

³⁸ As shown by ILS 952: the (maternal) grandmother Rubellia Bassa celebrated by Sergius Octavius Laenas Pontianus (the consul of 131).

³⁹ Thus Servilia, the daughter of Q. Marcius Barea Soranus, and Fannia, daughter of P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus.

⁴⁰ AE 1954, 70: adduced in *Tacitus* (1958) 628.

The Octavii Laenates are a reputable family deriving from the Marsian country. No need to seek help from 'Marso nescio quo Octavio, scelerato latrone atque egenti.'⁴¹ An Octavius Laenas held a magistracy at Marruvium.⁴² For Marsians the exit into Latium from the high country was Tibur, by the Via Valeria. Hence early relations to be surmised in forgotten history. Recently Marruvium paid honour to a C. Rubellius L.f. Blandus.⁴³

VII

The study of Roman families and senatorial careers was styled long ago a sheer delight.⁴⁴ If arduous, it can sometimes issue in valid results, not under contestation. Thus for the Rubellii, at least so far. A problem of ages and identities impinged that can no longer be postponed: a C. Rubellius Blandus was one of the *tresviri monetales*. He has often been taken to be the father of the consul.⁴⁵

The post is held by young men two or three years short of the quaestorship. Clear indications are to hand. For example, two moneyers in a college firmly dated to 16 B.C. become consuls in 6 and 5.⁴⁶ Both had the benefit of consular parentage, hence able to accede to the *fascēs* at thirty-two or not long after, according to the regulations ordained in the Republic of Caesar Augustus. The new man is in a different case, twenty years (and often more) elapsing before his consulship.

Blandus the *monetalis* is involved in the most intricate problem of Augustan numismatics. He belongs to one of the four colleges who signed the small brass coins, the *quadrantes*. The group is otherwise anomalous, since one half has three members, the other four.⁴⁷ Dates for the four have been allocated in a range between the years 9 and 2.⁴⁸

⁴¹ Cicero, *Phil.* 11.4. He had 'Marcus' for praenomen (Appian, *BCiv.* 4.62.266).

⁴² ILS 5364.

⁴³ AE 1975, 305.

⁴⁴ Nepos, *Vita Attici* 21.4: quibus libris nihil potest esse dulcius iis qui aliquam cupidinem habent notitiae clarorum virorum.' That 'honesta cupido' abated in the long sequel, with dire consequences for the understanding of Roman history.

⁴⁵ PIR¹, R 81; Nagl, RE IA, 1158. And most in the sequel.

⁴⁶ viz. C. Antistius Vetus and L. Vinicius, cf. PIR², A 771.

⁴⁷ In BMC.R. Emp. I, XCVIII. the four were numbered and ordered as follows:

IX Lamia, Silius, Annius

X Pulcher, Taurus, Regulus

XIII Apronius, Galus, Messalla, Sisenna

XIV P. Betilienus, C. Naevius Capella, C. Rubellius Blandus,

L. Valerius Catullus

⁴⁸ Mattingly selected the years 9, 8, 5, 4. For K. Pink, however, a run from 10-7 (NZ LXXI [1946]) 123. Again, adopting Mattingly's temporal order, 6, 5, 3, 2 in A. Kunisz,

C. Rubellius Blandus had three partners lacking any clue of identity, although by exception all possess full nomenclature. For this college the dating varies, with a strong tendency towards the lower limit.⁴⁹ To cut short a long discussion, no harm or vexation ensues when Blandus is put in the vicinity of 3 B.C.⁵⁰

If that is so, the *monetalis* comes out as the future consul. To argue for parent would run into difficulties.⁵¹ For example, not old enough to have a son consul in A.D. 18. In passing brief observations may be set on record. First, there is no call to put the moneyers of *quadrantes* in a close sequence. Second, the range might extend from 11 to 1. Third, Livineius Regulus, one of the three *suffecti* in A.D. 18. If he is supposed identical with the Regulus of one college, and with 'Reg[. . .],' who was *praetor peregrinus* in 2 B.C., he can hardly have held the post later than 9 B.C.⁵² Therefore about fifty when consul. A casual notice shows Livineius an advocate of consequence. Along with M. Lepidus and L. Piso he undertook to defend Cn. Piso in 20.⁵³ The Livineii were already senatorial in the last epoch of the Republic.⁵⁴

VIII

To have Blandus a *monetalis* in 3 or 2 B.C., hence born about 25, concords with the year of his consulship. That is, acceding to the *fasces* at forty-two. For a senator of non-consular parentage, earlier access cannot be established under Augustus or in the first epoch of his successor. A pair of items concerning Caecina Severus (*suff.* 1 B.C.) is consonant with birth c. 44 B.C. In A.D. 15 he has forty *stipendia* behind him, likewise in 21.⁵⁵ The first figure reckons from the military tribu-

Recherches sur le monnayage et la circulation monétaire sous le règne d'Auguste (Wrocław 1976) 153. On the latter, observe that 6 B.C. will not do for L. Aelius Lamia (*cos.* A.D. 3).

⁴⁹ For the detail, references in U. Weidemann, *op. cit.* 64 n. 8. Add K. Pink (8 B.C.).

⁵⁰ Discord being evident among experts, and urgent need for constant regard to dates and ages in the careers of senators. Some of the *quadrantes* might belong in the period A.D. 10–14, so M. Grant opined, *The Six Main Aes Coinages of Augustus* (1953) 108ff. He stated that 'prosopography affords virtually no aid.'

⁵¹ U. Weidemann indicated a preference for the consul's father but remained inconclusive (*op. cit.* 65. cf. 68). For the consul, T. P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate 169 B.C.–14 A.D.* (1971) 256.

⁵² The praetor was not noted in PIR², L 290.

⁵³ *Ann.* 3.11.2.

⁵⁴ From Campania, cf. T. P. Wiseman, *op. cit.* 237. To which, add *Ann.* 14.17.1.

⁵⁵ *Ann.* 1.64.4; 3.33.1.

nate, the second from the quaestorship. Caecina was of good family, from Volaterrae. Some of the low-born military such as Tarius Rufus (*suff.* 16 B.C.) and Sulpicius Quirinius (*cos.* 12) may well have had to wait some years. Much longer might be the delay if a man had only the arts of peace to commend him: that is to say, law and oratory. When Q. Haterius, a speaker of some note, won that distinction in 5 B.C. he was then close on sixty—nearly ninety when he died in 26.⁵⁶ Another person of this type is C. Vibius Rufus (*suff.* 16), frequently cited, like Haterius, in the reminiscences of Seneca. A stray anecdote helps. Rufus affected high pretensions, boasting that he owned the curule chair of Caesar the Dictator and a wife who had once been married to the orator Cicero.⁵⁷ The lady cannot be Terentia.⁵⁸ She is that Publilia whom her guardian married in 46 B.C. and divorced the next year.⁵⁹ Therefore either Rufus was quite inhuman in his passion for relics and antiques, marrying a woman nearly old enough to be his grandmother, or else he was considerably older, almost a generation older, than the date which his consulship might indicate. In fact the retardation of Rufus is confirmed once he is recognized as the parent of C. Vibius Rufinus, consul suffect with M. Cocceius Nerva in 21 or 22.⁶⁰ Rufinus acquires ample definition as a friend of Ovid, as an author writing about herbs and trees and flowers, as a proconsul in Asia, to be assigned the tenure 36/7.⁶¹

The short interval after the consulship of a parent, an elderly *novus homo*, here on attestation for the first time, recurs in the sequel, predictably. Acquiring rank and privilege the son begins on parity with the most eminent in the land.

Though only the son of a praetor, Rubellius enjoyed early favour from Caesar Augustus. As quaestor (c. A.D. 2) he was one of the pair allocated to the ruler.⁶² They tend to be aristocratic. For parallel to

⁵⁶ Jerome, *Chron.* p. 172 H, cf. *Ann.* 4.61.

⁵⁷ Dio 57.15.6.

⁵⁸ Who became a subject of confusion and fable, allegedly transmitted 'per quosdam gradus eloquentiae' to Sallust and to Messalla Corvinus (Jerome, *Adv. Iov.* 1.48).

⁵⁹ A neglected inscription reveals M. Publilius Strato, freedman of Publilia and of C. Vibius Rufus (CILXIV 2556: Tusculum). On which, cf. *CQ* 28 (1978) 293f.

⁶⁰ CIL VI 1539; 9005 = ILS 1795 (August). Thus Groag in *PIR*², C 1225 (the consular jurist). Others have tried to put the pair in the vicinity of the year 40.

⁶¹ For this argument, *History in Ovid* (1978) 85f. Rufinus ended as legate of Germania Superior, attested in 43 and in 45 (ILS 7076; 2283). The articles on Rufus and Rufinus in *RE* VIII A, 1979ff. were in any case defective, variously.

⁶² On which, M. C  beillac, *Les Quaestores Principis*, etc. (1973).

Blandus observe one of the four Vitellius brothers (sons indeed of a procurator).⁶³ Or Ummidius Quadratus, quaestor in 14.⁶⁴ Q. Vitellius was thrown out of the Senate in 17.⁶⁵ Quadratus, after a rapid advance to a praetorship in 18, had to wait about twenty-two years for the consulate.

Persons somewhat unlikely on a surface view may nevertheless have seen provinces and armies. A military tribunate omitted (like the post of *monetalis*) from the proud and sober presentation of Blandus' career on his Tiburtine inscription is no bar. Again, Blandus either before or after his praetorship may have been for a time with Ti. Caesar on the northern campaigns (from 4 onwards). Casual allusions in Ovid render that hypothesis plausible for a pair of his cultivated friends, viz. Pomponius Graecinus (*suff.* 16) and Vibius Rufinus (*suff.* 21 or 22).⁶⁶ In long absences from Rome the general needed congenial company.

IX

When Caesar proposed to reward an aspiring new man with one of the four major priesthoods, the honour normally accrued about the time of his consulship. Blandus became a pontifex. Along with the augurs they stood highest in estimation.

In the *Annales* of Tacitus Rubellius Blandus makes two appearances as a speaker. In 20 he proposed a harsh penalty against Aemilia Lepida, the divorced wife of Sulpicius Quirinius; and in the following year, alone among the consulars, he supported Marcus Lepidus on the plea of mercy for Clutorius Priscus, the vain and incautious author of a premature funerary lament for the ailing Drusus Caesar.⁶⁷ Then nothing until wedlock with Julia.

Blandus had slipped unscathed through the season of hazard and peril that opened with Agrippina and her eldest son consigned to imprisonment in 29, to culminate in the destruction of Aelius Seianus and the dreadful aftermath. Meanwhile the Rubellii acquired a notable enhancement. In 29 L. Rubellius Geminus comes out as *consul ordinarius*, unique on the *Fasti* between Pomponius Flaccus in 17 and L. Vitellius in 34. Both enjoyed the friendship and confidence of the ruler.

⁶³ Suetonius, *Vit.* 1.2.

⁶⁴ ILS 972 (Casinum).

⁶⁵ *Ann.* 2.48.3.

⁶⁶ Ovid *Ex Ponto* 1.6.1f. (Graecinus) 3.4.5 and 64 (Rufinus).

⁶⁷ *Ann.* 3.23.2; 51.1.

Geminus is only a name: a younger brother of Blandus, or perhaps a nephew. Curiosity should have been aroused by L. Rubellius T. T. Geminus Caesianus on a gravestone at Rome, a boy who died at the age of thirteen.⁶⁸ The cognomen 'Caesianus' admits of alternative explanations. First, the boy's father was a T. Rubellius Geminus who had married a Caesia. The praenomen 'Titus' deters. Not borne so far as known by the Tiburtine family—and in the whole of Italy only one T. Rubellius.⁶⁹

Second therefore, and better, a product of adoption, to be assumed testamentary because of the retained patronymic. On that showing, L. Rubellius Geminus adopted the son of a T. Caesius. For adoption, recourse is had to relatives in the first instance. The boy Caesius looks like a nephew to the wife of L. Rubellius Geminus (*cos.* 29).

In any event, a link between the two families, hence a temptation to search for others, even if not to be proved of close propinquity. At first sight, scant prospect. Caesii are all too frequent throughout Italy.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, Tibur has something to offer among the better sort. First, the family of the lyric poet Caesius Bassus, the friend of Persius.⁷¹ He had an estate in the Sabine country, where he wrote poems in winter; and also a villa beneath Vesuvius, where he perished during the eruption.⁷² An inscription found on the territory of Tibur concerns C. Caesius Bassus: a piece of property was sold in his absence, the proceeds to be paid to two men, a Scipio and a M. Silanus.⁷³

Second, L. Apronius Caesianus, the son of L. Apronius (*suff.* 8): consul in 39 and proconsul of Africa. To him belongs without doubt the fragment at Tibur showing the tribe of that city. It begins with 'L. f. Cam. / [...].janus.'⁷⁴ The military man L. Apronius was a trusted adherent of Tiberius Caesar—and not likely to incur danger during the season of Seianus. He had married a Caesia: his daughter, the wife of Lentulus Gaetulicus, was called either Caesia or Caesiana.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ CIL VI 25503 (registered in PIR¹, R 84 under the consul Geminus).

⁶⁹ viz. T. Rubellius L. f. Pudens (CIL V 3024: Patavium).

⁷⁰ Over three columns in TLL, Onomasticon.

⁷¹ PIR², C 192.

⁷² *Vita Persii* (twice); Schol. on Persius 6.1.

⁷³ CIL XIV 3471 (between Varia and Sublaqueum). Accepted as the poet himself in PIR², C 192.

⁷⁴ AE 1916, 110 = *Inscr. It.* IV 1. 52. Not a Junius Silanus as there assumed. In PIR², A 972 Groag was unduly diffident: 'nescio an.' He is registered, but not as Apronius Caesianus, on the list of African proconsuls by B. E. Thomasson, RE Supp. XIII, 3.

⁷⁵ PIR², C 976.

X

Blandus owed social ascent to his father's acquisition of Sergia. It carried alliance with another rising family, the Octavii Laenates, and through them with the consular Cocceii. Of a previous marriage for Blandus himself, no trace survives. It would be peculiar indeed if this good man refused the social norm and failed to contract a match shortly before his quaestorship. For some of the municipal men local repute and opulence outweighed the advantages (often hazardous or oppressive) imported by an aristocratic bride.

It was an elderly gentleman, verging towards sixty, who won the hand of a princess, fifteen years subsequent to his consulship: a tranquil steady person, avoiding excess, remote from feuds and annoyance. Life under the Caesars entailed discretion. Some of the wealthy paraded antique parsimony, congenial as a protest against conspicuous expenditure; and an aristocrat might be disposed to conceal for safety his talent or ambitions, passing for dull or merely amiable.⁷⁶

The qualities that Tiberius looked for when making his selection in 33 are not devoid of instruction. Cassius did not respond like his brother to a rigorous upbringing—'facilitate saepius quam industria commendabatur.' Vinicius is styled 'mitis ingenio et comptae facundiae.'⁷⁷

Blandus was something of an orator, although not in the first rank for eloquence among the consulars. He might also have been a writer. The commentator Servius happens to cite 'Rubellius Blandus et Quadrigarius historici.'⁷⁸ Though linked to a late Republican annalist, this Rubellius Blandus may be an antiquarian researcher rather than a historian—and the *rhetor* rather than the consular (though anything can happen in a long life). Blandus is not likely to have neglected the traditions and cults of his *patria*. Blandus (and not his father) may have restored the Hercules altar at Tibur.⁷⁹

It would be a pleasing fancy that Blandus, responsive to another kind of tradition (the maternal grandfather a philosopher), devoted anxious care to the education of his children. They came too late to

⁷⁶ A certain Cornelius Sulla was alleged a 'simulator segnitiae' (*Ann.* 14.57.3). Falsely, cf. 13.47. 3: 'nullius ausi capax natura.'

⁷⁷ *Ann.* 6.15.1.

⁷⁸ Servius on *Georgics* 1.103 (Gargara, in the territory of Thurii).

⁷⁹ ILS 3401. For the antiquarian writer Octavius Herennus, RE XVII, 1830. He dealt with Hercules Victor and the Tiburtine guild of Salii.

benefit from precept or example. Rubellius Plautus cannot be more than quaestorian in rank when he goes into exile in 60, while Blandus, absent from record subsequent to 38, may not have survived to complete the sixty-third year of his life (see below).

XI

Before the end Blandus achieved the proconsulate of Africa. It is certified to 35/6 by inscriptions at Lepcis.⁸⁰ The abnormal delay since his consulship comes as a surprise, at first sight. The explanation is not far to seek.

Tiberius Caesar set out with the intention of maintaining a decennial interval, but the system encountered sundry disturbances. In Africa proconsuls had to be specially appointed or prorogued because of the seven years of warfare (17–24), and in Asia at least one tenure of two years intervened (26–28).⁸¹ That was a tolerable phenomenon, unlike what soon became manifest.

In a general statement Cassius Dio alludes to consular proconsuls retained in office for a sexennium.⁸² The names and dates are worth knowing. The process works out as follows. In 29 the lot awarded Asia to P. Petronius (*suff.* 19). About M. Silanus M.f. (*cos.* 19) there are certain problems: he went to Africa in 30, succeeding C. Vibius Marsus (*suff.* 17).⁸³ Both mandates were prolonged until the summer of 35.

It was high time for the ruler to break free from his morbid habits of procrastination. Prolonged tenures find apologists, it is true: a wise choice of governors, care for the well-being of the provincials, and so on. In this instance nine or ten ex-consuls were frustrated of legitimate aspirations—and the practice does not recur.

In 35 Tiberius had to reach back a long way for proconsuls. For Asia, to Cotta Messallinus (*cos.* 20).⁸⁴ Early in the next year the patri-

⁸⁰ IRT 330f., cf. also (not dated) 269; 540.

⁸¹ AE 1934, 87 (Cos): M. Lepidus (*cos.* 6), an anomalous appointment. For Lepidus and for other proconsuls of the period, *JRS* 45 (1955) 29f. = *Ten Studies in Tacitus* (1970) 43f.; *History in Ovid* (1978) 160f.

⁸² Dio 58.23.5 (under 33: no names).

⁸³ The tenure of Marsus was triennial (ILS 9375), i.e. from 27 to 30, but he may have been recalled before its expiry. As concerns Silanus, the dedication to C. Maenius Bassus comes in: 'praefecto fabrum/M. Silani M. f. sexto/Carthaginis' (ILS 6236: Tibur). The years may be calendar, not proconsular. A tenure for Silanus from 36 to 39 has found recent advocates, cf. B. E. Thomasson's list in *RE Supp.* XIII, 3. On which, remarks in *Historia* 30 (1981) 196f.

⁸⁴ The year is not attested, but there is no other place.

cian C. Sulpicius Galba (*cos.* 22) debarred from the proconsular sortition by 'tristes litterae' from Caesar, committed suicide.⁸⁵ Asia, it appears, fell to Vibius Rufinus (*suff.* 21 or 22).⁸⁶ In Africa the successor to Rubellius Blandus has not been ascertained.⁸⁷ What else is known of Blandus can be briefly chronicled. When in 36 a conflagration laid waste the Aventine and a great part of the Circus Maximus, Caesar furnished funds to make good the damage, and a commission was appointed: the husbands of the three daughters of Germanicus (namely Ahenobarbus, Cassius, Vinicius), along with Rubellius Blandus. Another senator was added to their number: P. Petronius, like Blandus a recent proconsul.⁸⁸ The last trace of Blandus belongs to the year 38 when he set up the dedication to 'Diva Drusilla.' His name does not occur in the context of dynastic plots or perturbations before or after the death of Caligula. Kinship with the dynasty might have conferred a public funeral.⁸⁹ In 43 the widow fell a victim to intrigues of Valeria Messallina.⁹⁰ Nor was much to be heard of the three noblemen who married the daughters of Germanicus. Cassius was compelled by Caligula to surrender his wife to the young Aemilius Lepidus, his coeval friend—and the designated successor to the throne. Cassius was an easy-going fellow. Vinicius, however, turned out to be a man of spirit. After the assassination of Caligula he was eager to make a bid for the power. Although Vinicius sought thereafter to appear harmless, and survived for a season with a second consulship in 45, he perished in the next year, poisoned, so it was alleged, by Valeria Messallina. Ahenobarbus had succumbed to a natural death in 40.

⁸⁵ *Ann.* 6.40.2.

⁸⁶ As argued in *History in Ovid* (1978) 85 f. A difficulty has since been removed. P. Lentulus Scipio, it seemed, should have that tenure (PIR², C 1398, cf. 251). A new document puts him under Claudius: from Hierocaesarea in Lydia, noted under *Inscr. Ephesos* III 659.

⁸⁷ The next known is L. Piso (*cos.* 27), cf. Dio 59.27.2. Tacitus was in error (*Hist.* 4.48.1.), cf. *Historia* 30 (1981) 197.

⁸⁸ *Ann.* 6.45.2.

⁸⁹ As Caligula for Sex. Pompeius (Seneca, *De tranq.* 11.10): to be presumed the son of the consul of 14.

⁹⁰ Dio 60.18.4. Her memory was cherished for forty years by Pomponia Graecina, the widow of A. Plautius, the first governor of Britain (*Ann.* 13.32.3). Not irrelevant to the personal knowledge that accrued to the young Cornelius Tacitus.

XII

Rubellius Blandus is not merely a Roman consular who gets attached to the stemma of the Julii and Claudii and serves, in his own person or by contrast with others, to illustrate vicissitudes in the dynasty. The rise of the Rubellii is one of those casual facts that dispel conventional notions about Roman political life and confirm the aristocratic Princeps as a steady patron of *novi homines*. Tiberius was a jealous custodian of 'pietas.' What obligation he honoured in promoting the Rubellii and in finally introducing this municipal strain into alliance with the dynasty, that cannot be known. Did he benefit when a young man from the lessons of the first knight to give public instruction at Rome?⁹¹ Or were the Rubellii steady adherents of the Claudii Neronēs in troubled times?

Other cities of Latium were drawn into the strife of Roman factions, and eventually into civil warfare. For Marcus Antonius the fabled descent from Antioch, a companion of Hercules, indicates Tibur as the 'ultima origo' of the family.⁹² And it was suitable that Caesar's adherent should lay hands on the Tiburtine villa of Metellus Scipio.⁹³ Nor are partisans beyond detection.⁹⁴

On the other side, the Coponii, who enjoyed wealth and esteem.⁹⁵ One of them, proscribed by the Triumvirs, owed salvation to his wife's intercession with Antonius.⁹⁶ This Coponius, or another member of the family, became a Caesarian by the year 32. He earned merit through the unfriendly comment uttered in the Senate about another

⁹¹ His model for Latin eloquence was Messalla Corvinus, cf. Suetonius, *Tib.* 70.1: 'quem senem adulescens observarat' (with inadvertence to their respective ages).

⁹² Plutarch, *Ant.* 4.

⁹³ Cicero, *Phil.* 5.19; *Ad fam.* 12.2.1 (on this villa, and a misconception about it, cf. *CQ* 28 (1978), 294f.).

Antonius held a military parade at Tibur on November 29 of 44, many senators attending (*Rom. Rev.* [1939] 126). Three years later, on the eve of the Perusine War, Tibur surrendered temple treasures (on loan) to Octavian (Appian, *BCiv.* 5.24.97).

⁹⁴ In the first place, Munatius Plancus (*cos.* 42). For C. Geminius, *Historia* 4 (1955) 62f. = *Roman Papers* (1979) 282. For Manius (active in 41), *Historia* 13 (1964) 119 = *RP* 597f.

For some hesitations, T. P. Wiseman, *New Men In the Roman Senate 139 B.C. - 14 A.D.* (1971) 233; 239f. Geminius has the 'Camilia,' also the tribe of Pisaurum.

⁹⁵ For the Coponii, T. P. Wiseman. *op. cit.* 226.

⁹⁶ Appian, *BCiv.* 4.40.170.

Tiburtine, the great Munatius Plancus, general and diplomat and the paragon of renegades.⁹⁷

Political allegiances of the first Rubellius may have brought material damage during the civil wars, compelling him to turn his talents in another direction. Success in his new profession—or rather, perhaps, the reward of ‘fides,’ for Tiberius did not forget the Republican and Pompeian allies of his family—repaired the fortunes of the Rubellii. Tacitus comments upon their wealth and refers to the ancestral estates; in Asia, not in Africa.⁹⁸

Like other new names of note in the history of Rome, ‘Rubellius’ turns out on investigation to be rare and restricted in its provenance.⁹⁹ It was not carried by ‘negotiatores’ to the countries of the East, it is absent from the Illyrian and Balkan lands. In the western provinces it occurs once only in Spain, once in Africa, twice in Sardinia, not at all in Narbonensis. Nor are Rubellii at all frequent in the various regions of older Italy, from Etruria and Picenum down to Calabria.¹⁰⁰ It may be that this single municipal *gens*, with its clients and its freedmen, accounts for most of them: almost the only praenomina found are ‘Gaius’ and ‘Lucius.’

Passienus the orator, a contemporary of the Tiburtine knight L. Rubellius Blandus, may serve for parallel. His name is patently Etruscan, and exceedingly uncommon.¹⁰¹ The Passieni are a solitary family, extinct after the third generation: the last Passienus left no son. The match between C. Rubellius Blandus and the princess Julia was blessed with offspring, four children.¹⁰² No grandchildren in the male line are attested. The termination of the Rubellii, however, is not caused by infertility: it was accelerated by the Emperor Nero.

A wider theme emerges, the social and political recompense now open to liberal studies. A few names suffice to declare the matter. Vibius Rufus got to the consulate in the end. Likewise old Haterius, an orator of portentous and proverbial fluency, commemorated by a saying of Augustus and condemned by an obituary notice in Tacitus.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ Velleius 2.83.3.

⁹⁸ *Ann.* 14.22.3.

⁹⁹ Only one inscr. is cited by Schulze, LE 220 (CIL XI 15539: Luca).

¹⁰⁰ Transpadana offers one (CIL V 3024: Patavium).

¹⁰¹ Schulze. LE 213, citing CIL XI 2376 = CIE 868 (Clusium). No specimen in Wiseman, *op. cit.* 249.

¹⁰² viz. Plautus, Rubellia Bassa, the boy or child Drusus Blandi f. revealed by his brother (CIL VI 16057)—and, not attached to the stemma in PIR¹, R 80, the Rubellius Blandus of Juvenal 8.39ff.

¹⁰³ Seneca, *Controv.* 4, praef. 7; Tacitus, *Ann.* 4.61: ‘eloquentiae, quoad vixit, celebratae: monumenta ingeni eius haud perinde retinentur’, etc.

He also married a daughter of M. Agrippa—his son, D. Haterius Agrippa is described as a relative of Germanicus Caesar.¹⁰⁴

The original Passienus possessed a talent that could be named in the company of Pollio and Messalla.¹⁰⁵ His son, L. Passienus Rufus, became *consul ordinarius* (4 B.C.) and proconsul of Africa, while his grandson equalled and even surpassed the distinction of Rubellius Blandus. Adopted by the minister of state, Sallustius Crispus, he held two consulates and married two princesses, Domitia the aunt of Nero and Agrippina his mother: Agrippina, it is alleged, encompassed his end and inherited his fortune.¹⁰⁶

On a surface view the orators whose purple patches adorn Seneca's compilation are a strange assortment of stylists and pedants, remote from the courts, the Forum, or the Curia. Some at least had their feet firmly planted on the ground—or on the political ladder. Others established a renown which their sons were able to exploit. Names like 'Passienus,' 'Haterius' and 'Rubellius' exhibit the fine flower of municipal and Italian talent.¹⁰⁷ Provincials are already on the way. The Spaniard Porcius Latro was a notable declaimer. His friend, the Roman knight from Corduba, who preserved these memorials of the Augustan schools, had a son who became the dominant literary figure of his epoch, a persona grata at Court, a power behind the throne.¹⁰⁸

XIII

Brought into alliance with the dynasty, the Rubellii soon declare the fatal effects of that propinquity. Rubellius Blandus, it is true, had a peaceful end, but his son was among the illustrious victims of the Neronian tyranny. In the degree of descent from Augustus, Rubellius Plautus was the peer and equal of Nero, so Tacitus stated.¹⁰⁹ Hence suspect and vulnerable. The unobtrusive habits of the young man, his

¹⁰⁴ *Ann.* 2.51.1.

¹⁰⁵ Seneca, *Controv.* 3, praef. 14.

¹⁰⁶ Schol. on Juv. 4.81.

¹⁰⁷ None of those three names is found in CIL I² or in Degraffi, ILLRP.

Schulze in LE 269 cites for 'Haterius' only D. Aterius Arruntius (CIL VI 12450), but he notes 'Hatilius' and the Etruscan 'Hatile,' (286). The name is infrequent. Observe three specimens in Etruria, CIL XI 2046 (Perusia); 2650 (Saturnia); 3208 (Nepes).

¹⁰⁸ For the elder Seneca, and for the other Spanish rhetores, see M. T. Griffin, *JRS* 62 (1972) 1ff.

¹⁰⁹ *Ann.* 13.19.3: 'per maternam originem pari ac Nero gradu a divo Augusto.' Not by blood, on which some set store, as Agrippina: 'se imaginem veram, caelesti sanguine ortam' (4.52.2). Rubellius Plautus descended from Octavia, the sister of Augustus.

attachment to the traditional virtues, gave no protection, his devotion to the teaching of the Stoics aggravated his nocivity.

Plautus came early into danger. The mother of Nero, angry at being thrust aside from the power, had designs on the young man, so it was alleged (*Ann.* 13.19.3). A short respite, and in 60 a comet appeared, portending change and alarming the ruler of the world; and experts or the credulous made public an ominous sign when a thunderbolt struck the country palace (Nero dining there) at Sublaqueum in the territory of Tibur (14.22.1 ff.). Therefore Nero indited a letter to Plautus, encouraging him to depart from Rome to a retreat in Asia, where he possessed ancestral estates (22.3). Plautus survived for five years, until a centurion arrived with the fatal mandate (57f.).

The historian, refusing to let his exposition decline into the biography of a Caesar, concentrated emphasis in his third hexad on three victims of Nero: Annaeus Seneca, Thrasea Paetus, Domitius Corbulo. To that design Rubellius Plautus contributes an example of consummate artistry and structure. He is also a vital link in historical transactions.

On his first entrance the dynastic antecedents are alluded to (13.19.3), and the episode concludes ominously with 'Plautus ad praesens silentio tramissus est,' (22.2). The second, evoking 'nobilitas per matrem ex Julia familia', conveys his unimpeachable morality and conduct (14.22.1). Then, Seneca extruded, Tigellinus now emergent as the evil counsellor is employed to warn Nero against philosophy, citing Plautus as a pernicious specimen. Not only his affecting 'veterum Romanorum imitamenta' but 'adsumpta etiam Stoicorum adrogantia sectaque quae turbidos et negotiorum adpetentes faciat' (57.3).

The historian's procedure is patent, and noteworthy the first occurrence of the word 'Stoicus' in the *Annales*, the first signal to incriminate the sect and doctrine as a political menace to the security of ruler and government.

The account of Plautus' end in Asia brings up a rumour that he had been in touch with Corbulo, at the head of a great army (58.2). Likewise his wife's father, Antistius Vetus (*cos.* 55), who sent a messenger to Plautus counselling suicide. (15.3). Next, when at the end of 65 Vetus is prosecuted, the name of Plautus is duly adduced (16.10.1).

In the following year Nero brought to destruction 'Virtus ipsa' in the persons of Thrasea Paetus and Barea Soranus (16.21.1). To charges against the latter the prosecutor added 'amicitia Plauti' (23.1). More significant and totally revealing is the language in which Cossutianus

Capito (in a private interview) incites Nero to action against Thrasea. With appeal to past history he indicts 'ista secta' as subversion to all ordered authority (22).

No reader of normal alertness would miss the precedent (Tigellinus on Plautus), the development and climax of a theme, the devices of a coherent historian.

XIV

Tacitus conjured up all his resources to embellish, and to magnify, Rubellius Plautus, admirable in the conduct of his life, constant and courageous at the end, with philosophers in attendance: the Greek Coeranus and Musonius the Etruscan. A model and a lesson, breeding corroborated by doctrine—and not the sort of character Juvenal could use. The satirist presents for the scorn and delectation of his readers another Rubellius, the archetype of the stupid and incompetent aristocrat. He is a Rubellius Blandus, a son of Julia:

his ego quem monui? tecum est mihi sermo, Rubelli
Blande. tumes alto Drusorum stemmate, tamquam
feceris ipse aliquid, propter quod nobilis esses,
ut te conciperet quae sanguine fulget Iuli.

(8.31-42)

Blandus exhibits no merit in any arts of peace or war, only pedigree. He has neither hands nor feet, he resembles a stone image, a herm:

at tu
nil nisi Cecropides truncoque simillimus Hermae.
nullo quippe alio vincis discrimine quam quod
illi marmoreum caput est, tua vivit imago.
dic mihi, Teucrorum proles, animalia muta
quis generosa putet nisi fortia?

(8.52-57)

In short, a lump of living statuary. If Juvenal is given credit, Blandus is a deleterious brother of the exemplary Plautus, an addition to the stemma of the Rubellii. The poem, be it noted, is strongly Neronian in tone, in matter, in personal names.

The inept *nobilis* is not certified outside the pages of Juvenal. He may well be genuine—decayed families survive unrecorded by historians or by the consular *Fasti*. Yet he might be only a plausible and malignant invention. To men who wrote under Trajan and Hadrian,

in recent memory of the brief and calamitous reign of Nerva, the claims of aristocracy, old and new, and the antithesis between *virtus* and pedigree, that was a theme of contemporary moment. The name 'Rubellius' bore a peculiar significance for a satirist, or for a historian.

Juvenal's choice of names demands careful scrutiny. Indeed, a full analysis is desirable.¹¹⁰ There are traps for the unwary. In this satire he addresses a 'Ponticus' (8.1, cf. 74ff.); and a 'Creticus' comes in (38). They have been acclaimed as degenerate descendants of illustrious houses.¹¹¹ In fact, no *nobilis* had taken 'Ponticus' as a triumphal cognomen, and the Metelli were extinct long since.

Referring to characters in recent history, Juvenal normally employs a single name, as witness the ten members of Domitian's council in Satire 4. Apart from Rubellius Blandus, there are four exceptions. Rubrenus Lappa (7.72) is defined as a dramatic poet; and Carrinas Secundus (8.264f.) is on ready identity. Nor is there cause for questioning Crepereius Pollio (9.6f.) as a person of some notoriety. Observe Crepereius Gallus (the companion of Agrippina), who perished when the vessel collapsed in the Bay of Naples.¹¹² Finally, Volusius Bithynicus, the friend to whom Juvenal dedicated one of his last poems (15.1).

Rubellius Blandus therefore may be assumed a known figure in Roman society, a brother of Plautus and perhaps named in the *Historiae* of Cornelius Tacitus.¹¹³ That author would not miss the death of Junia Calvina in 79, the last in the descent from Divus Augustus. When the doors of the Mausoleum sprang open, Vespasian was not dismayed. The portent, he said, pertained to Junia Calvina.¹¹⁴

XV

M. Cocceius Nerva was produced somehow or other as emperor after the assassination of Domitian. Not a person of character or talent.

¹¹⁰ See meanwhile the excursus in G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (1954) 289–94. For brief comments, *AJP* 100 (1979) 256ff.

¹¹¹ G. Highet, *op. cit.* 272 (Ponticus); 63 and 293f. (Creticus).

¹¹² *Ann.* 14.5.1 To be presumed identical with, or related to, the imperial procurator C. Crepereius Gallus, cf. B. Levick and S. Jameson, *JRS* 54 (1964) 98, whence *AE* 1964, 173 (Pisidian Antioch).

¹¹³ Further, possibly the consul suffect in the pair 'Blandus et Pollio' (CIL VI 14221). But Blandus may have left a son by an earlier marriage.

¹¹⁴ Suetonius *Divus Vesp.* 23.4 Calvina was a daughter of M. Silanus M. f. (*cos.* 19) and Aemilia Lepida.

The line of the Cocceii (the grandfather and the father), had exhibited eminent jurists, but Nerva did nothing to perpetuate the tradition. His nobility was not Republican—the Cocceii derive from the Triumviral period—but conspicuous, now that four generations had passed since the Battle of Actium, sparse indeed being the old families that outlasted the first dynasty. Nerva himself had been a figure at Court and in high society, extravagantly honoured by Nero after the conspiracy of Piso.¹¹⁵ Vespasian conferred on him an eponymous consulate, Domitian a second. Further, a link with the line of Caesar Augustus can be discovered, though not of consanguinity—his maternal uncle Octavius Laenas had married Rubellia Bassa, daughter of Blandus and of Julia.¹¹⁶ Nerva already possessed the qualities, none of them resplendent, that made him an attractive candidate. How far the identity of his aunt by marriage can have counted is a question that must elude answer. Something was made of it when it had ceased to matter. The ashes of Nerva were consigned to the Mausoleum of the Caesars.¹¹⁷

When he had reigned for not much more than twelve months, Nerva adopted as his son and successor M. Ulpius Traianus, the legate of Germania Superior. That Nerva should have passed over his next of kin in favour of Trajan will surprise only those who fancy his action a free decision.¹¹⁸ The hand of the political managers and the allies of the army commanders is surmised.¹¹⁹ If pedigree and social prestige account for the elevation of Nerva, those prescriptions were firmly set aside in favour of the *virtus* of the new nobility when Trajan was chosen and imposed as emperor.

Nerva was effete and obsolete. The Italian *novi homines* had run their course. The Cocceii came from the old Latin colony of Narnia, in the south of the Umbrian country, the Octavii Laenates were Marsian, the Rubellii Tiburtine. Tacitus speaks for his own class, the magnates of Transpadana, Narbonensis and Spain. If the message is often covert

¹¹⁵ *Ann.* 15.72.1 (*ornamenta triumphalia* and a *statua triumphalis* in the Forum).

¹¹⁶ ILS 952, cf. above.

¹¹⁷ *Epit.* 12.10.

¹¹⁸ Kinsmen are mentioned in Dio 68.4.1. Nerva when emperor paid public honour to his mother Sergia Plautilla (ILS 281). Her brother, Octavius Laenas, married Rubellia Bassa, their son leaves no trace; he was first cousin to Nerva.

One of the *suffecti* of 97 was 'Se[]', the colleague of Domitius Apollinaris (AE 1954, 220). Possibly a Sergius Octavius Laenas, better Sex. Hermetidius Campanus attested as legate of Judaea in December of 93 (CIL XVI, App. no. 12). On this question cf. *JRS* 54 (1954) 81 f.

¹¹⁹ For this conception, *Tacitus* (1958) 13 ff.; 35 f.

and oblique, being disguised by Republican themes in his *Annales* and by his predilection for the 'magna nomina,' it sometimes emerges in a startling fashion. The indignation he proclaims at the misalliance of Julia the granddaughter of Tiberius Caesar seems exaggerated.

Tacitus emphasises the equestrian grandfather, but is silent about the station of Blandus' father. Now another commoner had married a princess in the same year, M. Vinicius (*cos.* 30). How much better was he than Rubellius? The father and the grandfather of Vinicius had been consuls, but his extraction was municipal, from Cales in Campania (6.15.1). The facts are given, but extenuated. Anger is absent. Very different the comment on the marriage of Julia.

The placing of the item will furnish instruction. Tacitus carefully explained the death of the consular Cocceius Nerva, who, tired of life and tired of six years with Tiberius on the island, resolved to make an end by starvation, despite earnest entreaty from his friend (26.1.f.). Then, after brief report about the extinction of Agrippina and Planцина (26.3), he proceeds, with 'tot luctibus funesta civitate,' to insert the marriage of Blandus and Julia (27.1), and passes to the decease of the Prefect of the City, Aelius Lamia, 'extremo anni' (27.2). Tacitus thus disjoins Julia from the other princesses (Drusilla and Livilla) with whose marriages the year opened (15.1). The source followed by Cassius Dio grouped the three together, although not in initial prominence, and of them naming only Julia. They come up in sequence to a journey of Tiberius to the near vicinity of Rome.¹²⁰

The disjunction operated by Cornelius Tacitus lodges the marriage of Blandus and Julia in a melancholy context—'pars maeroris fuit.' The consular historian (*suff.* 97) cannot be acquitted of a malicious design. He indulged in a subversive attack upon the pretensions of the Italian aristocracy in his own day. It has something to do with Nerva.

Similarly Juvenal. That he should set upon a relative of Nerva when launching his invective against birth and pedigree is by no means inappropriate. He lays emphasis on the dynastic blood of his Rubellius Blandus,

tumes alto Drusorum stemmata, tamquam
feceris ipse aliquid propter quod nobilis esses
ut te conciperent quae sanguine fulget Iuli.

(8.40-42)

¹²⁰ Dio 58.21.1. In Tacitus the Emperor's absence from Capreae is first alluded to lower down: 'deviis plerumque itineribus ambiens patriam et declinans' (6.15.3). At the beginning of the previous year he got as far as the gardens beside the Tiber (6.1).

He forgot, if he ever knew, how recent was the nobility of the Rubellii. Juvenal declaims about plebeian talent, eloquence coming out of the people, and a base-born advocate who might plead in the courts on behalf of a dumb aristocrat and elucidate the law:

gaudia longa feras. tamen ima plebe Quiritem
facundum invenies, solet hic defendere causas
nobilis indocti; veniet de plebe togata
qui iuris nodos et legum aenigmata solvat.

(47-50)

The satirist makes his point. He might have sharpened it with a reference to the origin of the Rubellii. Juvenal's Rubellius Blandus is not just any incompetent scion of the nobility. Luxury and torpor dishonour the 'bonae artes' of an energetic ancestor, the municipal knight who taught the art of public speech.

RONALD SYME

WOLFSON COLLEGE, OXFORD

INTERPRETATIONS

ARISTOPHANES AND SOPHRON?

In the *Frogs* (1331–1363) Aristophanes has Aeschylus treat the audience to a mischievous critical parody of Euripides' monodies. A terrifying dream has broken the sleep of the heroine, who turns out to be a housewifely type. She calls on her servants to help her prepare apotropaic measures to avert the omen of the dream. But then she makes the tragic discovery that the horrendous portent of the dream has already been accomplished; she calls her neighbor (?) to witness that Glyce has snatched her rooster and run off with it. While the dastardly deed was being accomplished, says she, she had been hard at work on her spinning so that she could take it to market in the morning. She then summons the Cretan archers seconded by Artemis with her hounds and Hecate with her torches to search the premises and particularly Glyce's apartment in quest of the stolen goods.

The applicability of this parody to Euripides is obvious enough in a number of ways. As a takeoff on his fondness for reports of dreams it has often been compared with that of Hecuba (*Hec.* 59ff.). Then there is the oxymoron of ψυχὰν ἄψυχον (1334) and the pathetically repeated words such as φόνια φόνια. But what is perhaps most striking is the really comic contrast between the unexceptionably tragic elevation of the opening (1331–1340) with the utter bathos of the chicken stealing (1341–1363). This latter is the very sort of homely "realistic" touch of which Euripides is made to boast (959):

οἰκεῖα πράγματ' εἰσάγων, οἷς χρώμεθ' οἷς ξύνεσμεν.

If we had wondered at Aristophanes' effrontery in making Euripides argue that it is a virtue of his poetry to teach the Athenians to be more careful managers of their domestic economy and to be suspicious (971–979) we now discover that he was only setting him up in straw in order to let Aeschylus knock him down with his parody.

The picture of the poor lorn woman (a widow no doubt) at work far into the night, spinning her flax to take to the market in the morning, aroused from her brief sleep by a nightmare only to find that the dream's foreboding is already realized in the onrushing loss of her

rooster and the way she then summons up the dread powers of the night to help her pursue the thief has a familiar ring for me. But the ring can hardly be true, for what it recalls is Theocritus' *Pharmaceutria* (II). The reminiscence lies in the fact that Simaetha is another poor lorn woman who has, in her own opinion, been cruelly wronged, seeks aid and vengeance at dead of night from the powers of the dark and is the teller of her own sad fate. Once this chain of association is set up I am also reminded of Herodas' mime entitled the *Dream* (VIII). It is not only that a dream is involved and that the narrator sets the scene as well as telling the dream, but the scene is a very similar domestic one. The dream, of course, becomes a parable and the parable is the point of the poem. Now no one, so far as I know, has been so misguided as to suggest that Theocritus, perhaps even less Herodas, drew any inspiration in these cases from Aristophanes. In fact we are told by the scholiast on the *Pharmaceutria* that Theocritus was basing the Idyll to some extent on Sophron, and A. S. F. Gow in his commentary allows that "T. may have borrowed some hints from Sophron" at least. And, whether Herodas wrote mimes in iambs or wrote iambs on subjects appropriate to the mime, such scenes as that at the opening of the *Dream* must owe something to Sophron.

If, then, the Theocritean scene and scenario owe something to Sophron I would like to raise the question as to whether Aristophanes' parody may not do so. Such an idea might seem to be excluded on chronological grounds. Sophron's dates are far from certain. The *Souda* places him in the time of Euripides. That kind of vague synchronism is not very helpful. But according to Photius' *Lexicon* (s.v. 'Πηγίβους) Sophron's son Xenarchus, at the prompting of Dionysius I, lampooned the people of Rhegium as cowards. Now Dionysius' trouble with Rhegium came to a head in 388 or soon thereafter and he destroyed the city in 387 (Diod. 14.3). If Xenarchus was at least twenty at this time, as one might assume, he would have been born no later than 407. Adding another thirty years for his father's age at the time of Xenarchus' birth we would arrive at 437 for Sophron's birth, and this date could obviously be moved back ten or even twenty years without serious improbability. Rough and ready as this calculation may be it suggests that Sophron could have been writing his *Mimes* at a time that would in the abstract admit of Aristophanes having been aware of them.

One piece of information seems to stand in the way of acceptance of such a hypothesis. Diogenes Laertius (3.18) tells us that Plato is believed (δοκεῖ) to have been the first to bring manuscripts of Soph-

ron's *Mimes*, which had hitherto been neglected (ἡμελημένα), to Athens. Assuming that Diogenes is to be believed even when he puts in a saving δοκεῖ, when would Plato have brought these works back from Syracuse? His visits to Syracuse ended in 387, 365, and 360 respectively, all too late to have had anything to do with the *Frogs*.

If, on the other hand, one were to argue that Diogenes' testimony is shaky it might be supposed that at least limited knowledge of the *Mimes* could have come to Aristophanes in Athens before 406. In view of the Athenian disaster at Syracuse it seems highly improbable that the importation of the *Mimes* could be placed between 414 and 406, especially if Syracuse was the only source for copies. I should not like to pursue the argument beyond this point and certainly cannot say that I am convinced by my own chain of evidence. All I can say is that the *scenario* in *Frogs* 1341–1363 seems to me un-Euripidean, that it is reminiscent of mime literature, and raise the question of the possible significance of this.

LLOYD W. DALY

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA



ARTEMIDORUS DALDIANUS, *ONIROCRITICA* 3.24

R. A. Pack's authoritative text (Leipzig 1963) reads:

Ἐν ἁρίστερά περιβεβλησθαι ἢ ὅπως ποτὲ γελοίως καὶ μὴ κοσμίως πᾶσι πονηρὸν καὶ πρὸς ταῖς ἀπραξίαις διασυρμὸν καὶ καταγέλωτα ὑπομεῖναι σημαίνει.

Robert J. White, *The Interpretation of Dreams: Oneirocritica* by Artemidorus (Park Ridge 1975) 164 renders:

"Dressing oneself to the left side or in any ridiculous or unseemly manner whatsoever is a sign of bad luck for everyone. In addition to unemployment, it signifies that the dreamer will endure ridicule and mockery."

Father A. J. Festugière, *Artémidore: La Clef des Songes Oneirocriticon* (Paris 1975) 192–93 renders:¹

¹ I owe knowledge of this book to Professor Georg Luck. Festugière prefers after Reiff Ἐπαρίστερά in 3.24, 25: see *IG* III.3.67.8.

"*Etre vêtu avec gaucherie* ou, en quelque manière que ce soit, de façon ridicule et inélégant est mauvais pour tous et indigne, outre le chômage qu'on subit, raillerie méchante et risée."

"Dressing oneself to the left side," apart from neglecting the tense of the infinitive, is a literal translation without meaning in English. "To be dressed awkwardly" makes sense; but I do not think it is what the Greek means. What 'Επ' ἀριστερὰ περιβεβλησθαι means in English is "to have dressed backwards"; that is back to front, to have put on a cloak backwards, or a left shoe on the right foot. At *Onirotica* 3.25 'Επ' ἀριστερὰ γράφειν is *to write backwards*, Festugière's *Ecrire de droit à gauche*. My interpretation is assured by *Acta Thomae* 92 (111.206.1-4 Lipsius-Bonnet), where after rising and inadvertently putting his left sandal on his right foot, Charisius rightly expects the worst:

"Ὁρθρου δὲ γενομένου ἀπελθὼν ὁ Χαρίσιος ἐνεδύσατο, καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ὑπόδημα εἰς τὸν δεξιὸν πόδα ὑπεδήσατο. καὶ ἐπισχὼν εἶπεν πρὸς τὴν Μυγδονίαν· Τί ἄρα ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα;

WILLIAM M. CALDER, III

THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER



TWO CRUCES IN SENECA, DE VITA BEATA 25.2

As there is no difference between pleasure and hardship, why not demonstrate one's virtue in prosperity rather than in adversity and poverty? *Quid ergo est?*—asks Seneca.

Malo quid mihi animi sit ostendere praetextatus et †causatus
quam nudis scapulis aut †sententis.

In a recent issue of *AJP* (101 [1980] 446) A. W. Camps rushed to rescue this text from the *tormentum crucis*. In place of the nonsensical *causatus*, the reading of our best authority, the *codex Ambrosianus*, he proposes to read *canusinatus*. The wool of Canusium was indeed famous, and it was used, as Camps notes, "for the warm outer-garment, called the *paenula*." I object to this *sanatio*, for however captivating it might appear, it is guilty of three *crimina*.

First, *nihil novi sub sole*. The reading *canusinatus* appears in Muretus' edition of Seneca, Rome 1585; and Muretus claims to have derived it from a *codex Siculus*.¹ The first reaction of the present writer to Camps' idea was to attempt a counter-emendation: *causiatus* (*causia* or *causea* was a Macedonian head-gear, but it was also known at Rome, cf. Mart. 14.29). A glance at L. D. Reynolds' *OCT* apparatus (Oxford 1977) saved this writer from rushing this old² (and indefensible) emendation into print. As the German saying goes, *hier ist der Hund begraben*: Reynolds does not list the reading *canusinatus*, nor is it to be found in any recent edition of Seneca. To come across it one has to go to older books, for instance the edition by C. R. Fickert (see n. 1),³ the famous fourth edition of Lipsius (Antverpiae 1652) or, surprisingly enough, the school edition by J. F. Hurst and H. C. Whiting (New York 1877).

Second, a credible emendation must fit smoothly into the rhetorical structure of the sentence. Camps' emendation violates this rule. There are two *cruces* in the text; while trying to remove the first of them Camps states expressly that the merits of Lipsius' *semitectis* (which he prints in lieu of the other *crux*) "are irrelevant here." Now, quite to the contrary, the merits or demerits of Lipsius' conjecture are very relevant here.

The sentence in question has either chiasmic or parallel structure. In the former case Seneca is contrasting *praetextatus* with †*sententis* and †*causatus* with *nudis scapulis*; in the latter *praetextatus* is opposed to *nudis scapulis* and †*causatus* to †*sententis*. If we take, for

¹ For the reading of Muretus, see C. R. Fickert, *L. Annaei Senecae Opera* 3 (Lipsiae 1844) 187, in app. This obviously is not the place to enter into a discussion of the mysterious *codex Siculus*; see M. C. Gertz, *Studia critica in L. Annaei Senecae Dialogos* (Hauniae 1874) 9–11.

² Reynolds attributes it to Brakman, (i.e. C. Brakman, *Annaeana nova* [Leiden 1910] 8–9; cf. Idem, "Annaeana," *Mnemosyne* 56 [1928] 151), but according to Fickert's apparatus the reading *canusinatus* appears already in some of the *codices Pinciani*. That *causiatus* might be the reading also occurred to H. Wagenvoort, "Ad Senecae Dialogorum Libris VII–XI adnotationes criticae," *Studi Luigi Castiglioni* 2 (Firenze 1960) 1084–85, but he discovered in time that the same conjecture (in the form *causeatus*) had been proposed by M. Leumann in *TLL* s.v. "gausapatus" (1934). Apparently neither of them consulted Fickert (or Lipsius), and in addition Wagenvoort missed Brakman and T. Birt, "Marginalien zu lateinischen Prosaikern," *Philologus* 83 (1927) 49–50, who also read *causeatus* (and Birt in turn missed Brakman's study of 1910).

³ In addition to *canusinatus* and *causeatus* Fickert lists the following readings (emendations or the readings of the *deteriores*): *camisatus*, *catus*, *gausapatus*, *chlamydatus*, *clamidatus*, *candidatus*.

example, Camps' *canusinatus* (to which Lipsius' *gausapatus* corresponds⁴) and Lipsius' *semitectis* (sc. *scapulis*) we would conjure up the following picture: take off your *praetexta* and your shoulders are bare; take off your fine Canusian *paenula* and your shoulders are half-covered (or vice versa in the chiasitic arrangement). Rhetorically it is a lame figure: *nudae scapulae* and *semitectae scapulae* are ill-matched and awkward as the opposing pair to *praetextatus* and *canusinatus*. One wonders why the *praetexta* and the *paenula*—or rather the lack of them—should have produced different results with respect to the degree of nakedness of the poor man's back.

This leads us to our third and crucial point. Camps' conjecture disregards the *realia* of the Roman *res vestitaria*. Roman mantles, and in particular the *paenula*, have been the subject of a long and erudite study by Frank Kolb. As he points out, the *paenula* was steadily gaining popularity in the Roman world, but even at the time of Trajan it was socially an inferior dress as compared with the toga. On the *Anaglypha Traiani* the senators and the knights appear dressed in the togas; *paenulati* are the common citizens.⁵ Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 13.22(21).1, speaks of *toga*, *paenula* and *lacerna*, in this order of social respectability. The magistrate's *praetexta* and the common citizen's *paenula* are again an ill-matched pair. Of course one can argue that the magisterial *praetexta* is here associated not with the common *paenula*, but rather with the rich man's expensive *paenula Canusina*. This would indeed be a possibility were not the syntax and the dressing habits of the Romans against it.

In the text of Seneca the conjunction *et* springs to one's eyes.⁶ If we print *canusinatus* we tacitly assume that Seneca's rich philosopher

⁴ Lipsius (4th ed., Antverpiae 1652) prints *praetextatus et candidatus*, but in his annotation to *praetextatus* he opts for *pexatus* (slavishly reproduced in the *Dictionary* of Lewis and Short), a good example of how fondness for conjectures leads to the disfiguration of a perfectly sound text. In his annotation to *candidatus* he changed his mind and decided to read *pelasatus et gausapatus*. In Lipsius' defense it ought to be said that he perceived the incongruity of the *praetexta* and the *paenula*, see below in the text.

⁵ F. Kolb, "Römische Mäntel: *paenula*, *lacerna*, *μανδύη*," *Röm. Mitt.* 80 (1973) 69–167, esp. 93–94, and plate 24. Cf. T. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* 3 (Leipzig 1887) 217–23.

⁶ W. H. Alexander, "Seneca's Dialogues I, II, VII, VIII, IX, X. The Text Emended and Explained," *University of California Publications in Class. Phil.* 13.3 (1945) 65–66, attempted to defend Lipsius' *gausapatus* and *semitectis* with the following argument: "just as *semitectis* gives a contrast with *nudis*, *gausapatus* . . . suggests the contrast between the dignity of the official *praetexta* and the informality of the outing suit." But Seneca's *et* is a stumbling block for any such interpretation: it suggests complementarity,

wore at the same time both the toga and the *paenula* (as an overcoat). Now on the basis of literary and monumental testimonies F. Kolb was able to establish that the *paenula* was worn "direkt über der Tunica und nicht über der Toga."⁷ As Nonius (861 L.) says, *paenula est vestis, quam supra tunicam accepimus*.

There exists, it seems, sufficient evidence to dispose, once and for ever, of all emendations that assume a garment hiding in †*causatus*. And so it goes and *canusinatus*, and *gausapatus*, and *chlamydatus*, and *camisatus*.

The *veteres*, and nowadays Camps, looked for an answer to the shoulders. The *moderni* transferred their attention to the head and the feet. As far as the head-cover is concerned only one conjecture seems to have been proposed, our old acquaintance, *causatus* (but see n. 4). Yet it is not obvious at all why Seneca should have selected this rare and non-Roman head-cover as his example. The Romans *praetexta* and the Macedonian *causia* are an odd pair.⁸ *Coronatus* would be a better choice, for it could point to the status of personal felicity.⁹ Yet it is too far removed from the word-form we are supposed to emend, and above all, we have to remember that among the Romans the uncovered head was not a symbol of poverty or adversity.¹⁰

The head being of no help, let us now turn to the feet. Here the prospects seem brighter. The senatorial shoes, the *calcei*,¹¹ are a

not contrast. Alexander perceived this clearly. His solution? "It would improve the text from this point of view to read *aut* for *et* after *praetextatus*." Again, the old *morbus philologorum*: the readiness to sacrifice a sound text for the sake of a doubtful conjecture. The reading *semitectis* must go; as Birt, op. cit. (above, n. 2) 50, observed, it brings "für das, was Seneca will, nichts wesentlich Neues."

⁷ Op. cit. (above, n. 5) 79-80.

⁸ Cf. the critique of this emendation by A. Klotz in his review of Brakman's *Annaeana nova* in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* 31 (1911) 834.

⁹ Cf. the curious phrase *vulgum tam chlamydatus quam coronatus voco* (*de vita beata* 2.2), now brilliantly elucidated by H. Dahlmann, *Bemerkungen zu Seneca, De Vita Beata* (= Abh. Akad. Mainz, 1972, 6) 5-8 (= 309-314). *Chlamys* and *corona* are here the symbols of *felicitas*, cf. Cic. *Phil.* 2.85 of Caesar: *sedebat in rostris . . . amictus toga purpurea . . . coronatus*, and see other examples collected by Dahlmann (*Suet. Cal.* 19; *Ner.* 25; *Domit.* 4.4, and already Auctor *ad Her.* 4.60). Yet all this is of little help for the conjecture *coronatus*. As Dahlmann saw, Seneca alludes to the *felicitas* of a *triumphator*, and under the Empire this was an exclusive privilege of the ruler, cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* 1³ (1887) 426-29, and 432 n. 5 (*chlamys* as the Greek term for the Roman *paludamentum*).

¹⁰ Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* 3.217. See also 1³.426: "Kopfbedeckung trägt der Beamte in der Friedenstracht in der Regel nicht."

¹¹ See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* 3.2 (1888) 888-92, esp. 888: "Der Schuh scheidet die Senatoren von den übrigen Bürgern."

splendid counterpart to the magisterial *toga praetexta*. *Calceatus* is the conjecture we owe to the *ingenium* of F. Schultess.¹² We ought to have embraced it unreservedly but for one obstacle: how are we to solve the other *crux*? Schultess proposed to read *sectis plantis*, quoting Verg. *Ecl.* 10.49: *tibi ne teneras glacies secet aspera plantas*, but this is far-fetched indeed. As a result no editor with the exception of J. W. Basore in *LCL* (1932) admitted Schultess' conjectures into his text, and Reynolds does not quote them even in his apparatus. He may be right for it cannot be stressed enough that a successful emendation must take care of both daggers at once. So there is no happy end to this story, but there is a morale to it: better two daggers than one placebo.

* * *

Strictly as an *obiter dictum* may I be permitted to offer a suggestion. Perhaps we ought to change the direction of our search. Seneca's argument consists of a series of three rhetorical expositions, questions and answers (or conclusions). Our *cruces* come in the second segment. In the first part (25.1) he contrasts the *opulentissima domus* and the *pons sublicius*, the 'domicile' of the *egentes*, and concludes: *Domum illam splendidam malo quam pontem*. In the third part (25.3) he juxtaposes felicity and adversity. His conclusion is: *Malo gaudia temperare, quam dolores compescere*. This demonstrates clearly that also his conclusion in the second segment ought to be closely connected with the preceding *expositio*. This *expositio* runs as follows (Reynold's text):

Pone <in> instrumentis¹³ splendentibus et delicato apparatu: nihilo me feliciorem credam quod mihi molle erit amiculum,¹⁴ quod purpura conuiuis meis substernetur. Muta stragula mea:¹⁵ nihilo miserius ero si

¹² F. Schultess, *Philologischer Anzeiger* 17 (1887) 302 (review of the edition by M. C. Gertz). He regards *calceatus* as *sicher*; *sectis plantis* "würde wenigstens dem Sinne entsprechen." A. Klotz (loc. cit. [above, n. 8]) describes Schultess' *calceatus* as *glänzend*; "ingeniose Schultess" remarks E. Hermes in his Teubner edition (1905).

¹³ *instrumentis* A. F. Haase (Bibl. Teubn. 1851) following some *dett.* (R and V, Reynolds) reads *in stramentis*, not without some justification. See below in the text.

¹⁴ A. Bourguery (Coll. Budé, Paris 1951), endorsed by W. H. Alexander, op. cit. [above, n. 6] 65, reads *adminiculum*, "cushion." He follows the *manus quinta* in the *Ambrosianus* (cf. the edition by M. C. Gertz, [Hauniae 1886] 245 in app.). But there is no doubt that *amiculum* is the correct reading: it has manuscript authority and is required by the following *praetextatus* and *nudis scapulis*. Cf. Varro, *Men.* 212 (Non. 864 L.): *cubo in Sardinis tapetibus; clamidas et purpurea amacula*.

¹⁵ So Madvig combining the conjectures of Agricola (*Malo stragulam meam*) and Fickert (*Muta magnam rem meam*); *multas magnam meam* A.

lassa ceruix mea in maniculo faeni adquiescet, si super Circense tomentum per sarturas ueteris lintei effluens incubabo.

Now as a companion to *praetextatus* (cf. *molle amiculum*, *purpura . . . substernetur*) one would expect a word conveying a sense of luxury, perhaps *delicatus*.¹⁶ Seneca's usage of the word is not against this idea, and may even be taken to support it.¹⁷ As to †*sententis*, I doubt if this *paradosis* contains a word referring to *scapulae*; if this were the case one would rather expect the word-order *scapulis nudis aut. . . Nudis scapulis* expresses an absolute concept: the lack of a garment.¹⁸ A similar concept, expressing the want of something essential, will also be hidden in †*sententis*. Consider what Seneca says in *Ep.* 20.9:

Ego certe aliter audio, quae dicit Demetrius noster, cum illum uidi nudum,¹⁹ quanto minus quam [in] stramentis incubantem . . . Quid ergo? . . . Et ille ingentis animi est, qui illas circumfusas sibi . . . ridet suasque audit magis esse quam sensit. Multum est non corrumpi diuitiarum contubernio; magnus ille, qui in diuitiis pauper est.

The perfect philosopher shows his virtue *nudus* and without *stramenta*, and still better when he does not let himself *corrumpi diuitiarum contubernio*. The same image, the same morale, and nearly the same wording as in *de vita beata*. In view of this text and of the preceding disquisition about the *stragula* (and probably also *stramenta*), *maniculum faeni* and *tomentum*, one may ask: is it too adventurous to read *nudis scapulis aut sin <e stra> mentis*?²⁰

J. LINDERSKI

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL



¹⁶ One of the *deteriores* (cf. Fickert in app.) has *catus*; not that this *per se* is *magni momenti*.

¹⁷ Cf. esp. *Ep.* 66.49; 114.4 (*quam delicatus fuerit*, sc. Maecenas); *de ira* 1.18.2; *de tranqu. animi* 2.13; *de const. sap.* 10.2 (*delicati et felices*); cf. also Cic. *de off.* 1.106 (*delicate ac molliter vivere*).

¹⁸ Cf. *Ep.* 63.11.

¹⁹ Cf. *Ep.* 62.3: *Demetrium . . . mecum circumfero et relictis conchyliatis* (= *purpuratis*, cf. Dahlmann, op. cit. [above, n. 7] 6) *cum illo seminudo loquor*. *Seminudus* = *nudis scapulis*.

²⁰ T. Birt, op. cit. (above, n. 2) 49–50, read *nudis scapulis aut sine tegmentis*. He introduced *tegmentis* as a counterpart to his reading *causeatus*, and adduced as a com-

A GREEK PALINDROME IN EIGHTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

When a tree falls in the forest when there is no one around to hear it is there any sound? When a scribe copies Greek in an England that understands no Greek is there any comprehension? In the case I am thinking of in the second question there would seem to be only the scribe's comprehension that he is copying magic and spells.

British Library manuscript Royal 2A.20 is a Latin "Libellus Precum" which was copied according to E. A. Lowe,¹ probably somewhere in Mercia, in the second half of the VIII century. On f. 49^r there is a series of prayers and charms to stop bleeding. Excerpts from this folio were rather unsatisfactorily published by G. Storms in his *Anglo-Saxon Magic*.² The text of his excerpt No. 59 contains what should have been recognized as four iambic dimeters as follows:

Rivos cruoris torridi
contacta vestis obstruit.
Fletu rigantis supplicis
arent fluenta sanguinis.³

The suppliant is clearly the woman with an issue of blood (Matthew 10.20) although the next word in the text is *Beronice*, showing the common confusion of the Saint with her prototype.

The passage which follows is the one with which I am principally concerned.

parison *Consol. ad Helv.* 7.9, *tegmenta caputem*. But *tegumentum* does not *per se* point to the head-gear; and objections to the reading *causeatus* (see above) still hold. Yet it was a great idea to discover *sine* in the first part of † *sententis*. Cf. also P. Grimal, *L. Annaei Senecae De Vita Beata* (Collection *Érasme*, Paris 1969) 112 in app. "A titre d'hypothèse" he proposes to read *praetextatus et loricated quam nudis scapulis et sine tegumentis*. *Sine tegumentis* reproduces basically the reading of Birt (without quoting him), and *loricated* is better passed over with silence, even *à titre d'hypothèse*.

I should like to thank my friend Deedra Keller for her unfailing help.

¹ *CLA* III, p. 28, No. 215.

² (The Hague 1948) 293. His dating of Royal 2A.20 to the "11th century" is not to be taken seriously.

³ Ms. *rigante* and *fluente*. The text is correctly written on f. 16^r where it also occurs. These verses are not recorded by Schaller and Könsgen in *Initia carminum Latinorum saeculo undecimo antiquiorum* (Göttingen 1977) nor by H. Walther in *Initia carminum ac versuum medii aevi posterioris Latinorum* (Göttingen 1969).

Libera me de sanguini/bus deus deus
 salutis mee AMICO CAPDINOPO/ΘΙΘΡΟΝ
 ΔΡΑΚΑΙΜΟ fodiens magnifice contextu<m>
 fundavit tumultum / urugma domine adiuva.

Until the Greek has been deciphered it is not immediately apparent that the Latin which follows is a translation of it. I myself had not much confidence in my decipherment until I observed that it not only corresponded roughly with the Latin but also resulted in a dactylic hexameter and my colleague, Jeffrey Rusten, pointed out that the hexameter is a palindrome. The result is the following line:

ἀμήσας ἄρδην ὀροφηφόρον ἥδρασσας σῆμα

The whole line is known from the so-called Planudean Appendix (= *AP* (Beckby) 16.387b2) and appears to be translatable as "having reaped I established a lofty-roofed monument." The sense of the line seems to be minimal without any context, but perhaps it is too much to expect a palindrome to make much sense or, indeed, to have had any context any more than it has in the *Anthology*. The most noteworthy word in the line is the adjective ὀροφηφόρον which is recorded by LSJ in this sense only from an epigram of Agathias (*AP* 9.631), and if the word was coined by Agathias and the palindrome picked it up from him we would have a sixth-century date as the earliest possible for the line. However that may be, the line seems to me to be based on the *Iliad* 24.451 where, as Priam approaches the shelter of Achilles, the shelter is described as ὑψηλή (449) and we are told that the Myrmidons had thatched it,

λαχνήεντ' ὄροφον λειμωνόθεν ἀμήσαντες.

It is perhaps idle to speculate as to how and when this line and the other bits of Greek which appear on the same folio reached England. That its strange pagan flavor would not be unacceptable in the Saxon world need not be surprising in the light of its context here. At least in the Greek East palindromic texts are closely associated with magic charms⁴ and Homeric lines are not uncommon in the magic papyri⁵ of late antiquity.

As for the other bits of Greek referred to above I am not able to make much headway with them. Following the passage dealt with above occurs the word *urugma*, which may represent ὀρυγμα and have something to do with the *fodiens* of the Latin translation, which

⁴ See the article "Palindrom" by K. Preisendanz in *RE* 36 (1949) 133-39.

⁵ *PMag* I, p. 88 and II, p. 147.

appears to have no proper relation to ἀμήσας. On the same f. 49^v appears the following passage (No. 60 in Storms):

ad sanguinem restringen /
dum scribis hoc. COMAPTA OCOFMA CTY / TONTOEMA
EKTYTOPO.

At first sight it would seem that this too should yield some recognizable Greek. I have thought in desperation of σώματα ὅσα (or ὅσοι) ἐμαστιγοῦντο <τὸ?> αἷμα ἐκ τοῦ τόπου, but the idea of Christ's bloody flagellation has probably contributed too much to this unsatisfactory solution. The first word certainly suggests σώματα, but I am led by the occurrence of σουματα amongst other plain gibberish in the great Paris magic papyrus⁶ to believe that here too we may have nothing but gibberish.

The same cannot be said of two words which occur two lines farther down. They appear as CACINCACO YCAPTETE and are to be interpreted as κακινκάκως ὑπάγετε, an invitation to the affliction or to the spirit which causes it to depart in anything but peace. The adverb κακινκάκως is of late development and appears in some Modern Greek dictionaries as κακὴν κακῶς. The form in which I have transcribed it was discussed by Kurtz, Krumbacher and Nestle in a series of notes in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*.⁷

One line, the last on this folio, seems also to have been conceived as Greek, but I shall not undertake to transcribe it because of the difficulty of distinguishing Greek characters from Roman. Again I am tempted to believe that it is magic gibberish.

One would not like to suggest that Theodore of Tarsus should be burdened with responsibility for the importation of magic texts to England when he came to Canterbury in 668, but perhaps there were other Greeks who came with such baggage.

In closing I would like to record that my attention was drawn to this material by Allen Lampert, a graduate student in English, whose studies had brought him to the manuscript. I had not had time to share with him the above results when our very pleasant conferences were brought to an end by his sudden and lamentable death.

LLOYD W. DALY

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA



⁶ *PMag* I, p. 176.

⁷ 3 (1894) 152-55, 7 (1898) 482 and 8 (1899) 157.

THE ANAPHORA *EI IN LATIN

I have outlined, *Studia Celtica* 10/11, 1975/6, 66–69, my view of the oldest reachable gendered pronominal flexion for IE, to which *ei > Skt. *ay-ám* belonged. I propose that the following are relatively undisturbed direct descendants of that paradigm found in attested Latin.

The neuter nom. acc. sg. *id* is clear; it is zero-grade *i-*+ *-d*. This is also reflected in Osc. *id-ic*.

The non-neuter acc. sg. *im* is similarly formed. It is possible to explain *em* in more than one way, but it could have been extracted from *em-em* 'eundem.' The latter in turn must have undergone assimilation from **im-em* = Skt. *im-ám*. On allied questions see my discussion of Welsh *ef*, *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies* 29 (1980) 83–84.

The *-dem* of *idem* is generally regarded as arising by misdivision of *id-em*, but the doubts expressed by Ernout-Meillet s.v. *idem* are well taken; and in the face of *emem* and the corrupt *imeum* one might well expect a parallel to Umbr. *er-ont*. It seems quite reasonable that *-dem* may have early arisen from a concatenation of *de* + *-em*. Since Lat. *is* and Osc. *iz-ic* are fresh formations modelled on *im* and *id*, it is preferable to regard *idem* as simply continuing the original **ei* + *dem*. We may then regard the orthography EIDEM CIL 1.638.9 as perfectly expectable, while EISDEM and EISDIM are not so much faulty as rebuilt from the last.

The non-neuter nom. pl. **ei-es* is best reflected in EIS CIL 1.582.16 and EEIS CIL 1.581.4; conflated variants are IEIS CIL 1.698.3.12 and *is*. OLat. *ei* and inscriptional EI, EEI, IEI, and I are analogical.

Neuter *ea* and masc. acc. pl. *eōs* are not original and have been built upon the new Latin base *e-*, as seen in *eum*, *eam*, and *eōrum*. It is not clear to me whether the gen. pl. was originally **ei-s-om* (> Osc. *eisun-k*) or **e-s-om*; I incline on morphological grounds to the latter.

Latin fem. sg. *ea* likewise reflects remodelling on the new base *e-*, but Osc. *io-c* is a regular feminization formed as is Greek *μία*. If Varro's fem. acc. sg. *iam* is to be trusted it is ancient and regular. The model and source for OLat. masc. IVM are ambiguous.

We come now to the oblique cases (the "weak" stem forms), for which the IE suppletive stem was **e-*, though perhaps augmented (through confusion with the most ancient genitive **e-s*?) as **e-s-*. The genitive *eius* EIIVS must rest ultimately on this stem. The most

ancient form must have been **e(e)l* or **esel*. It seems that in Latin **-el* was regularly replaced by **-ios* (of appurtenance); therefore we expect **eios*. This may well be directly represented by Plautus's syncopated *eis*. Since the intervocalic yod would have been liable to absorption at an early date, it seems the form was strengthened, either by doubling the yod or by replacing the stem *e-* by *ei-*. Plautus's *ēius* must be secondary, as with *ea* etc. above.

The dative formed on the stem *e-* may be assumed to have been **e-ei > ēī*; this could underlie Plautus's monosyllabic *ei*. To such a short form a new dative could have been fashioned, giving **ēiei*, and this may be what we see in inscriptional EIEI. The later state of this is probably Plautus's *ēī*.

In the dat. abl. pl. *ibus* we apparently have **ei-bhos*, with the same state of the base as we see in Osc. gen. pl. *eisun-k*. But in *eis*, *īs* we may well have **e-ōis*, unless the last would have led to **ois > ūs*.

We have the ancient locative **i* in *i-bi* and *i-nde*.

In light of these relics it may not be too wide of the mark to see a memory of the non-neuter nom. sg. **ei* in the inscriptional EIS for *is*.

ERIC P. HAMP

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



HĪC AND *IBI* IN LATIN

I discussed *inde* (*AJP* 97 [1976] 20–21) in the context of *hīc* and *ibi*, inter alia. In its general lines and in almost all particulars I still subscribe to the argument there set forth. However, I have since revised a few details which may easily escape the notice of Classical philologists and may therefore usefully be mentioned in summary here.

In that discussion I regarded *ibi* as descended from **i-dhe*, with a formation identical to that underlying OLat. *ubei*. Such an assumption then requires a later crossing or conflation (p. 21) to produce the observed *ibi*, where the labial will not be the normal phonetic output as it is in *ubei*. (Note that I neglected to correct a misprinted **kudei* to read **kuðei*.) The same assumption also underlay my analysis of *ubei* and allied forms in *Italic and Romance: Linguistic Studies in Honor of Ernst Pulgram* (ed. H. J. Izzo [Amsterdam 1980] 69–73, esp. 71), since that essay was written for appearance in 1976 (see p. vi) and could

not be revised for the final printing,¹ through no fault of editor or author. This analysis is repeated, and should be corrected, in *Papers in Honor of Madison S. Beeler* (1980) 345, fn. 2.

It is clearly of advantage to be able to derive *ibi* directly, and that is what I have done in *Papers from the Parasession on Pronouns and Anaphora*, Chicago Linguistic Society 1980 (edd. Jody Kreiman and Almerindo E. Ojeda) 147–50, esp. 148–49. The structure of *ibi* < **i-bhi* is therefore, in the terms employed in *AJP* 97 (1976) 20, **locative pronominal*, or *pronominal base *i + locative (zero ending; see p. 21), + deictic enclitic (*-bhi)*.² It is clear then that *ibi* has precisely the same structure as *hic*, as analyzed in the works cited. The explanation is thus straightforward.

In *AJP* 97 (1976) 20–21, I was conservative in reconstructing the base of *hic* as **ghei/gho-*. In the *Parasession* article I associated

¹ It is convenient here to register some corrigenda and updatings to that article. P. 70 has some misprints: line 15, read OCS *kŹdei*; line 23, read **(k)ubei* (with spirant labial); line 29, read **itā*. The reference in footnote 1 can now be completed: *Studia celtica* 10/11, 1975/6, 59–69, esp. 66; see also *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie* 37 (1979) 167–68. On page 71, line 5 up of text, we may note that *nē* was modelled on *nek* because the two were syntactically equivalent as sentence connectives. It could be made more explicit that the first tabulation of forms on p. 72 was generated by basing our reconstruction of the forms under consideration in collocation with the negative alone. On p. 73, line 10, *i-a* should read *i-ā*; and footnote 9 should be inserted carrying a reference to *AJP* 97 (1976) 20–21.

Finally, but not essential to our argument above, to footnote 8 we may remark that we have meantime reconstructed Arumanian *iu* as **ibi + ubi*, *Studii și cercetări lingvistice* 28 (1977) 169.

I would also draw attention to my discussion of these and allied matters in *Papers from the Parasession on Diachronic Syntax*, Chicago Linguistic Society (1976) 352ff.; *Studii clasice* 17 (1977) 147–48; *Festschrift für Oswald Szemerényi* (1979) 343–50, where I equate Lat. *ita* correctly with Welsh *yt*, but *ibi* (now incorrectly) with Welsh *yð*; and an article on Lat. *ut* in *Glotta* (in press).

² It will be seen that my analysis here and above differs markedly from that of Pierre Monteil, *Éléments de phonétique et de morphologie du latin* (Paris 1970) who (222) reconstructs **te bhei* simply with “une désinence” **-bh(e)y*, yet who (238) identified this element with those seen in *ibi*, *ubi*, and Greek *φι* Mycenaean *-pi*. I believe it is clear that *tibi* and *ibi* both bear the same deictic **-bhi*, that *ubei* carries the locative enclitic **-dhe*, and that the instrumental *-φι* (Armenian *-b*) is to be identified with the instrumental particle which has yielded the English preposition *by* and German *bei*.

³ Monteil, op. cit. 222, cannot identify **-ghey*, “inconnu par ailleurs.” For *hic* he equates (235–36) **ghi-ce* with Skt. *hi* ‘surely’ and *vai-ṣi*. It is of course possible that these are ultimately related, as has been claimed before; but I would insist that such an equation still rests on a speculative association that is anchored in no inherent

hic with the final part of *mi-hi*.³ We know that this Lat *-hi* and Skt. (*má*)*hy(-am)* are to be equated with Armenian (*in*)*j*. Therefore the IE consonant was **ǵh*. The reconstruction for *hic* therefore is **ǵhei/ǵhe-/ǵho+*.

ERIC P. HAMP

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



semantax, i.e. there is no essential dependency between asseveration or emphasis and deixis. There is however a clear relation between deixis and the pronouns of the speech situation.

Monteil further takes the long-scanned nom. sg. *hic* as analogic on *hocc*; I take it as a possible survival of *hic* < **ǵhei*, the regular form.

REVIEWS

JASPER GRIFFIN. *Homer on Life and Death*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980. xvi + 218. \$37.50.

This is a good book, good because it is humane and restores to Homer the humanity he had steadily lost in recent years to the computer and the microphilologists of formulaic analysis. The call for an "oral poetics" in the wake of the work of Milman Parry and his followers has not only remained unanswered, but has produced an uneasy silence. Understandably so, since no one seems to know exactly what an oral poetics looks and feels like, what rules govern it, or how it differs from ordinary poetics. Moreover, some recent studies have led to a fundamental questioning of the orthodox oral hypothesis—and not merely a nibbling away at its edges. It is not yet clear where these developments will lead, but there now appears to be a thaw, a new openness in Homeric studies. Many scholars now feel freer to discuss the poetry of Homer and to attempt to interpret it, rather than to concentrate their energies on problems of composition and origins.

Griffin's thoughtful book may be a sign of this change. He proposes no new methodology or dogmatism and rarely polemicizes; he admits to using "aesthetic methods not essentially or radically new" (xiv). One may object to the term "aesthetic," since it leaves Griffin open to the charge of "mere aestheticism," but Griffin has faith in the validity of instinctive responses to the poetry of Homer and demonstrates that an intelligent and sensitive appreciation not only remains possible, but now has become more necessary than ever.

In short, then, we have here a refreshingly old-fashioned approach, without gimmicks, which aims to understand Homer the way the Greeks understood him. To this end, Griffin makes frequent use of the Scholia, and it is indeed heartening to note a revival of interest in this rich tradition of Homeric exegesis. Griffin also finds himself in sympathy with the humanistic unitarianism found in some German scholarship, whose prime exemplar would be the admirable Karl Reinhardt. It is altogether appropriate and a term of praise to set Griffin's book in the context of that tradition. Throughout, Griffin keeps his attention firmly focused on the *Iliad*, which he regards as "the vision . . . essentially, of one man" (xvi). The *Odyssey* and, to a lesser extent, Near Eastern, Germanic, and Celtic parallels are adduced for the purpose of delineating, by contrast and comparison, the contours of that vision.

The first two chapters, as well as the fourth, deal with Homer's style, not in the narrow sense of diction, but within a larger perspective, that is, the means by which the poet conveys his conception of the heroic life and death. The primary characteristic of that style is its objectivity. With the reticence praised by Aristotle (*Poetics* 1460 a 5–7), Homer rarely comments or explains, nor does he explicitly pass judgment on the events of his narrative. Some critics have concluded that such explication and judgment are therefore

neither called for nor intended. But this conclusion misapprehends the character of the objective style. The poets allow things to speak for themselves; and they will speak eloquently, if we will but listen.

Griffin first examines certain objects and scenes which characterize their owners or participants far more vividly and subtly than any discursive description. For example, the frivolity of Paris becomes apparent in his choice of clothing. So too, the scepter of Agamemnon exemplifies the king's predicament. The description of its august lineage in Book 2 is followed by the flight of the army produced by Agamemnon's poor judgment. Odysseus finally restores order by seizing the ancestral scepter and encouraging the best men with speech, while thrashing the insolent Thersites with the same emblem of royal authority. "This," concludes Griffin, "is how to be a king" (18), and we ourselves can judge Agamemnon's failure to live up to the regal scepter he has inherited. Similarly, certain representative scenes or a series of contrasting episodes offer graphic descriptions of the characters in action, catching and crystallizing their essences in dramatic vignettes. The scenes with their respective wives perfectly convey the differences between Hector and Paris. Similarly, the recurring episodes involving rejected pleas for mercy on the battlefield bring out the characters of the gentle Menelaus, the ferocious Agamemnon, and the tragic Achilles. Many of Griffin's examples are, as he admits, not new (compare Lessing's *Laocoon*), but he has a sensitive eye for the telling or pathetic detail which speaks volumes in a line or a word. Since, moreover, Homer's is a "world of stylized and universally intelligible gestures" (27), eating, lamentation, the taking of oaths, and the rituals of hospitality have a symbolic significance readily accessible to Homer's audience. The *Iliad* exploits these symbols in a manner different from the *Odyssey*. For example, in comparing the scenes of shared lamentation, Griffin contrasts the charm of the *Odyssey* with the tragic depth and pathos of the *Iliad*.

Characterization, discussed in Chapter 2, is similarly suited to the central themes and world view of the respective poems. Griffin takes note of the relative opaqueness and enigmatic quality of the characters in the *Odyssey* as compared to the *Iliad*. He connects this indirection to the importance of deception as a dominant theme in the *Odyssey*, whereas the presumed contradictions in the characters of the *Iliad* arise from the complexity of its central preoccupation: the nature of the Homeric hero and the "meaning and significance of the heroic life and death." Rejecting the views of those who deny Homer's heroes any consistent and individualized characterization or psychological depth, Griffin argues that the characters are indeed differentiated from one another and that they "can be seen to intend things which they do not explicitly reveal as their intention" (52). The second proposition may provoke controversy in that it suggests that one can, indeed, must, go beyond the simple surface of the text. In fact, any interpretation of the Homeric poems which categorically refuses to do so must remain flat and impoverished.

In his fourth chapter, Griffin demonstrates how the objective style manages to produce pathos even in depicting the deaths of very minor characters. The short "obituary notices" which accompany those deaths are not to be understood as merely ornamental or as intended to provide a bit of human interest or to relieve the monotony of the battle scenes. Rather, they touch on

the central nerve of the *Iliad* with its tragic perception of human life. The motifs employed to evoke pathos in these minor deaths are the same as those used in the deaths of the major figures. Griffin reminds us that the *Iliad* is a poem about death, or, more precisely, about living and dying. The Homeric vision inevitably focuses on *the* pivotal moment of the heroic existence: "the change from the brightness of life to a dark and meaningless existence" (143) with the death of the hero. The noble restraint of the Homeric style with its understated, dispassionate objectivity presents without sentimentality, on the one hand, or brutality, on the other, the tragic pathos of that moment.

Griffin's third chapter on "Death and the God-Like Hero" and his two final essays on the gods in the *Iliad* form the best introduction to the subject I know, and a bare summary cannot do it justice. Griffin has grasped a fact of paramount importance: neither the gods nor the heroes can be understood in isolation from one another; they each receive their definition through the other. Both gods and heroes are acutely aware of the differences separating them, and both understand themselves by contemplating the other. Griffin correctly underlines the doubleness which characterizes the hero, who is both god-like and doomed to mortality. The heroes are like the gods not only in their strength and beauty and their concern for honor, but also in the passionate and sometimes arbitrary indulgence of their will. In other words, they resemble the gods in all their ambiguity. The heroes are marked out by the love of the gods, yet given the arbitrariness of the gods, even such divine concern cannot escape ambiguity. Moreover, as Griffin notes, such love does not ensure success; it is often lavished on doomed heroes—but, then, all heroes are ultimately doomed. It is mortality which finally and radically separates the heroes from the gods. The hero must constantly and *consciously* face death and, like the tragic Achilles, finally accept his mortality without flinching. Paradoxically, it is precisely "the pressure of mortality which imposes on men the compulsion to have virtues; the gods, exempt from that pressure, are . . . less 'virtuous' than men" (93). "The hero dies . . . for the glory of song" (102). But here, Griffin emphasizes, the *Iliad* moves far beyond an unreflective heroism where that reward is left unquestioned. The heroes—above all Achilles of the twin fates—brood over the value and meaning of that glory.

Griffin's analysis is indeed impressive, yet two areas demand further exploration. Griffin's discussion omits "men such as are now," we, the poet's audience, whose relations with the gods are neither so intimate nor as terrifying, and whose admiration for the heroes is mixed with horror and pity. It is only by recognizing the third member of the equation that the place of the hero as a *tertium quid*, a strange and wonderful *Mischwesen* between the gods and "mere mortals," becomes patent and the complexity of his nature is revealed. Secondly, while acknowledging that the death the hero must confront is "unsoftened by any posthumous consolation or reward" (94), Griffin, despite his title, does not fully explore the consequences of the Homeric view of death or the problems it raises. To be sure, it clears the world of troublesome ghosts. Yet in dispensing with any substantial afterlife, Homer gives up the possibility of reward or punishment in the hereafter. Because of Homer's authority, his austere conception of the afterlife had enormous implications for Greek ethical thought which never ceased to grapple with them. It is already problematic in the *Odyssey*, but is perfectly suited to the tragic vision of the *Iliad*. Within the

confines of the epic, this uncompromising conception of death serves to exalt the epic itself, which alone has the power to confer immortality, *kleos aphthiton*.

Turning to the gods, Griffin attacks those who refuse to take the Homeric gods seriously or who "minimize the divine" in Homer by considering it to be merely conventional or "literary" or a means of comic relief, or who reduce the gods to expressions of social and psychological forces or pressures. His defense avoids the Dionysiac rhetoric of Walter Otto but, while well taken, does not quite get to the bottom of things. To the charge that the Homeric gods lack *numen*, Griffin responds that the heroes themselves are pious; they pray and sacrifice to the gods. (It would be interesting to ascertain whether some heroes are more pious than others.) "Mystery, power, and effortlessness" (153) are the marks of divine intervention, and the gods are "by no means always lacking in dignity and stature" (150), but behave in impressive ways "like a real god" (152), while the characters respond "in what can only be called a religious way" (152). But Griffin's examples of the "shattering effect" of divine intervention occur mainly when the heroes come up against hostile divinities. The more typical reaction to manifestations of the divine in Homer is wonder (*thauma*, *thambos*), usually unaccompanied by either fear or ecstasy. To be sure, certain images of the divine in Homer can, in fact, be paralleled by the Biblical God of Abraham, but such superficial similarities mask overwhelming differences. Griffin is absolutely right about the pervasive importance and seriousness of the Homeric gods, but a comprehensive examination must, I believe, begin from more fundamental principles.

Griffin draws attention to the fact that the miraculous, monstrous, and uncanny have, for the most part, been excluded from the divine in Homer. So too, the heroes are no longer invulnerable, nor do they have magic powers. "The austere teaching of the *Iliad*" (166) also rejects apotheosis, even though examples from the past are mentioned. The removal of this possibility within the epic lends a special pathos to the destiny of the heroes. The luminous anthropomorphism, once so admired in Greek myth, has fallen into disrepute and is now often considered shallow and unimaginative. Griffin identifies Kirk's assessment of Greek mythology as part of the "revolt from classicism" (173), which discovers greater depth in "monstrous images." While correct in criticizing Kirk's lack of sympathy toward Greek material, Griffin is somewhat unfair in equating that stance with the structuralist approach. To be sure, the structuralists may be drawn to myths whose surface meaning is obscure, bizarre, and irrational, precisely because their analysis produces more spectacular results in demonstrating a deeper logic and coherence. According to Griffin, the focus of Greek mythological thought is the heroes rather than monsters, and this leads to a preoccupation with the question of man's position in the world rather than the Lévi-Straussian antinomy of nature and culture. But here Griffin confuses the manner and the matter of myth, for the question of man's relation to the world inevitably overlaps with the problem of nature and culture. Characteristically, it is not so much the *Iliad* but rather the *Odyssey* with its interest in human institutions and civilizations and their contraries which deals with this problem. The action of the *Iliad* is not, in fact, dominated by the axis of nature and culture. But Griffin might find himself more receptive to those who discuss the poem in terms of a vertical axis of

gods, men, and beasts, with the heroes occupying a precarious middle ground between the gods and men "such as we are now."

Griffin's study saves the best till last. His final chapter attempts to define the attitude of the gods toward men in all its complexity and ambiguity, and to discuss the way that attitude informs the grandly tragic vision of the *Iliad*. Griffin begins from the observation that the Olympians not only oversee the actions of men for punitive and moral purposes, as do celestial divinities among many peoples, but the Homeric gods often merely observe the doings of mortals "like spectators of a drama or a sporting competition" (182). This distinction between gods who "look after" men and those who simply "look on" is crucial to an understanding of Homeric divinity. The gods sometimes laugh at men and sometimes pity them; their observation of mortals reinforces their sense of their own superiority. "To complete their bliss they need . . . mortal men and their sufferings" (189). Both the love and enmity of the gods for the heroes are the consequences of their close familial ties, but the gods can pity and mourn even their favorites only briefly. Moreover, the gods have the power to impose sufferings capriciously; and, finally, they can turn away from watching men as easily as they pay attention to them. Their not watching, as Griffin notes, "defines the position of mortals still more crushingly" (198), but he does not elaborate. It would be interesting to gauge the difference between those episodes in which the pantheon intervenes freely, those in which Zeus alone assumes charge, and those in which even Zeus withdraws his gaze from Troy. The frivolity of Homer's gods, which is so jarring to modern sensibilities and already disturbed the ancients, coexists with their sublimity. The gods cannot possess the heroic ennobling and tragic qualities which men learn from accepting their mortality. The presence of the divine audience thus "both exalts and humbles human action" (201), revealing both its insignificance and its grandeur.

Griffin is well aware of the problematic nature of Homer's conception of the gods as dispassionate spectators, a view which, on several occasions, is "on the point of becoming a reproach" (202). Griffin dwells rather on the effects this view makes possible. But if the gods are, as Jaeger claimed "an aristocratic society which is immortal" (193), the question must finally be posed as to whether that aristocracy is based on *arete*. If not, it must ultimately be recognized as a tyranny. There is another question that Griffin does not answer or really ask. If "we are able to share their [the gods'] viewpoint and see human life as they see it" (203), is there any distinction between the perspective of the divine audience and that of the poet?

The strength of Griffin's admirable exposition lies in his insistence on Homer's overall vision of the pathos and greatness of the heroic existence combined with a close adherence to the particulars of the Homeric text. On occasion, Griffin appears to stop short of speculating about the consequences of certain aspects of the Homeric world view or to hesitate to probe into its foundations. Nevertheless, this study reminds us why we read Homer and of our own humanity.

J. STRAUSS CLAY

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

JOHN BUCKLER. *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 B.C.* Cambridge, Mass. and London, England; Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. x + 339. \$25.00. (Harvard Historical Studies, v. 98)

The publication of Buckler's fine book on the Theban hegemony marks an important step forward in the study of Greek politics and diplomacy during the fourth century, and particularly, of course, in the study of Thebes; nearly a hundred years divide its appearance from that of the last intensive study of this decade in Boeotian history in E. von Stern's *Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie* (1884). Buckler explores here the nature of the Theban hegemony (or, more properly, as Buckler himself points out, Theban 'ascendancy') and examines the ways in which the power of Thebes was won and lost. It was in recognition of their limitations, Buckler suggests, that the Thebans sought to exert their influence by means of two systems of alliance—one with the the Peloponnesian states (Argos, Arcadia, Messene, Elis) and one with Thessaly and Macedonia. The limitations of the Thebans, however, were considerable. Theban manpower was not adequate for extensive conquest or control of land outside Boeotia, nor could the Theban economy have maintained for any length of time an army either of citizens or of mercenaries. Over these circumstances the Thebans had little control. What they might have done, however, to foster the survival of their short-lived ascendancy was to build some sort of formal organization as well-defined as the Peloponnesian League. In this way, Buckler points out, it might have been possible for the Thebans and their allies to have shaped a policy agreeable to all and to have marshalled common resources to put their policies into action. In antiquity, orators and historians put forward the view that the Theban hegemony was exclusively the work of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Buckler has assembled a great deal of evidence in support of that view; but he argues too that Epaminondas and Pelopidas may have been lucky to die when they did—before the inevitable collapse of the Theban thrust for power in Greece. For, Buckler maintains, "the aspirations of Epameinondas, Pelopidas, and the Thebans were doomed from the outset" (224).

Buckler derives this inevitability not only from problems peculiar to Thebes but also from what he sees as the difficulties inherent in the governments of all Greek πόλεις, and he maintains in his Epilogue that "the inability of Thebes to maintain its hegemony" was "symptomatic of the larger failure of the Greek polis," since Thebes shared with other πόλεις the lack of "a standing body like the Roman senate" to shape a consistent policy. "Small wonder," Buckler concludes, "that Theban policy, like that in other Greek states, was often a thing of fits and starts, of striving for a goal only to shrink from the cost in men, money and effort necessary to achieve it" (225–26). Buckler has made an excellent case for this phenomenon in Thebes itself; he has not, I think, demonstrated that these same factors held back all Greek πόλεις, and, as we have seen, elsewhere in the book he contrasted the Thebans' policy with the more successful ventures of both Athens and Sparta. Throughout, Buckler is on weakest ground when he tries to draw parallels between Thebes and other πόλεις. In discussing the deposition and trial of Epaminondas in 369, for example, Buckler duly notes (144) the Athenian law which permitted deposed στρατηγοί to resume office if acquitted at their trials but fails to take into

consideration the fact that we know of not a single στρατηγός who did so; and for his contention (141) that the Athenians had resolved the problem of commands expiring in the midst of a campaigning season, he adduces only common sense as evidence. Much could in fact be said on this topic which might shed light on the crisis which Epaminondas' refusal to lay down his command engendered at Thebes, but Buckler does not say it, and so the Athenian parallel remains weak.

But the virtues of this important book far outweigh any defects. The narrative moves briskly and the style is terse and clear. Documentation is very full, and Buckler is much more scrupulous than most of us in telling his readers in the course of long notes exactly which references in the note back up precisely which contentions in the sentence or paragraph to which they refer. The Harvard Press is to be taken to task for relegating these masterful notes to a dismal exile in the back of the book. (I can only assume that this sort of behavior is a matter of cost and convenience. I have never understood the philosophy that notes "clutter" a text.) The work is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1, "The Land of Boiotia" (Buckler does not Latinize Greek names) demonstrates the ways in which topography favored the dominance of Thebes within Boeotia despite the favorable situation of some other πόλεις (Orchomenus, for example). Chapter 2 on "The Reestablishment of the Boeotian Confederacy" traces the role which threats from outside played in that phenomenon and shows how the rivalry of the greater Boeotian cities could work to the advantage of the lesser. Buckler argues convincingly here on a number of grounds that the confederacy enjoyed wider support within Boeotia than has generally been thought. The precise nature of the confederacy and its various offices is discussed in detail in this chapter, as is the elusive prosopography of the group of Ismenias. The remainder of the work is devoted to a close and careful analysis of the military and diplomatic history of the hegemony: Chapter 3, "Leuktra"; Chapter 4, "Conflict in the Peloponnesos (370-368 B.C.)"; Chapter 5, "Theban Intervention in the North (369-367 B.C.)"; Chapter 7, "Thebes and the Aegean (367-364 B.C.)"; and Chapter 8, "Chaos in the Peloponnesos (366-362 B.C.)." One intervening chapter (Chapter 6) treats "Internal Politics at Thebes."

The skimpiness of the evidence does not make it impossible for Buckler to add a great deal to what has already been said about internal matters in Thebes during this crucial decade. There is much that we simply do not know—the precise manner of the selection of boeotarchs, for example, and the family backgrounds of the Theban politicians who had paved the way for hegemony by turning the state towards democracy in the 380's. In matters of foreign policy, Buckler is on firmer ground; his analysis of the motivations of Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Arcadia during the period 371-62 is consistently keen and thoughtful. Buckler's attitude towards his sources is judicious and discriminating, both in Appendix 2 (there are two valuable appendices, the first on chronology and the second on literary sources) and—which is a greater tribute to his skills as a writer and a historian—throughout the body of the text. In the appendix on sources, Buckler argues persuasively the foolhardiness of recent attempts to deny the prejudice of Xenophon against both Epaminondas and Pelopidas (not without a certain testy tenacity of his own—Buckler evidently has some strong passions himself, and exasperation with

Xenophon and his defenders is clearly one of them). Those who, like the present reviewer, have spent more hours than they like to recall perusing the works of the Attic orators and anticipate passing many more in the same dubious pursuit will welcome Buckler's assessment of the orators here as "a mean, meretricious and scurrilous lot" (275) and approve his criticism (287) of those who assume "that the orators are being candid."

The greatest strength of the book, however, will be immediately evident to its readers: it lies in Buckler's close command of the topography of Boeotia, Thessaly and the Peloponnese, and it is as an essential work in the military history of the ancient world that this impressive book will make its mark. Years of painstaking labor and meticulous reconstruction have borne great fruit here; throughout, Buckler's discussion of military manoeuvres—illustrated with sixteen photographs and eight excellent relief maps—is as vivid and dramatic as it is rich in vital detail. No scholar or layman with even a passing interest in Greek warfare should fail to read this book.

JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS

SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

CHARLES D. HAMILTON. *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 346. \$19.50.

Hamilton's book is an excellent specimen of a certain kind of speculative history. It is both well argued and well written. Starting from the social and economic impact of the Peloponnesian War on the Greek world, Hamilton seeks to trace the relations between internal politics and foreign policy in the various states which ultimately became involved in the Corinthian War. Promising an effort "to avoid the Scylla of undue skepticism as well as the Charybdis of foolish credulity" (21), Hamilton has tried to fill in the gaps in the skimpy and inconsistent source materials and to present a detailed and coherent account of the challenges faced by various groups during this era and of the ways in which these challenges were or were not met. The results are highly successful. Hamilton concludes that the problems in Greece during the years 404 to 386 were the product of deep factional divisions within the various πόλεις. First, he argues, Sparta's failure to achieve a lasting peace in 404 cannot be traced solely to political inexperience, selfishness or limited resources, as some scholars have maintained; rather, she failed "because her policies were constantly subject to revision and change through the workings of factional rivalry" (326). Second, factional conflicts prevented the various πόλεις from concluding a lasting peace in 387: at that juncture, Hamilton writes, "differences of policy among the factions in the various states prevented an easy acceptance of the terms of peace" (328). Finally, he maintains that there was "a demonstrable link between the foreign policy of Sparta and the prominence of the different factions in . . . other states" (327). Hamilton's narrative supports all these conclusions.

The book is divided into four parts: Part One, The Dominance of Sparta; Part Two, The Failure of Peace; Part Three, The Corinthian War; and Part

Four, Sparta's Hollow Victory. Scholars have often assumed that Spartan government was singularly monolithic and followed a conspicuously consistent foreign policy. In Part One Hamilton provides a refutation of this view which in its depth and detail is long overdue. The account he gives of Spartan politics from 404 to 395 makes clear the continuous rivalry and interaction between the factions which were quite naturally forged in the victory at Aegospotami and its aftermath—one conservative group; one seeking overseas expansion to the east; and a third amenable to expansion but preferring that Sparta confine her sphere of interest to mainland Greece. Hamilton is right to reject as too simple the arguments which have blamed Sparta's failure to keep the peace of 404 on inadequate resources or cloistered virtue; rather, deep and predictable divergences over the proper use of her victory prevented Sparta from following a consistent policy after 404 and contributed in no small measure to the outbreak of the Corinthian War. In this first section of the book Hamilton treats the military manoeuvres leading to the battle of Aegospotami, the negotiations concerning the fate of Athens, the career of Lysander and the choice of a successor to King Agis, and the conspiracy of Cinadon; he also offers an incisive analysis of the relations between various Spartan factions and Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. The Thebans were the first of Sparta's allies to protest her settlement of the Peloponnesian War, and Hamilton begins Part Two accordingly with a discussion of Theban affairs after the war, leading up to the unpleasantness at Aulis in 396. Hamilton's discussion stresses the effect of Spartan policy on the vicissitudes of the parties of Leontiades and Ismenias, and it includes a long (and perhaps not entirely pertinent) digression on the nature of the Boeotian Confederacy. Hamilton next turns his attention to Athens, taking as his point of departure the end of civil strife in the rapprochement of the fall of 403. His exposition of political realities in Athens both in general and in the period at hand begins well and steers clear of the temptation to burgeon into a set piece even longer than the discussion of the Boeotian confederacy, but it takes a wrong turn somewhere on page 169, where Hamilton offers a disquisition on the trial of Socrates, concluding that "the reason for his arraignment was probably to perpetuate the mood of reconciliation and stability." I think not; but in any event Hamilton opens a can of worms here which might better have been left on the shelf. A careful discussion of the Oxyrhynchus historian's analysis of Athenian politics follows, and Hamilton ends the chapter in the summer of 396 with three political factions isolated in Athens, one eager for war, another set against it, and a third biding its time, waiting on events. Hamilton does not, I think, make as much as he might of the problems which were likely to be created at Athens by the extreme delicacy of the balance between these three parties. To be sure, as Hamilton makes clear in the last chapter of this section of the book ("The Outbreak of the Corinthian War"), with the passing of time and in particular after the arrival of Timocrates in Greece with his famous gold, the seriousness of the economic and political obstacles to war began to diminish, and the first and third of these parties began to close ranks at Athens; but the intense ambivalence which the Athenians had manifested during the years between the wars pointed to acute and ominous conflicts within the state. The sending of ambassadors to Persia—and the absence of a protest when the Spartans intercepted and executed them; the sending of Demaenetus to aid

Conon—and his terrified recall immediately afterwards: episodes like this betray a serious division within the state which was not, I think, entirely healed at the time the conflict broke out and which would continue to have bearing on the Athenians' prosecution of the war.

The Thebans, Corinthians, Argives and Athenians, then, went to war with Sparta in 395, united in their fear and resentment of Spartan high-handedness and aggression, and Part Three of Hamilton's book deals with the war itself. Hamilton begins by offering a brief outline of the years 395–393, tracing the failure of Sparta to break the will of the coalition which had been formed against her. Despite Spartan land victories at Nemea and then at Coronea, developments in the naval sphere seemed ominous for the Spartans: by the end of 393 the Corinthians and the Athenians once again possessed strong fleets; the Athenians had begun to fortify both Athens and Piraeus; and, most of all, the victory of Conon and Pharnabazus at Cnidus and their successes in persuading the cities of Asia Minor to expell their harmosts and declare their autonomy boded no good. In 392, consequently, the Spartans opened negotiations for peace, and the nature and chronology of these negotiations Hamilton treats in detail in a chapter which represents in many ways the climax of his study.

Already in antiquity the resemblance between the peace negotiations of 392 and those of 387/86 had occasioned considerable confusion. The principal contemporary sources for the negotiations are the *Hellenica* of Xenophon and Andocides' oration *On the Peace*—documents which agree in no particulars and must surely refer to two different sets of negotiations. Hamilton offers an excellent discussion of the unsuccessful peace conference at Sardis, and he offers as well an original and persuasive thesis concerning the equally unsuccessful conference several months later at Sparta: it was the Athenians, he argues, moved by military setbacks, who initiated the second set of negotiations. Hamilton also presents strong arguments in favor of dating the fragment of Philochorus preserved in Didymus concerning the impeachment of the Athenian ambassadors not to the negotiations of 392 but rather to the successful peace negotiations of 387/86. His treatment of Athenian internal politics in his discussions of the Philochorus fragment and of the Athenians' decision to reject the peace formulated at Sparta in 392 is not as full as it might be, but all in all this is one of the finest chapters in the book and provides to my mind the most thorough and judicious analysis to date of the events of 392.

The next chapter, which largely reproduces Hamilton's careful 1972 article in *Historia*, treats political developments in Corinth and the strange flirtation between Corinth and Argos during the war. The final chapter in Part Three, "The Resurgence of Athens," analyzes both the operations of Iphicrates on the mainland and those of Thrasybulus along the coast of Asia Minor. Hamilton's interpretation of Thrasybulus' imperialism is on the whole correct, but his failure to underline the ambivalence of the Athenians at the outset of the war places him at a disadvantage in dealing with the sudden recall of Thrasybulus at the height of his success. In Part Four, Hamilton provides an excellent analysis of the military and diplomatic events leading to the Peace of Antalcidas, expanding on the work of Graefe in reconstructing Antalcidas' decisive coup in the Hellespont and providing a narrative of that campaign which is as dramatic as it is detailed. Here too he deals much more satisfactorily with internal dissent at Athens.

Hamilton's study amply bears out his tripartite conclusion—that factional divisions within Sparta set in motion a chain of events which destroyed the peace of 404; that factional conflicts within the πόλεις boded ill for the success of the Peace of Antalcidas; and that the prominence of various factions within the πόλεις of Greece can very often be traced directly to changes in Spartan policy. The story of the unsuccessful peace of 404 and the war which followed is told with force and drama, blending narrative and analysis in highly readable proportions and reaching an appropriate climax in the discussion of the unsuccessful peace negotiations of 392. Hamilton's gracious cadences make his close account flow smoothly and carry the reader without a jolt through some of the choppiest waters in the history of the πόλεις; and the Cornell Press is to be praised too for its production of the book, which is well bound with wide margins, readable print and, most of all, footnotes at the bottom of the page where they belong.

JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS

SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

M. PAPATHOMOPOULOS. *Nouveaux Fragments d'Auteurs Anciens. Ioannina [Greece], 1980. Pp. 80 (Panepistemion Ioanninon. Philosophike Schole. Seira "Peleia," 5)*

The scholia John Tzetzes (henceforth Tz.) wrote to some of his own works abound in frs. from and comments on lost ancient texts. Nevertheless these scholia have been published only in part. Papathomopoulos (henceforth P.), Professor of Classics at the University of Ioannina, Greece, and former student of Jean Irigoin, has produced this short book while preparing a critical edition of Tz.'s *Carmina Iliaca* and Tz.'s scholia to these *Carmina*. The book contains the Greek text of two dozen or so frs./scholia together with P.'s commentary *variorum* on them (Hesiod, Cleinias of Carystus, Stesichorus, Hipponax, Aeschylus, Euripides, Parmemon of Byzantium, Alexander of Ephesus, Eratosthenes, Orpheus, Heraclitus, Democritus, Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Herodorus of Pontus, Philochorus, Baton of Sinope, Theagenes, and Dictys of Crete). Since, however, some of these frs. have already been edited, the word 'nouveaux' in the title does not accurately report what the book delivers. In 'Ἡσιόδεια fr. I (= p. 11) P. offers a Tz. scholion which states that, unlike Homer, Hesiod (whoever this "Hesiod" really was) has Menelaus and Agamemnon as sons not Ἀτρέως but Πλεισθένους ἑρμαφροδίτου ἢ χλωῦ, ὃς ἱμᾶτιον γυναικεῖον ἐνεδέδυτο. On the basis of this scholion P. finds it advisable to propose that Pleisth. as the hermaphroditic/lame etc. father of Ag./Men. constituted the original tradition which Homer changed for reasons of decorum. That "Hesiod" had Pleisth. as father of Ag./Men. is not particularly surprising, since in early Greek poets (see P. p. 22, note 4) we meet the two brothers as *Pleisthenidai*. Nevertheless, ἑρμαφροδίτου-ἐνεδέδυτο introduces a Pleisth. not found elsewhere in early writers, and this part of the Tz. scholion may well derive not from "Hesiod," but from Tz. expanding on "Hesiod" with the paraphernalia of Lucian's *Podagra* 256 and the like. That Greeks in Homer's day and even earlier knew of Ag./Men. as *Pleisthenidai* (with Pleisth.

as either father or grandfather or ancestor) constitutes, I think, a possibility; but suggestions that Pleisth. for these early Greeks was hermaphroditic/lame etc. can hardly be appreciated as anything more substantial than unprofitable speculations. In 'Hσιόδεια fr. 2 (p. 26 [fr. 276 M.-W]) P. finds the lection εἴθ'², v. 1 sound. However, the sequence εἴθε μοι, εἴθ' constitutes an *anadiplosis*, not just an epic repetition, and the question to be addressed by P. ought to have been whether *anadiplosis* can be accommodated in (early) Greek Epic. In 'Hσιόδεια fr. 3 (p. 27) P. offers a Tz. scholion which attributes the *Aegimius* to a Κλεινίας ὁ Καρύστιος. P. attempts to make this information credible by suggesting that the mention of 'Αβαντίς/Εὔβοια in the *Aegimius* (fr. 296 M.-W) may be due to the local interest of Cleinias (P. takes Καρύστιος = from Carystus in Euboea). This is clever. Nevertheless, the mention may well be due to the poet's interest in Io, the ancestress of Heracles (cf. Aesch. (?) *Prom. V.* vv. 770-74), and Heracles' son Illus adopted by the Dorian King Aegimius, and not to patriotism. After all, could not Καρύστιος refer to the toponym Κάρυστος in Lacedaemon (cf. Strabo 10.1.6)? In view of Cleinias of Cnossus in Pl.'s *Lg.* and Cleinias of Tarentum in D.S. 10.4.1, it is likely that the name is possible for a Lacedaemonian as well. Is a Euboean epic poet (an Ionian) more likely to write on Aegimius, the son or father of Dorus (eponym of the Dorians), than is a Dorian epic poet? In Στησίχορος (p. 29) Ἰσαν and Φελένας seem convincing, as does P.'s λαβών for Tz. In Ἰππώναξ fr. 1 (p. 32 [fr. 72, 5-7 West]), I share West's doubts about P.'s conjectures στέγευς and κάτεγγυς (see P. p. 34, note 2). Regarding his further conjecture ὅ<κ>χων he fails to show that the form is Ionic/Hipponactean (Tz.'s ὄχων is not likely to be metrically correct either in spite of P.'s note 4, p. 32). Also P.'s contention that ἐπὶ ἀρμάτων τε καὶ θρεϊκίων ὅ<κ>χων λευκῶν forms a hendiadys I find not convincing—it forms a ταῦτολογία. After all, during the night (I take it that Rhesus in Hipponax, as in Homer, was killed in his sleep) horses do not remain yoked to the chariot (and so they do not qualify for ἐν in P.'s hendiadys). Nor are seven genitives in two verses (without any other case [reading στέγευς with P.]) attractive. The reading πῶλων (pro ὄχων) may well be what Hipponax wrote. In Hipponax fr. 2 (p. 34 [fr. 26^a West]), the Tz. lection ἀλλ' οἱ seems correct. In Hipponax fr. 3 (p. 34 [fr. 65 West]) P.'s endorsement of σπένδοντες seems judicious. In the Aeschylus fr. (p. 36 [fr. 193 Mette = 300 Nauck²]) the words γαῖαν κυλίνδει do not make sense. P.'s acceptance of γλῆνος (v. 4) on the basis of Hsch. (γλῆνος· φάος) and LSJ (s.v. γλῆνος II) leaves me sceptical. If γλῆνος was excerpted from this passage of Aeschylus, I wonder why it was glossed as φάος (it is not *light* but *heat* that melts the snow) rather than as ἥλιος; and I may point out that ἥλιος is *usitatissimum vocabulum* for all periods of the Greek language, and therefore all the more the *mot juste* to gloss γλῆνος, if only γλῆνος had come from here. I wish to stress that Hsch. does not tell us that γλῆνος comes from Aeschylus; indeed, γλῆνος is not a *vox dictionis tragicæ* so far as extant evidence goes. P.'s conjecture αἰθαλής is hardly convincing, because (a) it is an ἀμάρτυρον (b) no emendation is needed—there is nothing wrong with the lection εὐθαλής. I further doubt P.'s ἐν ᾗ = ἐν Αἰθιοπίδι γῆ. Is the "mountain snow" (v. 5) likely to be located ἐν Αἰθιοπίδι (= ἐν κεκαυμένη) γῇ? In Εὐριπίδης (p. 39 [fr. 228, 1-5 Nauck²]) the reading ἐκ γαίας (v. 2) does not seem meaningful. Nor can P.'s construction of τέθριππ' ἰόντος ἡλίου stand (he takes τέθριππ(α) as internal

object): (a) The meaning must be that the sun moves across the sky "on" his four-horse chariot (i.e. ἐπὶ τεθρίππῳ [or ἐπὶ -ῳ]) or else "by means of" his four-horse chariot (i.e. τεθρίππῳ [= *dat. instrumentalis*]). By definition, internal object cannot carry such "on"/"by" relations. (b) P.'s very δρόμον (by which he reaches the internal object construction) is untenable, for while a Greek says εἶμι ὁδόν he does not also say εἶμι δρόμον (unless P. knows of such an instance), but εἶμι δρόμῳ/δρόμοις (such expressions as θεῖν/δραμεῖν δρόμον do not constitute parallels to εἶμι δρόμον, for θεῖν/δραμεῖν inherently bespeak "rapid" movement, while εἶμι does not). In his Παρμένων (p. 41 [Powell, *Coll. Alex.*, p. 237]) the sequence Νεῖλ(ε) . . . Νεΐλου presents a harsh transition from the 2nd person (Νεῖλ') to the 3rd (Νεΐλου) which is not likely to be Parmenon's. ἄνθρωποι (v. 1) seems to be a filler, but it might conceivably be correct. P.'s conjecture ὅ τε is attractive, and so is his Μένδην τε (v. 3). In Ἐρατοσθένης (p. 44), P. has not justified his change, in the Tz. text (l. 11), of Ἀρχιμήδης ὁ Συρακούσιος τοῦ Ἀιστόξενοιο ὁ Ταραντίνος. Is not Tz. liable to a (μνημονικόν?) ἁμάρτημα? In the αἰδέσποτον (p. 49) P.'s argument for an original iambic trimeter is well taken. In Ἡράκλειτος (p. 51 [B126 D.-K = 42^a Marcovich]) the reading δεινός of the Tz. scholion seems doubtful. I emend it to <σκο>τεινός which is supported by the fact that Heracl. was nicknamed not δεινός but σκοτεινός (see D.-K., v. 3, s.v. σκοτεινός) and also by the fact that the very scholion explains the nickname with διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σκοτεινόν. In Φερεκύδης (p. 55) should we not read ἀποκείται *pro* ἀπόκειται (l. 8) in view of the preceding indefinite relative ἢ ἄν? In the Ἡρόδωρος scholion (p. 59) the lection ἥρωα (v. 22) is defective; I emend it to ἥρῳα (= hexameters [see LSJ s.v. ἥρῳον]), i.e. Ἀπολλώνιος ἥρῳα γράφων = Ἀπ. (ὁ Ῥόδιος) τὰ Ἀργοναυτικά γράφων. In the Φιλόχορος scholion (p. 62), P. argues convincingly against the Pindaric scholia. In the Βάτων scholion (p. 65) P. convincingly embraces the lection Βάτων. Also P.'s other improvements here are good, including Ὑποπλάκιοι. In the Θεαγένης scholion (p. 67) the lection ἄττικοι (l. 8) seems defective. I emend it to ἀστικοί. Aeacus taught the primitive Aeginetans ἐμπορίαν καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ συνελεύσεις . . . καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς ὅσοις ἀστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται, he transformed them from ἄγροικοι into ἀστικοί, he *civilized* them—ἀττικοί is all the more strange since the text tells us that Aeacus came from *Argos* (l. 6). P. pronounces lections from Tz. to be confirmations of scholarly conjectures. Thus, e.g., on p. 34 (= Hipponax) the lection λαγούς of C (λαγῶς in Athenaeus' codd.) according to P. confirms Meineke's conjecture λαγούς. However, Byzantine scholars (and Tz. is one of the most learned among them) knew that λαγῶς ὁ Ἀττικός, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ο (= λαγός) ὁ Ἰων. Could it be then that λαγούς in C is a Byzantine conjecture performed on a text reading λαγῶς? Unless previously confirmed as transmitted, a Tz. lection has no authority to confirm a modern conjecture. And while on the subject of lections/conjectures, P. will do well if in future publications he does not discuss professed *coniecturae* (even when they are *emendationes palmares*) in terms of *lectiones* (e.g., p. 37 ". . . nous avons écrit αἰθαλῆς [= P.'s *conjecture*] . . . comme *varia lectio* ou même *lectio difficilior* de εὐθαλῆς [= *lection* in CF] . . ."). I had a pleasant and profitable time reading this short book in which P. does not always carry conviction, and yet invariably demonstrates ingenuity, diligence and breadth of knowledge.

GEORGE LEONIDAS KONIARIS

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS (BOSTON)

BOOKS RECEIVED

- ANTON, JOHN P. *Science and the Sciences in Plato*. New York, Eidos, 1980. Pp. xvi + 127. No price stated.
- BIRASCHI, A. M. et al. *Strabone: Saggio di Bibliografia, 1469-1978*. Perugia, Università degli Studi, 1981. Pp. 137. No price stated.
- BOLKESTEIN, A. M. *Problems in the Description of Modal Verbs: An Investigation of Latin*. Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. 1980. Pp. x + 185. Dfl. 36.50. (Studies in Greek and Latin Linguistics, 1)
- California Studies in Classical Antiquity*, vol. 12 (1979). Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California, 1981. Pp. x + 303. \$30.00.
- CASAVOLA, FRANCO. *Giuristi Adrianei*. Naples, Jovene, 1980. Pp. xii + 430. L. 15.000.
- CHAMBERS, M. et al. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. 48. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1981. Pp. xviii + 166, 8 pls. No price stated. (Graeco-Roman Memoirs, 67)
- CHARLET, JEAN-LOUIS. *L'influence d' Ausone sur la poésie de Prudence*. Aix-en-Provence, Université de Provence, 1980. Pp. 291. No price stated.
- COLACE, P. RADICI. *Choerili Samii Reliquiae*. Rome, Bretschneider, 1979. Pp. xxi + 160. No price stated. (Biblioteca di Helikon: Testi e Studi, 13)
- CURRY, NEIL. *Euripides: The Trojan Women, Helen, The Bacchae*. Cambridge University Press, 1981. Pp. 166. \$5.50. (Translations from Greek and Roman Authors)
- DERBOLAV, JOSEF. *Von den Bedingungen gerechter Herrschaft: Studien zu Platon und Aristoteles*. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1980. Pp. 298. No price stated.

- DEVIJVER, H. *Prosopographia Militarium Equestrum Quae Fuerunt ab Augusto ad Gallienum. Pars Tertia: Indices*. Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1980. Pp. 365. Bfr. 1.550. (Symbolae A/3)
- DÖPP, SIEGMAR. *Zeitgeschichte in Dichtungen Claudians*. Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1980. Pp. xii + 281. DM 68. (Hermes-Einzelschriften, 43)
- ECK, WERNER et al. *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte; Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff*. Cologne and Vienna, Böhlau, 1980. Pp. xv + 595, DM 128. (Kölner Historische Abhandlungen, 28)
- ERB, GERNOT. *Zu Komposition und Aufbau im ersten Buch Martials*. Frankfurt-am-Main and Bern, Lang, 1981. Pp. 193. No price stated.
- FERLAUTO, FILIPPO. *Il testo di Tucidide e la traduzione latina di Lorenzo Valla*. Università di Palermo, 1979. Pp. 69. L. 2000.
- GARCÍA DOMINGO, ENRIQUE. *Latinismos en la Koiné (en los documentos epigráficos desde el 212 a.J.C. hasta el 14 d.J.C.): Gramática y léxico griego-latino, latino-griego*. Colegio Universitario de Burgos, 1979. Pp. 845. No price stated.
- GIGANTE, MARCELLO. *Contributi alla storia della officina dei papiri ercolanesi*. Naples, Industria Tipografica Artistica, 1980. Pp. 238. No price stated.
- GONZALEZ VAZQUEZ, JOSE. *La imagen en la poesía de Virgilio*. Universidad de Granada, 1980. Pp. 339. No price stated.
- GRIMAL, PIERRE. *Seneque*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1981. Pp. 127. No price stated. (Que Sais-je?)
- GRMEK, M. D. *Hippocratica: Actes du Colloque hippocratique de Paris (4-9 septembre 1978)*. Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1980. Pp. 486. No price stated. (Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 583)

- JENKINSON, J. R. *Persius, The Satires: Text with Translation and Notes*. Warminster, Aris & Phillips, 1980. Pp. vii + 131. Cloth, \$29.00; Paper, \$14.50.
- KAIOMO, JORMA. *The Romans and the Greek Language*. Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1979. Pp. 379. No price stated. (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 64)
- KOLENDO, JERZY. *L'agricoltura nell'Italia romana*. Rome, Riuniti, 1980. Pp. lx + 222, 8 pls. No price stated. (Biblioteca di storia antica, 10)
- KURZ, GEBHARD et al. *Gnomosyne: Menschliches Denken und Handeln in der frühgriechischen Literatur. Festschrift für Walter Marg zum 70. Geburtstag*. Munich, Beck, 1981. Pp. x + 325. DM 145.
- L'antiquité classique*, vol. 49 (1980). Brussels, 1980. Pp. 694. No price stated.
- LAUFFER, SIEGFRIED. *Die Bergwerkssklaven von Laureion*. Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1979. Pp. x + 322. DM 98. (Forschungen zur Antiken Sklaverei, 11)
- LEAR, JONATHAN. *Aristotle and Logical Theory*. Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 123. \$17.50.
- MACMULLEN, RAMSAY. *Roman Social Relations 50 B.C. to A.D. 284*. Yale University Press, 1974. Paper, 1981. Pp. ix + 212. \$4.95.
- MITFORD, TERENCE B. *The Nymphaeum of Kafizin: The Inscribed Pottery*. Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1980. Pp. xxiv + 286, 8 pls. No price stated. (Kadmos, Supplement II)
- PALMA, ANTONIO. *Le 'curae' pubbliche: Studi sulle strutture amministrative romane*. Naples, Jovene, 1980. Pp. xii + 275. No price stated. (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà Giuridica dell'Università di Napoli, 184)

- PETERS, MARTIN. *Untersuchungen zur Vertretung der indogermanischen Laryngale im Griechischen*. Vienna, Österreichischen Akademie, 1980. Pp. x + 364. DM 80. (Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften philosophisch-historische Klasse Sitzungsberichte, 377)
- PETROCHEILOU, N. K. *Φύση καὶ λειτουργία τοῦ κινήτρου τοῦ μυθολογικοῦ παραδείγματος στήν ἐπική ρωμαϊκή ποίηση*. Thessalonica, 1980. Pp. 237. No price stated.
- PRITCHETT, W. KENDRICK. *Studies in Greek Topography. Part III (Roads)*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California, 1980. Pp. xii + 369, 103 pls. No price stated. (Classical Studies, 22)
- PROCTOR, DENNIS. *The Experience of Thucydides*. Warminster, Aris & Phillips, 1980. Pp. viii + 264. No price stated.
- RONCONI, ALESSANDRO and SCARDIGLI, BARBARA. *Storie, libri XXXVI-XL di Tito Livio*. Turin, Unione Tipografica, 1980. Pp. 903. L. 36.000. (Classici latini, N. 8/VI)
- SAKELLARIOU, MICHEL. *Les proto-grecs*. Athens, Ekdotike Athenon, 1980. Pp. 287. No price stated.
- SCHOFIELD, MALCOLM et al. *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 342. \$34.50.
- STEPHANOPOULOS, THEODOROS K. *Umgestaltung des Mythos durch Euripides*. Athens, 1980. Pp. 175. No price stated.
- Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, vol. 27 (1977). Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980. Pp. xix + 370. Cloth, \$42.50; Paper, \$32.50.
- THOMSEN, RUDI. *King Servius Tullius*. Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1980. Pp. 347. No price stated.
- TRAGLIA, ANTONIO and ARICO, GIUSEPPE. *Opere di Publio Papinio Stazio*. Turin, Unione Tipografica, 1980. Pp. 1128. L. 45.000. (Classici latini, N. 34)

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

FOUNDED BY BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE, 1880



❧ SUMMER 1982 VOLUME 103 NUMBER 2 ❧

ALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

DISKIN CLAY, EDITOR

Georg Luck, James W. Poultney, John Pollini, Michael L. McCormick
Frank Romer, Book Review Editor
Candida Allanbrook, Secretary

Benjamin D. Meritt, *Honorary Editor*

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY • Volume 103 • Number 2 • Summer 1982
ISSN 0002-9475

Copyright © 1982 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

All rights reserved. No portion of this journal may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the formal consent of the editors and publishers. For copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law, the copier must pay a fee of \$1.00 per copy through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, Massachusetts 01970. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. It is the journal's policy to require the assignment of copyright from all authors.

The *American Journal of Philology* publishes original contributions in Classical Studies, particularly in the fields of Greek and Roman Literature, Textual Criticism, Classical Linguistics, Ancient Philosophy, History, and Greek and Latin Epigraphy. It is published quarterly: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. Subscription price: \$30.00 Institutions, \$14.00 Individuals. Foreign postage is \$2.50 additional. Single issues: \$8.00 each.

Subscriptions, address changes, advertising, and other business correspondence should be sent to The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Division, 34th and Charles Streets, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A. Claims for replacements of missing issues must be received within three months (six months for foreign subscribers) following publication of the issue.

Postmaster: please send form 3579 to the above address.

Indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals and in Book Review Index.

Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland, and at additional mailing offices.

Composition by Bet Sha'ar Press, Inc.

The Printers' devices appearing on the front cover of *AJP* have been selected from among the ones especially created in stained glass for the Hutzler Undergraduate Reading Room on the Homewood Campus of The Johns Hopkins University. They represent the devices by Aldus Manutius (Spring), Robert Estienne (Summer), Joannes Frobenius (Fall), and Christopher Plantin (Winter).

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 103, No. 2

WHOLE No. 409

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

JEFFREY A. WHITE

Bellerophon in the 'Land of Nod':

Some Notes on *Iliad* 6.153-211 119

RUTH SCODEL

The Autobiography of Phoenix: *Iliad* 9.444-95 128

ROBERT L. KANE

Oedipus Tyrannus, 1084-85: "I'll not deny my nature?" 137

RICHARD F. THOMAS

Catullus and the Polemics of Poetic Reference:

Poem 64.1-18 144

JEFFREY M. DUBAN

Venus, Epicurus and *Naturae Species Ratioque* 165

PETER ELDER

Horace, *Ode* 3.19 178

LOWELL EDMUNDS

The Latin Invitation-Poem:

What is it? Where did it come from? 184

DAVID N. WIGTIL

The Translator of the Greek *Res Gestae* of Augustus 189

BRIAN CROKE

The Originality of Eusebius' *Chronicle* 195

INTERPRETATIONS

201

J. STRAUSS CLAY

Ἄκρα Γυπέων: Geography, Allegory, and Allusion
(Archilochus Fragment 105 West)

MICHAEL J. MILLS

Τύχη in Aristoxenus, Fr. 41, and *Eudemian Ethics* θ.2

DAVID SIDER

Notes on Two Epigrams of Philodemus

D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY

Propertius 4.3.94: An Appendix

ERIC P. HAMP

Remnants of the Pronominal Genitive Singular -l

REVIEWS

217

NETTA ZAGAGI

*Tradition and Originality in Plautus: Studies of the Amatory
Motifs in Plautine Comedy* (Erich Segal)

J. M. SNYDER

Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura (Diskin Clay)

CEDRIC WHITMAN, Tr.

Fifteen Odes of Horace (Georg Luck)

BETTY ROSE NAGLE

*The Poetics of Exile: Program and Polemic in the Tristia
and Epistulae ex Ponto of Ovid* (S. Georgia Nugent)

CLAUDIUS CLAUDIANUS

Cl. Claudiani De Bello Gothico. Edizione critica, traduzione
e commento di Giovanni Garuti (Michael McCormick)

P. COCKSHAW, M.-C. GARAND et P. JODOGNE, Eds.

Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata MCMLXXIX
(Michael McCormick)

BOOKS RECEIVED

228

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

BELLEROPHON IN THE 'LAND OF NOD'*

SOME NOTES ON *ILIAD* 6.153-211

That certain Hellenic and Semitic myths show correspondences of detail, motif, and (sometimes) conception, no longer surprises us. The evaluation of such parallelisms is usually a very difficult job; yet West's *Prolegomena* to the *Theogony*, for example, in which the relationship between the Hesiodic poem and older, recovered tales of the Phoenicians, Babylonians, Hurrians, and Hittites (not all of them Semitic, of course) is clarified, prove how the reading of a Greek text can be enriched thereby.¹ Precisely how such genuine cross-cultural developments occur, when they *did* occur, and their extent, are enormous questions. Nevertheless, most people presuppose a wide dissemination or diffusion of Semitic mythical lore throughout Asia Minor and the Near East, emanating from Mesopotamia. There would have been a subsequent transmission of some of this lore in Mycenaean times, from the East and from the South, to Hellas—a direct transmission in a few cases, perhaps, but mostly through peoples, Semitic or not, made intermediary by geography or trade, through Cretans, Phoenicians, Lycians, etc.

Leaf, Bérard, and others have drawn attention to the Lycians, particularly, as likely candidates for such a rôle in *history*.² The ties

* An earlier draft of this essay was delivered at the annual Christmas meeting of the American Philological Association in Boston, on 29 December 1979.

¹ As everyone knows: M. L. West (ed.), *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 18-31, particularly; also, West's commentary on the poem's Castration of Uranos (154-210) and Titanomachy (617-719) and Typhoeus (869-80) sequences, *ad loc.*; and see his "Select Bibliography" on *Hesiod and the East*, pp. 106-7. For another elegant example of this approach, see Walter Burkert, "Von Amenophis II. zur Bogenprobe des Odysseus," *GB* 1 (1973) 69-78.

² Walter Leaf, *Troy: A Study in Homeric Geography* (London 1912) 308-10, 320-22; Victor Bérard, *Les Phéniciens et l'Odysée*, 2 vols. (Paris 1902-3) 1.305-66 (particularly 332-41)—with all of the caveats of subsequent scholarship that adhere, rightly, to

between this section of Anatolia and mainland Greece, in *myth*, have long been observed: we know from sources other than the *Iliad* that Glaucus of Corinth, the father of Bellerophon, married a Lycian princess, as his son did and, of course, as did his son's would-be slayer, Proetus of Tiryns; Proetus, indeed, was installed in Tiryns and given it to rule by his Lycian father-in-law, Iobates (or Amphianax), and the city's walls were fortified for him by Lycian Cyclopes after his brother Acrisius had driven him from Argos.³ In my discussion, I shall attempt, through an examination of the Bellerophon legend, particularly as it is transmitted in *Il.* 6.153ff., where it appears in Greek literature for the first time and is set, in the main, in Lycia, to advance some new arguments in favour of the supposition (long maintained) of a Semitic origin for the hero and to connect him with the biblical Cain.⁴

The hero's name, Βελλεροφόντης, has never been satisfactorily etymologized. In antiquity, the latter portion of the name was usually understood to derive from θείνω (*θένω), 'smite' (cf. the *o*-grade φονεύς), and the initial portion variously interpreted in the light of

this single-minded but very interesting and often useful work: cf., e.g., M. E. Nilsson, *Homer and Mycenae* (London 1933) 25–26. For a survey of Lycian cults, Hellenic and Oriental, see Shelagh Jameson, *RE Suppl.* 13 (1973) s.v. "Lykia," 291–93.

³ See, e.g., Apollod. 2.3.1f., Hyg. *F.* 157, Str. 8.6.11; also, H. Thomas and F. H. Stubbings, "Lands and Peoples in Homer," in A. J. B. Wace and F. H. Stubbings (edd.), *A Companion to Homer* (New York 1963) 306; further documentation in G. Radke, *RE* 23.1 (1957) s.v. "Proitos," 125–27. The very fact of Diomedes' (of Calydon) and Glaucus' far-flung guest-friendship (which occasions their exchange of tales in the *Iliad*) is proof of an extraordinary relationship; and it may be that the connections we observe between the ruling houses of Corinth and Lycia point to an unconscious expression on the part of the mythographers of some regularized arrangement of exogamy between them.

⁴ Of the well-known and accessible handbook expositions, all are out of date: Rapp, in W. H. Roscher (ed.), *Ausführliches Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* 1.1 (Leipzig 1884–86) s.v. "Bellerophon," 754–74; Bethe, in *RE* 3 (1889) s.v. "Bellerophon," 241–51; Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythologie* 2.1–2 (Berlin 1920), in "Die Griechische Heldensage," 179–85. Likewise, the major studies: H. A. Fischer, *Bellerophon: eine mythologische Abhandlung* (Leipzig 1851); H. W. v. Prittwitz u. Gaffron, *Bellerophon in der antiken Kunst* (München 1888); Ludolf Malten, "Bellerophon," *JDAI* 40 (1925) 121–60 (by far the best of these). A. Giusti wrote a noteworthy psychological sketch of the hero, "La distimia di Bellerofonte (*Iliade*, VI, 200–2)," *REHom* 3 (1933) 39–49, and compared him to the biblical Jacob, in "Homeric," *MC* (1937) 68–80, also to Nebuchadnezzar, in "Leggendo IV," *MC* (1938) 54. More recently and pertinently: Rolf Peppermüller, *Die Bellerophonessage, ihre Herkunft und Geschichte* (Unpubl. Diss., Tübingen 1961) (reviewed by J. A. Davison, in *CR* 12 [1962] 303 f.); from his dissertation, Peppermüller has abstracted "Die Glaukos-Diomedes-Szene der *Ilias*, Spuren vorhomerischer Dichtung," *WS* 75 (1962) 5–21 (= Peppermüller²).

this: in the scholia to *Il.* 6.155, Bellerophon gets his name from having killed *Bellerus*, a king of Corinth (otherwise unknown);⁵ and later, Eustathius, in his commentary to the *Iliad*, noting that Bellerophon is also called Ἐλληροφόντης, sees in this portion of the name ἔλληρα, a dialect form of κακά.⁶ There are measures of *undisguised* desperation, too, such as Fulgentius' *buleforunta* (compounded of βουλή and φορέω [= *consultatorem sapientiae*]).⁷ Now there is a tendency (which seems more reasonable when one considers names like Κλεοφόντης and Ἀριστοφόντης) to derive -φόντης from φαίνω, 'make appear' (though, still, this is problematical, as is the epithet of Hermes, Ἀργειφόντης).⁸ Rapp (in Roscher), building on the speculations of Max Müller, constructs an astonishing etymology for the name by combining the notion of *manifestation* with ἔλληρο- (of Eustathius' version), to which Müller had added a digamma (as representing β- of the other form), equating this formation with L. *villus*, 'tuft of hair,' and *villosus*, 'shaggy,' in the (possibly Aristophanic?) sense that a cloud is a shaggy monster, to explain Bellerophon as the 'hero-who-brings-on-the-clouds,' or the 'hero-who-appears-in-the-clouds,' i.e., a "Sonnenheld."⁹

Yet I think that his name is theophoric, and the initial element of it most probably to be derived from *Baal*, the great storm-, fertility-, war-god of the Phoenicians and Canaanites, bearing the meaning of 'lord,' 'master,' 'possessor,' as appears in the Semitic names *Hannibal*, *Hasdrubal*, *Jerobaal*, *Ittobal*, etc.¹⁰ And, though the usual develop-

⁵ *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ex codicibus aucta et emendata*, ed. W. Dindorf [vols. 5-6, *Scholia Townleyana*, rec. E. Maass], 6 vols. (Oxford 1875-88) *ad* Z 155 [1.233-34, etc.].

⁶ Eustathii, Archiepiscopi Thessalonici, *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem*, ed. G. Stallbaum, 4 vols. (Leipzig 1825-30) 2.99.41-42 [= Roman edition, 635.5-6].

⁷ Fulg. *Myth.* 3.1 (in Fabii Planciadis Fulgentii v.c., *Opera*, ed. R. Helm [Leipzig 1898] 59).

⁸ See Jessen, *RE* 2 (1896) s.v. "Argeiphontes," 703-4. And cf. the epithet (always of Enyalios [= Ares]) ἀνδρεφόντης (of B 651, H 166, Θ 264, P 259), which upsets calculation further.

⁹ Rapp (above, note 4) 767-68.

¹⁰ I have been anticipated, I discover, in this obvious (seeming) derivation by H. Lewy, *Die semitischen Fremdwörter in Griechischen* (Berlin 1895; rpt. Hildesheim 1970) 192-93, who connects the latter portion of the name, moreover, with the reconstructed Heb. form **rafon*, 'deliverance,' or 'consecration,' (cf. *Raphael*). On the god Baal, see Cumont, *RE* 2 (1896) s.v. "Baal," 2647-52; also, De Moor, and Mulder, in *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*, edd. Batterweck and Ringgren, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids 1975) s.v. "ba'al," 181-200.

ment of the god's name into Greek is Βῆλος, the formation Βελιτανᾶς (attested from the Ionian Ctesias, in Phot. *Bibl.*, as so derived)¹¹ seems genuine, and irregularities of this sort among such derivatives are to be expected, in any case. If we except *Belus*, the father of Phoenician Dido,¹² probably the most well-known Βῆλος of Greek mythology is the son of Poseidon and Libya, brother of Agenor and ruler over Egypt, after whom the famous *Belidae*: in a legend in which Poseidon and his attributes and symbols are so ubiquitous (cf. Bellerophon's Corinthian name, Ἰππινόοος, or the sea-epithet/name, Γλαυκός, of the line of Corinth, for only two) as to suggest that Bellerophon is a "Doppelgänger" of the god, such a connection is probably significant.¹³

From Homer's account of the legend, we may surmise that the Corinthian Bellerophon is in vassalage to king Proetus, an inferior man (a typical condition of heroes in myth). From Apollod. 2.3.1-2 we learn, further, that he had come to Proetus, initially, to be purified of a murder (which is equally typical): he had killed his brother, a certain Deliades, or Piren (Πείρην), or Alcimines.¹⁴ According to Apollodorus, then, Bellerophon, like Cain, was a *fratricide*.

In Tiryns Bellerophon falls into a sexual entanglement: he unwittingly excites the lust of Proetus' wife, Anteia (in later versions,

¹¹ Ed. Bekker (Berlin 1824) 39a.5. An explanation for the particle -λεπο- of the hero's name seems far to seek. Likeliest, it is an Hellenic modulation of an outlandish sound, without decipherable meaning (at least in Greek), as of the name entire: this would be true of -φοντης, also, despite its Hellenic cast and despite ancient and other hypothesis. We are not dealing with an hybrid.

¹² For him, see, e.g., Austin's note (Publius Vergilius Maro, *Aeneidos liber primus*, ed. R. G. Austin [Oxford 1971]) to *Aen.* 1.621.

¹³ See S. K. A. Wide, *Lakonische Kulte* (Leipzig 1893) 40, and below, note 14.

¹⁴ Recall, in connection with the brother *Piren*, the spring Πείρηνη on the Acrocorinthus, one of a number struck out by the hoof of the horse of wonder, Pegasus (offspring of Poseidon), and cf. the sea-water well, the Ἐρεχθίδης on the Athenian Acropolis, likewise the work of the god. I hope to be able to prove in detail one day that Bellerophon, as we think of him now, is a conflation of Hellenic and Semitic figures: the multiplicity of equine associations in the myth (the animal emblem of Poseidon: see the material assembled by Bethe [above, note 4] 242) betokens a specifically Greek (Corinthian) hero of the Heracles or Theseus type, here an aspect of Poseidon of the Isthmus, whose *Haupttat* is the taming of the horse Pegasus; the weirder adventures of the hero in Anatolia belong, I believe, to a Semitic rider-hero, whose *Haupttat* is the slaying of the Chimaera in Lycia, a hero whom Greeks (maybe as early as Mycenaean movement thither: see Peppermüller² [above, note 4] 20) perceived as akin to their master (probably originally called Ἰππινόοος or -ους; see Dindorf [above, note 5] *ad Z* 155 [1.233, etc.]) of Pegasus, thus beginning the process of assimilation.

Stheneboea), whom he, in his virtuousness, resists. She traduces him to her husband, who despatches the hero to his father-in-law in Lycia with the famous σήματα λυγρά of a sealed missive meant to signal his execution.¹⁵ Such poisonous triangular relationships, with negligible variations of detail and conclusion (the common ingredients being a failed seductress, an innocent youth, and a deceived father-figure), can be multiplied easily from Greek myth, as from Hebrew.¹⁶ That the Bellerophon-Proetus-Anteia relationship recalls quite vividly the Joseph-Potiphar-Potiphar's wife episode of Gen. 39, is well known.¹⁷ We have, as well, from about the end of the second millennium, the Egyptian "Story of Two Brothers," a cruder representative of the same basic narrative type.¹⁸ And, in 2 Sam. 11, there is another Old Testament analogue (with an altered configuration of principals): the aging king David contrives the death of his warrior, Uriah the Hittite, in order to possess Uriah's wife, Bathsheba; David instructs his general,

¹⁵ To set aside the vexed question of writing in the Homeric poems, L. H. Jeffery's observation (in Wace and Stubbings [above, note 3] 555) that the πῖναξ πτυκτός containing Proetus' message is compatible with the hinged, wax-coated *wooden* (and cf. Hom. *Od.* 12.67: πῖνακός τε νεῶν, where the word means 'spars' or 'wood fragments') tablets of Assyrian reliefs, seems apropos.

¹⁶ Three Semitic variations of the type follow, below. Cf. the Hellenic variations collected by M. Simpson (in *Gods and Heroes of the Greeks: the Library of Apollodorus*, trans. with intro., notes, by M. Simpson [Amherst 1976] ad 2.3.1-2 [81 n. 10]): Acastus-Peleus-Astydamia (Apollod. 3.13.3); Amyntor-Phoenix-concubine of Amyntor (Apollod. 3.13.8); Phineus-Plexippus and Pandion-Idaea (Apollod. 3.15.3); Cynus-Tenes-Philonome (Apollod. *Epit.* 3.24); Cretheus and Athamas-Phrixus-Demodice (Hyg. *Astr.* 2.20; Theseus-Hippolytus-Phaedra (Apollod. *Epit.* 1.18-19.).

¹⁷ The handsome and righteous Hebrew Joseph is loved by the wife of his Egyptian master Potiphar, captain of the guard of Pharaoh. Potiphar has turned all of his affairs over to Joseph's management, and they prosper accordingly. Potiphar's wife confronts Joseph in her empty house and, when agitatedly catching hold of his clothes she begs him to lie with her, he absconds, leaving his clothing in her hands. She represents him to her husband as a villain and Joseph is thrown into prison.

¹⁸ In J. B. Pritchard (ed.), *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton 1955) 23-25. Anubis and his wife stand *in loco parentum* to Anubis' younger brother Bata, who, in turn, serves them as factotum. Bata is handsome and strong and good, and Anubis' wife falls in love with him. One day, when Bata returns from the fields to the village to fetch seed for Anubis, Anubis' wife attempts to seduce him, unsuccessfully. Bata flees away back to the fields, having promised to reveal the matter to no one. But, out of fear, the woman impugns him to Anubis as having tried to rape her. Anubis resolves to kill his brother, but the god Re-Herakti delivers Bata out of Anubis' hands. Then Bata, out of bitterness, castrates himself and departs to the "Valley of the Cedar." (Vindication and a happier future await Bata, as Joseph and [at least a happier immediate future] Bellerophon, though not Uriah in the version below.)

Joab, to set Uriah in the thick of the fighting, where he is sure to be killed, in a letter that he has Uriah himself deliver.¹⁹

When Bellerophon leaves the court of Proetus for Lycia, he travels, at *Il.* 6.171, θεῶν ὑπ' ἀμύμονι πομπῇ,²⁰ such divine tendance of heroes as they embark upon quests or other enterprises of high purpose being commonplace in Greek myth (cf. Heracles or Odysseus). Cyrus Gordon likens to this phenomenon the angel of the Lord (of Ex. 23.20, and of Num. 20.26) who leads Moses and the children of Israel out of Egypt.²¹ So, too, the "mark of Cain" of Gen. 4.15, which is an emblem of the Lord's protection and guidance, and *not* a sign of ostracism (*that* has been effected already), an indication that Cain, like Bellerophon, is *sacer*, the god's for good or ill.²²

In Lycia, Proetus' father-in-law, the king (nameless in Homer, but later Iobates), commands Bellerophon to kill the Chimaera, expecting that he will perish in the attempt.²³ However this orientalising, multiplex monster is to be visualized and whatever her origin(s),²⁴ the Chimaera of myth is not only physically hideous and fearsome and mighty, but (like her father, Typhoeus) anarchical and morally repulsive: she is a devastator and a man-killer, and she stands for *Evil*, over which it is Bellerophon's mission, as hero, to triumph. In this regard, the monster Leviathan (of Job 41.8 and Pss. 74.12-17 particularly) comes immediately to mind; yet there may be another Old Testament *locus* more suitable to the purpose. At Gen. 4.6-7, the Lord

¹⁹ David is "aging," of course, in a relative sense only: in 2 Sam., he lives on hence for 13 chaps., and for two additional chaps. into Kings; and, according to 1 Chron., he fathers ten more sons, to say nothing of daughters (I owe these sensible observations to my colleague, John Schmitt of Marquette). But David here in a subtler context satisfactorily represents the type.

²⁰ The scholiast rationalizes (Maass [above, note 5] *ad Z* 171 [5.212]) the escort as consisting in αἰσίοις οἰωνοῖς.

²¹ C. H. Gordon, *The Common Background of Greek and Hebrew Civilizations* (New York 1965) 234-35.

²² Cf. E. A. Speiser (intro., transl., annot.), *The Anchor Bible Genesis* (Garden City, New York 1964) *ad loc.* [p. 31]; also, G. von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary*, trans. J. H. Marks (Philadelphia 1961) *ad loc.* [p. 103].

²³ Strangely, Homer is silent about the winged stallion here—another vexed question, but the hero's mastery and use of him to slay the beast are described in a passage of eerie beauty in Pind. *Ol.* 13.64ff. On Pegasus, see G. Türk, *RE* 19¹ (1937) s.v. "Pegasus," 57-65.

²⁴ See esp. West (above, note 1) 255 (*ad Hes. Th.* 321); also, Anne Roes, "The Representation of the Chimaera," *JHS* 54 (1954) 21-25, Bethe, *RE* 3 (1889) s.v. "Chimaera,"³ 2282, and Ruge, *ibid.* s.v. "Chimaera,"² 2281. For later (fanciful) rationalization, see Maass (above, note 5) *ad Z* 181 [5.213] and Plu. *Moralia* 247F-248E.

says to Cain (who is embittered by the Lord's acceptance of his brother Abel's offering and at the rejection of his own): "Why are you resentful, and why has your countenance fallen? Surely, if you act right, it shall mean exaltation. But if you do not, *sin is the demon at the door*, whose desire is toward you; *yet you can be his master*."²⁵ Might this be a pious adaptation by the author of Genesis worked upon some half-forgotten, menacing entity—more in keeping with the Chimaera—of a more primitive tale? The concepts of a menacing demonic Sin (here in Gen.) and of the Chimaera (of Greek myth) embodying evil—both testing the mettle of heroes—are kindred and suggest the possibility of some common source.

The second of Bellerophon's feats in Lycia is to fight and to defeat the "glorious Solymi" (the Σολύμοισι κυδαλίμοισι of Hom. *Il.* 6.184). These must be connected somehow with the mountain range τὰ Σόλυμα ὄρος (of Strabo 14.3.9), on the eastern end of Lycia, above Phaselis and the sea. Bérard derives the name of this range from a Semitic word for 'staircase';²⁶ be that as it may: one *does* observe in its vicinity mountains called, respectively, Φοινικοῦς, 'Phoenician' (Str. 14.3.8), and Κλίμαξ, 'ladder' (Str. 14.3.9). And, Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Ἱεροσόλυμα)²⁷ derives *Jerusalem* from mountains of the same name, τὰ Σόλυμα, Jerusalem being, after all, a hill settlement; and Tacitus says (in *H.* 5.2) most specifically: *Clara alii Iudaeorum initia, Solymos, carminibus Homeri celebratam gentem, conditae urbi Hierosolyma nomen e suo fecisse*. We know now that Jerusalem is most likely to mean 'foundation' or 'city' of the god Šlm, 'evening twilight,' or 'evening star,' a prominent god of Syria and Palestine mentioned in Ugaritic texts.²⁸ This would make the *Solymi*, if the intuitions of the ancients were correct, the people of this Semitic god.²⁹

²⁵ Translation from Speiser (above, note 22) 29 (my italics); and cf. his comments ad loc. (pp. 32–33).

²⁶ Bérard (above, note 2) 1.337, citing Lewy (above, note 10) 191.

²⁷ Stephani Byzantini, *Ethnicorum quae supersunt*, ed. A. Meineke (Berlin 1859) 328.

²⁸ Fohrer, in *The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. G. Friedrich [transl. G.W. Bromley], vol. 7 (Grand Rapids 1971) s.v. "Sion, etc.," 298.

²⁹ Leaf thinks (Homer, *Iliad*, ed. W. Leaf, 2 vols. [London 1900–2; rpt. Amsterdam 1960] ad Z 184 [1.271]) that the *Solymi* are a generalized name for the Semitic inhabitants of southern Asia Minor (comprehending Milyai, Kabali, and Pisidians), and infers (from *Od.* 5.283) that they were driven into the mountains by invading Lycians. And for impressive confirmation of the fact of a substantial Semitic presence in Lycia in historical times (4th cent. B.C.), see the literature on the discovery of the trilingual (Greek; Lycian; Aramaean: a West-Semitic dialect of Anatolia, for which we have

As an agent and advancer of civilization (who rids the world of monsters), the slayer of the Chimaera, the Solymi, and the Amazons, Bellerophon is a 'culture hero.' The king of Lycia, enlightened by his deeds, gives him his daughter to wed and a share of his kingdom (the expected rewards of folk tale). Too, Homer, at *Il.* 6.194-95, gives him *agricultural* connections: καὶ μὲν οἱ Λύκιοι τέμενος τάμον ἔξοχον ἄλων, / καλὸν φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης, ὄφρα νέμοιτο. Like the Cain of Gen. 4.2, a culture hero come to grief, an agent of a higher order of civilization than his brother Abel, a "keeper of sheep," Bellerophon becomes (at no matter how many removes)³⁰ a "tiller of the ground."

Finally, at Hom. *Il.* 6.200, the hero becomes, mysteriously, 'hated of all the gods' (the language recalling Lycurgus' fate in Diomedes' narrative that balances Glaucus' Bellerophon tale). Homer does not tell us the reason for this, but we are safe to assume (as commonly) some act of heroic excess.³¹ According to Pind. *Isthm.* 7.43-48, for the impudence of an ascent to heaven (an attempt to become immortal) on the stallion Pegasus, Bellerophon is dashed to earth. This is the understanding of Horace (*O.* 4.11.25 ff.), too, who links Bellerophon with Phaëthon to make a cautionary statement about ambition. Then—presumably the result of the foregoing—according to Hom. *Il.* 6.201-2, the hero "wandered alone over the *Aleian Plain*, eating his heart out and avoiding the paths of men." Certainly Homer's *Aleian Plain* (πεδῖον τὸ Ἀληϊόν) cannot be that localized 300 miles from the Xanthus in Cilicia by Hdt. 6.95 (and by others following him).³² A scholiast's gloss provides the solution: the name is a play on ἀλᾶτο ('he wandered'), from ἀλάσσαι, of the same line, that makes a kind of cog-

evidence from as early as the 10th cent. B.C., and which had become a lingua franca of the Achaemenid empire) stele from Letoon of Xanthos: H. Metzger and E. Laroche, "Notes sur la stèle trilingue du Létœon de Xanthos," *Kadmos* 13 (1974) 82-83; H. Metzger, "La stèle trilingue récemment découverte au Létœon de Xanthos: Le texte grec," *CRAI* (1974) 82-93; E. Laroche, "Le texte lycien," *ibid.* 115-25; A. Dupont-Sommer, "Le texte araméen," *ibid.* 132-49 (particularly 133-34).

³⁰ As, according to Homeric conception, the land would be worked by serfs. In Gen. 4, there seems a clear progression of metiers, from shepherd to farmer (which is extended further in the Kenite genealogy that follows the Cain and Abel tale), towards the more intricately organized societies of cities. I suggest, tentatively, that Cain's was a fitter offering here than Abel's for an *urban* god (i.e., a member of a pantheon, like Baal) and thus unacceptable to the Lord.

³¹ The scholiast (Dindorf [above, note 5] *ad* Z 200 [3.292]) conjectures that Bellerophon fell from grace because he slew the Solymi, a people "beloved of the gods" (θεοῖς ὄντας προσφιλεῖς).

³² Documentation in Hirschfeld, *RE* 1 (1894) s.v. "Ἀληϊὸν πεδῖον," 1360.

nate accusative, to which the scholiast compares—quite properly—the figure τέμενος τάμον of the nearby verse 194, and also the familiar Homeric κειμήλια κείσθαι; it means the 'Plain of Wandering,' a metaphorical conceit for a fallen state, for a condition of exile, misery, vulnerability, distraction.³³ Now, when Cain slew his brother Abel and the Lord chastised him, he "went out of the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the *Land of Nod*, on the east of Eden" (Gen. 4.16): that is to say, the 'Land of Wandering,' an identical conceit, to express an identical state, the Semitic root *nad* having appeared already (in Gen. 4.12) in the Lord's injunction to Cain, "A fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be on the earth."³⁴ The *Aleian Plain* and the *Land of Nod* are the same psychic landscape.³⁵

JEFFREY A. WHITE

ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY

³³ Dindorf (above, note 5) *ad* Z 201 [3.293, etc.]. The scholia (Dindorf *ibid.* 292–93) suggest some other derivations for the name: (1) Bellerophon abides there avoiding his fellow man (*ἀλεεινῶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*); (2) salt crystallizes there (*παρὰ τὸ τοὺς ἅλας ἐκεῖ πηγνύσθαι*); (3) the plain is barren and uncultivated (*παρὰ τὸ ἄσπερον καὶ μὴ ἔχον λήϊον*), an hypothesis immediately repudiated (*οὐδόμοῦ, ἀλλ' . . .*). That it may derive from ἄλας is a possibility, too: this would make a nice reverberation of the Homeric *hapax* τυφλός (at 139) and the fate of Lycurgus; certainly it was thought so to be derived by some, accounting for Bellerophon's blindness in several subsequent versions. Yet on balance, the explanation from ἄλας is far likeliest to be right. For a kindred development, consider the Dorian hero *Aletes* ('Αλήτης), likewise connected with Corinth and named for the wanderings of his exiled father *Hippotes* (Noel Robertson, "The Dorian Migration and Corinthian Ritual," *CP* 75.1 [1980] 1–22).

³⁴ See Speiser (above, note 22) *ad loc.* [p. 31]; von Rad (above, note 22) *ad loc.* [pp. 103–4]; also, F. Brown, S. R. Driver, C. A. Briggs (edd.), *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament* (Oxford 1907; rpt. Oxford 1974) s.v. "nod" II, p. 627.

³⁵ A final similarity: Prof. John Peradotto has remarked (in conversation) on the open-ended destinies that Bellerophon and Cain, like Odysseus, enjoy; we do not witness their deaths in myth.



THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF PHOENIX: *ILIAD* 9.444-95

Although the long speech of Phoenix in the ninth book of the *Iliad* (434-605) has received a large share of scholarly attention, as an important section of a central scene of the poem, and as an ethical statement, a relatively small share of critical scrutiny has been given to its opening section, in which Phoenix describes how he came to stand in a quasi-paternal relationship to Achilles. The allegory of the Litali, which follows the autobiography, and the concluding exemplum of Meleager have tended to usurp the interest of scholars.¹ It has been recognized that the story of Phoenix' departure from his home is based on the same motifs of anger and supplication as the main plot of the *Iliad* and the Meleager example.² Interpretations of this resemblance, however, have been few and unconvincing.³

Such a narrative digression within a speech should serve to further the rhetorical purpose of the speech, and the first step in explaining such a piece of subordinate narrative must therefore be to

¹ I have been unable to see one of the few scholarly discussions of the autobiography, P. Wiesmann, *Die Phoenix-Novelle. Interpretation von Ilias IX, 447 ff.*, Beilage zum Schulprogramm der Bündner Kantonschule (Chur 1948). A. Lesky, *Die Homerforschung in der Gegenwart* (Vienna 1952) 40, comments on it very briefly: "Die Absicht, durch die Geschichte Phoenix Gewicht und Nähe zu Achill zu geben, wird richtig gezeigt . . . Leider verlieren sich Teile der Schrift in Tiefendeutungen die mit Figurenspaltung und Inzestpsychologie arbeiten." Much of the work on the embassy has been concerned with such issues as the duals and the original role of Phoenix or with a Meleager epic as the possible source of the *Iliad*, and hence this section has been given short shrift, even in discussion of Phoenix; M. Noe, *Phoinix, Ilias und Homer*, Preisschriften der fürstlich jablonowskischen Gesellschaft 56 (Leipzig 1940), gives it only seven pages (25-32), which are largely devoted to the problem of "Hellas" in the autobiography; D. Motzkus, *Untersuchungen zum 9. Buch der Ilias unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Phoinixgestalt* (Diss. Hamburg 1964), scarcely mentions it.

² A full discussion of the parallels is given by J. Rosner, "The Speech of Phoenix: *Iliad* 9.434-605," *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 314-27; cf. D. Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias* (Berlin 1970) 268-69.

³ The *communis opinio* sees this section of the speech as serving to stress the emotional ties between Phoenix and Achilles; see Wiesmann and Lesky (n. 1 above), and A. Boskos, *Μελέαγρος—'Αχιλλεύς καὶ Φοῖνιξ* (Nicosia 1974) 11. This is clearly an important function of this first part of the speech, but it does not require the full autobiography or explain its similarities with Achilles' or Meleager's situation.

specify the aim of the speech in which it stands as precisely as possible. Here, most Unitarians would agree on the basic structure of the speech and on its place within the *Iliad*.⁴ The embassy has three speakers: Odysseus presents the official offer of Agamemnon, Phoenix an exposition of heroic, traditional ethics, Ajax the simple claims of friendship. Yet the poet has given himself a peculiar problem. Achilles' response to Odysseus' speech is an announcement that Achilles will return to Phthia on the next day. Nothing could more vehemently express his rejection of the gifts. But clearly, the plot demands that Achilles remain; moreover, the poet wishes to show Achilles as at least somewhat moved by the other speakers, particularly by Ajax. Insofar as Achilles' final statement that he will fight to defend his own ships is a concession, it is a concession to Ajax, whose appeal is straightforward and personal. Yet Achilles' decision to fight only at this extremity is based on the example of Meleager, who fought only when the enemy's missiles struck his own chamber and his wife begged him.⁵ This example is thus crucial for Achilles, but it could not be placed in Ajax' speech, whose force comes from its brevity; if, moreover, Achilles' adoption of Meleager as a positive example directly followed Phoenix' use of Meleager as a negative one, the failure of the example would overshadow what Phoenix does achieve by his speech: he weakens Achilles' resolve to return to Phthia. So Achilles responds to the emo-

⁴ The clearest statement of the view taken here is that of C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Ma., 1957) 190-91. Some Analysts, regarding Phoenix as a late interpolation into the embassy, and his speech as thus having no possibility of organic relation to the rest of the scene, have hunted out and emphasized inconsistencies with the rest of the *Iliad*. Cf. D. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1956) 312-13, where it is argued that since Achilles will in fact receive gifts, though he refuses the embassy, the example of Meleager is directed at "a man to whom it does not apply." But most Unitarians and many Analysts would agree with the analysis of W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien*³ (Darmstadt 1966) 140, who calls this difference between paradigm and narrative an example of the "Ungenauigkeit" principle. Much confusion has resulted from a failure clearly to distinguish Meleager as a model for what Phoenix wants Achilles to do and not do as a model for what he does; even if, as was first suggested by E. Howald, "Meleager und Achill," *RM* 73 (1924) 405-25, Cleopatra of the paradigm is a deliberate echo of Patroclus, Patroclus' entry into battle in Achilles' place turns the story in a new direction and destroys exact correspondence.

⁵ This does not mean that the *Iliad* was modeled on a *Meleagris*, as was argued particularly forcibly by J. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 11-42. It is more likely that the traditions about Meleager were reworked to provide an exemplum; see C. M. Wilcock, "Mythological Paradeigma in the *Iliad*," *CQ* 14 (1964) 141-54.

tional appeals of both Phoenix and Ajax, while his use of the example Phoenix offers is delayed until after Ajax' speech.

The way Achilles' gradual change of mind is distributed over the speeches of Phoenix and Ajax obscures the pivotal nature of Phoenix' speech. At its beginning, the issue is evidently whether Achilles will leave Troy (434-45). At its conclusion, on the other hand, Achilles is presented with only two alternatives (601-5). Either he will fight immediately, and thus receive gifts and honor, or he will fight when it is too late, and will have less honor, because he will receive no gifts. For any heroic warrior but Achilles, the argument as thus presented would be irresistible. The speech shows a shift in thought, whether this is caused by confusion or by a deliberate rhetorical strategy.

At the speech's opening, Phoenix directly confronts Achilles' threat to leave as it affects himself. He could not leave Achilles, he says, even if he were to be made young again (444-46).⁶ The following story ostensibly is told in order to demonstrate his closeness to Achilles, and clearly functions, at least in part, as a *captatio benevolentiae*. Phoenix was young when he left Hellas. He fled from his home because he had quarreled with his father, Amyntor, who had taken a concubine. Phoenix' mother, thus dishonored, persuaded her son to seduce the young girl, so that she would be disgusted with the older man.⁷ When Amyntor learned of his son's action, he cursed him with childlessness.⁸ If 458-61 are genuine, Phoenix then would have killed his father, had not a god intervened (the parallel to *Il.* 1 is striking).⁹ In any case, he desired to leave home, but was prevented for nine days by relatives, who besieged him in his chamber, entreating him and guarding him day and night as they feasted on Amyntor's meat and wine (466-70).

⁶ A similar rejuvenation-motif introduces Nestor's paradigmatic stories of his youth at 7.157, 11.669, and 23.432.

⁷ The Sch. A on 452 may well be right in glossing προμνησθαι as πρὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μνησθαι; this interpretation is, of course, somewhat more favorable to Phoenix than the alternative, that the preposition does not change the meaning.

⁸ Impotence is probably implied; cf. G. Devereux, "The Self-Blinding of Oidipous in Sophocles: Oidipous Tyrannos," *JHS* 93 (1973) 36-49, esp. 43-44, where it is convincingly argued that blinding and castration are regular alternative punishments for sexual transgressions in Greek mythology.

⁹ The lines, which do not appear in any ms., are quoted by Plutarch, *de aud. poet.* 8, where they are said to have been removed by Aristarchus. They include the only reference in the passage to Phoenix' χόλος, but his anger is strongly implied not only by his actions, but by οὐκ ἐπὶ πάμπαν ἐρητύει' ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός (462); similar language is used of anger at 1.192, and of the feeling of a man whose relative has been killed, but who accepts a recompense at 9.635.

On the tenth night, Phoenix broke the doors and leapt over the fence, getting past the men who guarded him and the slave women (477). Fleeing, he came to Phthia, where he was treated as a son by Peleus, and effectively adopted Achilles, since he could have no son of his own. The similarities between this tale and the stories of Achilles and Meleager are striking. All three share the theme of refused entreaties. Both the *Iliad* and the Phoenix story involve a dispute over a concubine. The Meleager example also has the curse, the quarrel with a parent, and the emphasis on the θάλαμος as the place where the angry hero sulks. The similarities are unlikely to be the result of coincidence, especially since both the Phoenix and Meleager stories have attested variants whose resemblance is far less notable.¹⁰ The story seems longer than is required if its sole purpose is to stress the relationship between Achilles and Phoenix. It should have an exemplary function which assists the aims of the speech as a whole.

One interpretation of the passage is that of the bT scholium on 449, according to which the analogy is essentially between Achilles and Peleus. Although Phoenix had wronged his father very much as Agamemnon wronged Achilles, he was "forgiven" by Peleus: so Achilles should forgive the man who has wronged him.¹¹ This reading imputes to Phoenix a remorse of which he shows no sign, and ignores the chief elements linking all three stories, the hero's anger and the supplications made to him. It is also a feeble argument: the paradigm would have force only if Amyntor forgave Phoenix. A complex series of equations has also been suggested.¹² While essentially Amyntor represents Agamemnon, and Phoenix Achilles, the paradigm implies that the responsibility for the quarrel is shared between Achilles and Agamemnon, since it was Phoenix who first interfered with another's property. When Phoenix is cherished and protected by a substitute father, who loves him like a son, and is given many gifts by this

¹⁰ For Meleager, there is not only the log familiar from Bacchyl. 5, but a death directly at the hands of Apollo (Paus. 10.31.3; Hesiod. frs. 25, 280 M-W). Phoenix was blinded in Euripides' tragedy, and miraculously healed by Chiron (fr. 86 N²; Ar. *Ach.* 421; ps.-Apollodorus 3.3.8, 3; Tzetzes on *Lyc.* 421). It might, perhaps, be argued that the *Iliad* in each case presents the least fantastic version, in accordance with Homer's habit—a tendency shown by J. Griffin, "The Epic Cycle and the Uniqueness of Homer," *JHS* 97 (1977) 39–42—but the curses which motivate the hero's anger in each paradigm are unparalleled, so that something other than a general tendency seems to be at work.

¹¹ R. Schlunk, "The Theme of the Suppliant-Exile in the *Iliad*," *AJP* 97 (1976) 204–5.

¹² Rosner, cited n. 2 above.

"father," Peleus, the intention is to cast the "father-figure" in a new light: Agamemnon, the hostile father of the first part of the story, is in the second part represented by the welcoming "father" Peleus. Achilles should imitate Phoenix by accepting the proffered gifts.

This scheme seems too complicated. A single figure, Agamemnon, is divided into two. Moreover, Agamemnon, though he is older than Achilles, is scarcely a father-figure to him—that role is taken by Phoenix himself. The gifts of the example bear no relation to the injury, the figure of reconciliation is not the same man with whom Phoenix had been angry; the main point of Phoenix' speech, the correct response of a hero to supplication, is ignored. If Phoenix' acceptance of Peleus' gifts is to be taken as a positive example, the narrative would implicitly urge the very course it most seeks to discourage, for it would imply that the solution for an unendurable situation is flight and recourse to that generous paragon and gift-giver, Peleus. Achilles has already reminded his hearers that he could simply enjoy Peleus' wealth (400). For Phoenix to stress the value of any wealth which is not a mark of τιμή would be a serious mistake.

The fundamental issues are anger, response to supplication, and honor, and it is in these terms that the narrative must function. Seen from this perspective, its similarities to the other two stories are accompanied by a striking difference in tone. While Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon concerns a girl who is both a prize of honor and a woman Achilles claims to love (335-43), the dispute between Phoenix and his father arises over a woman Phoenix seduced merely to please his mother. While Meleager's mother has cursed him with death, so that his doom resembles the fate which awaits Achilles if he remains at Troy, Phoenix is cursed with a sterility which, despite its pathos, in the heroic context cannot but seem slightly ridiculous. While Meleager is visited by embassies of priests, his father, mother and sisters, and companions, and Achilles is in this scene graciously entertaining his guests and the heralds who constitute the embassy, Phoenix is entreated by ἔται and ἀνέψιοί whose prayers seem to be accompanied by constant revels (466-69):

πολλὰ δὲ ἴφια μῆλα καὶ εἰλίποδας ἑλικας βοῦς
 ἔσφαζον, πολλοὶ δὲ σύες θαλέθοντες ἀλοιφῇ
 εὐόμενοι τανύοντο διὰ φλογός Ἠφαίστοιο,
 πολλὸν δ' ἐκ κεράμων μέθυ πίνετο τοῖο γέροντος.

The spectacle is more reminiscent of Penelope's suitors than of the courtesy and desperation of the other embassies. And Phoenix is not

only being begged to leave a self-imposed retirement, and rejoin his father, but imprisoned, to prevent him from escaping (or so it seems). When he emerges, it is not to enter battle, but to flee by leaping over a fence (477), λαθὼν φύλακας τ' ἄνδρας δμῳάς τε γυναῖκας. The entire story is as close to the sordid and ignominious as the epic style could permit a heroic character to descend.¹³

The tone, then, of the Phoenix story is far from magnificent. The specific content shows precisely the action Phoenix seeks to deprecate in Achilles. Phoenix was involved in a νεῖκος, and his response was to do what Achilles has threatened to do: to ignore the pleas of his friends and to depart. This alternative is presented in a way that makes it seem obviously impossible. Achilles has invited the Achaeans to watch him sail away along the Hellespont (359-61), and Phoenix' answer is to describe himself, gallantly evading a crowd of slave women. Phoenix does not repent his actions, for there is no trace of remorse in what he says, but they could not be the actions of an Achilles. He has had a long life, and he has been rich. In fact, his situation is not unlike what Achilles' would be if he returned to Phthia. But what Achilles has presented in purely negative terms, as an absence of glory, ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν (415), is joined with what is almost a parody of the heroic quarrel, with a central character who is not doomed, but sterile.

This section of Phoenix' speech, therefore, corresponds to the shift in alternatives the speech as a whole presents. By suggesting that departure is an appropriate event in a story touched by the ridiculous, it effectively dismisses it as a truly possible choice. This dismissal is surely not accidental, and the shift of direction within the speech is evidently deliberate. Phoenix' narrative is a device for invisibly changing the terms of discussion. The transition is subtle and is concealed, for the excellent reason that it could not be made openly. If the

¹³ One of the few critics who has commented on the tone of Phoenix' autobiography is S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer* (Berkeley 1938) 199: "Phoenix is ethically a low-grade character. He tells quite frankly how he debauched the concubine of his father, and how, when his father cursed him, he entertained thoughts of parricide." This is doubtless an exaggeration, for at 497-511 Phoenix' ethics have been condemned as too "advanced" to be truly Homeric; only this episode is sordid. D. Lohmann, *Komposition der Reden*, cited n. 2 above, has drawn attention to the parallel anaphora of πολλά and 463 and 581ff., but does not remark on this difference in substance: in the second passage, from the Meleager example, it is the supplications that are repeated, while in the autobiography, though again the anaphora appears in a scene of supplications, the emphasis is on the many and repeated feasts of Phoenix' besiegers. Nothing could better point to the almost parodic quality of this narrative. What is shown here is not "repentance," but simply a pattern of action which, though not morally condemned, cannot appeal to Achilles.

issue of Achilles' returning home were ignored, the latter part of the speech might well fall on deaf ears, but the issue cannot be directly and openly confronted, because the choice Achilles seems to have made is fully valid within its own terms. If Achilles prefers long life to an early death with glory, no more can easily be said. No rational answer is available. Clearly, however, Achilles is not really insensible to the claims of honor, if these can be put in a form which can slip past his resistance.

The method of the speech is successful. Achilles' reply is not what Phoenix would have wished, nor is it entirely logical. Apparently, Achilles has weakened only to the extent of declaring that he and Phoenix will decide on the following morning whether to go or stay (618-19). He rejects Phoenix' stress on gifts as the external form of τιμή (and will show little interest when he receives them in bk. 19), and will show that he has received Meleager as a positive rather than a negative example. Yet, despite his insistence that a return home is still a possibility—an insistence required by the structure of the scene—he has accepted τιμή as a criterion (607-10):

“Φοῖνιξ, ἄττα γεραιέ, διοτρεφέες, οὗ τί με ταύτης
 χρεῶν τιμῆς· φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴση,
 ἥ μ' ἔξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, εἰς ὃ κ' αὖτις
 ἐν στήθεσσι μένη καὶ μοι φίλα γούνατ' ὀρώρη.

Though this reply rejects Phoenix' definition of honor, it is not the answer of one who prefers life to honor, and it implies that Achilles will remain.¹⁴ The recognition that honor is to be found only by staying is there, though Achilles himself may not be fully conscious of it.

¹⁴ There are difficulties in 609-10. The antecedent of ἥ is doubtful, as is the meaning of ἔξει; but trickiest is the allusion to the ships. At 618-19 Achilles is still considering a return to Phthia, but here it seems he will be by the ships as long as he lives, whether honor (or Zeus' allotment) is understood to be keeping him there (as opposed to going home), restraining him by the ships (as opposed to sending him into battle), or possessing him in the sense of being his portion in life. The first alternative presents too violent a self-contradiction, but either of the other two is possible: in his rejection of Phoenix' notion of honor Achilles shows that he cannot talk about the kind of τιμή he believes he has except in the context of the ships. The third sense, though vaguest, is perhaps best (the idiom would be analagous to that of κλέος ἔχει τινα) since even Achilles is unlikely to say that he will not fight as long as he lives. The lines cannot be athetised, as W. Leaf would like to do in his commentary ad loc. (London 1900, rpt. Amsterdam 1971): Achilles must make some reply to Phoenix' main argument, the point of honor, before he turns to the personal tie between Phoenix and himself, and finally to the original issue, his departure (he thus answers Phoenix' points in reverse order).

This use of an example to replace direct argument where a case cannot be defended logically is perhaps unusual, but at least an approximate parallel appears in the Homeric *Hymn to Venus*, 217-46. Aphrodite is trying to mitigate her embarrassment at her passion for a mortal, and so has recalled how close in beauty the race of Anchises is to the gods (200-1). As an example, she has cited Ganymede, whose beauty was such that Zeus snatched him away (202-17). This example, however, is a further source of embarrassment, for Anchises will not be taken away to Olympus. But a second anecdote both continues the theme of the beauty of the family and allows Aphrodite to escape from this difficulty. She describes how Eos snatched away Tithonus, asking Zeus to make him immortal, but forgot to ask also that he be ageless. Therefore old age overcame him, and when he became too weak to move his limbs, Eos laid him away in a bedchamber and closed the doors. Aphrodite concludes with a kind a moral (239-43):

οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ γε σὲ τοῖον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἐλοίμην
 ἀθάνατόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ζῶειν ἥματα πάντα.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἔων εἶδος τε δέμας τε
 ζώοις, ἡμέτερός τε πόσις κεκλήμενος εἴης,
 οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτά μ' ἄχος πυκινὰς φρένας ἀμφικαλύπτοι.

No actual reason is given why, if Aphrodite would like Anchises to live eternally as her husband, she could not obtain this favor from Zeus, taking care to avoid the error of Eos. This, however, is not what happens in this story. Yet no real explanation can be given; Aphrodite does not even say, for instance, that this is not Anchises' μοῖρα. Instead an example is offered of a kind of immortality which Aphrodite can reject for her lover, secure that he would not desire it, and this rejection replaces a reason why he could not be made immortal. In some ways, this example of the technique is even more striking than that of *Iliad* 9, since the issue evaded is one the speaker has raised herself, and since the moral is explicitly drawn, which leaves the logical flaw glaringly apparent. When a god argues such a case, however, persuasion does not really matter, for Anchises has no choice to make, while for Phoenix the need to convince Achilles is a matter of life and death.

Phoenix does not direct his audience to his moral, because to do so effectively he would have to debase himself publicly. He cannot prove that his choice is not the correct choice for Achilles if Achilles will not accept his premisses, and, even worse, he cannot directly compare the situations without declaring himself a negative paradigm, and such an act would be in the worst of taste and would undermine

the moral authority on which the remainder of his speech depends. By leaving the argument veiled entirely in narrative, Phoenix succeeds in presenting his message far more tactfully than even the celebrated Odysseus. With Achilles, the reader unconsciously realizes instantly that the hero cannot leave the tragic realm to which he belongs to make his story a vulgar comedy, and an argument the hero might reject, if it were put to him directly, allows the exhortation to be directed at a level suitable to the audience. At the same time, an example which, if given as a negative paradigm, would embarrass the teller, is placed within his assertion of his special claim on his hearer's respect. It is not logical, but a rhetoric which in skill and discretion is more effective than the reasonable arguments the last portion of the speech employs.

RUTH SCODEL

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

OEDIPUS TYRANNUS, 1084-85:
"I'LL NOT DENY MY NATURE?"

<p>ὅποῖα χρήζει ῥηγνύτω· τοῦμόν δ' ἐγώ, κεῖ σμικρόν ἐστι, σπέρμ' ἰδεῖν βουλήσομαι. αὕτη δ' ἴσως, φρονεῖ γάρ ὡς γυνὴ μέγα, τὴν δυσγένειαν τὴν ἐμὴν αἰσχύνεται. ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτὸν παῖδα τῆς Τύχης νέμων τῆς εἰδιδούσης οὐκ ἀτιμασθήσομαι. τῆς γὰρ πέφυκα μητρός· οἱ δὲ συγγενεῖς μῆνές με μικρόν καὶ μέγαν διώρισαν. τοιόσδε δ' ἐκφύς οὐκ ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι ποτ' ἄλλος, ὥστε μὴ ἔκμαθεῖν τοῦμόν γένος.</p>	<p>1076 1080 1085</p>
---	--

In analyzing this crucial passage, the reader must make a choice between two conflicting interpretations of 1084-85. But the opposing versions have not, it seems, been weighed against each other or judged on their comparative merits.¹

The more familiar version appears, for example, in Jebb's edition:²

"Such being my lineage, never more could I prove false to it, or spare to search out my birth."

Following Jebb, J. T. Sheppard translated the lines as follows:³

"I'll not deny my nature, but be myself and prove my origin."

Obviously, many other critics have chosen to interpret these lines in the same way. But if this interpretation is correct, what is the speaker supposed to be saying? Oedipus has concluded from Jocasta's

¹ The text transcribed above is from the *OCT* (A. C. Pearson). For a detailed discussion of the entire passage, see C. Diano, "Edipo Figlio della Tyche," *Dioniso* 15 (1952) 56-87, and F. Egermann, *vom Attischen Menschenbild* (München 1952 [repr., New York 1979]) 65-70, 149-51; also *Arete und tragische Bewusstheit bei Sophokles und Herodot* (München 1957 [repr., 1979]) 50-53, 93-94.

² *Sophocles, the Plays and Fragments, Pt. I, The Oedipus Tyrannus* (Cambridge 1893) 143. Jebb did not originate this version; it is here labelled "Jebb's" for the sake of convenience alone.

³ *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles* (Cambridge 1920) 71.

behavior that she does not want to have a low-born husband. Reacting to her presumed haughtiness (1078), the hero first declares that he will not retreat from any truth about himself, despite Jocasta's plea. The problem is to interpret the ensuing rationale, as expressed in 1082-85. If Jebb's version is correct, the argument is prescriptive, supplying grounds for action here and now. That is, if Oedipus should curtail the investigation out of fear of *dysgeneia*, he would thereby be untrue to his lineage as the "child of Chance" and brother of the "kindred months." Since the hero will countenance no such betrayal, the investigation must continue, regardless of its consequences.

How would Oedipus "deny his nature" if he refused to confront the herdsman? This is a perplexing question. Those who follow Jebb's version do not share a single, compelling view of what their interpretation means. For the purposes of this discussion, it is enough to point out that the question has been answered in various ways. Where opinions are numerous and subtly varied, it would be unwise to characterize any one solution as authoritative.⁴ It is, however, necessary to identify that feature of Jebb's version which is common to all examples of the type. And the common feature is this: Oedipus here considers whether he ought to continue the search and decides on a priori grounds that he cannot do otherwise. Without attempting to predict the outcome of the investigation, the speaker affirms that the truth must and will come out. Accordingly, the statement: . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι ποτ' ἄλλος. . . . here means: I could not now become another person, so as not to learn my origins to the fullest.

Lewis Campbell's edition and translation reflect a wholly different understanding of these lines (hereafter, "Campbell's version"):⁵

"So born, so nurtured, I can fear no change, that I need shrink to probe this root."

Here, the argument is not prescriptive but speculative. Instead of defining an attitude toward the investigation, the speaker aims to fore-

⁴ One could hardly improve on Jebb's own paraphrase of the standard interpretation (see his note on 1084): "Whatever may have been his human parentage, Oedipus is the 'son of Fortune' . . . : Fortune brings forth the months with their varying events; these months, then, are his brothers, who ere now have known him depressed as well as exalted. He has faith in this Mother, and will not shrink from the path on which she seems to beckon him; he will not be false to his sonship." For a useful expansion of Jebb's note (giving due weight to Oedipus' newly-discovered status as foundling), see the well-balanced commentary of T. Gould (Englewood Cliffs 1970) 125-26.

⁵ *Sophocles, the Seven Plays* (London 1906) 115. See also Campbell's Edition, Vol. I (Oxford 1879) ad loc.

tell its outcome. Oedipus is the “child of Chance” and cannot, as a result of this search, emerge as someone else. He is secure in the “birth-right” he obtained through the good offices of *Tychê*. Nothing revealed by the present investigation can negate the nobility he received as a gift from her. Hence, why should he shrink from consulting the last witness? There appears to be no real basis for Jocasta’s warning.⁶

Is it possible to decide which of these interpretations is correct? Jebb’s version is clearly favored by the majority of recent translators and editors.⁷ On the other hand, it contains certain flaws that are not present in the less familiar version. “I’ll not deny my nature, but be

⁶ What is a “child of *Tychê*?” Presumably a person whose present condition is the outcome of a chance event, or series of such events. (1) In Eur. Fr. 989 (Nauck), “child of Chance” is the personification of an *allotment* (ὁ τῆς τύχης παῖς κληρὸς; Plu. *Mor.* 965E, 644D). (2) In a context emphasizing sudden, unpredictable changes of status (*De Romanorum Fortuna*, 318C–D), Plutarch relates: “She (*Tychê*) took up and elevated C. Sulla from the bosom of his mistress Nicopolis and designated him for a monarchy and dictatorship far above the Cimbrian triumphs and seven consulships of Marius; in public he used to say that he, together with his exploits, was the adopted child of *Tychê*, loudly declaiming the words of Oedipus: ‘I count myself the child of *Tychê*’” (οὗτος τῇ . . . Τύχῃ . . . ἑαυτὸν εἰσποίει, βοῶν κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλεῖον ἑμαυτὸν παῖδα τῆς τύχης νέμω). (See also: Plutarch on the role of *Tychê* in fostering the careers of outsiders and exiles, *Mor.* 318B; above all, his analysis of the exposure and rescue [by *Tychê*] of the infant Romulus [320 A–E]). (3) In Horace, *Sat.* 2.6.49, “*Fortunae filius!*” is the invidious cry of those who, resenting the poet’s sudden celebrity as a member of Maecenas’ circle, insist on attributing his rise to chance (a charge which the poet elsewhere repudiates, *Sat.* 1.6.52–4: *non . . . casu, nulla . . . fors*).

For Euripides, Plutarch and Horace, a “child of *Tychê*” is one whom Chance has helped to create. It is therefore appropriate to ask what events in Oedipus’ life justify calling him a creature of Chance. In this very scene, it has emerged that the hero was exposed in infancy on Mt. Cithaeron (1035–36) and owes his life to an encounter between shepherds (1025–26, 1038–41). The unpremeditated character of this transaction has been suggested more than once (1025: *τυχῶν μὲν αὐτῷ δίδωκε*; 1039: *οὐδ’ αὐτὸς τυχῶν*). Moreover, Chance’s role in these events readily explains why she may be called his “mother”: unexpectedly, an infant was rescued from death and bestowed on a royal household; by presiding over the fateful transaction, *Chance* gave the hero his second lease on life.

⁷ See however the comments of B. M. W. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes*, New Haven (1957) 179–80, which seem to be consistent with the interpretation supported in this paper: “She [Chance] is ‘the good giver,’ and he will not be dishonored when his real identity is at last established . . . as the son of Tyche he will press on the search to the end—his parentage is a guarantee of success.” (See also: J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles, Part IV, The Oedipus Tyrannus* (Leiden 1967) 205–6.

myself and prove my origin" (so Sheppard, following Jebb). It should be noted that there is no verb in the Greek that means "deny" or "prove false," and no noun that means "nature." Furthermore, when ἐξέρχομαι is used, as here, with a predicate noun or adjective, it elsewhere means: "to emerge as this or that in the wake of some test." For example, an Aeschylean jury-trial "comes out equal-voted" (*Eumenides*, 795-96: ἰσόψηφος δίκη ἐξῆλθ' ἀληθῶς); earlier in the *O.T.*, it was feared that Apollo might "come out" unerring (1011: μή . . . Φοῖβος ἐξέλθῃ σοφής).⁸ It seems clear that this meaning accords very well with Campbell's version and not at all with Jebb's. (It might be added that οὐκ ἔτι, "no longer," only seems to fit Campbell's interpretation really well.) Having once become "Chance's child," Oedipus can no longer come out other than what she made him; so why should he not seek out the facts of his real birth?

Campbell's version has the added advantage of bringing the passage into full harmony with itself. Between 1076 and 1081 the hero predicts how he will react when the hidden facts begin to emerge. He "will be desirous" of seeing his birth (βουλῆσομαι) even if it is lowly; he "will experience no dishonor" (οὐκ ἀτιμασθήσομαι) in counting himself the child of Chance (i.e., a foundling). As the tense of the verbs indicates, Oedipus is looking ahead to the moment of discovery and predicting that the facts will not dismay him, even if (as seems probable) these facts should prove him "insignificant." The issue is not *whether* the investigation should proceed, but how its probable outcome will affect Oedipus. Accordingly, the hero declares that what has terrified Jocasta will never terrify him (1076-79). This is the "proposition" of Oedipus' speech. If Jebb's version is correct, the speaker now expands on his claim as follows (1080-85): "In counting myself the child of Chance, the Generous, I will experience no dishonor. For she is the mother who gave me birth, and the months born with me marked me out as humble and then again great. *Being such by birth, I could not come out* (i.e., now change into) *another, so as not to find out my true origins.*" So interpreted, the conclusion is not quite at odds with the speaker's proposition; but it interrupts the

⁸ Cf. F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Berlin 1872) 249. Ellendt gives as one of the definitions of ἐξέρχομαι (#5): *Mutationis in aliam formam notio*. Only one passage is adduced in support of this definition: *O.T.* 1084. Clearly, Ellendt was an advocate of Jebb's version. In order to accommodate this preference, he formulated a unique definition of the verb on the evidence of this passage alone. It would seem preferable to include the passage under Ellendt's *fourth* category ("de eventu").

flow of his thought, leaving a curious gap in the argument. Thus far, Oedipus has claimed that the insignificant birth feared by Jocasta poses no threat to his equanimity. (For his part, he will experience no disgrace in being discovered a foundling.) The ensuing lines (1082-85) purport to be an extension of this claim justifying (γάρ)⁹ the belief that Oedipus is immune to the ill effects of *dysgeneia*. And why is the speaker full of hope? Because (?) as Chance's child, he would prove disloyal, inconstant, untrue to her legacy if he doubted his native luck and declined to take a chance. Though unobjectionable in itself, this sentiment is out of place at the climax of Oedipus' speech. To be precise, the concluding lines throw the central argument off balance, introducing a second claim where they should supply grounds for the first. As it is, a denial that danger exists appears to be supported by an argument against shunning danger. Instead of defending a single proposition, the speech juxtaposes two quite different, if not incompatible, ideas: (1) whatever the outcome of this investigation, it has no power to dismay me, and (2) I would not be true to my heritage if I failed to put my fortune to test.

By contrast, Campbell's version ties the end of the speech to the beginning, letting the whole passage rise to a genuine climax in the last two lines: "In counting myself the child of Chance, the Generous, I will experience no dishonor. For she is the mother who gave me birth, and the months born with me marked me out as humble and then again great. *Being such a one by birth, I could not ever again come out another* (could not, that is, emerge from this test stripped of the identity given to me by Chance), *so as not to find out my true origins.*" In this version, the speech pursues a single train of thought from beginning to end. Unlike Jocasta, Oedipus will not flee from this investigation for fear of being found "insignificant." Acting in good time, Chance rescued her child from the wilderness and deposited him in the lap of royalty.¹⁰ No subsequent revelation can undo the effects of

⁹ The internal coherence of the speech depends on this γάρ. The speaker seems to be explaining why he has called himself the "child of Chance." In reality, however, the particle is more closely related to ἀτιμασθήσομαι, the only finite verb in the preceding sentence, and the word nearest to γάρ. Oedipus is clarifying the substantive claim that he will *feel no dishonor* in counting himself the child of Chance. γάρ accordingly introduces, not just 1082-83, but the composite statement located in the speech's last four lines (1082-85). In particular, 1082-83 expand on ἐμαυτὸν παῖδα πῆς τύχης νεύω (1080), while 1084-85 explain (or justify) οὐκ ἀτιμασθήσομαι (1081). It is precisely this explanatory function of 1084-1085 that is obscured in Jebb's version.

¹⁰ For a hint of Chance's role in these events, see 1025 and 1036, and above, note 9.

this gift. One who has risen from rags to riches need not fear to dredge up the rags. One who has had a second birth from Chance need not shrink from confronting the truth about his first, biological parents. The concluding lines, rather than introducing a new (prescriptive or moral) argument, corroborate the speculative claim already established in the speech: I will be content to see my birth, *because* I have meanwhile become the child of generous Chance, and cannot hereafter prove other than I now am (her "lucky" protégé).

In sum, Campbell's version not only has a stronger foundation in the Greek, but suits the context better than Jebb's. Furthermore, as rendered by an expert translator (such as, e.g., Mazon), this version gives impressive rhetorical force to the speech's closing lines:¹¹

C'est Fortune qui fut ma mère, et les années qui ont accompagné ma vie
m'ont fait tour a tour et petit et grand. Voilà mon origine, rien ne peut la
changer: pourquoi renoncerais-je à savoir de qui je suis né?

The speaker of these lines will emerge a fully tragic figure in the *exodos*. As for the present scene, it does not portray him as an heroic truthseeker, steeling himself to confront a potentially disastrous reality.¹² On the contrary, Oedipus "knows" on the basis of very cogent arguments that nothing he might learn from the shepherd can mar his present status. Supposing himself to be the child of undistinguished parents, the hero successfully demonstrates that he is nevertheless immune to the unhappy consequences of an ignoble birth. On the strength of this reasoning, Jocasta's plea is rejected and the inquiry pursued to its ultimate stage.

To say that Oedipus is never more deluded than at this moment is to repeat what has often been said before. What should be emphasized is that the dramatic weight of his speech is diminished if the closing lines are interpreted in the familiar manner. The focal point of this passage is not a pledge to continue the search at all costs, but a confident (though misguided) prediction of its outcome.¹³ Taken as a

¹¹ *Sophocle*, Tome II (Paris 1952) 111.

¹² For an extended defense of the opposing view (that Oedipus' behavior is affected by tragic knowledge), see F. Egermann, *Arete und tragische Bewusstheit*, 93-94 (Anhang VI); *Vom Menschen in der Antike* (München 1957) 50; also C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles* (Cambridge 1951) 145.

¹³ The prophetic conclusion of Oedipus' speech is a fitting prelude to the Choral ode which follows. The Chorus begin on the same note (1086): . . . εἴπερ ἐγὼ μάντις εἰμι. . . (Here ἐγὼ might suggest that the Theban elders are explicitly comparing themselves to Oedipus.)

whole, the passage dramatizes a choice of action based on rational prognostication: "Let the truth break forth; it will never find me other than I am" (other, i.e., than my luck has made me). The speaker's climactic prophecy links his speech with other prophetic passages in the play and defines its ironic relationship to the *anagnorisis*. In the immediate sequel, Oedipus will indeed "come out no other" than what Chance has made him. But this fact, so far from guaranteeing his peace of mind by shielding him from disgrace (as he predicted), will *itself* become the occasion of unimagined degradation and grief. Oedipus' prediction, for all that its truth appears (within his own perspective) to rest on unshakeable foundations, will prove a disastrous failure. Having pledged himself to exorcise a nonexistent demon (lowly birth), he will thereby conjure up a real one. To be sure, the literal sense of Oedipus' words is borne out by the result; yet it is not his foresight, but Apollo's oracle, that "comes out" verified: *ἰοὺ ἰοὺ τὰ πάντ' ἄν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ* (1182: "Ah, it would all, all come out unerring!", cf. 1011: . . . μὴ . . . Φοῖβος ἐξέλθῃ σαφής).¹⁴

ROBERT L. KANE

MIAMI UNIVERSITY, OHIO

¹⁴ I gratefully acknowledge the useful suggestions offered by the anonymous reader of this journal.

CATULLUS AND THE POLEMICS OF POETIC REFERENCE (POEM 64.1–18)

Omnia iam vulgata—the polemical nature of Catullan verse, and its place in the tradition of Callimachean programmatic invective, are now fully acknowledged. Critics have given attention both to this poet's negative and to his positive attitudes.¹ In favourable contrast to the miserable Hortensius (Poems 36, 95) stand the positive models, neoteric confrères of Catullus (Calvus, Poem 51; Cinna, Poem 95), pursuing their poetic art with adherence to the new standards: erudition, care of composition, and a delight in all that is clever, witty and urbane. Here we find the personal, polemical Catullus, highly self-conscious and aware of the new course on which Roman poetry was set, embedding in the polymetrics and epigrams statements which, while immediate and a part of the poet's world, constitute in their entirety a traditional literary manifesto.

The Alexandrian poet, and his neoteric Roman successor, is, I think, polemical in two ways. The first, as sketched above for Catullus, is essentially declarative—it lies in a statement of poetic purpose, a defining of affiliation, or a rejection of prior genre. Callimachus' prologue to the *Aetia* is the chief model, and every Roman poet with claims on the Alexandrian poetic ethic was to produce an adaptation or modification of the Callimachean lines.² The second method is one which may be viewed as a demonstration of polemical attitude. Without intruding into his verse the poet, through allusion and through alteration or conflation of his models, sets himself in a tradition and may thereby provide a commentary on his own place in that

¹ Antediluvians survive, of course, and will doubtless continue to flourish. So the latest piece on the densely programmatic Poem 50: "Mögen wir carmen 50 auch heute noch mit Ergriffenheit lesen, so ist es doch erst einmal nicht für uns schreiben, sondern es ist das persönliche und uneingeschränkte Bekenntnis des Dichters an Licinius Calvus: Mein Freund, ich liebe dich" (W. Kissel, "Mein Freund, ich liebe dich [Catull, c. 50]." *Wü rz. Jahrb. f. d. Altertumswiss.* n.f. 6b [1980] 59).

² E.g. Cat. 95; Virg. *Ecl.* 6.1–8; Hor. *Sat.* 2.1.12–15, *Odes* 1.6, 2.12; Prop. 2.1. Most conveniently, see W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom*, Hermes Einzelschriften 16 (1960) passim.

tradition, and ultimately on his own poetic art. Virgil, the master of this practice, provides an acknowledged instance in the Sixth Eclogue:

a, virgo infelix, quae te dementia cepit!

(*Ecl.* 6.52)

Theocritus and Calvus molded into a single Virgilian line.³ Here the poet's purpose is to indicate the active tradition of his own verse, and in some ways to demonstrate the superiority of the poetry which subsumes and transforms that tradition. To that extent the practice is polemical.

What I propose here is an examination of perhaps the most literary and allusive lines of Catullus—the opening of his epyllion. The purpose is to expose this portion of the poem as Catullus' major polemical demonstration of his literary affiliations. Why these lines? The reason will, I believe, emerge as we detect the complex of references and allusions that inhabit the opening tableau. But, in any case, the description of the Argo's departure seems deliberately chosen as a vehicle for polemical expression. Nowhere else does it play a significant part in the account of the marriage of Peleus and Thetis (a matter to which we shall return), and, even more significantly, in its previous treatment, the episode offered Catullus precisely the literary range which would be appropriate to the creation of an intensely erudite and polemical narrative. On the Greek side, Euripides' *Medea*, the *Argonautica* of Apollonius and Callimachus' *Aetia*⁴—these are the natural stages of influence in the maturation of the high neoteric style. At the same time, archaic Latin poetry, not just the *Medea* of Ennius, but other Ennian verse, as well as that of Accius, is incorporated into Catullus' proem in ways which, far from constituting mere literary reference, argue for the superiority of the narrative of the New Poet.

It is, of course, by no means a novel observation that the opening of Catullus 64 draws from previous literary expression; Quinn, with others, notes: "The first sentence is shot through with reminiscences of Ennius' version of Euripides' *Medea*."⁵ Nor are all of the allusions with which we shall deal missed by the commentators and critics.

³ On this see Z. Stewart, "The Song of Silenus," *HSCP* 64 (1959) 190; R. F. Thomas, "Theocritus, Calvus, and *Eclogue* 6," *CP* 74 (1979) 337–39.

⁴ We will come to deal specifically with Callimachean influences later; in general, on connections between Apollonius and Callimachus see Pfeiffer, *Callimachus* II p. xli–xlii.

⁵ *Catullus, The Poems* (London and Basingstoke 1970) 299.

None of them, however, includes *all* of them, and this in itself reveals a common attitude: what is lacking is a systematic examination of the *nature* of poetic reminiscence in these lines.⁶ Accordingly it will be an integral assumption of this study that reference to earlier poetry is potentially far from casual (an assumption which, I trust, the results will vindicate), but has a specifically polemical function: to demonstrate the importance of the poet's models, and often to indicate the superiority of his own treatment.

Peliaco quondam prognatae vertice pinus
 dicuntur liquidas Neptuni nasse per undas
 Phasidos ad fluctus et fines Aeetaeos,
 cum lecti iuvenes, Argivae robora pubis,
 auratam optantes Colchis avertere pellem 5
 ausi sunt vada salsa cita decurrere puppi
 caerulea verrentes abiegnis aequora palmis.
 diva quibus retinens in summis urbibus arces
 ipsa levi fecit volitantem flamine currum,
 pinea coniungens inflexae texta carinae. 10
 illa rudem cursu prima imbuit Amphitriten;
 quae simul ac rostro ventosum proscidit aequor
 tortaque remigio spumis incanuit unda,
 emersere freti candenti e gurgite vultus
 aequoreae monstrum Nereides admirantes. 15
 illa, atque <haud> alia, viderunt luce marinas
 mortales oculis nudato corpore Nymphas
 nutricum tenus exstantes e gurgite cano.

I

Catullan 'Correction'

The phrase is used advisedly. When Ennius wrote his *Medea* he worked closely with the Euripidean model. Although his tragedy was in no real sense a 'translation,'⁷ it did find its model in a single work.

⁶ Possible exceptions are: D. Braga, *Catullo e i Poeti Greci* (Messina 1950); F. Klingner, *Catullus Peleus-Epos*, Sitzungsab. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 6 (1956) (= *Studien zur griechischen und römischen Literatur* [Zürich 1964] 156-224). The first of these is less useful on the opening of Poem 64.

⁷ *Pace* Cicero, *De Fin.* 1.4, who, however, somewhat contradicts himself at *Acad.* 1.10: Ennius, Pacuvius, Accius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresse-runt poetarum.

Not so the opening of Catullus 64. Here the poet had before him a number of models, and as a result we can at a number of points detect a polemical commentary on his part. In his alteration, suppression, or promotion of details, he can be seen to be 'correcting' one or the other of his models, either in favour of an alternative source or in absolute terms.

Catullus is emphatic on the building-material of the Argo:

<i>pinus</i> . . . <i>dicuntur</i> . . . <i>nasse</i>	1-2
<i>abiegnis</i> . . . <i>palmis</i>	7
<i>pineae</i> . . . <i>textae</i>	10

Pinewood hull and oars of fir. The commentators have noted the attention given to *pin(us)*: at the end of the first line, and the beginning of the final line of the extended opening period.⁸ *Abiegnis* appears in between.⁹ But is Catullus here concerned merely with artifice? To answer this we must briefly touch on the technical tradition of ancient shipbuilding. Theophrastus (*Hist. Plant.* 5.7.1-3) discusses woods suitable for this craft: ἑλάτη, πεύκη and κέδρος seem in general to be the best.¹⁰ The ἑλάτη is the silver fir (Lat: *abies*; *Abies Cephalonica* or *pectinata*), and κέδρος needs no gloss. But πεύκη is a different matter; it does however (with πίτυς) seem to indicate some sort of pine (Lat: *pinus*; *Pinus Laricio*, *Pinea* or *Halepensis*).¹¹ In Greek a distinction seems generally to be made between ἑλάτη on the one hand, and πεύκη or πίτυς on the other.¹² Latin responds with *abies* for the former and *pinus* without distinction for the latter two. It is with this last distinction in mind that we should return to Catullus. His models, again, are Euripides and Ennius:

⁸ Punctuating with Fordyce (*Catullus* [Oxford 1973] ad loc.), who connects the relative clause of lines 8-10 with the preceding sentence.

⁹ In the light of this concentration, there may possibly be a play intended with *robora* (4). Cf. Virg. *Aen.* 4.441: *annoso validam cum robore quercum*; also *Geo.* 3.332.

¹⁰ Theophrastus also makes a distinction between wood suitable for war-ships (ἑλάτη) and for merchant-ships (πεύκη), but that is not, I think, relevant to the present discussion.

¹¹ *LSJ* s.v. ἑλάτη and πεύκη. Also Steier, "Tanne," *RE* 2 IV (1932) 2216-23.

¹² Indeed, the difference between πεύκη and πίτυς seems to be in part a matter of literary taste; both are found in Homer, lyric and Aeschylus, but πίτυς may have come to appear prosaic, for it is absent from the works of Pindar, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes (πεύκη, by contrast, is to be found some 20 times in Euripides, in differing senses: the tree, a torch, spear, the Trojan horse, etc.). Πίτυς is revived by Theocritus, who uses it interchangeably with πεύκη. Callimachus has both words, but Apollonius avoids πίτυς altogether.

μηδ' ἐν νάπαισι Πηλίου πεσεῖν ποτε
 τμηθεῖσα πεύκη . . .

(*Med.* 3-4)

utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
 caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes.

(*Scen.* 246-47 V)

For whatever reason, Ennius translated Euripides' πεύκη as *abies*.¹³ *Abies*, however, should respond to ἐλάτη, not to πεύκη. Hence Catullus' 'correction' and so too his emphasis of *pinus*. For him *abies* remains, but where it belongs—as the material for the Argo's oars (*abiegnis* . . . *palmis*), for Catullus knew his Apollonius:

κόπτον ὕδωρ δολιχῆσιν ἐπικρατέως ἐλάτησιν

(*Arg.* 1.914)¹⁴

In good Alexandrian fashion, Catullus refrained from mentioning the Argo by name:

cum lecti iuvenes, Argivae robora pubis
 auratam optantes Colchis avertere pellem
 ausi sunt vada salsa cita decurrere puppi,
 caerulea verrentes abiegnis aequora palmis.
 diva quibus retinens in summis urbibus arces
 ipsa levi fecit volitantem flamine currum.

(64.4-9)

Euripides, Apollonius and Ennius had all named the ship, but Catullus has relied on his reader's familiarity with the tradition. But more interesting is his attitude towards the etymology of Ἀργώ. The subject was clearly a matter of dispute, and in his three models Catullus appears to have had two options. Apollonius, without making the connection explicit, leaves little doubt as to his view on the matter:

νῆα μὲν οὖν οἱ πρόσθεν ἔτι κλείουσιν αἰοδοί¹⁵
 Ἄργον Ἀθηναῖς καμείν ὑποθημοσύνησιν.

(1.18-19)

¹³ The reason is a matter of speculation. H. D. Jocelyn (*The Tragedies of Ennius* [Cambridge 1967] ad 209) suggests caprice, sound-effect, or a desire on Ennius' part to imply a military expedition (cf. above, n. 10). In light of the pairing of these trees in the technical tradition, we cannot, I think, rule out simple error.

¹⁴ Also at 2.661, 4.105, 504, 1633. The source for Apollonius is Homer, *Od.* 12.172.

¹⁵ I follow Vian's text here, over Brunck's ἐπικλείουσι. From the wording at this point the matter of the construction of the Argo, and hence of its etymology, appear already to have been matters of contention.

αὐτὴ γὰρ καὶ νῆα θοὴν κάμε, σὺν δέ οἱ Ἄργος
τεῦξεν Ἀρεστορίδης κείνης ὑποθημοσύνησιν.

(1.111-12)

For Apollonius the derivation of the name is quite clear; it is naturally taken from the ship's builder.¹⁶ Ennius, on the other hand, had a different view of the issue:

quae nunc nominatur nomine
Argo, quia Argivi in ea delecti viri
vecti petebant . . .

(Scen. 249-51 V)

This etymology, somewhat less likely than Apollonius', may indeed be Ennius' own construction.¹⁷ And Catullus, to whom both possibilities were known and therefore available? Fordyce noted: "Catullus makes no reference to Argus the shipwright, who built the Argo under Athena's guidance (Apoll. 1.18-19, 111-12)."¹⁸ In the matter of contending etymologies, however, this must constitute more than mere omission, for Catullus first makes clear his model:

αὐτὴ γὰρ καὶ νῆα θοὴν κάμε, σὺν δέ οἱ Ἄργος
τεῦξεν . . .

(Arg. 1.111-12)

*ipsa*¹⁹ levi fecit volitantem flamine currum.

(Cat. 64.9)

Not merely is there "no reference" to Argus, but, through reminiscence of Apollonius' line, suppression of the co-worker, and hence of the etymology which it implies. And what of his attitude to the Ennian variant? Again, Catullus demonstrates his model:

quae nunc nominatur nomine
Argo, quia Argivi in ea delecti viri . . .

(Scen. 249-50 V)

¹⁶ This, naturally enough, appears to be the oldest extant etymology: Pherek. fr. 106 FG²H; also Apollod. 1.9.16.1; Ptol. Heph. 2 p. 185 Westerm. See Jessen, "Argo," *RE* 2.721-23.

¹⁷ Such is the view of Jocelyn (above, n. 13) ad 212-13. It appears only in Latin (Cic. *Arat.* 277, *Argolicam* . . . *navem*; Manil. 1.694, *Argivumque ratem*), although Ennius may have adapted it from a view connecting the name with the place Argos: Hegesander ap. Tzetzes, *Lycophron* 883; Hegessipus ap. *Et. Magn.* 136.31; Schol. Theoc. 13.21. Again, cf. Jessen (above, n. 16).

¹⁸ Fordyce (above, n. 8) ad 64.9.

¹⁹ Noted by W. Kroll (*C. Valerius Catullus* 3rd ed. [Stuttgart 1959]) ad loc.

cum *lecti iuvenes*, *Argivae* robora pubis

(Cat. 64.4)

The crew is specified, the model is apparent, but here too the etymological gloss, in this case that of Ennius, is removed. F. Klingner claimed that Catullus did not need to give the origin of the name *Argo*,²⁰ but that is to assume that there is a single derivation, which, as we have seen, is hardly the case. As in his reaction to Apollonius, so with Ennius, Catullus has indicated his general model while suppressing a crucial detail—in both instances the etymology of the ship's name.

In rejecting these two variants, Catullus, I believe, points to a third:

τὴν δὲ ναῦν Ἀργῶ προσαγορευθῆναι κατὰ μὲν τινὰς τῶν μυθογράφων ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸ σκάφος ἀρχιτεκτονήσαντος Ἀργού καὶ συμπλεύσαντος . . . ὥς δ' ἔνιοι λέγουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ τὸ τάχος ὑπερβολῆς, ὥς ἂν τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀργὸν τὸ ταχὺ προσαγορευόντων.

(Diod. Sic. 4.41.3)

This is the first attestation of the etymology connecting the name to the adjective ἀργός (= 'quick', 'swift'), although it was clearly current before Diodorus (ἐνιοι λέγουσιν). It survives elsewhere only in scholia and in Hyginus, clearly derived from a common scholiastic source.²¹ Unlike the other derivations, it is never found alone, but always as an alternative to the more obvious options. We are quite clearly dealing with the coinage of an antiquarian mind, for, although apparently a product of the Hellenistic period,²² this derivation depends on a gloss (ἀργός = 'swift') which is exclusively Homeric.²³ Scholarly polemics are also suggested, in that a connection with the shipbuilder Argos (or the place Argos) is infinitely easier and more natural.

In short, while a speculative proposition, it would not be entirely guesswork to see in the formulation of this etymology the hand of Callimachus. Argonautic episodes appeared in at least two sections of

²⁰ *Studien* (above, n. 6) 159. I can find no basis for the claim of N. Scivoletto ("La Protasi del c. 64 di Catullo," *Giorn. Ital. di Philol.* 12 [1959] 346–48) that 64.4 is to be seen as an endorsement of the Ennian etymology.

²¹ Hyg. *Astr.* 2.37. Also Schol. Eur. *Med.* 1; Serv. Auct. Virg. *Ecl.* 4.34; Schol. Stat. *Theb.* 5.475; the wording in these commentaries is similar.

²² It is not mentioned by Pherekydes (above, n. 16).

²³ The exceptions are only apparent: Tymnes, *Anth. Pal.* 7.211.1 is itself a Homeric usage, and Cornutus, *N.D.* 16 is, like Diod. Sic. 4.41.3, an antiquarian context, in which modern usage is distinguished (ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοί).

the *Aetia* (1, fr. 7.19-21 Pf., 'Argonautarum reditus et ritus Anaphaeus'; 4, fr. 108-9 Pf., 'Ancora Argus navis Cyzici relicta').²⁴ And from the little we have of Callimachus on this theme it seems that he at least twice involved himself in the creation of new or polemical etymological explanations while dealing with the Argonauts. Fr. 14 Pf. is a citation from Pliny: *Corcyra Homero dicta Scheria et Phaeacia, Callimacho etiam Drepane* (N.H. 6.52). Pfeiffer has suggested that Callimachus may have associated this with the sickle (δρεπάνη) of Demeter, since at fr. 43.70 he connected Zancle in Sicily with the same implement used by Cronus to castrate his father.²⁵ Apollonius is at variance with this etymology.²⁶ We cannot here be certain that the Callimachean construct is original with him. That, however, cannot be said of his treatment of Pagasae, port of departure for the Argo; of this Hyginus records:

factam esse Pindarus ait in Magnesiae oppido cui Demetrias nomen est, Callimachus autem in iisdem finibus ad Apollinis Actii templum, quod Argonautae proficiscentes statuisset existimantur in eo loco qui Pagasae vocatur ideo quod Argo ibi primum compacta dicitur, quod est Graece παγᾶσαι.

(Hyg. *Astr.* 2.37)²⁷

Apollonius, who also has Pagasae as the starting point for the Argo, as well as for her final beaching (*Arg.* 1.238, 4.1781), makes no allusion to such an etymology. What is significant here is that this Callimachean explanation of the name Pagasae (πήγνυμι) is identical in nature to the derivation of Argo which we are proposing as Callimachean:

ἀργός	('swift')	→	Argo
πήγνυμι	('construct')	→	Pagasae

In final support, it should be noted that Hyginus, in the sentence preceding his discussion of the Callimachean explanation of Pagasae, also gave precisely the derivation with which we have been dealing:

²⁴ As Pfeiffer noted (ad fr. 109), these sequences attain a certain prominence, in that they (almost) frame the four books of the *Aetia*.

²⁵ On this see Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* II (Berlin 1924) 171; also Pfeiffer ad fr. 14, 43.70.

²⁶ At *Arg.* 4.983-86 he appears to have used the language of Callimachus (fr. 43.70-71, on Zancle) while discussing Phaeacia. On this see Pfeiffer ad fr. 43.70; Wilamowitz (above, n. 25) 171.

²⁷ See Pfeiffer ad *Aet.* 1, fr. 18.12; the sense of the final word in Hyginus is clear, whether we accept Muncker's παγῆναι or Schneider's πεπηχθαι.



nonnulli propter celeritatem graece dixerunt Argo appellatum.

(*Astr.* 2.37)

For a number of reasons, then, there is a strong possibility that this etymology was the contribution of Callimachus. Be it so or not, Catullus, I believe, while deliberately suppressing the derivations favoured by Apollonius and Ennius, at least alludes to this variant (of which he was doubtless aware); for throughout the opening lines of the poem he places great emphasis on the swiftness of the vessel:²⁸

ausi sunt vada salsa <i>cita decurrere</i> puppi	6
caerula <i>verrentes</i> abiegnis aequora palmis	7
ipsa <i>levi</i> fecit <i>volitantem</i> flamine <i>currum</i> ²⁹	11
tortaque remigio <i>spumis incanuit</i> unda	13

Such emphasis may be seen as constituting a multiple gloss on the etymology Ἀργώ/ἀργός. The day has passed when we needed to justify *per se* such linguistic subtlety in neoteric or Augustan poetry, and in any case this particular variety has been well documented.³⁰ A parallel example from the *Aeneid* is conveniently representative:

femina, quae nostris errans in finibus . . .

(*Aen.* 4.211)

Pease proposed that Virgil here intended (while suppressing the actual name) an allusion to a common etymology:³¹

²⁸ It is noteworthy that in Ennius' lines, Catullus' primary model, there is no such emphasis. Ellis (*A Commentary on Catullus* [Oxford 1889] ad loc.) remarks on *cita*: "not merely otiose like Homeric $\theta\omicron\tilde{\eta}\ \nu\eta\tilde{\iota}$, but signaling the ease and quickness of this first voyage."

²⁹ *Currum* is striking. Contrary to *ThLL* 4.1520.49, it is the *only* instance of the word meaning 'ship'; *Ciris* 26 refers to a car camouflaged as a ship, and is therefore not parallel (as is noted by R.O.A.M. Lyne, *Ciris, A Poem Attributed to Vergil* [Cambridge 1978] ad loc.). The commentators all point to the regular metaphorical use of ὄχος, ὄχημα, etc. in tragedy, and this is of course quite possibly the source of Catullus' *currus*—although it is interesting that the usage never caught on. We may be missing some information; in *Pythian* 4, a poem which appealed to Callimachus (cf. fr. inc. sed. 716 and Pfeiffer ad loc.), chariots and ships appear together (17–18), and the Argo's anchor is referred to as $\theta\omicron\tilde{\alpha}\varsigma\ \text{Ἀργοῦς}\ \chi\alpha\lambda\iota\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu$ (25).

³⁰ For Catullus, see D. O. Ross, "Uriosque apertos: A Catullan Gloss," *Mnemos.* 26 (1973) 60–62; for Virgil, J. Marouzeau, "Virgile Linguiste," in *Mélanges, A. Ernout* (Paris 1940) 259–65; W. F. Jackson Knight, *Roman Vergil* (London 1944) 197–201; J. S. T. Hanssen, "Virgilian Notes," *SO* 26 (1948) 113–25.

³¹ A. S. Pease, *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935) 540 (Addenda ad 4.211); Also Hanssen (above, n. 30) 121.

errans → πλανήτις → Διδώ

The same process is required of the reader:

cita, decurrere, volitantem, etc. → ἀργός → Ἀργώ

In the case of Catullus particularly, the familiarity of the etymological debate provides a check.

The suggestion is that Catullus was allusively referring to this etymology; further that he may have had Callimachus in mind while doing so. There is, I believe, additional support for this second claim. Catullus, of the Argonauts:

ausi sunt vada salsa cita decurrere puppi 6

At issue is the verb, *decurrere*. The commentators give parallels for its transitive force, but only for the simplex,³² and the real problem surely lies with the prefix *de-*. Ellis seems to have acknowledged this ("*Aen.* v. 212 *Prona petit maria et pelago decurrit aperto* suggests that the idea may be that of running down a slope of water").³³ Fordyce too cites the Virgilian line, but how close is it? R. D. Williams has, I think, explained it correctly: "'down' to the shore from the high seas (*decurrit*)."³⁴ That is what suits Virgil's context, and, moreover, it is what we expect of *decurrere*: the Latin equivalent of κατατρέχειν, 'to sail shore-wards'.³⁵ This obviously cannot be the sense of Catullus' *decurrere*, and so the Virgilian instance will hardly constitute a parallel. K. Quinn does seem to confront the issue: "the transitive use and the sense of 'race through or across' seem to have belonged to the technical language of navigation, chariot-racing, etc."³⁶ This appears to be a reference to *ThLL* 5.229.21-26 (*de qualibet motione . . . de navigatione*), where the occurrence at Cat. 64.6 (cited as 64.11) is cited. But the Catullan instance is to be distinguished in its generality, in that each of the others in that entry refers to a course which has been

³² E. G. Plaut. *Merc.* 547, *pelagi cursores* (where the nominal form also distinguishes it from Catullus' *decurrere*); Virg. *Aen.* 3.191, *currimus aequor*, 5.235, *aequora curro*.

³³ Ellis (above, n. 28) ad loc.

³⁴ *The Aeneid of Virgil, Books 1-6* (Basingstoke and London 1972) ad loc. For this common meaning of the verb with ships, see *ThLL* 5.228.54ff. Those who invoke *Aen.* 5.212 as a parallel for Catullus seem unconcerned by the ablative (*pelago*).

³⁵ *LSJ* s.v.; or, more prosaically, κατατρέχειν, the opposite, of course, being ἀνατρέχειν, 'to sail out to sea.'

³⁶ Quinn (above, n. 5) ad loc.

carried completely through to its conclusion, with actual distances being uniformly mentioned or implied.³⁷

In short, I can find no wholly satisfactory parallel for Catullus' use of *decurrere*. Callimachus, *Aetia* 4, fr. 108 Pf. is an apostrophe to the harbour of Cyzicus,³⁸ where the Argo put in to take on drinking-water:

Ἀργὼ καὶ σέ, Πάνορμε, κατέδραμεν καὶ τεὸν ὕδωρ.

Is it not possible that Catullus, the translator of the very next episode of the *Aetia*, applied the same verb to his Argo?³⁹

II

Catullan Conflation

It has already emerged that Catullus, in the opening lines of Poem 64, had in mind not a single model, but a variety or complex of models—a complex which at times merges and is transformed into a new and individual form of expression. We may now proceed to examine systematically Catullus' method of conflating these various models. Again, in that this practice requires the poet to accept, reject or modify his predecessors' treatments, the spirit is essentially polemical.

I

Peliaco quondam prognatae vertice pinus

1

The carefully constructed double reference of this opening line has gone unnoticed. First Ennius. As is generally recognized, he 'corrected' the time-sequence of Euripides, removing the *hysteron-proteron*⁴⁰ that appears at the beginning of that poet's *Medea*:

³⁷ Epit. Alex. 85, *iam stadia CCCC decurrerant*; Symm. or. 6.3, *multo itinere decurso*; Ammian. 17.1.4, *sursum versum decurso* (sc. *Rheno*), 24.6.2, *classis stadiis triginta decursis*.

³⁸ Following Dieg. 5.33–39, although some would see in Πάνορμε an apostrophe to an eponymous hero; see Pfeiffer ad loc.

³⁹ Although we do not know how Catullus read his Callimachus, it seems reasonable to allow that he knew of this episode.

⁴⁰ Page, following the scholiast's criticism of Timichidas (*Euripides, Medea* [Oxford 1952] ad loc.), objects to the term, claiming that Euripides presents "a logical sequence of thoughts." Which he does, but it is still, I think, a *hysteron-proteron*. See also F. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1912) 97–99.

εἴθ' ὦφελ' Ἀργοῦς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος
 Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν κυανέας Συμπληγάδας,
 μηδ' ἐν νάπαισι Πηλίου πεσεῖν ποτε
 τμηθεῖσα πεύκη . . .

(Eur. *Med.* 1-4)

Thus for Ennius the timber of Mt. Pelion is the first stage:

Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus . . .

(Enn. *Scen.* 246)

Catullus followed this lead, at the same time elevating the geographical reference, by use of a new adjective: *Peliaco* . . . *vertice*.⁴¹ Thus recognition of Ennius' reorganization. Concurrently, however, he has preserved reference to the Euripidean original, by reduplicating the alliteration found at *Med.* 3, but absent from the Ennian version:

Πηλίου πεσεῖν ποτε / . . . πεύκη
Peliaco . . . *prognatae* . . . *pinus*

Also noteworthy is the apparent parallel between Πηλίου . . . ποτε and *Peliaco* quondam.⁴² In the very first line of his poem, then, Catullus has artfully indicated two of his primary sources by conflating them into single line while yet preserving recognizable traces of the two originals.

2

dicuntur liquidas Neptuni nasse per undas	2
Phasidos ad fluctus et fines Aetæaeos	3

Two mannered lines, the first with its epithet-noun rhyme at main caesura and line-end,⁴³ the second containing unusual Greek proper

⁴¹ So Quinn (above, n. 5) ad loc.

⁴² Apparent in that Euripides' ποτέ is in virtual tmesis with μηδ' at the beginning of the line. For the recent claim that Catullus' *quondam* (as well as *dicuntur*, 2) may be influenced by Cic. *Arat.* 420-21 (*vir quondam Orion manibus violasse Dianam*/ dicitur), see D. P. Kubiak, "Catullus 64.1-2," *AJP* 102 (1981) 41-42. On ποτέ as a common feature of the opening of epyllia, see W. Bühler, *Die Europa des Moschos*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 13 (1960) 47-48.

⁴³ The first of almost fifty such rhymed lines in the poem. This ratio of 12 percent is far in excess of Ennius' practice (less than 5 percent in the *Annals*), as of Virgil's (5 percent in both *Aen.* 9 and in the 'neoteric' *Aen.* 4). The higher incidence of end-stopped lines in Catullus (as against Virgil) accounts, no doubt, for some of the difference, but clearly the pattern produces a highly mannered effect which appealed to Catullus.

names, medial alliteration and consciously varied word-order. The general source, and in part the constellation, as some commentators have noted,⁴⁴ in part belong to Apollonius:

Κολχίδα μὲν δὴ γαῖαν ἱκάνομεν ἠδὲ ῥέεθρα
Φάσιδος.

(*Arg.* 2.1277–78)

From here too Catullus no doubt took the spondeiazon of 64.3, for Αἰήτας appears at the end of the following line, *Arg.* 2.1279.⁴⁵ Yet a further model seems to exist for Catullus, and one which may also have been in Apollonius' mind; again, it is the archetype:

εἴθ' ὦφελ' Ἀργοῦς μὴ διαπτᾶσθαι σκάφος
Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν κυανέας Συμπληγάδας . . .

(*Eur. Med.* 1–2)

First, Euripides and Apollonius: Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν; Κολχίδα μὲν δὴ γαῖαν.⁴⁶ Catullus, at the beginning of 64.3, has clearly drawn from the diction of Apollonius, *Arg.* 2.1277–78 (*Phasidos ad fluctus*; ἠδὲ ῥέεθρα / Φάσιδος); on this diction, however, he has apparently imposed the word-order of Euripides, *Med.* 2 (*Phasidos ad fluctus*; Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν). This claim is supported by two facts: first, Catullus obviously had the Euripidean opening before him at this point, and, secondly, this is the *only* clear example in Catullus of the simple word-order: proper name in the genitive + preposition + governed noun.⁴⁷

3

ausi sunt vada salsa cita decurrere puppi	6
caerulea verrentes abiegnis aequora palmis.	7

Here, as elsewhere at this point of the poem, Catullus seeks for variation in his description of the ship's voyage. It is noteworthy that in the

⁴⁴ Best by Kroll (above, n. 19) ad loc.

⁴⁵ Noted by Klingner, *Studien* (above, n. 6) 158; Quinn (above, n. 5) ad loc.

⁴⁶ The connection between Euripides and Apollonius is not necessary to our argument, and may not be intentional; however, in that Catullus had both passages in mind, it seems likely that he noticed the similarity.

⁴⁷ This word-order may seem unexceptional, particularly since it was very much favoured by Virgil, particularly as a clausula (*Simoentis ad undam*, etc.); it is, however, unique in Catullus, the closest instances (64.2, *Neptuni nasse per undas*, 95.5, *cavas Satrachi penitus mittetur ad undas*) being less compact and therefore slightly different.

first eighteen lines there are eleven references to the sea. *Mare* is not used,⁴⁸ and the repetitions are artful.⁴⁹ In these lines, as Klinger has best observed, Catullus drew heavily from the high diction of earlier Latin poetry: *vada* for 'sea' is found first in Accius (*mystica* . . . *vada*, *inc. fab.* fr. 687 Ribb.), *salsus* is Ennian (*mare salsum*, *Ann.* 142 V; *aequora salsa*, *Scen.* 367), and *puppis* for 'ship' is first attested in Cicero's *Aratea* (389).⁵⁰ These instances show that there is a deliberately archaic, or epic, flavour to Catullus' description, but we should turn to two consecutive fragments from the *Annals* of Ennius, which appear to suggest that Catullus had a more specific model in mind:

verrunt extemplo placide mare marmore flavo;
caeruleum spumat sale conferta rate pulsum.

labitur uncta carina, volat super impetus undas.

(Enn. *Ann.* 384–85, 386 V)

The lines describe the departure of the Roman fleet, during activities against Antiochus in 190. The commentators refer in passing to the first fragment, pointing specifically to *verrunt* at Enn. 384 and *verrentes* in Cat. 64.7. However, the similarities do not end there, for there are several coincidences of words descriptive of sailing and the sea:

Ennius	Catullus 64
verrunt	verrentes (7)
caeruleum	caerula (7)
volat	volitantem (9)
sale	(vada) salsa (6)
carina	carinae (10)
spumat	spumis (13)

These words are not particularly commonplace, and the coincidence is, I think, rather too high to be accidental. If so, then what we find in the lines of Catullus is a systematic sprinkling of Ennian diction in an otherwise eclectic description. For now, it must rest at this, but we shall return to Ennius' lines later, when we come to look at Virgil's debt to the opening of Catullus 64.

⁴⁸ Although it appears elsewhere in the poem (30, 155, 269), in these highly stylized opening lines it seems to be consciously avoided as too common. The same applies for *navis* (used at 84, but not in the poem).

⁴⁹ So *liquidus* . . . *undas* (2), *tortaque* . . . *unda* (13); *caerula* . . . *aequora* (7), *ventosum* . . . *aequor* (12), *aequoreae* . . . *Nereides* (15); *candenti e gurgite* (14), *e gurgite cano* (18).

⁵⁰ Klinger, *Studien* (above, n. 6) 158.

aequoreae monstrum Nereides admirantes

15

The commentators, among them, cite the relevant references, but none cites all of them, and this again demonstrates the flawed approach to Catullus' epyllion: this line, like others, and the setting it depicts represent a conflation of prior literary treatment, Catullus' own arrangement of a disparate set of models, and hence an implicitly polemical commentary on those models. The most obvious and direct influence is Apollonius' description of Thetis and the Nereids sporting around the Argo, and helping her through the Wandering Rocks (*Arg.* 4.930–63).⁵¹ From there Catullus drew the actual Nymphs (Νηρηίδες, 4.930),⁵² as well as their activity. But he has conflated these details with a passage containing more specific dictional and stylistic similarities. In the first book of the *Argonautica* the nymphs stand on Mt. Pelion, marveling at the strange phenomenon of the world's first ship:

ἐπ' ἀκροτάτῃσι δὲ νύμφαι
Πηλιάδες κορυφῇσιν ἐθάμβεον εἰσορώσσαι
ἔργον Ἀθηναίης Ἰωνίδος

(*Arg.* 1.549–51)⁵³

Catullus has appropriately replaced these nymphs with the Nereids, but, through the four-word hexameter,⁵⁴ and translation of their surprise (ἐθάμβεον/*admirantes*), he clearly intended a parallel. Through this double reference he has conflated disparate contexts from Apollonius.

A third model matters, one mentioned by Ellis⁵⁵ but apparently lost to subsequent critics. In the *De Natura Deorum* (2.89) Cicero

⁵¹ See Kroll (above, n. 19) ad 64.12. Although the Nereids are frequent escorts of ships (Soph. *O.C.* 716; Eur. *El.* 433; *Culex* 345), the detail here clearly points directly to Apollonius.

⁵² The patronymic is found first in Latin at Cic. *Arat.* 446 (*Nereides almae*), where, interestingly, Cicero has replaced Aratus' Doris and Panope (*Phaen.* 658) with the collective epithet.

⁵³ In separate entries, Kroll (above, n. 19) refers to these lines and to *Arg.* 930–63, but the crucial point of Catullus' blending of the two contexts is missed. Quinn (above, n. 5) ad loc. is the only commentator to mention both passages together.

⁵⁴ In that this is one of only four such lines in all of Catullus (all are in 64), it obviously represents a deliberate 'translation' of *Arg.* 1.550.

⁵⁵ Ellis (above, n. 28) ad loc.

preserves a brief plot summary, together with a number of lines from early in Accius' *Medea*:⁵⁶

utque ille apud Accium pastor, qui navem numquam ante vidisset, ut
procul divinum et *novum vehiculum* Argonautarum e monte conspexit,
primo *admirans* et perterritus hoc modo loquitur:

tanta moles labitur
fremibunda ex alto ingenti sonitu et spiritu;
prae se undas volvit, vortices vi suscitatur
ruit prolapsa, pelagus respergit reflat.

(Cic. *Nat. Deor.* 2.89 = Acc. *Med.* 391–94 Ribb.)

Cicero is using the shepherd's change from bewilderment to understanding as a paradigm for the philosopher in his observations of natural phenomena, and therefore he does not, unfortunately, cite the entire speech. However, from what we have, and from the summary preceding it (which, presumably, in some way reflects the language of Accius), this passage is clearly central to the *topos* with which we have been dealing. Indeed, Accius himself has in these lines combined previous treatments. The wonder and fear of the shepherd (*novum vehiculum* . . . *primo admirans et perterritus*)⁵⁷ finds its source in *Arg.* 4.317 (ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι νηῶν φόβῳ—the object being the Argo),⁵⁸ as well as in the surprise of the nymphs on Mt. Pelion (Πηλῖαδες . . . ἐθάμβεον, 1.550).⁵⁹ But just as Catullus was to conflate this second passage with the description of the Nereids at *Arg.* 4.930–63, so Accius appears to have added a further reference to his account, significantly from this very same section of the *Argonautica*; Apollonius compared the Nereids to dolphins:

ὥς δ' ὅπταν δελφῖνες ὑπὲρ ἁλὸς εὐδιώοντες
σπερχομένην ἀγεληδὸν ἐλίσσωνται περὶ νῆα . . .

(*Arg.* 4.933–34)

⁵⁶ On balance this seems to have been the title (in spite of Prisc. *de metris Ter. CGL* III p. 424 K, *Accius in Argonautis ex persona pastoris* . . .). Some favour the possibility of an adaptation of a play by Sophocles, but the proximity of what remains to Apoll. *Arg.* 4.316–20 makes this, I believe, less likely. See Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* II (London and Cambridge, Mass. repr. 1967) 456–57.

⁵⁷ These words are from Cicero's summary, but they presumably had some similarity with the unreported part of Accius.

⁵⁸ The general similarity between these two passages is noted by Ellis (above, n. 28) ad 64.15.

⁵⁹ The idea of surprise at this new phenomenon seems to be a particular feature of Apollonius, again perhaps telling against Sophoclean influence on Accius (see above, n. 56).

Accius, as E. Delage noted,⁶⁰ has himself adapted this, perhaps to a less happy context (additional support for the fact of adaptation), making the Argo herself appear like a dolphin to the watching shepherd:

sicut lascivi atque alacres rostris perfremunt
delphini

(*Med.* 403–4 Ribb.)

Already in Accius, then, we find a conflation of passages from the *Argonautica*.⁶¹ What emerges from Catullus' treatment is a continuation of this practice, with possible reference to Accius included (cf. Accius: *admirans*, Catullus: *admirantes*).⁶² In Poem 64.12–15 Catullus has restated a traditional motif, giving it an individual focus while preserving recognizable allusions to his literary predecessors.

III

Catullus and Virgil

If Catullus is the first major proponent of multiple reference in Latin poetry, then the master of that practice, as we suggested at the outset, was Virgil. In the unequalled range of his learning Virgil adapted and subsumed the whole poetic tradition that was his heritage: Greek epic, Hellenistic literature, archaic Latin poetry—and the neoteric poetry of the previous generation. While this is beyond the scope of the present paper, Virgil's method of conflation at one point provides us with an example, intrinsically of interest and possibly capable of being viewed as confirmation of the conclusions we have presented. At *Aen.* 8.91–93 appears the culmination of the process of reshaping and conflation that has been our subject:

labitur uncta vadis abies; mirantur et undae,
miratur nemus insuetum fulgentia longe
scuta virum fluvio pictasque innare carinas.

⁶⁰ "Accius Imitateur d' Apollonius," *Mélanges . . . M. Octave Navarre* (Toulouse 1935) 113.

⁶¹ Such practice may have been a hallmark of Accius' drama; on this, see W. H. Friedrich ("Zur altlateinischen Dichtung," *Hermes* 76 [1941] 120–28), who has argued that Accius combined Sophoclean and Euripidean contexts where related material was available.

⁶² Delage (above, n. 60) connects the description of the water's turbulence at *Arg.* 1.540–43 with Accius *Med.* 391–94 Ribb. If so, these may be behind the spirit of Cat. 64.12–13: *quae simul ac rostro ventosum proscidit aequor/ tortaue remigio spumis incanuit unda.*

Aeneas' fleet is sailing up the Tiber, a river previously unacquainted with ships—this is clearly the emphatic implication of *insuetum*, and it is consonant with Virgil's depiction of pre-Trojan Italy as a land unfamiliar with the arts of civilization. Thematically, then, the situation is parallel with that of Catullus 64.1-15, amazement at the first ship; the parallelism is supported by similarities of diction (Cat., *admirantes*; Virg., *mirantur . . . miratur*).⁶³

But the opening sentence of Virgil (*labitur uncta vadis abies*, 8.91) also has its antecedents. The Ennian reminiscence has long been recognized.⁶⁴

*labitur uncta carina, volat super impetus undas*⁶⁵
(Ann. 386 V)

labitur uncta carina per aequora cana velocis
(Ann. 478 V)

The similarities are immediately apparent, but what of the divergences? Again Virgil: *labitur uncta vadis abies*. The alteration, I would suggest, is influenced by Catullus 64.6-7, lines which, as we have seen (above, pp. 156f.), were themselves written with the same Ennian passage (Ann. 384-85, 386 V) in mind. Consider Catullus:

ausi sunt vada salsa cita decurrere puppi,
caerula verrentes abiegnis aequora palmis.
(64.6-7)

Virgil has conflated *vada* and *abies*⁶⁶ with the Ennian phrase *labitur uncta*. . . . Treating a similar theme, he has not only adapted the diction of Catullus but has also included a clear reference to one of the sources of the Catullan lines.

⁶³ Noted, to my knowledge, only by one commentator of Virgil: K. W. Gransden, *Virgil Aeneid Book VIII* (Cambridge 1976) ad 8.91-92: "cf. Apollonius 1.544-52 and Catullus 64.1-15, where the sea-nymphs wonder at the Argonauts (*admirantes*)."

⁶⁴ Since Macrobius, *Sat.* 6.1.51. Virgil elsewhere modified the Ennian line in a slightly different fashion (*natat uncta carina*, *Aen.* 4.398), this time retaining Ennius' *uncta carina*, but altering his main verb. On Virgil's drawing from Ennius here, see M. Wigodsky, *Virgil and Early Latin Poetry*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 24 (1972) 49-50.

⁶⁵ Cf. too Virgil's *undae* at the end of 8.91 (although it is syntactically separate).

⁶⁶ Although *abiegnis* in Catullus is of oars; Virgil's metonymy of *abies* may be a polemical reference to the *abies/pinus* debate (see above, pp. 147-48). Incidentally the history of Virgil's use of *abies* has been roughly handled. Fordyce (*P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Libri VII-VIII* [Oxford 1977] ad 8.91) notes: "The metonymy of *abies* . . . appears first here, but may well be older." Indeed it is (Acc. *Epinausimache* 331 Ribb. *lucifera lampade abietem exurat Iovis*), as is recorded at *ThLL* 1.94.5-6. The author of that entry, however, has missed *Aen.* 8.91, citing Accius' as the only example.

IV

Ovid

Ovid's age, as well as his mentality, made him well suited to the art of multiple reference, and a relevant example exists. *Amores* 2.11, a propempticon to Corinna, opens in high fashion:

Prima malas docuit mirantibus aequoris undis
 Peliaco pinus vertice caesa vias,
 quae concurrentis inter temeraria cautes
 conspicuam fulvo vellere vexit ovem.
 o utinam, ne quis remo freta longa moveret,
 Argo funestas pressa bibisset aquas!

(*Am.* 2.11.1-6)

From here Ovid turns to Corinna and the present. The striking concentration of literary reminiscence in this proem, and in the poem in general, has not gone unnoticed.⁶⁷ Some influences, however, have not been noted, and, again, it is the *nature* of these references that is important, for Ovid has here demonstrated not only his knowledge of the separate treatments, but also his awareness of the very process of conflation carried out in the works of his antecedents. The Catullan influence (*Cat. Peliaco . . . vertice pinus*; Ovid *Peliaco pinus vertice . . .*) needs no argument.⁶⁸ Wilkinson also noted that the third couplet appears to be a reference to Euripides' *Medea*. Ennius' version should be added to this (*utinam ne . . . Scen.* 246 V; *o utinam, ne quis . . . Am.* 2.11.5).⁶⁹ Finally, in the first line of 2.11 (*mirantibus aequoris undis*), Quinn sees a reminiscence of Catullus 64.15 (*Nereides admirantes*).⁷⁰ Possible, but more likely, I think, that we have here Ovid's

⁶⁷ References to Euripides, Apollonius, Horace, Propertius and Tibullus have been noted: L. P. Wilkinson, *Ovid Recalled* (Cambridge 1955) 21-23; K. Quinn, *Latin Explorations* (London 1963) 266-73; W. Görler, "Ovids Propemptikon (*Amores* 2,11)," *Hermes* 93 (1965) 338-47.

⁶⁸ See Wilkinson (above, n. 67) 27; Quinn (ib.) 267.

⁶⁹ Although these could conceivably be independent translations of Euripides (εἴθ' ὥφελ' Ἀργεὺς μὴ . . .), it seems highly unlikely that Ovid did not have Ennius' famous lines in mind. Note too Ennius *Scen.* 247 V, *caesae . . . (abiegnae)*, and Ovid's (*pinus*) . . . *caesa* (the verb is absent from Catullus 64). Could this be yet another instance of *abies* vs. *pinus*?

⁷⁰ Quinn (above, n. 67) 267. Incidentally, the opening of Catullus 64 was elsewhere much in Ovid's mind. At *Met.* 1.95 he tells of the absence of ships in the golden age: (*nondum*) . . . *montibus in liquidas pinus descenderat undas*. That ship being in effect the Argo, the repetition of Catullus' rhyme (*liquidus . . . undas*, 64.2) is surely not accidental.

own conflation of the Catullan context and the verses Virgil produced with Catullus in mind: *mirantur et undae*, / *miratur nemus insuetum*, *Aen.* 8.91-92.

If so, then the opening to Ovid's poem is to be seen as the final, all-inclusive instance of multiple reference and conflation on this theme, presented with typically Ovidian understatement as a mere exemplum, preceding the more immediate 'personal' elegy to Corinna.

V

Conclusions

It has been our claim that in the type of poetry of which Catullus 64 is representative the influence of antecedent verse is to be seen as far more than mere reference, that a great deal of the intent of the New Poetry is to modify, conflate and incorporate prior treatments. Through this method the poet rejects, corrects or pays homage to his antecedents, and—the ultimate purpose—presents his own as the superior version. The first fifteen lines of Catullus' epyllion (and this is, I believe, true for much of the poem)⁷¹ are dense with an array of connected references whose nature requires that we view the poem in many ways as a vehicle for polemical poetic expression.

At this point it may be useful to return to a question which was briefly posed at the outset: why does Catullus begin a poem on the wedding of Peleus and Thetis with an account of the Argo's voyage? While it is true that Peleus was among the Argonauts, his place in that tradition is hardly central. More important is the fact that in opening the poem as he does Catullus has been compelled to alter what seems to be a set tradition:⁷²

This romantic story of love at first sight between the mermaid and the mortal is found only here. In the usual form of the legend, as it is told by Apollonius (i.558), Peleus is already the husband of Thetis and the father of Achilles when he goes with the Argo; in Valerius Flaccus (i.130) the wedding scene appears on the Argo's decor and (i.275 ff.) little Achilles is brought to see his father off.

This constitutes something more than mere rearrangement of detail, and, excluding the possibility of the poem's being a translation of a

⁷¹ Many examples come to mind, Ariadne's soliloquy being the most obvious.

⁷² Fordyce (above, n. 8) ad 64.19.

lost Hellenistic piece,⁷³ we are entitled to ask why Catullus, in his most ambitious and careful literary production, would take such liberties. It does not seem preposterous to suggest that Catullus found the story of the Argo, in the appropriate range of its previous treatments, an irresistible starting point for a poem with whose central themes it traditionally had little in common.

RICHARD F. THOMAS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

⁷³ See Fordyce (above, n. 8) 272 for the arguments. T. B. L. Webster (*Hellenistic Poetry and Art* [New York 1964] 308-10) is, I think, unsuccessful in his (admittedly cautious) attempt to argue that the poem is a 'translation.'

VENUS, EPICURUS AND *NATURAE SPECIES RATIOQUE*

The sense of wonder in contemplating phenomena implies the perception of something far more deeply infused than what appears to the eye; of some inner power or beauty of which the outward appearance is symbolical or suggestive . . . In the wonder excited by a fact is the germ of the feeling of majesty with which the apprehension of a great truth affects the mind.

Sellar

I

Venus and Epicurus appear to be counterparts in the *De Rerum Natura*.¹ Epicurus is even said to "replace" Venus in the prologue to Book Three.² Yet the verbal and syntactic parallels which give rise to the idea of replacement have never been fully described. Nor have the

¹ This study is a companion piece to one entitled "Ratio Divina Mente Coorta and the Mythological Undercurrent in the Deification of Epicurus," in *Prudentia* 11 (1979) 47-54 and was read at the Jacob Bernays International Centenary Conference, Tel-Aviv University, May 31, 1981. I am grateful to Professors Diskin Clay, Georg Luck, Charles Segal and John Van Sickle for criticism and suggestions. The following key works are referred to hereafter by author alone: C. Bailey, *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, vol. 1-111 (Oxford 1947); D. Clay, "De Rerum Natura: Greek Physis and Epicurean Physiology (Lucretius 1, 1-148)," *TAPA* 100 (1969) 31-47; idem, "The Sources of Lucretius' Inspiration," in *Études sur l'Épicurisme Antique* (Lille 1976) 205-27; A. Cox, "Lucretius and His Message: A Study in the Prologues of the *De Rerum Natura*," *G & R* 18 (1971) 1-16; J. P. Elder, "Lucretius 1.1-49," *TAPA* 85 (1954) 88-120; A. Ernout et L. Robin, *Lucrèce De Rerum Natura*, vol. I-III (Paris 1962³); E. J. Kenney, *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura*, Book III (Cambridge 1971); J. T. Lienhard, S. J., "The Prooemia of the *De Rerum Natura*," *CJ* 64 (1969) 346-53; R. Minadeo, *The Lyre of Science* (Detroit 1969); G. Santayana, *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante and Goethe* (New York 1910); E. M. Thury, *Naturae Species Ratioque: Poetic Image and Philosophical Perspective in the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius* (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania 1976).

² See E. A. Hahn (*PAPA* 72 [1941] XXXII-XXXIII) who outlines an approach for treating the poem in light of its opening invocation. Epicurus' replacement of Venus in Prologue Three is anticipated by a certain erosion in the Venus imagery after Prologue One; see Thury, 140-46. For other aspects of Venus in the poem, see *ibid.*, 134f., and Clay, 1969: 33-39. For the compatibility of Venus with Epicurean belief, see Lienhard, 351, and the eloquent exposition by R. Schilling, *La Religion Romaine de Venus* (Paris 1954) 350-58.

method or implications of such a replacement received their due attention. The present study proposes to reveal the method of Lucretius' presentation of Venus and Epicurus as counterparts and to show how Lucretius thus intended them as complementary aspects in the meaning of the phrase, *naturae species ratioque* (cf. 1.148, 2.61, 3.93, 6.41).

Bailey explains *species* as the "face" or "outward appearance" of nature; *ratio*, as its "law or inner workings."³ Cox adds that "while the primary meaning of the phrase must be something like 'the outward appearance and inner workings of nature,' *species* will also have an implied reference to active human observation and *ratio* to active human reasoning."⁴

Nature's *species*, so magnificently depicted in the opening prologue, elicits an emotional response which cannot but bring the viewer to a sense of involvement in Nature's observable workings. Yet this response is not its own end. It serves, rather, to awaken the senses to the ensuing possibilities of the *ataraxia* in Nature's *ratio*.⁵ This *ratio* requires objective reasoning and seeks to discern the hidden processes that underlie Nature's observable workings. Epicureanism, the *vera ratio*,⁶ is the ultimate goal to which the combined responses of emotional involvement and empirical observation should lead. Venus and Epicurus are avenues to that full comprehension of Nature which embraces both responses.

Venus' association with *species* first occurs at the poem's start with the appearance of Venus, creation and the *species* of Spring (1.10):

nam simul ac species patefactast verna diei.

³ Bailey, 625.

⁴ Cox, 6. M. R. Ojeman, S.S.N.D. (CB 39 [1963] 57) provides numerous related renderings for the phrase *naturae species ratioque*. See further Cox, 6; Lienhard, 348; Minadeo, 11-15; and Clay, 1969: 43. Clay also discusses (33-35, 46f.) the Greek equivalents for the words constituting the phrase.

⁵ In extraordinary cases, such as the destruction of the universe, the *species* (or prospect, since such an occurrence will never become the object of observation or study) can instill fear by its very novelty. Thus does Lucretius speak of *nova res, nova species* (2.1024-25), *species miranda* (1036) and of the reader *novitate exterritus ipsa* (1040). Such a *species* is, nonetheless, the starting point of *vera ratio* (cf. 2.1023-25). For the novelty of a *species miranda* should not deflect the mind from, but rather, tenaciously accompany it as far toward *ratio* as possible (2.1040-43). And where, as in the case of infinity, the *rerum natura* allows no visible *species* to the naked eye, it is, again, the "prospect" which must engage the mind's eye in the quest for *ratio* (2.1044-46).

⁶ For Epicureanism as *vera ratio*, see Thury, 84 n. 19.

A syntactic and verbal parallel found in Prologue Three suggests that Venus is to *species* what Epicurus is to *ratio* (31.13):

nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari.

The grouping *nam simul ac* appears only in these two instances followed first by *species* in reference to Venus and then by *ratio* in reference to Epicurus.

The *De Rerum Natura*'s "marriage" of poetry and philosophy reflects precisely this all embracing comprehension in Lucretius' world-view and is likewise active in the meaning of *naturae species ratioque*. Minadeo has suggested that the phrase is the nexus for the merger of poetry and philosophy in Lucretius: "There is no poetry without philosophy in the work, no philosophy without poetry. There is only *naturae species ratioque*, the philosophy and the poetry, unfolding smoothly toward their promised end."⁷ We may, then, elaborate as follows. *Natura* has two constituent parts, *species* and *ratio*. *Species* is the realm of observable process and appearance governed by Venus. As such, it elicits an emotional response and sense of involvement which we associate with the workings of Venus and of poetry. *Ratio* is the realm of hidden process and reality governed by Epicurus. As such, it requires empirical observation and the sense of detachment which we associate with the philosophy of Epicurus as with all scientific inquiry.

II

The association between Epicurus and *ratio* is apparent from the start where Lucretius credits Epicurus with discovering "through what *ratio* each thing has its power limited" (1.76-77: *finita potestas denique cuique/quanam sit ratione*). The association is particularly apparent in those contexts which describe his intelligence as "risen from a divine mind" (3.14-15: *ratio . . . divina mente coorta*) and which credit him with the discovery of "that intelligence of life which is now called wisdom" (5.9-10: *vitae rationem invenit eam quae/nunc appellatur 'sapientia'*).⁸

⁷ Minadeo, 21. The words "nexus" and "merger" are my own.

⁸ Such references are also significant in Lucretius' conception of Epicurus as a divinity (5.8: *deus ille fuit, deus*; discussed below), though as I argue elsewhere (see above, n. 1), Epicurus' divinity relates him as much to Athena as goddess of wisdom as it does to Venus.

Venus' association with *species* does not have the same contextual reinforcement as does Epicurus' with *ratio*. Nonetheless, this association emerges from the four instances where the phrase *naturae species ratioque* appears in its full context (1.146-48, 2.59-61, 3.91-93, 6.39-41):

hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
discutiant sed naturae species ratioque.⁹

The contexts following these repeated passages (and 1.146-48 in particular) indicate that *species* refers to the regularity of all visible phenomena: nothing arises from nothing or without cause. At 3.94ff., Lucretius is still concerned with causal regularity as he begins his lengthy description on the nature and interrelationship of mind and soul. But there he deals with an invisible phenomenon.

It is important to note in developing the relationship between Venus and *species* that Venus does more than simply induce propagation (1.20):

efficis ut cupide generatim saecula propagent.

Her realm is all nature (1.21-23):

quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas
nec sine te quicquam in dias luminis oras
exoritur neque fit laetum neque amabile quicquam.

We cannot, on this basis, ascribe all causality and regularity to Venus; we cannot make her an emblem of Nature's *species*, as such. We can, however, strongly associate her with it and appreciate the symbolic significance of that association with Lucretius' attitude toward his own poetry. For Venus' companionship will allow him to realize the goddess' life-giving capacities (1.20: *efficis . . . ut propagent*) in terms of his own poetic medium (1.24-26):¹⁰

te sociam studeo scribendis versibus esse
quos ego de rerum natura *pangere* conor
Memmiadae nostro . . .

⁹ The last instance (at 6.39-41) is problematic since only there does the phrase not appear at the end of the prologue (cf. Cox, 6).

¹⁰ The request for Venus' companionship is one aspect of Lucretius' association of the goddess with poetry. C. J. Classen (*TAPA* 99 [1968] 103) notes that ἡδονή (the Greek equivalent for *voluptas*; cf. below, n. 28) early and frequently characterizes the pleasing nature or form of speech while ὀφροδίτη denotes the beauty, grace and charm of style.

Bailey correctly notes of *pangere* that "the root sense should be to 'fix' or 'make fast' and that a metaphor from building is probably intended." He also notes the "fixing" of the stylus in the tablet.¹¹ But the exact meaning of the metaphor (over which Bailey expresses puzzlement) appears connected with the relationship of the verb to *propagant* at 1.20. Ernout-Meillet explain *pango*: "'ficher, enfoncer, planter' . . . verbe à nasale infixée de la racine **pāg-* . . . dont la forme à voyelle longue se trouve dans . . . *prōpāgō*, -*inis* f., 'provin' . . . *prōpāgō*, -*ās*, -*āre* 'reproduire par provignement' et 'propager' . . ."

An important metaphoric sense of *propago*, -*are* appears, then, to derive from viticulture.¹² With Lucretius' object to fix or "implant" (*pangere*) the proper understanding of things in Memmius, the latter's designation as *Memmi clara propago* (1.42) must be taken as more than a "conventional poetic periphrasis."¹³ In a transferred sense, Memmius himself becomes the "vine," which, to continue the analogy, must be wed to *vera ratio*. Successful grafting of the vine is not, however, automatically guaranteed. The initial stages of training with a matured, yet alien, doctrine will require added support or inducement toward a fully shared growth. Such inducement comes in the form of the doctrine's poetic *species*, the alluring "outward appearance" which maintains the "vine's" attachment.¹⁴ Thus, verse 16:

te sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis.

may apply as much to the creatures under Venus as to Lucretius' reader. Both will be *capta lepore* (1.15) as the advent of Venus, equated with the "appearance" of Spring,¹⁵ heralds the poet's creative, and Nature's procreative, impulses.¹⁶ Both are the province of Venus.

¹¹ Bailey, ad loc.

¹² This is not to rule out the more traditional etymology from Greek πηγύναι "to peg," for which see Clay, 1969: 37.

¹³ So Bailey, ad loc.

¹⁴ Clay, 1976: 212, notes that Lucretius' method is "to attract his reader to the surface of his poem and then bring him to look through its surface to the argument that lies beneath." Clay notes, in this connection, the various verbs compounded with *per*: *perpotet* (1.940), *perspicis* (4.25), *pernosces*, *perductus* (1.1114), *pervideas* (1.1117). Such formulations do not suggest an ancillary role for Lucretius' poetry, but rather a role consistent with the aims and expectations of Epicureanism.

¹⁵ Note 1.10: *species . . . verna diei* and 5.737: *it ver et Venus*.

¹⁶ Elder, 111 f., notes that "Lucretius wishes his own poem to be in itself productive. He wishes his readers to 'mate' with it and through this communion to produce the right way to live life. . . . He asks for the same *leporem* (1.28: . . . *aeternum da dictis, diva, leporem*) by which the animals in line 15 were enticed to reproduce (*capta lepore*)." Note also *ibid.*, 110 n. 56: "*Lepos* is not just 'delight' but often something like 'attractive appeal'—the attraction which may lead to sexual union . . ."

III

But as comparison of 1.69-74 and 922-27 reveals, Lucretius' poetic progress also has a counterpart in Epicurus' excursion "beyond the flaming ramparts of the world." We may note that both Epicurus and Lucretius are smitten in mind or in spirit (1.69-70: *sed eo magis acrem/irritat animi virtutem* and 1.922-23: *sed acri percussit thyrso laudis spes magna meum cor*), both experience heightened intellectual or spiritual awareness (1.72: *vivida vis animi* and 1.925: *instinctus mente vigenti*), both wander or range afar (1.74: *peragravit* and 1.926: *peragro*)—Epicurus beyond the *flammanitia moenia mundi* and Lucretius through the *avia Pieridum*.¹⁷

Clay equates the *avia Pieridum* (1.926) with the ἄπειρον of Epicurus, thus explaining how Lucretius "can portray himself as *following* in Epicurus' footsteps and at the same time striking out through a trackless region to the sources of poetic inspiration."¹⁸ Venus still remains the source of Lucretius' poetic inspiration. But Epicurus, as the inspirer of the poet's philosophy, directs the course of that inspiration past the "flaming ramparts of the world" and through infinity itself to its philosophic *telos*. For the poetry remains an idle indulgence but for the philosophic end it serves; and the philosophy, a mannequin, but for the poetic impulses that give it life, or, in the poet's own idiom, a cup of bitter medicine without the honeyed rim. "As Epicurus was a creator of ideas, Lucretius is a creator of poetry. The two, working together, *recreate* mankind . . . (thus performing) a task like Venus' of fertilization."¹⁹

IV

The partnership of Venus and Epicurus in the poet's enterprise is but one aspect of their complementarity in Nature at large. For Venus induces the observable processes of *natura* which culminate in the things of Nature. But Epicurus explains the nature of things, the inward workings and physical operations which underlie all things,

¹⁷ Note the further correspondences at 1.70 *effringere ut arta* and 930-31: *artis/ . . . exsolvere*; 931: *religionum* and 63: *religione*. I discuss 1.922-25 below (p. 173) in a different context.

¹⁸ Clay, 1976: 209.

¹⁹ Elder, 95, n. 12, with reference to 1.942: *recreata* and 6.3: *recreaverunt*.

earth included. In the Epicurean vision, the massive sensuous earth of Venus' domain becomes a crystalline abstract, a transparency of atoms and void, dots and spaces (3.25-30):²⁰

At contra nusquam apparent Acherusia templa
nec tellus obstat quin omnia dispiciantur,
sub pedibus quaecumque infra per inane geruntur.
His ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas
percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi
tam manifesta patens ex omni parte resecta est.

The knowledge which Epicurus has imparted allows Lucretius to see down beneath the earth and to proclaim the non-existence of Hades. Lucretius here appears to make his own philosophic vision the counterpart of Epicurus' excursion in the opposite direction, *extra . . . flammantia moenia mundi*.²¹ As Epicurus brought back a knowledge of what is above, so will Lucretius acquire a knowledge of what is below.²² Lucretius' is not so much a repetition of his master's "trip" as it is an extension.²³ Their visions are complementary, coextensive. Lucretius yet further emerges here as a link in the relationship between Venus and Epicurus. We will first examine the nature of Lucretius' Epicurean revelation and then suggest that the effect of that revelation on the poet is analogous to Venus' effect on Nature. Within the framework of that analogy, Epicurus will be seen to "replace" Venus.

As Lucretius looks down, the earth's surface does not appear as the vision-obstructing solid of everyday perception. He views that surface, himself in a state of transport, with the finer eye of mystic revelation, and sees it for what it really is, a compound like anything else, consisting of atoms and void. He does not tell us what things *infra per*

²⁰ Clay, 1969: 43, offers a similar formulation: "Yet *natura* as it is revealed by *ratio* lies furthest from the sensuous world of the proem and its evocation of Spring in the poet's invocation of Venus. Sunk deep below the *species verna diei* and the *suavis daedala tellus* of the proem is a world barren of the sensuous qualities of this; a world deprived of all sound, smell, taste and color."

²¹ For Epicurus' excursion *extra . . . flammantia moenia mundi*, see 1.72-79. That Lucretius has this passage in mind is especially apparent from 3.14-23 which immediately precedes his vision of the below.

²² So Ernout-Robin, vol. II, p. 7: "Au dessus de nos têtes, Epicure nous fait voir des dieux qui ne s'occupent pas des choses de notre monde; sous nos pieds, il nous fait voir qu'il n'y a pas d'enfers: deux sources de nos terreurs sont ainsi définitivement tarées."

²³ The Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria reports on Epicurus' "trip" in Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* 14.27, 8 (see H. K. Usener, *Epicurea* [Leipzig 1887] 243, 21 ff.). For discussion, see V. Buchheit (*Hermes* 99 [1971] 307f.) and Clay, 1976: 225 n. 17.

inane geruntur (28). But his vision might appear to reveal the following. He can distinguish the two constituents of the compound earth: its atoms moving through the void between. Such a vision penetrates to the center of the earth, continues through, and breaks forth beyond the compound's furthest reach (the earth's opposite side) into the larger void.²⁴ In the larger void he would discern the infinite and endlessly falling atoms forming new atomic shapes as the atoms collide, and bringing about the dissolution of shapes already formed—earth included²⁵—as they (the atoms) bombard them. Lucretius, then, in his own way, penetrates the *flammanitia moenia mundi*. Through a journey with clear parallels in effect and value with the journey of his master, Lucretius glimpses infinity from every side.²⁶

The immediacy of the poet's presence and participation in this vision is conveyed through the juxtaposition of adverb and pronoun: 28: *ibi me*—an immediacy heightened by the syntactic enclosure of the poet (*me*) and his position (*ibi*) by the very workings (*his ibi me rebus*) of whose secret goings-on he is witness,²⁷ if not participant; for he is an atomic compound as well. The sight, realization, and sense of participation in all of this seize him with a "certain divine pleasure and horror."²⁸ The indefinite *quaedam* conveys a sense of the ineffably

²⁴ This is the result of *nec tellus obstat* (26) to which Ernout-Robin, vol. II, p. 7, apply a telling phrase from 2.1046: "*nec tellus obstat*: parce qu'il s'agit de la vision de l'esprit *quo prospicere usque velit mens*." For the context, also apocalyptic, of 2.1046 see above, n. 5.

²⁵ See 2.1048—fin with Clay, 1976: 214–16, and n. 5, above.

²⁶ J. B. Logre, *L'Anxiété de Lucrèce* (Paris 1946) 113 sees in this "vision pathétique, un certain vertige d'infini: l'abîme s'ouvre devant Lucrèce et autour de lui, en haut, en bas, de toutes parts . . . il ne voit qu'infini par toutes les fenêtres."

²⁷ The ambiguity of the phrase (appropriate to the mystic context) allows for several possibilities, the most compelling of which I believe to be "here in the midst of these things" or "here in response to these things." Kenney, 28, translates *his . . . rebus* "because of these things" and *ibi* "then" (when I listen to the voice of *ratio*). He thus suggests an aural response on Lucretius' part where a visual response seems more appropriate.

²⁸ Cf. Bailey, 992, on *divina voluptas percipit atque horror* as a "peculiarly Roman expression for the religious emotion, in which *horror*, the religious awe . . . was a strong element." Cox, 8, explains the phrase as "the physical thrill of truly mystic vision." The positioning of *atque horror* is significant. It follows the singular verb *percipit* of which it and *divina voluptas* are both subjects. It thus appears as something of a semantic afterthought and surprises the reader with its unexpectedness. Moreover, the semantics of *atque* in Latin suggest that *horror* appears somehow to qualify *divina voluptas*. A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine* (Paris 1939), note the adversative or oppositional sense of *atque*: "Sens ancien 'et d'autre part' . . . de là 'et qui plus est,' dans une gradation . . . ou 'et pourtant.'"

acute pleasure he experiences. It is a vision of exquisite torment; at once his mind's disruption and delight. A response embracing polarities, it could be no better suited to a view of the infinite where the polarities of every day perception negate and become one another. The *ataraxia* which lies at the heart of such revelation is itself heightened by the polarities of power, assault and rapture which attend it. Such calm as this does not simply accompany the withdrawal to a life of meditation. It is removed from the complacent acquiescence to philosophic precepts. It is that calm which, following apocalypse, has an intensity all its own. It is offspring of the *divina voluptas atque horror* which the mystic union of poetic and philosophic vision can alone induce, which no mere poem on the nature of things, but the very poetry of things themselves,²⁹ can alone convey.

V

We may note the following similarities of response in Nature's reaction to the epiphany of Venus and Lucretius' reaction to the revelation of Epicurus' teaching. Nature's response to Venus in Prologue One is largely predicated on her designation as *voluptas*.³⁰ In Prologue Three, it is a certain *divina voluptas* together with *horror* which seizes the poet in response to Epicurus' powers in revealing Nature (3.29: *percipit . . . quod sic natura tua vi*). Language implying force is also apparent where Venus strikes *blandum amorem* into all creatures (1.19: *omnibus incutiens blandum per pectora amorem*), a description, in turn, noteworthy for the similar language Lucretius uses in describing his own call to poetry (1.923-25: *percussit . . . / et simul incussit suavem mi in pectus amorem*). For, as noted, Venus is the force behind the creative as well as the procreative impulse.

The powers which Venus exerts over Nature and which Epicurus lends to the poet's perceptions converge thematically in the concept of

²⁹ The idea is adapted from Santayana, 38.

³⁰ For various aspects of the association between Venus and *voluptas*, see Elder, 102-04, 114-17, 119-20; Thury, 146-51; and B. Farrington (*Hermathena* 80 [1952] 26-31). See also G. Barra, in *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia della Università di Napoli* 3 (1953) 5-19 and E. Bignone, in *Storia della Letteratura Latina*, Vol. II (Florence 1945) 427-43. For the transference of *voluptas* to Calliope (6.94), see Clay, 1976: 220f. and Thury, 151-53. F. Giancotti, *Il Preludio di Lucrezio* (Messina-Firenze 1959) surveys the treatments which the opening invocation has undergone. A review and subsequent discussion by P. Boyancé (*REA* 62 [1960] 444 f. and *REA* 64 [1962] 407 f.) focus, *inter alia*, on Venus and *voluptas*. For a précis of Giancotti and others, see Lienhard, 347-49.

vis as well as in that of *voluptas*: note *perculsae corda tua vi* (1.13) and *quod sic natura tua vi* (3.29). The phrase *tua vi* occurs only in these two contexts and similarly at line ending. And in each case there is an accompanying notion of disclosure, release (1.10: *patefactast*, 1.11: *reserata*) or revelation (3.30: *tam manifesta patens ex omni parte resecta est*).

The verbal link *tua vi*, so intimately connecting the powers which Venus and Epicurus respectively command, is but one of many devices through which Epicurus "replaces" Venus in the scheme of Prologue Three. Epicurus is praised as the first to lift (3.1: *extollere*) life from darkness to light by revealing the *commoda vitae*, those things pertinent to a good and blessed life. Lucretius says he will follow in whatever footsteps Epicurus has left behind (3.3-4):

*te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis.*

This language recalls that of the animals in Prologue One, following wherever Venus may lead (1.16):

te sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis.

The pervasive use of pronouns is noteworthy in both contexts (3.9-10 and 1.6-9):

*tu, pater, es rerum inventor, tu patria nobis
suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis*

*te, dea, te fugiunt venti, te nubila caeli
adventumque tuum, tibi suavis daedala tellus
summittit flores, tibi rident aequora ponti
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum.*³¹

In 3.9-10, the repeated pronouns are not only characteristic of the hymnic style,³² but provide, as it were, a syntactic framework for the "substitution" of Venus by Epicurus and the deification which attends such replacement. For if Epicurus is in some way to take Venus' place, he must do so himself as a divinity. And the hymnic form, ill-intended for the praises of a mortal, must have a deity as its subject, or as in the case of Epicurus, someone on his way to becoming one. So it is that

³¹ We may further note that both 1.7 and 3.10 are followed by mention of flowers (1.8: *summittit flores*, 3.11: *floriferis ut apes in saltibus*).

³² See Kenney, 75f. On the hymnic precedents for the structure of 1.1-30, see Lienhard, 349f.

Epicurus is first designated simply as a Greek man (1.66: *Graius homo*); then as "ornament" of the Greek nation and as father (3.3: *o Graiae gentis decus*; 3.9: *tu pater*), and is, at last, overtly apotheosized (5.8: *deus ille fuit, deus*).³³

We may also note that 3.9-10 share the use of the pronoun with another passage in the opening invocation, 1.38-40:

hunc *tu*, *diva*, *tuo* recubantem corpore sancto
circumfusa super *suavis* ex ore loquellas
funde petens placidam, Romanis, *incluta*, pacem.

1.38-40, in turn, parallel 3.9-10 in their designation, at identical line position, of Epicurus as "famed": compare *incluta*, *pacem* (1.40) and *inclute*, *chartis* (3.10). Aside from 5.8:

dicendum est, *deus ille fuit, deus, inclute*, Memmi.

where *inclute* is used of Memmius (but in the passage apotheosizing Epicurus), there are no other uses of the word at any line position.³⁴

Other parallels are equally significant. When, as a result of Epicurus' teachings, the terrors of the mind disperse (3.16: *diffugiunt animi terrores*) and Lucretius can see beyond the *moenia mundi* through to the quiet abodes of the gods, he sees abodes undisturbed by winds, clouds and other forms of inclement weather (3.19-20):

apparent *divum numen sedesque quietae*
quas neque concutiunt *venti* nec *nubila* nimbis.

While such descriptions are traditional for heavenly abodes of the gods (e.g. *Od.* 6.43-45), in the present context they evoke associations again with 1.6-9 (supra):

te *dea*, te *fugiunt venti* te *nubila* caeli.

Here winds and clouds disperse at Venus' arrival. It is she who brings the heavenly condition to earth: Spring. Likewise, it is the perception of just so perfect a condition (the abodes of the gods) which Epicurus'

³³ See above, n.1.

³⁴ A further parallel between Venus and Epicurus (discussed at greater length elsewhere; see above, n. 1) emerges from the similar language used of the former's petition to Mars and of the latter's pronouncements to mankind (1.39-40 and 6.6):

suavis ex ore loquellas
funde petens
omnia veridico qui quondam *ex ore profudit*.

teaching allows Lucretius. Such abodes are untouched by snow or frost "and a cloudless aether always covers them which smiles with bounteously outpoured light" (3.21-22):

semperque innubilis aether
integit, et large *diffuso lumine ridet*.

So in the description of the perfect condition on earth, it is the ocean plains that smile (1.8):

tibi *ridet* aequora ponti . . .

and the sky which shines with outpoured light (1.9):

. . . nitet *diffuso lumine caelum*

The connection is here underscored by Lucretius' awareness of the inherited association in Greek between "smiling" and "shining" (1.8: *ridet*, 1.9: *nitet*, 3.22: *ridet*). For the primary metaphorical meaning of γελάω "to laugh" is "to shine with reflected light."³⁵ The abodes of the gods, as described in 3.16-21, are, in a word, "placid," which is precisely the sky's condition at 1.9:

placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum.

Conclusion

In the process of Epicurus' deification and his "replacement" of Venus, his powers, in their own way, become all but equal to those of Venus. Venus' powers, in fact, become explicable in terms of his own: "Epicurus conquered by means of his life-giving intelligence (1.72: *vivida vis animi*): he made it possible for men to understand the allegorical aspect of Venus and to participate in divinity, at least insofar as divinity signifies utter tranquillity in the face of Nature's variations."³⁶ But the understanding he provides of Venus' allegorical aspect in no way compromises or invalidates what that aspect is meant to signify, namely the high emotion and thrill to the quick which the awakened observer experiences at the sight (*species*) of Nature. This Epicurus

³⁵ Cf. M. L. West, *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 170f. and P. H. Schrijvers, *Lucrèce, Horror Ac Divina Voluptas* (Amsterdam 1970) 272.

³⁶ W. S. Anderson (*TAPA* 91 [1960] 17). Epicurus' superiority to Venus has been recently argued by Thury, 157 and 173.

could never represent or "replace."³⁷ His is the realm of Nature's reason and rationale (*ratio*). The way in which Venus and Epicurus thus both complement and complete each other constitutes an aspect in the meaning of *naturae species ratioque*. The two of them are the *sine qua non* of that full comprehension of Nature which embraces detached empirical observation and involved emotional response. And it is precisely this all-embracing comprehension which the "marriage" of Lucretius' poetry and science reflects.

JEFFREY M. DUBAN

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

³⁷ Lucretius does, by his own account, experience *divina voluptas . . . atque horror* as the result of Epicurus' teaching. But this is a special case, one of mystic revelation. Lucretius can actually see the atoms working, and that sight is one of high emotion and thrill. While others may come to understand how atoms work, they will not see or participate in that process. Their response will thus be more intellectual, less emotional.

HORACE, ODE 3.19¹

Quantum distet ab Inacho
Codrus pro patria non timidus mori
narras et genus Aeaci
et pugnata sacro bella sub Ilio:
quo Chium pretio cadum 5
mercemur, quis aquam temperet ignibus,
quo praebente domum et quota
Paelignis caream frigoribus, taces.
da lunae propere nouae,
da noctis mediae, da, puer, auguris 10
Murenæ: tribus aut nouem
miscentur cyathis pocula commodis;
qui Musas amat imparis,
ternos ter cyathos attonitus petet
uates: tris prohibet supra 15
rixarum metuens tangere Gratia
nudis iuncta sororibus.
insanire iuuat: cur Berecynthiae
cessant flamina tibiae?
cur pendet tacita fistula cum lyra? 20
parcentis ego dexteras
odi: sparge rosas. audiat inuidus
dementem strepitum Lycus
et uicina seni non habilis Lyco.
spissa te nitidum coma, 25
puro te similem, Telephe, Vespere
tempestiua petit Rhode:
me lentus Glyceræ torret amor meae.

¹ The most enlightening study of this ode is by Gordon Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968; hereafter *Trad.*) 115–18, substantially

It is mid-winter, probably late afternoon, and chilly.² An antiquarian has been boring his friends with talk about remote matters: how many years between the first king of Argos and the last king of Athens (with the pedantic if patriotic gloss *pro patria non timidus mori*, 2). Then, as if that had not been enough, the fellow, for good will, had thrown in a bit on the not simple lineage of the House of Aeacus. The House apparently suggested to him his next theme: the wars—notice the comfortably wide-ranging plural—at holy Troy.

Finally Horace, the speaker throughout the poem,³ breaks in. He is cold, and tired of antiquity.⁴ He can stand this talk no longer, and bursts in to rebuke the antiquarian for the esoteric stuff he has been wasting their time with (1-4), when they were better busy with the pressing questions of the moment (5-8): how much will Chian cost (Chian was expensive), who will tend the fire for heating water for the wine, who will lend us his house, do you all know how late it is (*quota*, 7) and whenever shall we get out of this cold? On these practical subjects not a word from you! *Narras* (3) now becomes a muzzled *taces* (8).⁵

Scene and time shift,⁶ and we are now well into a symposium. Three toasts: to the new moon, to midnight, and to Murena upon his

repeated in his *The Third Book of Horace's Odes* (Oxford 1969; hereafter *Odes*) 108-12. Useful is the often neglected commentary of Wilhelm Dillenburg, *Q. Horatii Flacci Opera Omnia*⁷ (Bonn 1881; hereafter Dillenburg) and of course those of Page and Wickham. On the views of Kiessling-Heinze⁸ (Berlin 1955; hereafter Heinze) on the setting of this ode, see n. 6. The punctuation in the text given above is that of Williams, *Odes* 108-9. Notice that the strophes are full-stopped save for the fourth where the rising excitement dictates the enjambment of line 16.

² Dillenburg 211 compares the opening of C. 1.9.

³ So it is generally assumed, rightly, I believe; many details in Horace's odes, as we know, are left up to the reader to supply for himself. In the case of this ode perhaps more demands are made upon the reader than usual: "severe demands" (Williams, *Trad.* 115, and esp. 171-249). Thus we are not told who is speaking to whom, nor the party's location, nor who is providing the house, nor whether there has been or will be a dinner party (*pace* Pph. *ad* 1.7 "ad epulandum"; Bentley *ad* 1.7 "Quota hora ad cenam ueniam?"; Page 361 "a feast"; Wickham 191 "where and when we are to sup"; and Heinze 336 "Das Essen ist vorbei."

⁴ "Tum Horatius internis et externis frigoribus cruciatus, ---" Dillenburg 211.

⁵ "*narras*: colloquial, almost slangy,"—appropriate to the general mood (Shorey-Laing 377).

⁶ Williams, *Trad.* 118 assumes "a considerable gap in time between lines 8 and 9 (there is a gap also before iii.8.13)" and "By line 18 a later stage of the party has arrived."

appointment as an augur.⁷ Probably, as Williams suggests (*Odes* 110), "the party is being held on 31 December and the time is midnight" and doubtless the party pleasantly edged its way into 1 January when Murena would technically enter on his new office. But as for Murena's elevation, it is only, in the end, a proper excuse for Horace's real interest, the revel and its sequels. The poem hurries on and in dithyrambic mood Horace himself assumes the rôle of *magister bibendi* and promptly lays down the ground rules for the drinking. There shall be goblets (*pocula*) of three measures (*cyathi*) of wine for the temperate who follow the three Graces, and nine of wine for those, amongst whom Horace as *attonitus uates* is adroitly included, who love the

So in his *Odes* 110. But J. F. G. Gornall, "Horace, *Odes* III.19. Does it contain 'a gap in time'?" *GR* 18 (1971) 189 prefers to follow Heinze's interpretation of lines 7-8 "which places the setting of the *whole* of the ode at the *convivium* itself and so does away with the 'considerable gap in time' and 'the imaginative transition.' Heinze takes *domum* as referring to the place where the guests are to sleep *after* the *convivium* is over, and *quota* as referring to the time when the party is to *break up*."

Heinze 336 assumes "Bei Murena --- findet ein Gastmahl auf gemeinsame Kosten statt. Das Essen is vorbei: ---." Then, says Heinze, Horace stops the antiquarian and begins the drinking. There is, however, nothing in the text to support Heinze's assumptions, though indeed a reader, e.g. Williams, must make assumptions about this poem. Yet it is noteworthy that Heinze has no comment at all on *quo praebente domum*: odd, if he can say in his interpretation "Bei Murena," and ad 11.5ff. can assume that the speaker says: "weisst du auch, wie spät es schon ist? höchste Zeit, dass wir des Wirtes gedenken, dessen warmes Haus uns vor der barbarischen Kälte schützt." Anent Murena and *praebente domum* (7), cf. Hor., *Sat.* 1.5.38: *Murena praebente domum*. Was Hor. in *C.* 3.19.7 consciously or unconsciously recalling himself, and even more of a guess, was Heinze somehow recalling the passage in the *Satires*, where he does not refer to the passage in our poem? Gornall 190, unlike myself, prefers Heinze's interpretation because, first, thus "the ode makes better sense and has more point and unity, if it is taken as describing one occasion and not two" and, second, there is no time gap in Horace's other "drinking-party odes." As to the first, Williams' interpretation does not call for two occasions but for two time gaps on the one occasion. Unity and point are thereby achieved. As for Gornall's second criticism, Williams had noted the gap in *C.* 3.8, to which might be added the shifts in *C.* 1.5 or 1.9. I doubt that Hor. reined in his inventive powers by consulting his more usual practices.

⁷ Heinze 337: "der Toast gilt dem neuen Monat, dem neuen Tag, und dem Augur Murena: also wohl der neuen Würde, die Murena am ersten Tage des neuen Monats übernimmt." I have no desire, nor competence, to enter the thicket of the Murenæ (*Sat.* 1.5.38; *C.* 2.10.1; 3.19.11); on their identities see K. M. T. Atkinson, *Historia* 9 (1960) 469ff. (cited by Williams).

unevenly numbered Muses,⁸ both drinks to be mixed with the set amount of water.⁹

The party again moves on, this time to: "why no music?" implying that girls (as players) should now be present. Sprinkle roses, orders the poet.¹⁰ Yes, I know they're expensive at this time of year, but I hate stinginess (21-22). The music, presumably equipped with appropriate girls, has arrived, and now the mad noise increases (*dementem strepitum*, 23). Ah, the neighbors! Very well. Let old Lycus hear it, that jealous Lycus, and that young girl not at all suitable for him (*non habilis*, 24).¹¹

Suddenly comes the poem's close, in quiet contrast with what had gone before: handsome Telephus and the "seasonable" Rhode (Page), and at last Horace's own *lentus amor* (28).

* * *

An Horatian achievement: the langorous opening strophe, the swift, dramatic progression of the symposium, and, to match the mood of the first strophe, the gentle final strophe with its theme of love, love ready for Telephus, and love slow and maybe unrequited for Horace.

All is Greek, save for the Paeligni and Murena: the venerable form and the whole mise-en-scène which Horace's fancy and imagina-

⁸ Lucky uneven numbers are prominent: three toasts, three or nine (3 times 3) *cyathi* and again 3 times 3 (*ternos ter cyathos*), the three Graces and the nine Muses (*Musas imparis*; cf. Virg., *Ecl.* 8.73-75: *numero deus impare gaudet*). Magical numbers! An augur's province was divination of the god's will; divination belongs "to the region of magic" (Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience* [Macmillan 1911] 293). Murena is, or is to be, an augur. Hor. is a *uates* (prophet/poet) and as both he is *attonitus* (struck/inspired).

⁹ Three *cyathi* of wine to nine of water, or vice versa, seems to be what Hor. meant. The matter does not call for all the fuss made over it, though for several unwittingly amusing judgments, see Page 362-63.

¹⁰ Which no doubt Rhode will enjoy.

¹¹ Time in this ode is a pervasive, if subtle, motif. The poem's shifts in time have already been observed. But there is more: the poem opens with topics from the past, moves with alacrity to the present (the drinking party), and closes with a hint of the future. Lycus is old; his girl, and Telephus, and *tempestiua* Rhode are youthful; Hor. seems somehow older.

tion have created.¹² Yet all the same Horace has personally stamped it with his own indelible hallmark, the subtle note of the ultimate worth of wine as a symbol of inner contentment, of poetic inspiration, and of love—with which of course a good symposium should end.

How has Horace managed his effects of contrast and dramatic emphasis? To a large degree through his staccato volley of questions, through his positioning of single key words, and through his carefully selected verbal repetitions. Now, to these three matters.

In the first strophe, the first word *Quantum* introducing the indirect question foreshadows, as we shall see, the insistent questions of the second strophe. And the easy juxtaposition of *Inacho* / *Codrus* slightly mocks the difficult reckoning of the years between the two kings. The poet can hold himself in no longer. Out erupt the really important questions: *quo* --- *pretio* (5), *quis* (6), *quo* --- *praebente* (7), and *quota* (7). Now, student of the distant past, what of these immediate concerns? No answer!

We now find ourselves—time has moved on—at the three toasts. The imperious *da* --- *da* --- *da*, twice first in the line (9 and 10) ring out convivially. Murena, *honoris causa*, stands first in his verse (11). But the proportion of wine to water seems to be more on Horace's mind than the new augur, for that business occupies six lines (11-16) with the explicit injunction that the two kinds of drinks, the stronger and the weaker, be appropriately assigned (*commodis*, 12, occupies the critical last place in the line).

The excitement rises. Under Bacchus' inspirational spell (cf. C. 2.19) the poet will become *attonitus* (Μουσοπάτακτος, Heinze) and vinal quarrels are now to be feared (*inmodicae mero* / *rixae*, C. 1.13.10-11).

The fifth strophe proclaims to the party the capital rule: *insanire iuuat*, first in its line (18). Bacchic revelries call for music, and the right kind of music, too. So, the demanding *cur* --- *cur* (18 and 20). And from the next strophe we see (or hear) that the genial rule has been obeyed: *dementem strepitum* (23) which they hope old Lycus and his young girl will hear. The repetition of *Lycus* --- *Lycu* (each the last word in lines 23-24) will be picked up at once in the final strophe by *te* --- *te* --- *Telephe* (25-26).¹³

This final strophe is in striking contrast with the preceding ones. It is, in Horatian fashion, a descriptive and reflective summation, a quiet finale with its accent on love. Young Telephus "bright with

¹² See Williams, *Odes* 112.

¹³ Noted by Dillenburger 213 (cited by Wickham).

clustering locks --- beautiful as the pure star of the evening" (Page) counterbalances old Lycus.¹⁴ And so, while Lycus' girl was *seni non habilis* (24), the *tempestiua* Rhode is ready for Telephus.

The last strophe contrasts as much with what went before it as the first strophe does with what follows it. Both, we now see, are in fact the enclosing panels which frame the Bacchic celebration.

This final strophe, to go back to it for a closer look, is, at least for the peaceful moment of the first two lines, a set and fixed tableau, a static scene given up to a picture of the lad. But the next line, the third, tells us that active love lies straight ahead for Telephus. As for Horace, only in the last line does he speak of his own love, a line bounded by the Horatian *me* at a poem's close, and by *meae*. Thus, even within this valedictory strophe, we find a gently expressed contrast: the young and handsome Telephus with "seasonable" Rhode, and the older Horace with his deeply persistent but maybe now unreturned love for Glycera: *lentus amor*. Whether Horace writes this last line in complete earnest—I leave aside who Glycera might be if indeed she be anyone¹⁵—or whether he writes it with a twist of melancholy or even with a note of wry self-mockery is unimportant. He may have been feeling all these emotions and all at the same time. But then, this is not autobiography but poetry.

PETER ELDER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

¹⁴ Most editors, following Ps. Acr. and Pph., have, usually with reluctance, taken the person addressed in lines 1–4 to be the Telephus of line 26. If this equation is made, then as Williams (*Trad.* 116) remarks, the indignation "in the brusque series of questions has disappeared" by line 25. Williams adds, frankly, that "The absence of anyone else compels us to believe that Telephus is addressed." It may be that Williams was content to go along with the usual equation in order thus to bolster here the generally sound thesis of ring-composition: so "the poem comes round in full circle to pick up the opening theme" (Williams, *Trad.* 118). But, let us assume that Hor.'s indignation was an amiable one, such as an older man might show toward a youth. Then, perhaps, we have an explanation of Telephus as the addressee in lines 1–4. This addressee had been chattering away about epic themes, such as the lineage of the House of Aeacus (Zeus, Aeacus, Peleus, Achilles ---). In *Epod.* 17.8: *mouit nepotem Telephus Nereium* (i.e. Achilles, son of Thetis who was a daughter of Nereus, spared Telephus). In *AP* 95–97: *et tragicus* --- / *Telephus et Peleus* --- / *proicit ampullas et sesquipedalia uerba* and the pair, Telephus and Peleus, recur in *AP* 104. Was Hor. playing with the addressee's name and his interest in the heroic? Yet Hor., against his three references to the mythical Telephus, twice uses the name Telephus for an idealized young and handsome lover (*C.* 1.13.1–2; 4.11.21). Hor., in short, may be combining in *C.* 3.19 both roles for his Telephus, the heroic warrior and the perfect lover.

¹⁵ See Kenneth Reckford, "Some Studies in Horace's Odes on Love," *CJ* 59 (1957) 25–33.

THE LATIN INVITATION-POEM: WHAT IS IT? WHERE DID IT COME FROM?

I

Several Latin poems are discussed as invitation-poems or in relation to "the" invitation-poem, which is believed to be a type of Hellenistic epigram. Some of these poems raise questions about their relation to the supposed type. For example, is Hor. C. 1.20 a representative of the type? Is Juv. 11? Cat. 13 is obviously an invitation-poem and, to most readers, a parody, but what is the point of the *unguentum*?

These and similar questions could be more easily answered if one had a definition of the Latin invitation-poem.¹ For reasons soon to be given, one cannot very well begin with a definition of the Hellenistic type. To define the Latin invitation-poem is obviously to extrapolate a type from a number of Latin examples, but it seems that one can neither select the examples without having defined the type nor define the type without having selected the examples. The only hope is that the potential examples will sort themselves out by presenting us with a group of poems each of which bears clear affinities to the others and all of which, individually and as a group, are clearly distinguishable from the other potential examples. There is such a group: Cat. 13, Hor. *Epist.* 1.5, Mart. 5.78, 10.48, 11.52.

The structure of the invitation-poem, as extrapolated from this group of poems, is tripartite: (A) invitation proper, (B) menu, (C) entertainment. The invitation proper gives the day and/or the time, the

¹ One might have expected a definition of the invitation-poem in Francis Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Latin Poetry* (Edinburgh 1972). He discusses AP 11.44, Hor. C. 1.20 and *Epist.* 1.5 as examples of poems addressed by inferiors to superiors and Cat. 13 and Hor. C. 4.12 as examples of poems addressed by equals to equals (240-45) but he assumes that the genre is already established as "the specialized minor type of kletikon usually known as the *vocatio ad cenam*," citing Nisbet's and Hubbard's commentary on Hor. C. 1.20 (see n. 8 below) and G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford, 1968) 9f. 103 ff. The best description of the invitation-poem I have seen is by E. Courtney, *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal* (London 1980) 490-91.

name(s), in the vocative, of the guest(s), and a qualification in the form of a *si*-clause (lacking only in Mart. 10.48). The "future of invitation" is a regular feature (in Mart. 10.48 the future tense appears not in A but in B). The menu states either what will be served, or what will not be served, or both (Mart. 11.52). Wine or drinking comes in as part of the menu (except Mart. 11.52). The entertainment is various, but whatever it may be, civility is typically the host's theme. The three parts of the invitation-poem appear thus in the group of poems under consideration:

	Cat. 13	Hor. <i>Epist.</i> 1.5	Mart. 5.78	10.48	11.52
A. Invitation proper	1-2	1-3	1-2	1-6	1-4
B. Menu	3-8	2, 4-6	3-21	7-20	5-15
C. Entertainment	9-14	7-31	22-32	21-24	16-18

The criteria that distinguish this group of poems from other potential examples are: (1) the tripartite structure; (2) the invitation not simply to drinking but to a *cena*; (3) the consequent mention of food; (4) specificity with respect to date and/or time.

Judged by these criteria, Hor. C. 1.20 is not an invitation-poem, nor are C. 3.29 or C. 4.12, though all of these contain invitational motifs which are shared, not surprisingly, by the invitational and the sympotic genres. Juv. 11 is addressed to a friend who has already accepted an invitation to dinner (60), and by this fact alone cannot be considered an invitation, although, like the odes just mentioned, it has themes and motifs in common with the invitation-poem.²

What of Cat. 13? Can the typological approach to the invitation-poem help to clarify the point of the *unguentum* (11), over which a minor controversy has arisen?³ The unguent offered by Catullus falls into part C of the invitation-poem as here defined. The unguent ought, then, to be the entertainment, which is, I believe, what it is. I agree with Vessey that the unguent stands for Lesbia's beauty.⁴ Other hosts may promise good company and good conversation, but

² On the relation of Juv. 11 to the invitation-poem, see Joachim Adamietz, *Untersuchungen zu Juvenal* (Hermes Einzelschriften 26 [Wiesbaden 1972]) 130-35.

³ R. J. Littman, "The Unguent of Venus: Catullus 13," *Latomus* 36 (1977) 123-28; J. P. Hallett, "Divine Uncction: Some Further Thoughts on Catullus 13," *Latomus* 37 (1978) 747-48. C. Witke, "Catullus 13: A Reexamination," *CP* 75 (1980) 325-31 challenges Littman's and Hallett's interpretation of the unguent.

⁴ D.W.T.C. Vessey, "Thoughts on Two Poems of Catullus: 13 and 30," *Latomus* 30 (1971) 45-55 at 45-48.

Catullus offers Fabullus the privilege of dining in the presence of Lesbia.⁵ The parody of the invitation-poem thus becomes, finally, praise of Lesbia. At the same time, the promise of unguent continues the parody by reversing the usual expectations of an invitation.⁶ Since the host typically adopts the attitude of "smart poverty"—an attitude that Catullus carries to an extreme—unguent, which was expensive, comes as a surprise. Only in the following line (12), where this unguent turns out to be Lesbia's, not Catullus', and metaphorical, not real, does it make sense, and the decorum of the invitation, rather, of the parodied invitation, is restored. Again, unguent is a properly sympotic theme, and is absent from the other four invitation-poems here discussed, most notably from the long sympotic passage in Hor. *Epist.* 1.5, whereas unguent always goes with drinking in the odes.⁷

II

Where did the invitation-poem come from? "The invitation-poem was in fact a minor category of Hellenistic epigram, and we are lucky to have one of the prototypes. . . . This is a poem by Philodemus. . . ." ⁸ The poem by Philodemus (*AP* 11.44) is, however, the *only* Hellenistic epigram we have which could have served as a model for the tripartite form of the Latin invitation-poem, and this fact deserves closer attention. The corpus of Hellenistic epigrams provides examples not of the form but of several of the motifs of the Latin invitation-poem. These motifs are modesty or "smart poverty,"⁹ the inappropriateness of dancers as entertainment;¹⁰ the subject of poetry-recitations;¹¹ the menu.¹² The last of these motifs, so distinctive in

⁵ The traditionalist, by the way, frowned upon the presence of women at the *cena*: Cic. *Cat.* 2.5.10, *ad fam.* 9.26.2. Of the five invitation-poems discussed in this article, two, *Cat.* 13 and *Mart.* 3.78, are invitations to a dinner for two couples. For what I believe is the correct interpretation of the last two lines of *Mart.* 5.78, see J. B. Greenough, "*Mart.* V.78, vv. 31, 32," *HSCP* 1 (1890) 191-92.

⁶ On these reversals, see J. J. Helm, "Poetic Structure and Humor: Catullus 13," *CW* 74 (1980-81) 213-17.

⁷ Hor. *C.* 2.3.13, 7.6-8 and 21-23, 11.13-17, 3.1.43-44, 29.1-5, 4.12.17; *Epod.* 13.8-9.

⁸ R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes: Book 1* (Oxford 1970) 244.

⁹ Lucilius *AP* 11.10.1: δειννάριον; Nicaenetus 2703 ff. G-P; cf. already Alc. frag. 71 L-P.

¹⁰ Lucilius *AP* 11.11.

¹¹ Lucilius *AP* 11.10, 137, 140, 394.

¹² Rhianus 3246 ff. G-P.

Martial, is problematical as regards its relation to Hellenistic epigram. There was the "shopping list,"¹³ which undoubtedly derives from comedy;¹⁴ but these lists do not read like the menus of the Latin invitation-poems. These menus bear a closer affinity to the simple Roman country dinner¹⁵ and seem to be at a second remove from Hellenistic poetry.

The same point can be made concerning all the epigrammatic themes that turn up in the group of Latin invitation-poems under discussion. These themes, which have come from epigrams that are strictly sympotic or have some application quite unrelated to an invitation, have been adjusted to an entirely new purpose. It is very doubtful, then, that the Latin invitation-poem is a species of Hellenistic sympotic literature. Hor. *Epist.* 1.5. is the most sympotic of the invitation-poems but the sympotic theme in lines 14-20 is clearly only one of the elements of the invitation.

But what of the invitation-poem by Philodemus, the supposed "prototype"? Before it is discussed, two more Roman invitations must be put in evidence. One can be inferred from Pliny *Ep.* 1.15, addressed to a friend who has broken a dinner engagement. The structure of this letter's first two sections is exactly the same as that of the invitation-poem. Pliny begins: *Heus tu promittis ad cenam nec venis* (for *venio* in part A of the invitation-poem, cf. Mart. 10.48.5, 11.52.2). Pliny goes on to say what he would have served (part B) and what the entertainment would have been (part C). He sums up his disappointment in a sentence in which all three parts of the invitation-poem appear: *At (A) tu apud nescioquem (B) ostrea, vulvas, echinos, (C) Gaditanas maluisti.* (For *apud* in part A of the invitation-poem, see Cat. 13.1 and Mart. 11.52.1; cf. Hor. *C.* 3.29.5; also *Epist.* 1.5.3 (*domi*)).

The second invitation occurs in Petr. 46.2, where one of the freedmen invites Agamemnon to dinner: "Someday I'll get you to come over to my villa and have a look at my little place. We'll find something to chew on, a chicken, some eggs. It'll be nice, even if the bad weather ruined everything this year.¹⁶ Anyway, we'll find some-

¹³ Asclepiades *AP* 5.181 = 920ff. G-P, Posidippus *AP* 5.183 = 3094ff. G-P.

¹⁴ See G-P on 920ff.

¹⁵ Hor. *Epod.* 2.47-60, *Sat.* 2.2.116-125, 2.6.63-76; Ov. *Met.* 8.637-678; Juv. 11.77-85; cf. Verg. *G.* 4.133.

¹⁶ Reading *disparpallavit*. See M. S. Smith, *Petronii Arbitri Cena Trimalchionis* (Oxford 1975) ad loc. I have discussed this invitation in "Ancient Roman and Modern American Food: A Comparative Sketch of Two Semiological Systems," *Comparative Civilizations Review*, no. 5, Fall (1980) 52-69 (issued as *Comparative Civilizations Bulletin*, vol. 9, no. 3).

thing to fill up on." In the invitation-poem, this self-deprecating tone is "smart poverty" and the chicken is poor man's fare (Mart. 10.48.17; cf. Hor. *Sat.* 2.2.121; Juv. 11.71).

The freedman is not imitating the tone of the invitation-poem¹⁷ nor is Pliny imitating its structure. Rather, we see in these two places the conventions of Roman social life upon which the invitation-poem rests.¹⁸ Turning now to the invitation-poem by Philodemus, we note that it is written in Herculaneum and addressed to a Roman patron, Piso.¹⁹ The sow's udders mentioned by Philodemus are a Roman delicacy. The ninth hour was the regular Roman time for dining.²⁰ Philodemus necessarily follows the conventions of Roman life. What about the poem as a whole? Its tripartite structure may well reflect not "a minor category of Hellenistic epigram," of which it would be the sole example, but a Roman social convention.²¹

LOWELL EDMUNDS

BOSTON COLLEGE

¹⁷ Consider also Trimalchio's words: hoc vinum . . . vos oportet suave faciatis (39.2, cf. 48.1). Commentators compare *AP* 11.44, Hor. *C.* 1.20 and Mart. 5.78.16. But Trimalchio is no more imitating or mimicking a literary convention than the freedman who promised chicken and eggs. Petronius has here given us a glimpse of the social convention, albeit handled with characteristic ineptitude by Trimalchio, on which the literary convention rests. The "real" Trimalchio comes out in his statement at 48.1: vinum, inquit, si non placet, mutabo (cf. Nasidienus in Hor. *Sat.* 2.18.16ff.). Trimalchio also tries to observe the convention by which the meal should be followed by civilized conversation. At 39.3 he says that, for him, the *cena* is incomplete without *philologia*. He proceeds to give a lecture on the signs of the zodiac, with reference to the zodiac dish he has served (35-36).

¹⁸ On the relation of various elements in Augustan poetry to Roman life, see Jasper Griffin, "Augustan Poetry and the Life of Luxury," *JRS* 66 (1976) 87-105, and on the invitation-poem's relation to social reality, see Oskar Hezel, *Catull und das griechische Epigram* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 17 [Stuttgart 1932]) 16-17.

¹⁹ Cf. W. Allen, Jr. and P. H. DeLacy, "The Patrons of Philodemus," *CP* 34 (1939) 59-65.

²⁰ J. Marquardt and A. Mau, *Das Privatleben der Römer*² (Leipzig 1886, repr. Darmstadt 1964) 298; cf. Mart. 10.48.1, 11.52.3: the bath at the eighth hour precedes the dinner.

²¹ I am grateful to Professor Richard Thomas for generous advice and also to Professor Joseph Solodow for generous and no less useful admonition.

THE TRANSLATOR OF THE GREEK *RES GESTAE* OF AUGUSTUS

The translator of the *Res Gestae* of Augustus¹ has never been identified as to native language or national origin.² Despite the absence of direct information from ancient sources, and despite the modern disagreement on this matter, three important sources of evidence can shed light on the translator's nationality or native speech. These sources—the Greek version itself, the corpus of *senatus consulta* in Greek, and archaeological evidence—fairly assure this conclusion: the translator of the *Res Gestae* was not a Roman. Instead, it is likely that the translator came from Anatolia or some other Greek-speaking area, in view of the translation's facility in Greek contrasted with its difficulty with Latin and with things Roman.

Scholarly opinion diverges widely on this issue. Georg Kaibel decried the numerous Latinisms of the Greek version.³ He viewed the translation as unfaithful to the Greek language and unacceptably dependent on the Latin text. His judgment is not quite explicit, but he clearly believed that a Roman produced the Greek version, and hence the Latinized passages occurring there. P. Viereck⁴ and David Magie⁵ both apparently supported a Roman translator in their respective studies of the vocabulary of Greek versions of Roman documents. Nicolaus Festa detailed many of the divergent renditions found in the Greek

¹ Editions by: Hans Volkmann, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1969); Ekkehard Weber, *Augustus. Meine Taten* (Munich, Heimeran, 1970); P. A. Brunt and J. M. Moore, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968) (without the Greek text); Jean Gagé, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, 3rd ed. (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1977).

² The phrase "national origin" is used in the literal sense of the place and culture of the translator's nativity and upbringing, not in the sense of legal citizenship. Such citizenship could of course belong to persons who had never been to Rome or who spoke no Latin.

³ Writing in Theodor Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti ex Monumentis Ancy-rano et Apolloniense*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, Weidmann, 1883) 197–202.

⁴ P. Viereck, *Sermo Graecus* (Diss. Göttingen, 1888), see especially the discussion on 85–88.

⁵ David Magie, *De Romanorum iuris publici sacrique vocabulis sollemnibus* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1905; reprint edition, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1973) passim.

version,⁶ and he often comments to the effect that the translator altered the text merely to accomodate it to a Greek-speaking audience. Apparently he thought that the translator clearly comprehended Roman matters, and hence was a Roman. S. F. Johanson recently described the use of the dative absolute in Roman inscriptions written in Greek,⁷ and seems to refer the source of the dative absolute in the *Res Gestae* to Augustus himself. He, too, prefers a Roman as the translator of this text.

On the other hand, A. P. M. Meuwese went to great lengths to show that the Greek version is entirely in accord with the *koinē* Greek of the first century and not at all Latinate.⁸ Thus, he supported the idea of a Greek-speaking translator for the text. Paul Regard followed Meuwese's reasoning and spoke for a non-Roman translator.⁹ Much more recently Gabriella Vanotti examined the alterations found in the Greek version,¹⁰ and she concluded from the errors and changes there that the translator must have been a Greek-speaker.

The errors of the version are undoubtedly the key to the nationality or the native language of the translator. However, the problem is complicated by the version's strict adherence to Latin structures and word order. Hence some commentators have understood the Latinisms in the Greek version as mistakes, rather than as part of a deliberate Latinate style and syntax. Since these Latinisms may well be intentional, a careful search must be made for unconscious slips or errors which might reveal the nationality or native tongue of the translator.

Such a major slip does occur in chapter nine of the *Res Gestae* (column II, lines 17-18 of the Latin text at Ankara). The Latin text here reads, *ex iis uotis saepe fecerunt uiuo me ludos aliquotiens sacerdotum quattuor amplissima collegia, aliquotiens consules* ("From these prayers, during my lifetime, at times the four major colleges of

⁶ Nicolaus Festa, "Animadversiones ad versionem graecam," *Acta Divi Augusti*, ed. S. Riccobono (Rome, Regia Academia Italica, 1945) 66-75.

⁷ S. Frederic Johanson, "A Note on the Roman Attitude towards the Bureaucracy," *Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Papyrologists* (London 1975), 183-88.

⁸ A. P. M. Meuwese, *De rerum gestarum divi Augusti versione graeca* (Buscoduci [s Hertogenbosch], C. N. Teulings, 1920) and "De versione graeca Monumenti Ancyran quaestiones," *Mnemosyne* 54 (1926) 224-33.

⁹ Paul Regard, "La version grecque du Monument d'Ancyre," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 26 (1924) 147-61.

¹⁰ Gabriella Vanotti, "Il testo greco delle 'Res Gestae Divi Augusti'," *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 27 (1975) 306-25.

priests often put on games, and at times the consuls did"). The Greek version at this place reads, ἐκ τούτων τῶν εὐχῶν πλειστάκις ἐγένοντο θέαι, τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ τῆς συναρχίας τῶν τεσσάρων ἱερέων, τοτὲ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπάτων. The version alters the phrase *sacerdotum quattuor amplissima collegia* ("the four major colleges of priests") to a Greek phrase meaning "the college of the four priests." The translator has misunderstood the Latin phrase because the adjective *quattuor* occurs ambiguously between *sacerdotum* and *collegia*. Since *quattuor* is not declined, its syntactical connection is unclear.

Mere ambiguity, however, is insufficient to attribute the misreading to a native Greek-speaker, rather than to a Roman. Such a misreading can only have been committed by someone ignorant of the Roman religious system. Rome had four major priestly groups—the *pontifices* of various sorts, the *augures* or interpreters of omens, the *quindecimviri* or priesthood of fifteen men, and the *septemviri* or the priesthood originally of seven men. No major Roman priesthood had only four members. The term *collegium* in the singular referred to any one of these priestly bodies, but in the plural it referred to these groups as a whole. Thus the Greek version shows two errors of understanding the Roman system. First, it mentions only one *collegium*, and second, that *collegium* is said to have four priests. These two errors arise from the misreading of *quattuor* as modifying *sacerdotum* instead of *collegia*.

Some editors and commentators, however, read the Greek word ἱερέων as a mistake for the feminine ἱερείων.¹¹ This emendation diminishes the effect of the shift in reference of *quattuor* by reading "the college of the four priesthoods." However, the feminine ἱερεῖα elsewhere in the version only renders the Latin phrase *uirgo Vestalis*, so that the word in those two instances clearly means "priestess," not "priesthood." The term is normally so used in Greek, and virtually never has the latter meaning. Furthermore, the translator would only be complicating matters if, in so few instances, this word had two distinct meanings. The average Greek-speaking reader, having encountered the word ἱερεῖα in the sense of "priestess" elsewhere in the text, would have understood a reading with ἱερείων in the sense of "the college of the four priestesses." The translator would hardly have committed such an error. Clearly ἱερέων, "priests," should remain.

¹¹ See H. Volkmann's edition; W. Weber, *Princeps*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1936); Vanotti, 311; and Festa, 74.

Besides, this attempted emendation still neglects the misreading of *quattuor* with the wrong word and the mistranslation of the plural *collegia* by the singular συναρχία. These errors still point to a non-Roman as translator and support the reading ἱερέων as the translator's intended term.

Other portions of the Greek version demonstrate the hand of the translator at work in an effort to simplify Roman politics and culture and to make the message acceptable to a non-Roman audience.¹² Several changes are quite apparent. 1) All Roman monetary terms in the Latin text—*denarius*, *sestertius* and its abbreviation *HS*, and *nummus*—are rendered as δηνάριον, with appropriate recalculations. 2) The Roman people is denigrated while the *princeps* is lauded by means of a careful choice of vocabulary, textual rearrangements, and certain omissions from the original and additions to the version. 3) Several divine, ethnic, and geographic names are Hellenized in the Greek text, and the names of two famous bridges near Rome are not translated at all; in chapter twenty where the Latin reads, "I repaired all the bridges except the Mulvian and the Minucian," the version uncertainly paraphrases, "I fixed all the bridges except two that were not in need of repair." 4) Some references to Roman subjugation of foreign peoples are softened or omitted. 5) Other misreadings of the Latin text occur, such as the rendition of *colonis* (i.e., *coloniis*) in chapter fifteen by ἀποικος, "colonist," instead of by ἀποικία, "colony," and the misunderstanding in chapter eight of the three census totals—the Latin sequence proudly shows a steady population increase (4,063,000, then 4,233,000, finally 4,937,000), but the version confounds the propaganda effect with a mistranslation of the first figure as 4,603,000.

Such alterations taken by themselves would hardly guarantee the translator's nationality. But in view of the glaring error regarding the colleges of priests, these other changes take on greater value in deciding the issue.

A second method of determining the translator's nationality is to compare the technique of the Greek *Res Gestae* with that of the corpus of *senatus consulta*. The extant Greek copies of the *senatus consulta* are apparently traceable to a translation center in Rome¹³ where they

¹² See D. Wigtill, *The Translation of Religious Texts in the Greco-Roman World* (Diss. University of Minnesota, 1980) 31–77, for a detailed examination of these alterations.

¹³ See Robert K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969) 13–19. Note also Victor Reichman, *Römische Literatur in griechischer Übersetzung*, *Philologus* Supplementband 34/3 (Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1943) 17–19 on *senatus consulta*.

were written under close Roman supervision, if not actually by Romans. If the Greek version of the *Res Gestae* were in a style and technique like that of the *senatus consulta*, it would likely have come from this quasi-official Roman tradition. However, major departures from the style of the Greek *senatus consulta* would indicate some other tradition of translating, perhaps even by someone of non-Roman birth.¹⁴

In fact, the Greek text of the *Res Gestae* does diverge from the general traits of the Greek *senatus consulta*. The decrees of the senate often use different lexical equivalents than the Greek *Res Gestae*. *Res publica* everywhere becomes τὰ δημόσια πράγματα, but exceptions occur in the *Res Gestae* alone, where τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα or ἡ πατρίς are also found. *Sestertius* is transcribed as σηστέριος, but the translator of Augustus always uses δηνάριον. A variety of terms renders *dictatura*, but only the Greek *Res Gestae* uses ἡ αὐτεξούσιος ἀρχή. The definite article is usually omitted in certain situations in the *Res Gestae* in Greek, such as before names and at the beginning of chapters, but is otherwise applied as one might expect; in the *senatus consulta*, however, it is used much less sure-footedly.

Several passages show an extreme freedom of translation unparalleled in the *senatus consulta*. The translator has heavily revised the sections of those chapters which portrayed Augustus as first citizen among peers (chapters 10, 12, 16, and 34), and has altered the order of the material and the syntax to elevate him to a position of monarchy. Such revisions in a Greek translation would have been unacceptable in Rome under Augustus himself and unlikely soon after his death. Yet the version, which appears about this time, displays many other monarchizing changes beyond those noted here.¹⁵ Hence, comparison with *senatus consulta* also supports the hypothesis of a non-Roman translator of the *Res Gestae*. Vocabulary, syntax, and ideology in this version differ markedly from the patterns found in the Greek decrees of

¹⁴ Reichmann, *ibid.*, 21–25, agrees to a different translation tradition for the Monumentum Ancyranum.

¹⁵ See further on such changes D. Wigt, "The Ideology of the Greek *Res Gestae*," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, part II, volume 30.1, ed. W. Haase (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1972) 624–38. Compare also the well-known readiness of Asia to accept worship of a ruler as divine, resulting in the building of temples to him even in his lifetime; see for example M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. 2, 3rd ed. (Munich, C. H. Beck, 1974) 384–87, and G. Herzog-Hauser, "Kaiserkult," *Pauly-Wissowa Realencyclopädie*, Supplementband IV (Stuttgart, Druckenmüller, 1924; repr. 1963) 806–53, especially 823–27.

the senate, or from what one might expect from any quasi-official translation bureau in Rome.

A third, less convincing argument may buttress this conclusion. Peculiarly, no other locale outside of Galatia has yielded copies of the *Res Gestae* in either language. (No doubt the original bronze inscription in Rome¹⁶ was melted down for more useful things.) The only known copies all originate from provincial Galatia—the temple at Ankara inscribed with both the original and the version, the inscription at Antioch in Latin, and the pedestal at Apollonia in Greek. Since the inscription apparently interested the Galatians or at least someone of influence there, one might presume that, with proper authorization, a local translator was appointed to render the text comprehensible to the regional populace. The translator would then likely be of Anatolian or other eastern extraction and more fluent in Greek than in Latin.

Three kinds of evidence, then, converge to support the conclusion that a non-Roman translated the *Res Gestae*: 1) internal alterations to the text of the version, particularly the mistranslation of *sacerdotum quattuor . . . collegia*; 2) comparison with the technique of the Greek versions of *senatus consulta* done in Rome; and 3) an argument from silence: the extant copies come from Galatia alone. Thus religious, cultural, stylistic, and archaeological arguments together indicate a non-Roman translator for the Greek *Res Gestae*, who lived in the Greek East and used Greek more readily than Latin.¹⁷

DAVID N. WIGTIL

OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY

¹⁶ Suetonius, *Aug.* 101.4, calls this inscription an *indicem rerum a se gestarum, quem uellet incidi in aeneis tabulis, quae ante mausoleum statuerentur*. The bronze inscription is also mentioned in the superscription to the *Res Gestae* in both languages.

¹⁷ A preliminary version of this paper was presented to the 1980 meeting of the Linguistic Circle of Manitoba and North Dakota under the title, "Evidence for the Translator of the Greek *Res Gestae*," an abstract of which appeared in that group's *Proceedings* 20 (1980) 30–31.

THE ORIGINALITY OF EUSEBIUS' *CHRONICLE*

The *Chronicle* of Eusebius of Caesarea must rank as one of the most influential books of all time. It provided a model for universal history and a format which located contemporary times firmly within the perspective of God's plan for mankind. As such it was continually copied, adapted, translated and continued from the earliest and its span and annalistic layout became the pattern for chronicle writing in the middle ages in both the Greek East and Latin West. Whether they realised it or not, the chroniclers of Western Europe and Byzantium were, for the most part, confined to an historiographical tradition which could be traced back to Eusebius' *Chronicle* in the early fourth century. So too, it was the *Chronicle* of Eusebius in the version of its earliest redactors which provided the basis for chronicle writing in Oriental, Slavic and Celtic languages.¹

Although the influence of this single book is beyond doubt, several questions surround the composition of the chronicle itself. Foremost among these is the degree of originality to be accorded Eusebius' composition. Was its popularity and influence simply fortuitous or due more to the fact that it was a thoroughly original and important work? Opinion has been divided on whether Eusebius who certainly established one historiographical tradition—ecclesiastical history—actually invented the Christian world chronicle as well.² Did Eusebius merely extend or perfect an already established pattern of historical compilation? It has been claimed that a totally synchronic tabular

¹ For a full and lucid discussion of the early versions of Eusebius and their relationship to the Greek original see A. A. Mosshammer, *The Chronicle of Eusebius and Greek Chronographic Tradition* (Lewisburg-London 1979) 29–83. Much useful information on individual Byzantine chroniclers is contained in E. M. Jeffreys, 'The Attitude of Byzantine Chroniclers towards Ancient History,' *Byzantion* 49 (1979) 199–238.

² In favour of Eusebius: A. Momigliano, 'Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century A.D.' in *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century* (Oxford 1963) 85; against: A. Schoene, *Die Weltchronik des Eusebius in ihrer Bearbeitung durch Hieronymus* (Berlin 1900) 275 and B. Altaner, *Patrologie* vol. III (Freiburg 1951) 174—both favour Africanus; uncertain: K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*² (Munich 1897) 321 and A. Bauer, *Ursprung und Fortwirken der christlichen Weltchronik* (Graz 1910) 12ff., who does not distinguish between the works of Africanus, Hippolytus, and Eusebius in terms of scope and content.

form such as we find in Eusebius already existed in antiquity.³ If there were no precise models for the Eusebian chronicle to be found in Greek (mainly Hellenistic Alexandrian) chronographical writing then there were, so it has been argued, at least Christian prototypes. Works like the *Chronographiae* of Julius Africanus (A.D. 221) which was used by Eusebius have been taken to represent a comprehensive and completely synchronic and unified account of world history so that Eusebius' own chronicle can lay little claim to originality in terms of scope and design.⁴

However, the careful researches of Helm⁵ and now Mosshammer⁶ have demonstrated the existence of a clear distinction in format, content and purpose between the works of Africanus and Eusebius. So far as we can tell, Africanus' concise *Chronographiae* in five volumes included many Greek and Oriental king-lists as well as lists of Olympiads, archons and consuls excerpted from earlier Greek writers. It also included a framework of time and eras beginning with Adam but, although Africanus made occasional synchronisms between Jewish and Greek history in his work, it was not a universal and synchronic chronicle recording each year from Adam to Christ. Eusebius used both Africanus' original sources (e.g. Manetho) and the *Chronographiae* itself in order to compile a comprehensive, co-ordinated chronicle from Abraham, not Adam, in which all the Greek and Oriental kingdoms were juxtaposed and perfectly synchronised with each year noted.

These conclusions are grounded in a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the *Chronicle* of Eusebius (as preserved in Jerome, the Armenian and Syriac versions as well as excerpts in Byzantine chronicles) and the extant fragments of the *Chronographiae* of Africanus (mainly from Synkellos) and they are achieved from a comparison of the content of both Africanus and Eusebius. Therefore a persuasive case can now be assembled for upholding Eusebius' claim to innovation in his *Chronicle*; that is to say, the chronicle represented a revolu-

³ C. Wachsmuth, *Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte* (Leipzig 1895) 139 (Castor of Rhodes).

⁴ E.g. H. Gelzer, *Sextus Iulius Africanus und die byzantinische Chronographie* (Leipzig 1880) 26 and A. van den Brincken, *Studien zur lateinischen Weltchronistik bis in das Zeitalter Ottos von Freising* (Dusseldorf 1957) 51–57.

⁵ R. Helm, *Eusebius' Chronik und ihre Tabellenform* (Abh. Berl. phil.-hist. Kl. 1923 nr. 4 [Berlin 1924] 9–13).

⁶ Mosshammer, *Eusebius*, 36–37, 146–57.

tion in chronographic composition and its popularity and influence is to be ascribed to the practicality and novelty of its scope and design.

There is, nonetheless, a collection of material of direct relevance to the problem of deciding whether the works of Eusebius and Africanus were of two distinct kinds which has been overlooked and which deserves attention, namely the late antique/early medieval scholars who knew the works of both Africanus and Eusebius and whose comparative assessments of these works still survive. A consideration of their comments furnishes additional and decisive support for the originality of Eusebius' chronicle and its differentiation from the *Chronographiae* of Africanus.

Even though Eusebius himself implied a distinction in kind between the *Chronographiae* of Africanus and his own chronicle by claiming novelty for his own reconstruction of world history,⁷ the evidence of Jerome suggests that this was the case. It must be remembered that Jerome himself knew exactly what a chronicle was in the tradition of Eusebius for he himself translated the *Chronicle* of Eusebius and continued it to A.D. 378, while he knew and used the work of Africanus as well.⁸ Yet Jerome marks a clear distinction between the chronological productions of Africanus and Eusebius. In his book on famous church writers he refers to Africanus' work as *quinque de temporibus volumina*⁹ precisely the same designation given it by Eusebius—τὸν ἀριθμὸν πέντε χρονογραφίων.¹⁰ These five books of chronography are to be contrasted in Jerome's account with the chronicle of Eusebius, not simply a work *de temporibus* in a given number of books but *chronicorum canonum omnimoda historia et eorum ἐπιτομή*.¹¹ Once again this is the precise way Eusebius described his own work: χρονικοὶ κανόνες καὶ ἐπιτομή παντοδαπῆς ἱστορίας Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων.¹² According to Jerome there is a difference between

⁷ Eusebius' own statements are at *Praeparatio Evangelica* x.9.2 (PG 21, 808) and in the preface to his chronicle: *in praesenti autem stilo eadem tempora contra se invicem ponens et singularum gentium annos dinumerans, ut quid cuique coaetaneum fuit, ita curioso ordine coaptaui* (ed. R. Helm, *Die Chronik des Hieronymus* GCS 47 [Berlin 1956] 8).

⁸ Hieron., *comm. in Dan.* (PL 25,542): *Africanus in quinto Temporum volumine. . . haec locutus est. . .*

⁹ *de uir. ill.* (ed. Bernoulli) LXIII.

¹⁰ *HE* vi. 31.

¹¹ *de uir. ill.* LXXXI.

¹² *Eclogae Propheticae* (PG 22, 1024). The word 'canon' in this context means a chronological list (of kings etc.); cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.74, Syncellus 387 (Bonn) and Jerome *de uir. ill.* 61.

books 'on times' and a completely synchronic world history in which these times are arranged side-by-side from a fixed starting point with all sorts of events recorded in it. This latter is the chronicle as we know it, the *omnimoda historia*, and this was how Jerome referred not only to the lost chronicle of his Spanish friend Nummius Aemilianus Dexter¹³ but also to his own translation and continuation of Eusebius—*chronicon omnimodae historiae*.¹⁴

Augustine of Hippo was not slow to grasp the importance of chronological arguments to Christian apologetic and he made considerable use of Eusebius' chronicle to this end in the *City of God*.¹⁵ He also knew of the *Chronographiae* of Africanus. Indeed it was once mistakenly thought that many of his chronological points came from Africanus directly rather than from Eusebius and others.¹⁶ However, Augustine passes over Africanus in stating quite explicitly that the first Christian world chronicle was written by Eusebius: *nostri autem qui chronica scripserunt prius Eusebius post Hieronymus*. . . .¹⁷ In Augustine's view, as in that of Jerome, the five volumes of Africanus were obviously not a chronicle in the pattern of Eusebius and Jerome.

The impact of Jerome and Augustine on Latin culture in the middle ages was immense yet it was the handbook of Cassiodorus, the *Institutiones*, which provided the clearest guidelines for the medieval Christian curriculum. In dealing with Christian historiography Cassiodorus could not overlook the central place of the world chronicle. In the instructions for his monks Cassiodorus informs them that the format and content of chronicle writing, so frequent and widespread in his own day, is to be traced back not to Africanus but only to Eusebius:

Chronica vero, quae sunt imagines historiarum brevissimaeque commemorationes temporum, scripsit Graece Eusebius; quae transtulit Hieronymus in Latinum, et usque ad tempora sua deduxit eximie.¹⁸

¹³ *de uir. ill.* CXXXII: *Fertur ad me omnimodam historiam texuisse, quam necdum legi*. The chronicle does not survive but an ingenious seventeenth-century cleric made an admirable, if fraudulent attempt at reconstructing it which is printed in *PL* 31, 55–272.

¹⁴ *de uir. ill.* CXXXV.

¹⁵ E.g. *de civ. Dei* iv. 6, viii.11, xii.11, xvi.16, xviii.2f.

¹⁶ The suggestion that Augustine used Africanus directly in *de civ. Dei* xviii was disposed of by B. Altaner, 'Augustinus and Iulius Africanus', *Vigiliae Christianae* 4 (1950) 37–45.

¹⁷ *de civ. Dei* xviii.8.26.

¹⁸ *Inst.* 1.17.2 (ed. Mynors).

Like Jerome, Cassiodorus was particularly aware of the popularity and novelty of the chronicle and that its structure was devised by Eusebius since he himself wrote such a chronicle.¹⁹ It remains possible, however, that Cassiodorus did not know Africanus and was therefore in no position to compare him to Eusebius. Still Cassiodorus' failure to mention Africanus does not mean that he did not know the *Chronographiae*. Sulpicius Severus, for example, clearly used Africanus although he does not actually say so;²⁰ while copies of Africanus were available in the east throughout the Byzantine period, along with the *Chronicle* of Eusebius.²¹

In addition to the monastic reading guide of Cassiodorus which decided the fate of so many classical and early Christian texts, medieval western Europe inherited much of antiquity's knowledge from encyclopaedias like the *Etymologiae* (or *Origines*) of Isidore of Seville who also wrote a chronicle in 615 and who therefore understood what constituted the Chronicle tradition. In the preface to his own chronicle, Isidore mentions the chronological works of both Africanus and Eusebius, but points clearly to the same distinction we find in Jerome: that is, Africanus was merely concerned with assembling chronographic material whereas Eusebius welded this material into a *multiplex historia* thereby providing a model that attracted numerous imitators:

*Breuem temporum per generationes et regna primus ex nostris Iulius Africanus . . . simplici stilo elicuit. Deinde Eusebius Caesariensis atque sanctae memoriae Hieronymus chronicorum canonum multiplicem ediderunt historiam regnis simul ac temporibus ordinatam post hos alii atque alii.*²²

From Isidore's statement we are led to believe that Africanus' five volumes consisted of regnal lists and genealogies, probably with much discussion of discrepancies, but nothing more. Eusebius' was a more complex work with this disparate material arranged in a coherent and sequential manner and gathered into a single time scale carefully set out. This corresponds exactly to the conclusion reached through an examination of the extant parts of both Africanus and Eusebius.

¹⁹ Ed. Mommsen, *MGH. AA.* t.xi (Berlin 1884) 120–61.

²⁰ Gelzer, *Africanus*, 107, 121 and G. K. van Andel, *The Christian Concept of History in the Chronicle of Sulpicius Severus* (Amsterdam 1976) 26–28.

²¹ Gelzer, *Africanus*, passim.

²² *Chron. Praef.* (ed. Mommsen, op. cit. 424).

Finally, that Isidore did not consider the *brevis temporum* of Africanus as a chronicle after the fashion of those of Eusebius and Jerome is evident from his notice concerning chronicles in the *Etymologiae*:

*chronica Graece dicitur quae Latine temporum series appellatur, qualem apud Graecos Eusebius Caesariensis edidit, et Hieronymus presbyter in Latinam linguam convertit.*²³

From the foregoing illustration it emerges that Africanus did not invent the Christian world chronicle but Eusebius. Africanus had compiled five books of detailed chronological tables, but it was the achievement of Eusebius to produce a format in which the various chronologies were combined and co-ordinated into a single schematic form. This was in order to illustrate the Christian view of world history from a definitive starting point in which all known events and kingdoms could be affixed to a single measure of time, the year of Abraham.²⁴

There is no need therefore to dispute Eusebius' claim that the innovative feature of his chronicle was this unprecedented mode of chronological comparison. The statements of Jerome, Augustine, Cassiodorus, and Isidore, provide an independent approach to the problem of evaluating the originality of Eusebius' chronicle, even if not all these had read Africanus. They confirm and thereby reinforce the case for Eusebius' originality which has been built upon a comparative study of the extant text of Africanus and Eusebius.

BRIAN CROKE

MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, SYDNEY

²³ *Etym.* v. 28 (ed. Lindsay).

²⁴ cf. J. Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques d'Eusèbe de Césarée durant la période pré-nicéenne* (Dakar 1961) 36-38, 59-63.

INTERPRETATIONS

ΑΚΡΑ ΓΥΡΕΩΝ: GEOGRAPHY, ALLEGORY, AND ALLUSION (ARCHILOCHUS FRAGMENT 105 WEST)

Γλαῦχ', ὄρα· βαθὺς γὰρ ἤδη κύμασιν ταρασσεται
πόντος, ἀμφὶ δ' ἄκρα Γυρέων ὀρθὸν ἵσταται νέφος,
σῆμα χεიმῶνος, κιχάνει δ' ἐξ ἀελπίτης φόβος.

At the beginning of his treatise on Homeric allegory, Heraclitus cites several examples from poets who have employed allegorical writing. The first comes from Archilochus (Fr. 105 West), of whom Heraclitus says: 'Ἀρχίλοχος μὲν ἐν τοῖς Θρακικοῖς ἀπειλημένος δεινοῖς τὸν πόλεμον εἰκάζει θαλαττίῳ κλύδωνι.¹ Although there appears to be nothing inherently allegorical in the verses cited, nor anything to connect them with the "Thracian troubles," we have no reason to doubt Heraclitus' testimony here and good reason to trust him. For it is unlikely that he would chose to cite a poem as a paradigm of allegorical composition, unless his readers would readily recognize it as such. Moreover, like Heraclitus' second example, Alcaeus' "Ship of State" (Fr. 326 L.P.), the Archilochus citation must be incomplete; there may well have been something in the sequel which made its allegorical character and Thracian setting explicit.

The eye of scholarly controversy has centered on the ἄκρα Γυρέων, a universally accepted emendation of Xylander for the MSS. γύρεον, and the readings γυρῶν, γυρεῶν, and γυρεύων from Plutarch's citation in *de Superstit.* 8.169 b. Only D'Arcy Thompson has expunged the Gyrean heights from the poem by reading γ'οὐρέων, but West does not trouble to record this suggestion in his apparatus.² Once the ἄκρα Γυρέων are properly restored to the text, the question of their location and significance remains. Bowra equates the ἄκρα Γυρέων with the Γυραῖη πέτρῃ where Locrian Ajax came to grief (*Od.*

¹ *Alleg. Hom.* 5.3 (Buffière).

² D. W. Thompson, "Archilochus Fr. 56 D," *CR* 55 (1941) 67. J. Tarditi, *Archilochus* (Roma 1968) does include the emendation in his apparatus (= Fr. 91).

4.500 ff.).³ Homer does not say where these rocks were located, but the Scholia place them near Myconos.⁴ On the basis of a tradition preserved in the *Nostoi* (Proclus *Chrestomathy*, p. 108 Allen), which has Ajax shipwrecked off the promontory of Caphereus in Euboea,⁵ Bowra maintains that the Gyrae must likewise be situated off Euboea. He then concludes that the war which Archilochus foresees must also be located in Euboea and be none other than the mysterious Lelantine War. Bowra's interpretation ignores Heraclitus' explicit testimony concerning the poem's Thracian setting. Since Bowra wrote, the discovery of a monument to Glaucus, the son of Leptinus, on Thasos tends to confirm a northern setting for the poem.⁶ Lavagnini supposes that rocks called Gyrae were also found off the coast of Thrace, but for this assumption, there is not a trace of evidence.⁷ Reviving an old view based on a gloss of Hesychius who names Γύρας a mountain in Tenos, Sandbach proposes a Tenian location for the ἄκρα Γυρέων.⁸ He claims

³ C. M. Bowra, "Signs of Storm (Archilochus, fr. 56)," *CR* 54 (1940) 127-29. The Homeric passage reads:

Αἶας μὲν μετὰ νηυσὶ δάμη δολιχρῆτμοισι·
 Γυρῆσιν μιν πρῶτα Ποσειδάων ἐπέλασσε
 πέτρῃσιν μεγάλῃσι, καὶ ἐξεσάωσε θαλάσσης·
 καὶ νύ κεν ἔκφυγε κῆρα, καὶ ἐχθόμενός περ Ἀθήνη,
 εἰ μὴ ὑπερφίαλον ἔπος ἔκβαλε καὶ μέγ' ἀάσθη·
 φῆ δ' ἄεκητι θεῶν φυγέειν μέγα λαΐτμα θαλάσσης.
 τοῦ δὲ Ποσειδάων μεγάλ' ἔκλυεν αὐδῆσαντος·
 αὐτίκ' ἔπειτα τρίαῖναν ἑλών χερσὶ στιβαρῇσιν
 ἥλασε Γυραῖν πέτρην, ἀπὸ δ' ἔσχισεν αὐτήν·
 καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόθι μέινει, τὸ δὲ τρύφος ἔμπησε πόντῳ,
 τῷ δ' Αἶας τὸ πρῶτον ἐφεζόμενος μέγ' ἀάσθη·
 τὸν δ' ἐφόρει κατὰ πόντον ἀπείρονα κυμαίνοντα.
 ὥς ὁ μὲν ἔνθ' ἀπόλωλεν, ἔπει πῖεν ἀλμυρὸν ὕδωρ.

⁴ Scholia V and H.P.Q. ad loc. Cf. Eustathius 1507.10.

⁵ The Cologne Fragment of Alcaeus (= S 262 *Suppl. Lyricis Graecis* ed. D. L. Page) appears to follow the *Nostoi* tradition by having the storm that destroyed Ajax strike at Aegae. See H. Lloyd-Jones, "The Cologne Fragment of Alcaeus," *GRBS* 9 (1968) 138-39.

⁶ See J. Pouilloux, "Glaucos, fils de Leptine, Parien," *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 79 (1955) 75 ff. Also the remarks of Pouilloux, "Archiloque et Thasos" in *Entretiens Hardt* 10 (Vandoeuvres 1963) 20-21.

⁷ B. Lavagnini, *Aglaia*³ (Torino 1947) 103 n. 2: "Ma è probabile che vi fossero delle Γυραὶ anche presso la costa di Tracia; γυραὶ (sc. πέτραι) è in fondo termine generico e indica delle rupi arrotondate."

⁸ F. H. Sandbach, "ἈΚΡΑ ΓΥΡΕΩΝ Once More," *CR* 56 (1942) 63-65. Sandbach cites Cicero's letter to Atticus (5.12.1), written when Cicero was stranded in Delos by bad

that the highest mountain on Tenos would be visible from neighboring Paros. The sight of its peaks covered with clouds would be a sign of bad weather, well known to Archilochus and "his friend Glaucus, presumably a fellow-Parian."⁹ Thus, the poet, caught up in the dangers of Thrace, alludes to a sign familiar to them both from their homeland.

All the preceding interpretations assume that the Gyrean heights are either literally present in the poem or, in the case of Sandbach, at least present in the mind's eye of the poet, but nevertheless a precise geographical entity. The imperative ὄρα makes us envisage a situation that seems real and present, as Plutarch in his citation in fact does (τοῦτ' ἰδὼν κυβερνήτης εὐχεται μὲν ὑπεκφυγεῖν. . . . *de Superstit.* 8, 169b). But the lines themselves suggest that the visible world of mountain and cloud is itself a sign (*sema*) of storm. The existence of a realm of such "signs" makes allegory possible. In his discussion of the poem of Alcaeus which follows ours, Heraclitus asks: who would not immediately believe on the basis of the image of men terrified at sea that it concerned a storm at sea? But he responds: ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει (5.7). Similarly, we might first think that the Gyrean Heights form a literal presence in Archilochus' poem, but this too is not the case. The ἄκρα Γυρέων are not a geographical allusion at all, but rather a mythological one. It is, in fact, their presence which indicates that the poem must be understood allegorically or, as we moderns might say, symbolically.¹⁰ Archilochus cared as little for the exact location of the Gyrean heights as he did for the "stone of Tantalus" which hangs over the island of Thasos (Fr. 91. 14 West). What interested him was that on these rocks the Lesser Ajax first found salvation and then met with destruction through his foolish boasting. The story, as the *Odyssey* Scholia point out, is a good one for making a moralizing or warning point.¹¹ In this connection, it may be appropriate to remember the

weather (*itaque erat in animo nihil festinare, nec me Delo movere, nisi omnia ἄκρα Γυρέων pura vidissem.*), to bolster his case for Tenos. But Cicero's allusion could refer equally well to Myconos or simply be proverbial.

⁹ Sandbach (above, n. 8) 65.

¹⁰ K. Reinhardt, "Personification und Allegorie" in *Vermächtnis der Antike* (Göttingen 1960) 35, n. 30, points out that the distinction between symbol and allegory is a modern one.

¹¹ Scholium P.Q. at *Od.* 4.499: ἡ διάθεσις τοῦ μύθου ὠφέλιμος τοῖς νέοις, ὅτι ἐφ' ἐνὶ ἀμαρτήματι ἐσώθη ἂν ὁ Αἴας διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν φιλανθρωπίαν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἄλλο προσέθηκεν. The Cologne Fragment of Alcaeus (S 262 S.L.G.) likewise exploits the Ajax story to point a warning exemplar to contemporary political events. See again Lloyd-Jones (above, n. 5) 128-29 and 136.

distinction made by Reinhardt between later allegoresis with its pedagogical or mystical/theological function and archaic allegorizing.¹² The latter is characterized by its immediacy and its warning or exemplary role, which allies it closely to the mythological paradeigma and the *ainos*.

It is, of course, impossible to reconstruct the precise circumstances which gave rise to Archilochus' poem. But, on the basis of the allusion to the fate of Locrian Ajax, it seems unlikely that Archilochus was simply referring to the imminent coming of war. More plausibly, Archilochus' friend Glaucus had already met with success in some undertaking; but now the danger of hybriistic over-confidence threatened to lose all that had been won: *κίχάνει δ' ἐξ ἀελπίης φόβος*.¹³

J. STRAUSS CLAY

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA



TYXH IN ARISTOXENUS, FR. 41,
AND EUDEMIAN ETHICS Θ.2.

Among the Πυθαγορικά ἀποφάσεις of Aristoxenus is a fragment in which he offers what he claims to be a Pythagorean doctrine on *τύχη*. It seems to have gone unnoticed by commentators on the *Eudemian Ethics*, although the connection with Aristotle's account of *εὐτυχία* in *E.E.* θ.2. has been noted by W. Burkert, who cites the fragment as an instance of Aristoxenus passing off fourth-century ethics as Pythagorean tradition, on the grounds that he is presenting as "pythagoreische Aussprüche" "eben das, was die Eudemische Ethik über *τύχη* entwickelt."¹ Leaving aside the question of Aristoxenus' credibility as

¹² Reinhardt (above, n. 10) 34–40.

¹³ If the context is a military one, the situation to which Archilochus refers might possibly be parallel to Odysseus' account of the raid on the Cicones (*Od.* 9.39–61), to which B. Seidenstücker, "Archilochus and Odysseus," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 20–22, detects several references in the poetry of Archilochus. I would like to thank the Editor for his helpful comments.

¹ W. Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon* (Nürnberg 1962) 96 and note 59. English translation by E. L. Minar, Jr., *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Harvard 1972) 108.

a source for Pythagoreanism, what I wish to consider here is the extent to which the distinctions drawn by Aristoxenus are, in fact, identical with those drawn by Aristotle.

The fragment is quoted by Stobaeus (*Ecl.* 1.6.18) and reads thus:

- 1 Περὶ δὲ τύχης τάδ' ἔφασκον· εἶναι μὲν τι καὶ δαι-
 μόνιον μέρος αὐτῆς, γενέσθαι γὰρ ἐπίπνοιάν τινα παρὰ
 τοῦ δαιμονίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἢ ἐπὶ
 τὸ χεῖρον, καὶ εἶναι φανερώς κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν
 5 εὐτυχεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ἀτυχεῖς, καταφανέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτο
 <τῷ> τοὺς μὲν ἀπροβουλεύτως καὶ εἰκῇ τι πράττοντας πολ-
 λάκις κατατυγχάνειν, τοὺς δὲ προβουλευομένους καὶ προ-
 νοουμένους ὀρθῶς τι πράττειν ἀποτυγχάνειν. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ
 ἕτερον τύχης εἶδος, καθ' ὃ οἱ μὲν εὐφυεῖς καὶ εὐστοχοί,
 10 οἱ δὲ ἀφυεῖς τε καὶ ἐναντίαν ἔχοντες φύσιν βλάστοιεν, ὧν
 οἱ μὲν εὐθυβολοῖεν ἐφ' ὃ τι ἄν ἐπιβάλωνται, οἱ δὲ ἀπο-
 πίπτοιεν τοῦ σκοποῦ, μηδέποτε τῆς διανοίας αὐτῶν εὐστό-
 χως φερομένης, ἀλλὰ αἰεὶ ταρассομένης· ταύτην δὲ τὴν
 14 ἀτυχίαν σύμφυτον εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπεΐσακτον.

I translate:

And this is what they used to say about fortune: that there is one part of it which is divine; for some men experience a sort of inspiration from the divinity towards the better or towards the worse and it is manifestly by virtue of this very influence that some men are fortunate and others unfortunate; and this is most evident from the fact that some men who act without prior deliberation and without planning often meet with success, while others who do deliberate beforehand and make plans to do something correctly meet with failure. And they say that there is also another type of fortune, by virtue of which some men are born naturally talented and shrewd, while others are born lacking such natural talent and having a contrary nature: of these the former hit the mark, whatever the objective at which they aim, while the latter miss the mark, their thinking (purpose?) never travelling with sure aim but always becoming confused. They say that this latter type of misfortune is congenital and not imported from outside.²

The fragment thus distinguishes between:

- (I) a divine type of *eutychia/atychia* caused by the interference of the divinity.

² *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium*, ed. C. Wachsmuth et O. Hense (Berlin 1884) 89 (= F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* [Basel 1945] vol. II, fragment 41 = H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* [Berlin 1951–52] 58 [45] DII.).

- (II) another type based on the innate talent of an individual for getting things right or, in the case of *atychia*, wrong.

(I)

Divine intervention of the sort described by Aristoxenus is specifically rejected as an explanation of εὐτυχία in *E.E.* at 1247a29 on the grounds that it would be strange for a god or a *daimon* to favour such a man as an εὐτυχής in preference to τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον.³ This does not prevent Aristotle, however, later concluding that there is a sort of εὐτυχία which is θεία (1248b4), the ultimate cause of which is θεός as the ἀρχή of κίνησις in the soul (1248a25–27). Von Arnim saw this as a contradiction and suggested that Aristotle changed his mind on the topic and that Θ 2. incorporated notes from different periods.⁴ But Aristotle seems not to have seen any contradiction in saying in one breath that there is a sort of εὐτυχία that is θεία and in implying in the next that such an εὐτυχής is not fortunate διὰ θεόν but only *seems* so—ἢ μὲν θεία (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχής διὰ θεὸν κατορθοῦν) (1248b3–4). Such an εὐτυχής is, in fact, fortunate διὰ φύσιν (1247b33–34).⁵ The difference is between God as the ultimate *arche* of the naturally (and so correctly) oriented irrational ὁρμαί of the man who enjoys θεία εὐτυχία and god as an interfering external agent. Thus what *E.E.* excludes (τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἔξωθεν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν, 1247a24) is precisely what Aristoxenus describes as divine *eutychia/atychia*, as the last two lines of the fragment make clear; if *eutychia/atychia* (II) are οὐκ ἐπέισακτον, the δαιμόνιον μέρος must be ἐπέισακτον.

³ The text used will be that of Fr. Susemihl, *Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia* (Leipzig 1884), unless otherwise indicated. F. Dirlmeier, *Eudemische Ethik*, übersetzt und erläutert (Berlin 1969) 482, understands in τοιοῦτον (1247a28) "den Mann des Würfels" (from lines 1247a22–23); I understand, more generally, a man who is like a πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπηγμένον (1247a25), that is ἄφρονα. With ἐπιπνοῖαν τινα παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου of line 2 of the fragment, cf. *E.E.* I, 1214a23–24, ἐπιπνοῖα δαιμονίου τινός.

⁴ H. von Arnim, 'Der neueste Versuch, die Magna Moralia als unecht zu erweisen', S.B. Wien, 209 (1929) 12.

⁵ Dirlmeier (op. cit. p. 492) is clearly right in rejecting Spengel's conjecture of <ἢ δὲ φύσει> at 1248b4–5. (L. Spengel, 'Über die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften,' Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften III Bd., 3 Abt., 1841, p. 550, note 1). It is not only superfluous but also wrong. The other sort of *eutychia*, which is παρὰ τὴν ὁρμην (1248b6), is διὰ τύχην.

(II)

It is the innate (non-divine) εὐτυχία of the fragment that is similar to the Eudemian θεία εὐτυχία.

Like the εὐτυχεῖς of Type (I), these of Type (II) presumably do not need to προβουλεύεσθαι; theirs is an innate intuitive genius for going straight to their objective—whence εὐθυβολοῖεν and εὔστοχοι; similarly the 'divine' εὐτυχεῖς of the *E.E.* are said to have no need of βούλευσις (1248a31-32).

Both, in fact, enjoy a sort of εὐφύια (cf. Fr. 41, line 9 and *E.E.* 1247a37-38, b21-28, 1247b38-1248a1). What sort, in the case of the *E.E.*, is made clear: the εὐτυχία which the *E.E.* calls θεία is that whereby εὐτυχεῖς succeed according to their aims (κατὰ τὴν ὁρμήν 1248b5; cf. 1247b29-30) and depends upon having 'naturally' and so correctly oriented irrational impulses or desires (1247b20-21, 34-38); given these, it is possible to succeed without λογισμός—indeed the *E.E.* emphasises that such εὐτυχεῖς (and others who succeed, in fact, διὰ τύχην) are ἄφρονες and ἄλογοι (1247a4, 16, 21; 1248a31, 34), for this is what makes their success so difficult to understand. Theirs, then, is an εὐφύια of the ὄρεξις. They are compared with people who are musically talented and can sing well but who are without any professional knowledge of singing and are unable to teach it, people who can sing through the good fortune of their natural endowment (1247b23-28);⁶ they are compared also with those divinely endowed with the gift of prophecy, μελαγχολικοί and εὐθυόνειροι (1248a34-b3).

⁶ Adopting Sylburg's οἱ ψῆδικοί for οἱ ἄδικοι at 1247b22 and his ἄσσονται for ἔσσονται of the Mss. at 1247b26. At b23 I read with Jackson <ῥ> ἡ φύσις (B' 'secundum quod') for ἡ of codd. (H. Jackson, 'Eudemian Ethics Θ. i, ii,' *Journal of Philology* 32 (1912 [1913] 215).

Interesting in the light of the Eudemian doctrine is a fragment, quoted by Aelius Aristides (Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς, ed. G. Dindorf, [Leipzig 1829] II, 19-20), from the Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettus. The fragment in question is Fragment 3 in Kraus (*Aischinis Socratici reliquiae, edidit et commentario instruxit H. Kraus* [Leipzig 1911]) = Dittmar Fr. 11b (H. Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratischen*. Philologische Untersuchungen und Fragmente, 21 Heft [Berlin 1912]). Socrates is arguing that diseases can be cured both ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη and θεία μοῖρα: Πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν καμνόντων ὑγίεις γίνονται, οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη, οἱ δὲ θεία μοῖρα. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη, ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν θεραπεύόμενοι, ὅσοι δὲ θεία μοῖρα, ἐπιθυμία αὐτοὺς ἄγει ἐπὶ τὸ ὀψῆσον.

For θεία μοῖρα to be thought of in such a subjective sense, almost as 'instinct,' is very rare (vide E. G. Berry, 'The History and Development of θεία μοῖρα and θεία τύχη down to and including Plato,' Dissertation [Chicago 1940] 44). The connection with ἐπιθυμία here makes it almost identical with θεία εὐτυχία as conceived of in the *E.E.*

In the case of the fragment, what sort of εὐφυΐα is meant is not so clear. If the man who exhibits *eutychia* (II) is the converse of him who suffers *atychia* (II), then it may surely be said that his διάνοια never goes astray. The question then is how to interpret διάνοια. There are two possibilities.

a) διάνοια might mean nothing more technical than 'purpose' or 'intention,' in which case *eutychia* (II) could be interpreted as identical with the Eudemian θεΐα εὐτυχία.

b) διάνοια might be meant in the narrower sense of 'thought,' in which case Aristoxenus might be reporting an εὐφυΐα of the διάνοια *as opposed to* an εὐφυΐα of the ὁρεξίς, although it would pretty clearly have to be of an intuitive rather than ratiocinative nature.⁷

I submit that the fragment is too brief for us to decide whether Aristoxenus is reporting such an 'intellectualist' account of τύχη or whether he is reporting the *E.E.* (or an account identical with it); even if the latter, there exist nonetheless the differences, as well as the similarities, noted above.

MICHAEL J. MILLS

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK, FREDERICTON



NOTES ON TWO EPIGRAMS OF PHILODEMUS

I

XXVI Gow-Page (*A.P.* 7.222)¹

ἐνθάδε τῆς τρυφερῆς μαλακὸν ῥέθος, ἐνθάδε κεῖται
 Τρυγόνιον, σαβακῶν ἄνθεμα σαλμακίδων,
 ἧ καλύβη καὶ δοῦμος ἐνέπρεπεν, ἧ φιλοπαίγμων
 στωμυλῆ, Μήτηρ ἦν ἐφίλησε θεῶν,

⁷ For Aristotle εὐστοχία (cf. εὐστόχως φερομένης in line 12), though *dianoetic* as opposed to *ethical* (vide *Rhet.* I, 1412a2, *E.N.* VI (*E.E.* V), 1142b2+; cf. *Part.An.* I, 89b10+), is nonetheless a mental talent devoid of reasoning—ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι εὐστοχία (*E.N.* VI (*E.E.* V), 1142b2; cf. *Div. Som.* 414e34, εὐστοχοί of οἱ μελαγχολικοί, who are certainly not 'rational'; cf. *E.E.* 1248a34-b3).

¹ A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, *The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip and Some Contemporary Epigrams* (Cambridge 1968), 2 vols. (to be referred to hereinafter as

ἡ μούνη στέρξασα τὰ Κύπριδος ἀμφιγυναίικων 5
 ὄργια καὶ φίλτρων Λαΐδος ἀψαμένη.
 πῦε κατὰ στήλης, ἱερὴ κόνι, τῇ φιλοβάκχῳ
 μὴ βάτον, ἀλλ' ἀπαλὰς λευκοῖων κάλυκας.

5 ἀμφιγυναίικων Theiler ἀμφὶ γυναικῶν codd.

2 Τρυγόνιον: That this is the proper name of this poem (rather than a woman named Tryphere), belonging to an emasculated Gallus, was noticed by W. R. Paton, *CR* 30 (1916) 48. As A. D. Nock points out,² Galloi are called *palmubulae* at Apul. *Met.* 8.26.4. Why the turtle dove in particular provides a fitting appellation for castrati is suggested by two characteristics: (a) διαγνῶναι δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὴν θήλειαν καὶ τὸν ἄρρενα (Arist. *H.A.* 613a16), and (b) *turturum educatio supervacua est, quoniam id genus in ornithone nec parit nec excudit* (Columella 8.9). In this poem these considerations seem more relevant than that, as Luck mentions, turtle doves were sacred to Aphrodite and Demeter.

σαβακῶν: As Luck 273–76 ably demonstrates, τρυφερῆς, μαλακόν, σαλμακίδων, and (see above) the name Trygonion all serve to demonstrate the peculiar nature of this castrated priest. He is also right to include σαβακῶν in this group, but his case (resting primarily on Hesychius' definition; see below) can be strengthened by a review of this and related words in order to show more precisely how the word can be understood as yet another indication of Trygonion's pathic state.³

A. Σαβακός is glossed as Διονυσιακός by Suidas, adducing this very poem of Philodemus. That this is more than a guess from context will be shown below. Hesychius, on the other hand, glosses the same adjective as ὁ σαθρός: Χῖοι,⁴ and the adverb σαβακῶς as αὐστηρῶς, ξηρῶς, τραχέως, a gloss that Chantraine and Gow-Page have found "déconcertante" and "at variance" with Hesychius' first definition. But a stem

Gow-Page). Older editions of the Anthology will also be referred to by the editors' names alone; for full information on dates and places of publication, the reader is sent to Gow-Page 2.470. The epigrams of Philodemus have been edited separately by G. Kaibel, *Philodemi Gadarensis Epigrammata* (Greifswald 1885).

² *Apud* G. Luck, "Trygonions Grabschrift," *Philologus* 100 (1956) 274 (an article to be referred to hereinafter by author's name and page number alone).

³ Luck 276 n. 2 also adduces Synesius *Calv. Enc.* 66.1204 (Migne *Patr. Gr.*) τοὺς ἐν τοῖς Κυβελ<Ε>ίοις . . . τοὺς κατεαγότας, the relevance of which will be seen below.

⁴ Σαθρός refers to physical weakness—e.g., of the human body (Hipp. *Vict.* 1.15) or of pottery (Pl. *Gorg.* 493e)—before it comes to connote feebleness of mind. Note *PGnom* (BGU 5) 244 γάλλων καὶ σαθρῶν.

meaning "break, shatter" (see below) could easily yield an adjective "unsound, cracked" (see n. 4) and an adverb "roughly, crudely." The linguistic connection between this meaning and "Dionysian" remains to be elucidated. (Note also Hipp. *Morb.* 1.31 ἦν δὲ ῥηγματῆς ἔη ὁ τὴν νοῦσον ἔχων καὶ σαβακός, where the specific force of the weakness entailed in the last word is not made clear.)

B. Sabaktes appears as one of the demons of the kiln (along with Syntrips, Smaragos, et al.), who destroys (smashes?) pots.⁵

C. The verb σαβάζω enjoys the same split definition as the adjective σαβακός. Suidas derives the name of the Phrygian god Sabazios (s.v.) from the cry σαβάζειν, which is equated with the more Greek εὐάζειν;⁶ hence, Suidas continues, some Greeks say σαβασμός for εὐασμός, and Sabazios is Dionysus.⁷ On the other hand, Hesychius glosses σαβάξας as διασκεδάσας, διασαλεύσας, a meaning seemingly so far from Suidas' that Chantraine felt there to be no connection between the two.

And yet these disparate definitions may in fact derive from a common root. As M. Astour, *Hellenosemitica* (Leiden 1965) 188-93, has shown, a significant number of Dionysus' many names can be derived from roots meaning "strike" or "rend" and hence "kill." (a) Bassareus is more likely to come from Semitic *bšr*, "to cut (to pieces)," than (as the older view holds) from the Thracian word for fox. (b) *Anthroporrhastes* was a title for Dionysus at Tenedos (Ael. *N.A.* 12.34).⁸ (c) Satyrus may come from Sem. *štr*, "to destroy, devastate." (d) Iacchus < Sem. *yakke* < *nky*, "to strike, kill." And (e) *Lyaios* (Anacreontea 12.9) probably originally meant "the Loosener," i.e., the Destroyer, although as, i.a., Timotheus *Pers.* 121 κακῶν λυαία

⁵ Epigr. Hom. 14.9, on which see M. J. Milne, "The Poem Entitled Kiln," in J. V. Noble, *The Technique of Painted Attic Pottery* (New York 1965) 102-13. Σαβάκτην is the reading of Suidas s.v. *Homerus* (approb. Wilam. et Milne). R. M. Cook, "Notes on the Homeric Epigram to the Potters," *CR* 62 (1948) 56, prefers Ἀμακτον, which is found in the Paris ms. of the Herodotean Life of Homer 32, but "Unkneeded" is far too passive a name for one of these demons. Sabaktes is furthermore reinforced by the word σαβακτίδες, glossed as ὀστράκινα ζῶδια by Hesychius, for which the most reasonable suggestion (that of Boehm, "Sabaktes," *RE* 2.1, 1531f.) is that one of these ceramic statuettes was the same as the βασκάνιον glossed by Phrynichus P.S. (Bekker *Anec. Gr.* 1.30) s.v. as ἀνθρωποειδὲς κατασκεύασμα, βραχὺ παρηλλαγμένον τὴν ἀνθρωπεῖαν φύσιν, δὲ πρὸ τῶν ἐργαστρίων οἱ χειρῶνακτες κρεμαννύουσι μὴ βασκαίνεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν ἐργασίαν. (This note has benefited from discussion with Prof. Morton Smith.)

⁶ Suidas uses the infinitives; the actual cries were εὐοῖ σαβοῖ (Dem. *de Cor.* 260) and εὐοῖ σαβοῖ (Eupolis *Bapt.* fr. 84 Kock).

⁷ Similar is Schol. ad Aristoph. *Av.* 874.

⁸ H. Weil, *BCH* 19 (1895) 401, derives Βαίτες from βαίω.

(used of the Magna Mater) shows, the Greeks came to understand the word as Deliverer.

Sabazios, then, may be yet another of this group. As "cutter," "crusher," or "breaker," this is a suitable name for a god who presides over *sparagmos* and *omophagia*; more specifically, the adjective σαβακός would further convey the idea of a "cut" follower of such a god, i.e., a castrated Gallus.⁹

3 ἢ καλύβη καὶ δοῦμος ἐνέπρεπεν: Not "a simple inversion," as Gow-Page and Luck say, which translates weakly as "Trygonion is well suited to . . ." or "der Laube und Dumos wohl anstand Trygonion"; rather, between the praise entailed in ἄνθεμα and Μήτηρ ἣν ἐφίλησεν, the phrase is more naturally to be understood as in LSJ s.v. ἐμπρέπω 2 "to be conspicuous or famous"; cf. esp. Pindar *Pyth.* 8.28 (Aegina) ἄνδρασι ἐμπρέπει. Trygonion, that is, did not merely fit into this society in a clubable way, he was its leading light.

5 ἀμφιγυναικῶν: Gow-Page follow Paton loc. cit. in reading ἡμιγ., the very word used of a Gallus in *A.P.* 6.217 ("Simonides"), but I prefer Theiler's hesitantly proposed ἀμφιγ. (*apud* Luck 286). For the sense suggested, "hinten und vorne weiblich," note some other compounds with ἀμφι- where the meaning is "X at both ends:" ἀμφι-δέξις (our "ambidextrous"), -κυρτός, -κοίλος, -μακρός. Note also ἀμφίβιος, used of Teiresias, who lived both as man and woman (*Luc. Astr.* 11), and ἀμφιγενής, "of doubtful gender" (Eustathius 668.48).

II

XXVII Gow-Page (*A.P.* 11.30)

ὁ πρὶν ἐγὼ καὶ πέντε καὶ ἑννέα, νῦν, Ἀφροδίτη,
ἐν μόλις ἐκ πρώτης νυκτὸς ἐς ἥλιον.
οἷμοι καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ κατὰ βραχύ. πολλάκι δ' ἤδη
ἡμιθανὲς θνήσκει. τοῦτο τὸ Τερμέριον.

⁹ Note what may be the same root in σάβυτρος (Eupolis fr. 99 Austin = *P. Oxy.* 1803.59) and σάβυττα (Com. Adesp. 1134 Kock), each defined by Hesychius and Photius as both *ἐρησέως εἶδος* and *γυναικείον αἰδοῖον*, the latter of which is also given as the meaning of σαβαρίχης (Teleclides fr. 64 Kock) by Photius. For the idea that a woman is cut at the genitals, cf. *A.P.* 11.262.2 *τεμνομένην*, and Rufus Ephes. 147.5 (of a woman's genitals) ἡ δὲ τομὴ σχίσμα.

ὦ γῆρας γῆρας, τί ποθ' ὕστερον ἦν ἀφίκηαι
ποίησεις, ὅτε νῦν ὦδε μαραινόμεθα;

5

3 τοῦτ' αὐτό Jacobs τοῦτο P Τερμέριον Pausw τερμόριον P

Gow-Page, like others before them,¹⁰ unhappy with the contiguity of two *thn*-stems, altered the former to ἡμιθαλές, which cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged. The first observation to be made is that Philodemus prefers coyness to explicitness, as was noticed here by Kaibel:¹¹ No verb in the first sentence, and no noun for πέντε, ἔννεα, or ἔν;¹² merely the pronoun τοῦτο in the next sentence; and a change of subject, still unexpressed, in the next sentence (as we punctuate). For all this, however, the diminuendo of the impotent lover remains clear: What he used to do up to nine times before he now does only once, with difficulty (μόλις); and the thing itself, the act from start to finish, lasts but a short time (κατὰ βραχύ);¹³ and already half-dead his member often dies altogether.¹⁴

This is indeed a "calamity" (and much more than Gow-Page's "last straw"), a meaning for *Termerion* found in late Greek lexica, which mistakenly derive the phrase Τερμέρια κακά (= μεγάλα κακά) from Termerium, where prisoners were kept (Suidas, Photius). But, as Kaibel and others have recognized, Philodemus' reference is to the Termeros who used to kill people by butting them with his head until he had his head broken by Theseus (Plut. *Thes.* 11). What the commentators have failed to point out is the particular appropriateness of the image. That is, a *Termerion kakon* is the punishment that fits the

¹⁰ Boissonade read ἡμιπνέες, Jacobs ἡμιπνέες (both *apud* Dübner).

¹¹ As he does in I.5 Gow-Page (*A.P.* 5.4), reading φίλη, followed by aposiopesis. Cf. also *A.P.* 5.184.5 (Meleager LXXII Gow-Page) and 9.241.5 (Antipater LII); also Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1178, Theocr. 1.105, Herodas 1.84. For this technique of euphemistic ellipsis in Latin poetry, see J. N. Adams, "A Type of Sexual Euphemism in Latin," *Phoenix* 35 (1981) 120-28.

¹² Gow-Page ad loc. say that "for πέντε = πεντάκις, see Asclepiades 5.181.11," but I think that they are wrong in both instances.

¹³ I do not know why Gow-Page think that μόλις and κατὰ βραχύ are "essentially synonymous expressions"; for the former, cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 509 Θρήκην περάσαντες μόγις πολλῶ πόνῳ, where obviously they were not moving with great speed; for the latter, cf. Philod. *Rhet.* 1.273 (fr. XII.10f.) Sudhaus καθόσον [τὸ] διαλέγεσθαι ταῦτο τ[ῷ] κ[ατὰ] βραχύ.

¹⁴ So much is death on his mind that Philodemus wonders what old age will bring if it comes (not "when," as Gow-Page translate). Kaibel compares Ov. *Am.* 3.7.65f. *nostra tamen iacere velut praemortua membra.*

crime, as is certainly the case in Philodemus, where that which has done the butting has had its κεφαλή "die."¹⁵

DAVID SIDER

QUEENS COLLEGE, NEW YORK



PROPERTIUS 4.3.94: AN APPENDIX

In a note entitled "Propertius 4.7.94: a reply" (*AJP* 102 [1981] 326) J. C. Yardley points out, taking issue with J. W. Allison (*ibid.* 101 [1980] 171), that the resemblance between this line (*mecum eris, et mixtis ossibus ossa teram*) and *Carm. Epigr.* (Buecheler) 1136.2 *ossibus hic uxor miscuit ossa meis* had already been noticed by others, including P. Fedeli in his commentary on Book IV (1965) and Yardley himself in *BICS* 24 (1977) 83.

If you are going to discuss Propertian echoes or parallels in post-Ovidian verse, there are two places you can ill afford not to visit. One is C. Hosius' introduction to his third (Teubner) edition (1932). His list, with some additions by G. B. A. Fletcher, was reproduced in P. J. Enk's edition of *Monobiblos* (1946); but Hosius also included in brackets Ovidian or pre-Ovidian references relevant to the several Propertian references, and these were not taken over by Enk.

The other place is my article "Echoes of Propertius" in *Mnemos.* 5 (1952) 307-31, containing some three hundred references missing in Hosius-Enk.

Fedeli had evidently been to Hosius. Five of his seven Latin parallels to 4.7.94, including *Carm. Epigr.* 1136.2, are there. However, this is not in Hosius' main list, but is cited on p. XXI n. 1. Enk gives only a reference to Hosius' footnote, and that is presumably why Allison was unaware of it. Fedeli adds two Ovidian passages, *Ars* 3.21 and *Met.* 11.706. These, with the addition of two prose inscriptions,¹

¹⁵ Κεφαλή is often "of things, extremity" (LSJ II); more particularly, punning on κεφαλή/φαλή/φαλλός (which may underlie Philodemus' reference to Termeros) goes back at least as far as Aristophanes' *Triphales*, where several examples may be found in the fragments (553, 554, 557); cf. J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (New Haven 1975) 112f., as well as Kock's note on the title, *CAF* 1.528f.

¹ Dessau *ILS* 8469 and 8640 (the latter apparently a false reference).

account for Yardley's citations in his *BICS* article and now again in *AJP*.

As for "Echoes of Propertius," the researcher whose tireless zeal carries him so far (perhaps helped along his dusty way by a signpost *sub versu* in *Propertiana* [1956; repr. 1967] p. 296), will be thus modestly rewarded in the section headed "CARMINA EPIGRAPHICA":

Prop. 4.7.94	mecum eris, et mixtis ossibus ossa teram
<i>Carm. Epigr.</i> 1225.10.	mecum semper eris
<i>Carm. Epigr.</i> 2023.2	et memores estis vos nobiscum esse
<i>Carm. Epigr.</i> 1571.2	C. Bellienus Fructus ossibus ossa dedit

To Hosius' parallels add Ov. *Met.* 11.706f. *si non / ossibus ossa meis at nomen nomine tangam.*²

Apparently neither Fedeli (despite his citation of Ov. *Met.* 11.706) nor Allison nor Yardley have been there. Has anybody? Yes, Zorka Popova: see her *Influence de Properce sur Carmina Latina Epigraphica* (Sofia 1974 p. 59; *Annuaire de l'Université de Sofia* 67.1 1973), p. 59. She writes in Bulgarian and I owe the reference to Professor J. Linderski.

D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY



REMNANTS OF THE PRONOMINAL GENITIVE SINGULAR -l

Latin *olim* means 'some time ago' and also 'hereafter, some time in the future.' The basing point is therefore the present, 'now.' The meaning of *olim* must be *'from now, from this time.'

The morphology appears to involve -*im* 'from, away,' as in *illim* etc. Phonologically *ōl-* could be **ouel-*;¹ cf. *nōnus* < **noyen-o-* < **neyen-o-*, reshaped from **neyn-o-*. In turn it is possible that **ouel* could go back to **euēl*. Whichever of these two, it is now possible to analyze **ou-el* or **eu-el* as an ancient genitive singular of the pronoun

² 1136.2 is absent as having been already cited by Hosius.

¹ Ernout-Meillet *DELL* suggest a connexion with *olle*, but the length of *ō* makes this impossible.

base seen in Slavic *ov-*, especially in western South Slavic (Slovene *óv*, Serbo-Croatian *ovāj ovō* 'this,' Makedonski *ova* 'this [neuter]'), Lithuanian *aurė* 'voilà,'² Iranian *ava-*. The genitive in *-el* would match that which is now well known from Anatolian for the pronominal declension; cf. Hittite *ki-(e-)el* /*kēl*/ 'of this,' *ku-e-el* /*kwēl*/ 'whose,' *ši-i-e-el* /*sēl*/ 'eius,' *a-pí-(e-)el* /*apēl*/ 'illius' = Lydian *bil* 'eius.'

It is generally agreed that the base in *semel* is that which is attested in Greek *εἷς ἕν* and in *semper*. But the ending has been found obscure; a neuter **sem-li* (Kent, *The Forms of Latin* [1946] 76 ¶ 324 II) is not likely. I propose that we have here another fossilized pronominal³ genitive singular, **sem-el*.

The adjective *sōlus* has remained without an explanation. If we resolve this phonologically as **seuel-o-* we find a thematization of an old genitive **s(e)ue-l* 'by oneself,' formed on the base of the reflexive **s(u)e*. To this formation we may juxtapose Greek *φίλος*, on which I have written, *BSL* (in press).

It is appropriate from the point of view of form-class for *sōlus* to have a pronominal background, since, as we know well, this adjective shows notable synchronic features of pronominal inflexion. In fact, when we observe this point of continuity it may be that we can understand more fully the motivation for the remarkable growth of Latin pronominal *-ius* genitive (cf. Leumann [1977] 477). When we recall the productivity of *-l-* adjectives of appurtenance in early Latin it is seen that at a particular time the function and semantics of an extended *-l-* genitive would have been virtually identical with those of an IE **-ios* derivative. We may therefore reasonably regard the *-ius* genitive as a direct continuation of the pronominal *-l-* genitive.

We may finally speculate that Latin preserves a reflex of the Hittite pronominal genitive *da-me-(e-)el* /*tamēl*/ 'other's, alius' (to *da-ma-iš* /*tamais*/ 'other'). For the common Latin lexeme *famulus* *famula* 'servant,' collective *familia*, Ernout-Meillet have no solution: "Les autres langues indo-européennes n'offrent aucun rapprochement. On peut se demander si le mot, dont la forme n'est guère indo-européenne, n'est pas emprunté, peut-être à l'étrusque⁴ qui a dû fournir aux langues italiques des mots de cette sorte." This is, of

² See my remarks, *International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics* 17 (1974) 7.

³ Note that *ūnus* is declined pronominally; my colleague Howard Berman points out that the Hittite numeral 'one' is written with a genitive in *-el*.

⁴ Rejected by Walde-Hofmann s.v.

course, a bankrupt appeal to ignorance. The phonological form, it is known, is furthermore problematic: Oscan and Paelignian both show *famel*, with no apparent thematic nominative; this has led to a certain amount of discussion of Oscan reduction of final syllables, i.e. syncope with absorption of -s, and that is perfectly possible. However, the existence of the Old Latin form *famul* makes it equally possible that the original form was simply **famel*. Yet I think it is not now crucial for our present point to decide whether the Proto-Italic (sic!) form was **famel* or the thematic **famel-o-(s)*. The important point is that we reconstruct **dh()mel(-o-)*; i.e. we have the old genitive, ultimately thematized.

Now to the semantics. We know from Festus, "*famuli origo ab Oscis dependet*." He of course spoke here of the etymon *famulus*; but perhaps what is being conveyed is the content or meaning of *famulus* = *famel* (Osc.). We are told by Festus that *seruus* was called *famel* by the Oscans. This is a question either of social equivalence or identification that we cannot undertake to argue here. However, we know that in Rome, with or without *seruī*, *famulī* or *familia* were reckoned as a component of a household. On the other hand, *famulī* were surely not members of the blood-descent of the household—a *domus* that among the Indo-Europeans projected great importance upon this trait of blood-descent, and bequeathed this trait of cultural value to the Romans. It would be natural, then, to find a severe dichotomy between the members of the household who descended by a blood line, the true kin, or by marriage and those stable members (servants, etc.) who descended from lines outside. The latter would be naturally identified as originating, or belonging, outside: they were those who "belonged to others." Thus they were "other's," **dh()m-el*. From the point of view of blood or marriage the **dh()m-el* > *famel* was *aliēnus*. Within the household they formed a social group—*familia*.

The Hittite vocalism is ambiguous; the first syllable could be **o* or **a* or **ṛ*. The Italic points to **dhṃel* = *dhmH-el*, or **dhāmel*.

ERIC P. HAMP

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



REVIEWS

NETTA ZAGAGI. Tradition and Originality in Plautus: Studies of the Amatory Motifs in Plautine Comedy. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980. Pp. 159. Paper, DM 34.00. (*Hypomnemata*, 62)

The perennial debate over what is Greek and what Roman in the comedies of Plautus is like the battle over Patroklos' body: each side wants the hero's armor, leaving the other with a lifeless body. Even this century's most important work on Plautine "originality" (an inappropriate critical term for any study of Greek or Roman literature¹), Fraenkel's *Plautinisches im Plautus* (1922) did not stop the *agon* for very long. Though he argued with great skill that certain stylistic elements and characterizations were unique to the Latin playwright, his views were almost immediately challenged (e.g. by Prescott, *CP* 1924) and have, in one way or another, been under fire ever since. Of course, Fraenkel wrote when only a few large fragments and many snippets of New Comedy were extant. Scholars who today deal with the same problems can consult a full-fledged OCT Menander and a 760-page commentary by Gomme and Sandbach. Among the new material published in the sixties was a papyrus containing forty-four lines from the Menandrian model for Plautus' *Bacchides*. For the first time since Gellius, scholars could make a direct comparison between the text of a Roman comedy and its actual source. In his analysis of the two passages (*Menander & Plautus: A Study in Comparison* [London 1968]), E. W. Handley demonstrated various indisputable aspects of the "Plautinising" process. Several of his conclusions gave concrete support to stylistic theories Fraenkel had conceived by sheer intuition. On the other hand, with such a wealth of new Greek material, it was inevitable that Fraenkel should be proved incorrect on some of his points. Indeed, he himself modified certain of his views in the addenda to Munari's Italian translation of *Plautinisches* (1960).

Netta Zagagi's richly documented monograph (based on her Oxford doctoral dissertation) questions some of Fraenkel's conclusions. This is no mere exercise in iconoclasm, but a genuine attempt to clarify the notion of what exactly "Plautine" should connote to scholars living in the 1980s.

The first chapter focusses on Plautus' frequent mythological comparisons *kath' hyperochēn*, e.g. such remarks as "*superavit dolum Troianum atque Ulixem Pseudolus*" (line 1244). This is so prominent a rhetorical feature in the plays of Plautus that its subsequent usage is hardly surprising. For example, Romeo so reveres Juliet that in comparison "Dido's a dowdy, Cleopatra's a gypsy, Helen and Hero hildings and harlots" (II.iv.41 ff.).

¹ Cf. Ter. *Eun.* 41; Hor. *AP* 128-30. Indeed neither Latin nor Greek has a precise term equivalent to our modern notion of "originality."

Finding no precedent in Attic comedy for this figure, Fraenkel deemed it pure Plautine invention. But Zagagi adduces a multitude of examples from Greek tragedy (mostly Euripides), philosophy, epigram, paroemiography, Hellenistic poetry, the newly-found Menandrian papyri and even a few traces in Old Comedy.² What is peculiar to Plautus is not the trope itself, but its frequency and the nature of its grammatical structure. Hyperbole in Greek mythological comparisons is usually expressed in short phrases with an adjective or adverb in the comparative degree, whereas "Plautus preferred the relatively uncommon construction with verbs denoting superiority [sc. *superare*, *anteire*, *antecedere*]" (p. 52). This, Zagagi argues, is quite consistent with Plautus' style which typically strives for "aggrandizement (Glorifizierung) of his characters and their experiences" (p. 17).

And yet, in "correcting" Fraenkel, Zagagi seems to have overlooked an important question to which her impressive evidence gives rise. It has long been accepted that Terence was an artistic anomaly and that the other authors of *palliatae* (Livius, Naevius, Ennius, Caecilius(etc.) wrote in what is commonly thought of as "Plautine style." Yet nowhere in the extant comic fragments do we find the slightest trace of a mythological comparison *kath' hyperochēn*.³ Plautus seems to have been unique in his predilection for this rhetorical figure—regardless of its provenance.

Her second chapter offers a close analysis of two amatory *cantica* (*Cist.* 203–28 and *Trin.* 223–75), each sung by a lovesick *adulescens*. Here Zagagi falls into the traditional trap of trying to separate Plautinisches from Attisches without having any of the Greek originals. Though her arguments for what are Plautine additions are persuasive, she is still on shaky ground when she speculates about possible non-dramatic Greek precedents. Take, for example, a statement like:

Plautus appears to have expanded the monologue not so much by introducing ideas of his own or of his contemporaries as by drawing upon Erotic motifs shared by his Attic models and Hellenistic love poetry. It is therefore within the framework of Greek Erotic traditions that Plautus' independence of Menander tends to be centred. (p. 82).

Zagagi believes "Hellenistic poetry may also have influenced Plautus, albeit indirectly" (p. 89). But what concrete evidence have we that Plautus read Callimachus and the Alexandrians—or anything except New Comedy and some Attic or Hellenistic Tragedy? Granted her identification of parallels is interesting, but is this *ipso facto* proof that they were actual models for

² Yet both Fraenkel and Zagagi seem to have overlooked Aristophanes *Ach.* 418ff., wherein Dikaipolis appeals to Euripides for "rags" so that he can appear *athlioteros* than a whole gallery of mythical heroes—Oeneus, Phoenix, Philoctetes and Belleroophon. At last Euripides agrees to let him have the garb of Telephus, so he can be *althliotatos* (436).

³ Perhaps the closest example is Trabea 1–5 R³: *Fortunam ipsam antiebo fortunis meis*. For a thoughtful study of the entire genre, see J. Wright, *Dancing in Chains: The Stylistic Unity of the Comoedia Palliata* (Rome 1974).

Plautus? In the absence of the pertinent papyri, we cannot unequivocally accept her conclusion that the Latin playwright's use of the Greek Erotic tradition "was one of the most important aspects of Plautus' originality" (p. 105).

Chapter III will please Latinists since it demonstrates how Plautus "Romanized" his imagery by recasting Greek amatory motifs into specifically Roman legal terminology. Moreover, "there is no parallel for this merging of juridical and amatory themes . . . in Greek Erotic traditions" (p. 117). Zagagi notes that the remarkable frequency of legal formulae in Plautus suggests that it must have been regularly employed in contemporary colloquial speech.⁴

In addition to an impressive command of Greek literature, Professor Zagagi now demonstrates an admirable acquaintance with the finer points of Roman Law. And Fraenkel is here evoked to support her argument. After many instructive examples of Latin "juridicisations" of New Comedy repartee, she concludes, "What is notable about the Plautinisations under discussion here is that they represent a world of love primarily Roman in tenor . . . could they not be considered as showing us a comic reflection of scenes taken from Roman life?" (p. 131). It might have been apposite to note that similar legalistic language appears in Roman tragedy as well.⁵

This volume marks an impressive scholarly debut even if, in the thorny matter of Roman originality, the final word still remains Fraenkel's:

Io non credo che nella letteratura latina, tanto poesia che prosa, ci siano elementi strutturali (cioè mezzi di costruzione e di articolazione in grande e in piccolo, ivi comprese anche le formule d'introduzione, di transizione e di conclusione), di cui si possa con probabilità dimostrare che sono stati inventati da un Romano. Un più attento esame finirà sempre per rilevare che alla base ci sono modelli greci, che in molti casi furono trasformati dai Romani e a Roma talvolta ricevettero un'impronta destinata a rimanere nei secoli (p. 424).

Fraenkel may stand corrected, but he still stands.

ERICH SEGAL

YALE UNIVERSITY

⁴This observation is also made by G. Rotelli, "Ricerca di un criterio metodologico per l'utilizzazione di Plauto," *BIDR* 75 (1972) 97-132, who argues that every Plautine play contains at least 150 references to legal matters.

⁵See Cataldo Rocco, "Tecnicismi sacrali e legali nelle tragedie di Ennio," *Pan* 1 (1973) 59-68. The author's hypothesis on why Ennius "juridicised" his tragic verse parallels Zagagi's explanation of Plautus' purpose: "per rendere più autorevoli le parole . . . che in tal modo diveniva più vivo e più vicino agli stessi spettatori" (p. 67).

J. M. SNYDER. Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*. Amsterdam, Grüner, 1980. Pp. 151. Fl. 52.00.

After Paul Friedländer's brilliant discovery of the "atomologies" governing the pattern of sound in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* ("The Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory in Lucretius," *AJP* 62 [1941] 16-34), a study such as this was inevitable. And, as J. M. Snyder amply demonstrates, it was also necessary. Friedländer left the exploitation and documentation of his fundamental insights to future readers of Lucretius (p. 24), and the surprise is that a full study of the puns and poetry of the *De Rerum Natura* was nearly forty years in coming. Snyder's work adds greatly to the repertory of Lucretian "atomologies," but even then it leaves something to future readers of the poem, for it is far from complete. Its lack of completeness is hardly a defect, for there will never be complete agreement on the extent to which Lucretius' etymological thought informs the patterns of sound in the *De Rerum Natura*. What Snyder demonstrates in detail is the pattern Friedländer left in outline: "The atomistic doctrine of language provided Lucretius with a rational bond with which to connect his most personal pattern of sound with the philosophy he professed." So Friedländer in 1941 (p. 30). "Far from being accidental, out of place, or pointless, as some of the commentators would have us think, his word-plays nearly always contribute significantly either to the meaning of a particular passage or, in a broader sense, to the exposition of several important themes of the poem." So Snyder, with abundant evidence to support her conclusion, in 1980 (p. 146). If these companion studies have done nothing else, they have made it impossible to divorce the sound of the *De Rerum Natura* from its sense and they make the critical terms Wortwitz and jingle ring hollow (cf. Diels, *Elementum* [1889] 6 on the *elementum*-paradigm, and Bailey, *Lucretius* [1947] I 158).

Snyder's first chapter is, as it should be, on the Epicurean theory of language which provides the philosophical justification for Lucretius' elaborate practice of "atomology." Her next topic is the "atomology" which connects the letters or *elementa* of the Latin language with the invisible elements of the universe. This fundamental model of the world writ large in the word of the *De Rerum Natura* is given the prominence it deserves. In a third chapter, Snyder demonstrates what Friedländer suggested in passing (pp. 21-22): Lucretius is an Epicurean in his "atomologies," but he is also a Roman in his penchant for etymological play and, indeed, some of his etymologies are confirmed by the paronomasia of Plautus and Naevius, and by the sober science of Varro. But Lucretius has better reason than other Romans for the connections he draws between the sounds of his language: his sound is more often than not sound sense. It is in her discussion of the background to Lucretius' etymologies in both Greek and Latin authors that Snyder establishes the classification of puns that informs her next chapter, "Lucretian Puns: Types and Functions" (pp. 67-68 and 74-121). Here problems arise, for her sense of modern, "scientific" etymology makes for distinctions that are alien to the practice of the *De Rerum Natura* (and all of Greek and Latin literature). Her typology is threefold: 1) the *figura etymologica*; 2) paronomasia; and 3) double entendre. These categories have a background in ancient rhetoric, but the fine line between the first two of these is the line Solomon drew across the infant. We will return to its wisdom and justice.

In a final chapter, Professor Snyder offers a just assessment of the serious contribution of verbal play to the *De Rerum Natura*. Here she distinguishes for the first time in her study between puns which are "thematic" and puns which are "rhetorical" (p. 144). This, I take it, is a distinction between sounds related by an underlying sense and sounds which are the accidents of alliteration. Essentially, it is a distinction between the *coniuncta* and the *eventa* in the language of the *De Rerum Natura*. It is to this first kind of pun that Snyder returns our attention. And here precisely is the contribution of this careful and attentive study. In her discussions of the *elementum*-paradigm, the large connections between *lignum* and *ignis*, *mater*, *terra*, *materies*, and Venus (*Venus/venire*; *Venus/venenum*) Snyder shows the large patterns of "atomology" which inform the argument of the *De Rerum Natura*. (To the complex associations of Venus, pp. 133–35, I would add the association with *ver* in 5.737.) Snyder has read and reread the poem with a rare alertness to its conjunction of sound and sense, *auribus arrectis*. And with a keen sense for the meaning of sound. Friedländer's study had pointed the way, as had Lucretius:

I 402 verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci
 sunt, per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute.

The reader will discover in this study much more than a repertory of Lucretian "atomologies." There is, for example, the larger pattern which Snyder detects in the use Lucretius makes of his poem as the visible model for the invisible nature of things: "Lucretius has led his student gradually from the elements of words to the elements of reality" (p. 46). She has a sharp sense for significant detail, such as the effect of the elisions at 3.329 which render, by the bridges of sound, the conception of a unified soul (*animi atque animae*, cf. p. 98 and *ad Hdt.* 63). Her awareness of the *omen* in names is often revealing of Lucretius' acute sensitivity to etymology (cf. her remarks on Scipiadus, 3.1034, and Heraclitus as *clarus*, 1.638–39, as well as her earlier "The Significant Name in Lucretius," *CW* 72 [1978] 227–30. I would balk at accepting her connection of Epicurus and *decurso* at 3.1042 and refer to Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 2 col. V 7 Chilton. And for the name Empedocles (and ἐμπεδοκῆς), I would note the contrast with 1.741). Indeed, etymology is present even by its absence; the etymological connection between *avis* and *avia* impinges even when one of the two terms is absent, as in 2.145: et variae *volucres* nemora *avia* pervolitant (cf. p. 117, and the etymology of Averno in 3.740–41, *avibus contraria cunctis*, where the etymology seems explained by the Varroian principle of *lucus a non lucendo*). There is much more which makes this book a valuable companion to Lucretius.

But there are, too, a number of problems. One of the most serious is the consequence of the author's seemingly elegant distinction between the *figura etymologica* and *paronomasia* (with its subcategory of Etymological Paronomasia, pp. 102–8). How is the reader of Lucretius to tell the two apart? Obviously by his sense of Lucretius' awareness of an etymological connection between two words of similar sound. But is his sense Lucretius' sense? For Snyder the connection between *deicit ictos* in 5.1125 is a *figura etymologica*, despite the lack of an etymological connection (cf. p. 84 and n. 15). But the conjunction of *mors/morbus* and *funditus/fundere* is classed as an example of paronomasia (pp. 101–2). The author's comment on this last is: "The two

words are, of course, from entirely separate roots, but it is clear that by the *etymological standards of the first century B.C.* they were regarded as related (p. 101 and n. 37, emphasis mine). But what other standards do we really have? Our paronomasia is Lucretius' etymology. This confusion points to one of the greatest needs for the Classicist who wants to understand Greek and Latin as these languages were understood by their speakers: we do not need still another etymological dictionary of Greek or Latin; we need an etymological dictionary which will record for us Greek and Roman practice.

A curious linguistic phenomenon is recorded in some of the passages Snyder reproduces. It is, at first blush, difficult to reconcile with the Epicurean theory of the origins of language which explains the babel of separate tongues which arise naturally out of the peculiar response of each nation to its own local experience (*ad Hdt.* 75-76, cf. pp. 12-14). Snyder sees it in the associations of Latin adjectives and Greek proper nouns, as in the case of *callida Calliope* and *clarus Heraclitus* (6.93 and 1.639). It also seems present in *Tartara taetra* (5.1126), *mel* and *melos* (1.938-47 and 2.412, although the two words are not directly juxtaposed), and just possibly we have the suggestion of ἀπειρία in the juxtaposition *avia Pieridum* (1.926). Are such associations accidental, or are they *coniuncta* which connect Greek and Roman experience in some common ground? For this possibility, consider Poseidonios T 89 Edelstein and Kidd.

This study might have had a longer title. This title is suggested at its conclusion where Professor Snyder speaks of punning, poetry, and philosophy (p. 144). The three terms are, as the author suggests, "interwoven threads in the fabric of Lucretius' epic" (again, p. 144). The punnic thread of puns can be drawn out even further and it remains possible to pull a little harder to reveal more of the thread of philosophy. I conclude my report on this admirable and sensitive study with four brief observations on the word which is missing from its alliterative title. Two of these are prompted by Professor Snyder's treatment of the Epicurean conception of language. She begins with the three paragraphs of the *Letter to Herodotus* on the origin of language (75-76, pp. 12-15), but such a study could begin with its opening and Epicurus' injunction that philosophers must look to the first conception suggested by each word (ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι, 38). It is just this first or original conception that Lucretius looked to in his etymologies and his attention to what is etymologically first in his language is obvious from the beginning of the poem where *natura* means birth (1.21) and his new term for the primary forms of matter, *primordia* (1.55) is explained by its etymology: *quod ex illis sunt omnia primis* (1.61). *Coniuncta* and *eventa* have the same explanation (1.451-58) and Lucretius is explicit on why he chooses this last word with its primary meaning in mind: *haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare* (1.458). A second observation goes back to the *Letter to Herodotus* and Epicurus' brief and difficult treatment of the importation of words from one language into another (76). Lucretius is the perfect example of the person who imports new concepts into his own language (cf. 1.134-45). His sustained illustrations of the working of these things which lie outside the experience of his own language (and senses)—οὐ συνορώμενα πράγματα—are the product of his thought on how best to express new truths in his own language κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἐρμηνεύσαι (*ad Hdt.* 76). Some terms

he is forced to import in their Greek form, *homoeomeria*, for example (1.830). Others he introduces by analogy. Elephants are elephants, but also *Lucae boves* (5.1302 and 1339; Varro, *LL* 7.389). So the atoms are brought into Latin as they are writ large in the letters or *elementa* of the *De Rerum Natura*.

This brings us to a third observation. Snyder believes that Lucretius might have owed this model for the working of the atoms in motion to Democritus (pp. 46–51 and 145). She could well have pointed to Democritus' well known illustration of the mechanism of atomic combinations in the transformations which produce *τραγωδία* and *κωμωδία* out of the same set of letters (*DK* 67 A 9). But there is no indication that Democritus (or Leucippus) made his own writings the model for the workings of the atomic world writ large. Lucretius did and he displayed this model in the text of the poem itself, *nostris in versibus ipsis* (1.800). (It is precisely this consideration that makes nonsense of Diels' hypothesis that Lucretius owed this "fundamentale Anschauung" to contemporary Epicureans, *Elementum* [1899] 8–14.) And this brings us to a final observation. Lucretius' example of the changes effected by the shifting of the 21 letters of the Latin alphabet—*lignum* and *ignis: atque eadem paulo inter se mutata creare | ignis et lignum* (1.912–13; and cf. Pliny, *NH* 37.42 for the native valence between the two words). Snyder acutely notices that the words *gigni* and *tigna* are part of this illustration (pp. 129–33). What she does not see is the philosophical model linking *ignis* and *lignum* as *coniuncta* in the language of the poem. It is suggested in the very language she reproduces (pp. 86, 130–32) and most remarkably in Lucretius' suggestion of how sensation and life can flare up from inanimate matter, as fire from wood cf. 2.879–85). *Accensi sensus* (2.944) is still another Lucretian "atomology." At this point in his argument, Lucretius has brought us to see in the language and transformations of the *De Rerum Natura* itself a solution to one of the most difficult problems of a materialistic philosophy, ancient or modern: not only does his *De Rerum Natura* stand as the model for the simple and potent mechanism of the transformations in this world; its meaning is related to its sound (cf. the key terms *sonitu et re* in 1.826), as fire is related to wood, and life and sensation to inanimate matter. (I offer some illustrations for this last in *AJP* 101 [1980] 354–55.)

To complain about the lack of an index to this valuable study of Lucretius' language might seem ungenerous. It is a very useful guide to one of the most striking features of Lucretius' philosophical poetry and an index (of passages and etymologies) would make it all the more useful, especially for the reader who thinks that he has just discovered a new "atomology" in the nature of things.

DISKIN CLAY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

CEDRIC WHITMAN, tr. *Fifteen Odes of Horace*. With a Foreword by Michael Putnam. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980. Pp. 51. \$12.00.

Cedric Whitman, Professor of Greek for many years at Harvard, was a poet in his own right. He liked to read Horace with his students. At his death, he left in typescript translations of fifteen Odes (1.5; 9; 13; 17; 25; 37; 2.8; 13; 3.10; 11 13; 4.1; 3; 7; 11). Thanks to his widow and his friends these accomplished renderings can now be enjoyed by a wider public.

Horace is difficult to translate into any language, it would seem to me; mainly because the moods he creates cannot be recreated in another medium, and also because we cannot feel the metre, hear the music (which he probably composed himself) the way a contemporary could.

But the challenge remains, and Cedric Whitman has been remarkably successful. I like 'roses, roses' for *multa rosa* in 1.5 and, in 1.25 'your house door hugs / Its post and threshold, / Where once it swung compliantly on ready hinges' for *amat . . . ianua limen / quae prius multum faciles mouebat / cardines*. The last stanza of 4.7 'Diana never has freed her chaste Hippolytus / From that infernal dark, / Nor mighty Theseus broken oblivion's chain that binds / Pirithous whom he loved' is very fine, but perhaps 'cannot free' and 'cannot break' would be better. 'Earth runs her course of change' for *mutat terra uices* in 4.7.3 is magnificent.

I feel less happy about 'Fierce mother of soft love' for *dulcium / mater saeua Cupidinum* in 4.1, and 'I dwell in awe / Of gods and muses dwelling near their heart' (1.17) for *dis pietas mea / et musa cordi est* seems one of a few misunderstandings of the text; 'callow hope of spirit shared' (4.1) for *spes animi credula mutui* cannot be right: *animus* surely is 'urge' or (sexual) 'desire,' not 'spirit.'

Cedric Whitman's love for the Latin poet and his own poetic gift are evident on every page. The book has been beautifully produced by the Stinehour Press, Vermont.

GEORG LUCK

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BETTY ROSE NAGLE. *The Poetics of Exile: Program and Polemic in the Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto of Ovid*. Bruxelles, Latomus, 1980. Pp. 184. Paper: 750.00 F. (*Collection Latomus*, 170)

As N. correctly notes, "Literary criticism of the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* . . . remains one of the last frontiers of classical scholarship." Her exploration of that frontier is therefore all the more to be welcomed and deserves some detailed consideration, but first several general observations on the book might be in order.

The most important contribution of the work is its recognition that Ovid's poetry from exile deserves study as poetic composition, not just as autobiography. A second strong point is N.'s convincing analysis of the continuity of the exilic poetry—both with Ovid's own earlier work and with other elegy. One drawback of the book is a lack of consistency in methodology; the

critical premisses and procedures of the study are not quite clear. In this regard, however, it must be said that the summaries concluding each chapter are quite helpful in clarifying the case N. is trying to present.

The book begins with a brief bibliographical essay, discussing work on Ovid's exilic poetry since 1958. The body of the study is then divided into three chapters entitled, "What: Subject and Genre," "Why: Aims and Addressees," and "How and How Well: Methods and Results." Each of these chapters merits some specific attention.

In Chapter I, N. argues that Ovid's decision to write elegies from exile represents both a symbolic break with his immediately preceding works and a continuity with his earlier amatory poetry. N. stresses Ovid's adaptation of amatory motifs to the situation of the exile (the elegiac *domina* becomes Ovid's wife, *Amor pharetratus* becomes the *Getes pharetratus*, etc.). This illuminating observation leads N. to trace several elegiac motifs and their exilic counterparts. Lacking, however, are thoughts on the implications of this narrative transformation. In carrying over to exile the themes of erotic elegy, is Ovid simply ringing another set of changes on the pun of *Roma/amor*?

N. includes here sensitive comparisons to other elegy, particularly the Catullan corpus. Thus she illustrates Ovid's continuity with an elegiac mode that need not be limited to strictly amatory themes. The importance of Propertius IV in this regard is given only glancing notice, however, and Ovid's own *Fasti* is disregarded. The first chapter also includes an extensive exposition of the theme of exile-as-death (both physical and poetic). Suggestive but, to this reader, less convincing is the attempt to prove an influence of Cicero's letters from exile on Ovid's exilic themes. N.'s claim that, "In the exilic poems, for the first time in his career, Ovid chooses to mention the actual labor of writing poetry," (p. 36) is incorrect. Throughout the *Fasti*, Ovid self-consciously treats the labor of his craft and is quite explicit about the actual process of composition.

N.'s second chapter raises the most important question about the exilic poetry, one raised obsessively by the poet himself: Why write it at all? N.'s first argument is closely related to the preceding chapter: Why write? Because of poetic *utilitas*, a notion adapted from erotic elegy. Far more important is N.'s contention that a meaningful answer to this question must be literary, not biographical. Yet N. herself, both here and later, fails to accept fully the implications of this position. For example, N. rightly insists that "Ovid's use of the theme of *solacium in litteris* is literary and not really psychological or philosophical" (p. 100). Yet she asserts that the poet continues to write because, "By immersing himself in fantasies of Rome, Ovid can forget, temporarily, his actual surroundings" (p. 99). Surely the latter provides a psychological, not a literary interpretation. (This problem recurs later, when N. speculates on Ovid's need "to make his apology to Augustus convincing" (p. 124), or explains that the exilic poems are monotonous because, "Monotony is the unavoidable product of constantly unpleasant surroundings and a constant desire to improve them" (p. 132). Such assertions seem to violate N.'s own alleged critical principles.) Finally, in the search for a *raison d'être* for the exilic poetry, the author turns to rather vague notions of the poet's "fantasy" and "power of imagination."

The final chapter is more marred than the second by an inconsistency between critical theory and critical practice. Included here is a strong analysis of what it means, in strictly poetic terms, for Ovid to declare that he has become "a Getic poet." But the chapter is plagued by a tendency to self-contradiction inherent in the very issues it raises. N. is concerned here with various aspects of the alleged correspondence between the poet's life-circumstances and his poetry. She examines several stances of the exilic poems, such as Ovid's apologies for the poor quality of his poetry and his unwillingness to undertake revision. She declares these stances "tendentious" and correctly characterizes them as literary *topoi*. But N. fails to take adequate account of the whole concept of a correspondence between life and art as a *topos* itself—and one which directly contradicts Ovid's own stance in *Tristia* II. There, he posits a neat dichotomy, declaring in effect, "My poems may be dirty, but my life is squeaky-clean."

The distinction between poetic *persona* and a poet's life-history is arguably the single most important critical tool in the contemporary interpretation of Roman elegy. In passing, N. once mentions the concept of *persona*. But the authorities cited (Croce, E. K. Rand, Herbert Weir Smyth) are so far from the most sophisticated theorists on the subject as to undermine confidence in N.'s grasp of the aesthetic issue. Having declared that poetic questions demand poetic solutions, N. is nevertheless tempted back to biographical answers. Thus, her study is undercut by a failure to take her own assertions seriously enough.

N.'s work first appeared as a doctoral thesis, and the present monograph retains in essence the argument of that 1975 dissertation. (Throughout the book, only two references appear to work published after 1975, with the exception of the author's own article.) Many such a work suffers from infelicities; to point them out is neither edifying nor necessary. Suffice it to say that a number of sound insights are presented here. But, on the major issue of Ovidian poetics, N. is like Dante's Vergil, who has not found the true way himself, but illumines the path for others to follow.

S. GEORGIA NUGENT

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

CLAUDIUS CLAUDIANUS. Cl. Claudiani De bello Gothico. Edizione critica, traduzione e commento di Giovanni Garuti. Bologna, Pàtron, 1979-. I.: Introduzione al De bello Gothico. Pp. 116. L. 4.500. (*Edizioni e saggi universitari di filologia classica*, 23)

Contrary to what the unwitting reader might deduce from its title, the present volume contains only the introductory material to a new, annotated edition of Claudian's celebration of Stilicho's defeat of the Goths at Pollentia in 402 A.D. It makes little pretense at originality, seeking only to provide a dossier for the study of the poem and its historical context. The book comprises the basic bibliography, an outline of what is known of the Gothic invasion, an extensive collection of excerpts from parallel sources on the events

alluded to in the poem (p. 48–50: the relevance of the extracts from the so-called Leonine Sacramentary is so tenuous that they would have better been excluded) and finally, a review of the chronology, structure and veracity of Claudian's poem.

MICHAEL McCORMICK

DUMBARTON OAKS AND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

P. COCKSHAW, M.-C. GARAND et P. JODOGNE, eds. *Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata MCMLXXIX*. Gand, E. Story-Scientia, 1979. 2 v. Pp. lvii + 608, [20] leaves of plates, ill. (*Les publications de Scriptorium*, 8)

The *Festschrift* honoring the late François Masai, one of the founding fathers of codicology, contains a number of truly exemplary studies in the fields of manuscript studies, textual and art history. Among those of interest to specialists of classical texts is E. G. Turner, "The Date of the Strasbourg Fragments of Euripides, *Alexandros*," vol. 1, 1–5 which revises the date of Strasbourg, B.n. et univ., pap. gr. 2342–2344 back to 250 B.C. This implies that the witness is anterior to the Alexandrine edition. E. G. T. further argues that in this witness, the *coronis* is used to indicate a shift in meter. The historian of Roman cursive script Jean Mallon uncovers errors in the Augusteus Virgil which show that this codex must descend from an exemplar written in the cursive hand current in the third century: "Les fautes du Virgile *Augusteus*," vol. 1, 7–10. Hubert Silvestre's thorough codicological analysis of the illustrated Brussels manuscript of Prudentius (tenth century) goes a long way toward clarifying the origin and subsequent history of this controversial witness: "A propos du *Bruxellensis* 10066–77 et de son noyau primitif," vol. 1, 131–56. P. B. Corbett, "In Defence of the Honest Scribe of H, i.e. the *Cena Trimalchionis* portion of MS Paris. lat. 7989 (= Codex Traguriensis)," (vol. 2, 389–92) offers a spirited and generally convincing defence of a number of readings of H, a scribe of "good faith and stupidity" (Gaselee). Cogent parallels are adduced, chiefly from Late Latin texts. Finally R. Desmed, "Le recueil des inscriptions relevées en Espagne par Nicolas Mameranus (1533–1535)," (vol. 2, 519–27) studies the epigraphical collection established in Spain by this Luxembourg humanist. He corrects Hübner's appraisal of Mameranus and re-establishes his priority as a source for over 100 of the inscriptions in *CIL* II, a fact which is of particular significance for the eleven inscriptions for which Mameranus is our sole independent witness.

MICHAEL McCORMICK

DUMBARTON OAKS AND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY



BOOKS RECEIVED

- ADRADOS, FRANCISCO R. *Diccionario Griego-Español*. Vol. I: α-άλλά. Madrid, Instituto "Antonio de Nebrija," 1980. Pp. clx + 155. No price stated.
- BONFANTE, LARISSA. *Out of Etruria: Etruscan Influence North and South*. Oxford, British Archaeological Reports, 1981. Pp. ii + 173, 122 ills. £10.00. (B.A.R. International Series, 103)
- BOUTROS, LABIB. *Phoenician Sport: Its Influence on the Origin of the Olympic Games*. Amsterdam, Gieben, 1981. Pp. viii + 151. Hfl. 35.00.
- DAY, JOSEPH W. *The Glory of Athens: The Popular Tradition as Reflected in the Panathenaicus of Aelius Aristides*. Chicago, Ares, 1980. Pp. xviii + 217. No price stated.
- DIETHART, JOHANNES M. *Prosopographia Arsinoitica I*. Vienna, Holinek, 1980. Pp. xviii + 389. No price stated.
- FEDELI, PAOLO. *Sesto Properzio: il primo libro delle elegie*. Florence, Olschki, 1980. Pp. 556. No price stated.
- GSCHNITZER, FRITZ. *Griechische Sozialgeschichte von der mykenischen bis zum Ausgang der klassischen Zeit*. Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1981. Pp. 189. DM 20.
- Helios*, vol. 8.2 (1981). Lubbock, Texas, Texas Tech Press, 1981. Pp. 96. No price stated.
- HILLYARD, BRIAN P. *Plutarch, De Audiendo: A Text and Commentary*. New York, Arno, 1981. Pp. xlix + 284. No price stated.
- HILTBRUNNER, OTTO. *Bibliographie zur lateinischen Wortforschung*. Band I: A-acvtvs. Bern and Munich, Francke, 1981. Pp. xxii + 298. Fr. 42.
- HINE, HARRY M. *An Edition with Commentary of Seneca, Natural Questions, Book Two*. New York, Arno, 1981. Pp. v + 488. \$55.00.

- HOUSEHOLDER, FRED W. *The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus*. Amsterdam, Benjamins, 1981. Pp. 281. No price stated. (Studies in the History of Linguistics, 23)
- KIERDORF, WILHELM. *Laudatio Funebris: Interpretationen und Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der römischen Leichenrede*. Meisenheim am Glan, Hain, 1980. Pp. x + 176. DM 60. (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 106)
- KINDSTRAND, JAN FREDERIK. *Isaac Porphyrogenitus, Praefatio in Homerum*. Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1979. Pp. 58. Sw. kr. 33.50. (Studia Graeca Upsaliensia, 14)
- KINDSTRAND, JAN FREDERIK *et al.* *An Index to Dio Chrysostomus*. Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1981. Pp. x + 481. Sw. kr. 157.00. (Studia Graeca Upsaliensia, 17)
- MACKENZIE, MARY MARGARET. *Plato on Punishment*. University of California Press, 1981. Pp. vii + 278. \$24.50.
- MARSHALL, BRUCE, ed. *Vindex Humanitatis: Essays in Honour of John Huntly Bishop*. Armidale, New Zealand, The University of New England, 1980. Pp. ix + 211. No price stated.
- MONTUORI, MARIO, ed. *De Socrate Iuste Dam nato: The Rise of the Socratic Problem in the Eighteenth Century*. Amsterdam, Gieben, 1981. Pp. 153. No price stated. (London Studies in Classical Philology, 7)
- MONTUORI, MARIO. *Socrates: Physiology of a Myth*. Amsterdam, Gieben, 1981. Pp. viii + 246. No price stated. (London Studies in Classical Philology, 6)
- MORPURGO-TAGLIABUE, G. *Demetrio: dello stile*. Rome, Ateneo, 1980. Pp. 216. L. 14.000.
- NELSON, H. L. W. *Überlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones*. Leiden, Brill, 1981. Pp. ix + 481. Guilders 144. (Studia Gaiana, 6)
- NICOLETTI, ADELE. *Sulla politica legislativa di Gordiano III Studi*. Naples, Jovene, 1981. Pp. 159. L. 6.000. (Pubblicazioni dell' facoltà giuridica dell'Università di Napoli, 121)
- PERETTI, AURELIO. *Il periplo di Scilace: studio sul primo portolano del Mediterraneo*. Pisa, Giardini, 1979. Pp. xvi + 561. L. 120.000. (Biblioteca di studi antichi, 23)

- PFAFFEL, WILHELM. *Quartus gradus etymologiae: Untersuchungen zur Etymologie Varros in "De lingua Latina."* Meisenheim am Glan, Hain, 1981. Pp. xxiv + 267. No price stated. (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 131)
- PIERINI, RITA DEGL'INNOCENTI. *Studi su Accio.* Florence, Cooperativa Editrice Universitaria, 1980. Pp. 169. No price stated.
- PIRCHER, JOSEF. *Das Lob der Frau im vorchristlichen Grabepigramm der Griechen.* Innsbruck, Wagner, 1979. Pp. 76. No price stated. (Commentationes Aenipontanae, 26)
- PUTNAM, MICHAEL C. J. *Essays on Latin Lyric, Elegy, and Epic.* Princeton University Press, 1982. Cloth, \$30.00; paper, \$7.95. (Princeton Series of Collected Essays)
- RODRIGUEZ, JENARO C. *Aspectos del vocabulario de Q. Curtius Rufus.* Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, 1980. Pp. 241. No price stated.
- SACKS, KENNETH. *Polybius on the Writing of History.* University of California Press, 1981. Pp. viii + 233. No price stated. (Classical Studies, 24)
- SEGAL, CHARLES. *Poetry and Myth in Ancient Pastoral: Essays on Theocritus and Virgil.* Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 348. No price stated. (Princeton Series of Collected Essays)
- SOLIN, HEIKKI. *Zu lukanischen Inschriften.* Helsinki, Fennica, 1981. Pp. 60, 5 pls. No price stated. (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 69)
- SORABJI, RICHARD. *Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory.* Cornell University Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 326. \$38.50.
- SORDI, MARTA, ed. *Religione e politica nel mondo antico.* Milano, Università Cattolica, 1981. Pp. ix + 277. L. 28.000. (Scienze storiche, 27)
- Supplementa Italica, nuova serie I.* Rome, Storia e Letteratura, 1981. Pp. 205. No price stated.
- SZLEZÁK, THOMAS A. *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins.* Basel and Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1979.

- VAIREL-CARRON, HÉLÈNE. *Exclamation, ordre et défense: analyse de deux systèmes syntaxiques en latin*. Paris, Belles Lettres, 1975. (Collection d'études latines)
- VERSNEL, H. S., ed. *Faith, Hope and Worship: Aspects of Religious Mentality in the Ancient World*. Leiden, Brill, 1981. Pp. xiii + 284, 27 pls. Guilders 112. (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion, 2)
- WOUTERS, ALFONS. *The Grammatical Papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt: Contributions to the Study of the 'Ars Grammatica' in Antiquity*. Brussels, Paleis der Academien, 1979. Pp. 333, 21 pls. No price stated.
- ZUCHELLI, BRUNO. *Varro Logistoricus: studio letterario e prosopografico*. Parma, Università di Parma, 1980. Pp. 92. L. 8.000.

JOHNS HOPKINS

Classics

The Lives of the Greek Poets

Mary R. Lefkowitz

"An exceedingly valuable study...will long be in demand as a standard reference work."—*Diskin Clay, The Johns Hopkins University*

For centuries, classical scholars have based their understanding of ancient Greek poetry, and, to a certain extent, culture, on equally ancient biographies of the poets—biographies which are largely fictional. The author argues that the ancient accounts were derived from popular fantasy and the poems themselves.

\$17.50

History of Classical Scholarship

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

translated by Alan Harris

introduction and notes by Hugh Lloyd-Jones

"The best short history of [classical scholarship]"—*from the introduction by Hugh Lloyd-Jones*

Now available for the first time in English, this path breaking volume, first published in German in 1921, discusses language and literature, archaeology, art history, ancient history, philosophy, epigraphy, numismatics, and papyrology.

\$20.00

Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in the Classical City, 750-330 B.C.

Andrew Lintott

"The author's knowledge of the evidence, and...his scholarship [are] superior."—*J. K. Anderson, University of California, Berkeley*

Assassinations of public figures. Crime in the streets. Civil war. Rioting and mass demonstrations. Andrew Lintott offers a provocative examination of this topical-sounding array of social ills during the final years of classical Greek civilization.

\$25.00

Song and Action

The Victory Odes of Pindar

Kevin Crotty

"An original and substantial contribution to Pindar scholarship. With good sense and good style, Crotty explores the techniques of this most difficult of Greek poets, achieving a synthesis that outdoes any other contemporary treatment. The sweep of the book and its familiarity with the overwhelmingly vast contemporary scholarship makes it the best overall exposé of Pindaric poetry available today."—*Gregory Nagy, Harvard University*



\$15.00

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

FOUNDED BY BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE, 1880



❧ FALL 1982 VOLUME 103 NUMBER 3 ❧

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

DISKIN CLAY, EDITOR

Georg Luck, James W. Poultney, John Pollini, Michael L. McCormick
Frank Romer, Book Review Editor
Candida Allanbrook, Secretary

Benjamin D. Meritt, *Honorary Editor*

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY • Volume 103 • Number 3 • Fall 1982
ISSN 0002-9475

Copyright © 1982 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

All rights reserved. No portion of this journal may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the formal consent of the editors and publishers. For copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law, the copier must pay a fee of \$1.00 per copy through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, Massachusetts 01970. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. It is the journal's policy to require the assignment of copyright from all authors.

The *American Journal of Philology* publishes original contributions in Classical Studies, particularly in the fields of Greek and Roman Literature, Textual Criticism, Classical Linguistics, Ancient Philosophy, History, and Greek and Latin Epigraphy. It is published quarterly: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. Subscription price: \$36.00 Institutions, \$15.00 Individuals. Foreign postage is \$2.50 additional. Single issues: \$8.00 each.

Subscriptions, address changes, advertising, and other business correspondence should be sent to The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Division, 34th and Charles Streets, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A. Claims for replacements of missing issues must be received within three months (six months for foreign subscribers) following publication of the issue.

Postmaster: please send form 3579 to the above address.

Indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals and in Book Review Index.

Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland, and at additional mailing offices.

Composition by Bet Sha'ar Press, Inc.

The Printers' devices appearing on the front cover of *AJP* have been selected from among the ones especially created in stained glass for the Hutzler Undergraduate Reading Room on the Homewood Campus of The Johns Hopkins University. They represent the devices by Aldus Manutius (Spring), Robert Estienne (Summer), Joannes Frobenius (Fall), and Christopher Plantin (Winter).

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 103, No. 3

WHOLE No. 410

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

RAMSAY MACMULLEN
The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire 233

WILLIAM F. WYATT, JR.
Homeric "Ατῆ 247

DISKIN CLAY
Unspeakable Words in Greek Tragedy 277

MICHELE RENEE SALZMAN
Cicero, the *Megalenses* and the Defense of Caelius 299

ROLAND MAYER
Neronian Classicism 305


INTERPRETATIONS 319

WILLIAM M. CALDER, III
The Size of Thespis' Chorus

RICHARD HAMILTON
The Lament for Ajax: Sophocles' *Ajax* 628-31

WESLEY E. THOMPSON
The Text of Isaeus, XI, 2

TADEUSZ MASLOWSKI
On the Margin of Cicero, *Pro Cluentio* 169 and 170



J. S. RUSTEN
Ovid, Empedocles and the Minotaur

R. H. RODGERS
Frontinus *Aq.* 76.2: An Unnoticed Fragment
of Caelius Rufus?

REVIEWS

338

DONALD KAGAN
The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition
(Raphael Sealey)

WESLEY D. SMITH
The Hippocratic Tradition (John Scarborough)

SANDER M. GOLDBERG
The Making of Menander's Comedy (James Tatum)

G. E. M. DE STE. CROIX
The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (K. R. Bradley)

PETER GREENHALGH
Pompey. Vol. 2: The Republican Prince (Barry R. Katz)

KITTY CHISHOLM and JOHN FERGUSON
Rome: The Augustan Age (F. E. Romer)

BOOKS RECEIVED

356

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

THE EPIGRAPHIC HABIT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

Knowing how to communicate in writing is one thing; doing so is another. There are plenty of studies on literacy, none on its use, that I know of. Of the forms taken by literacy, inscriptions constitute not only one of the most familiar but also the most widely reported throughout the Roman world. It is thus a specially useful window through which we may examine that world.

But the history of that window in itself has not been examined. We would have the heart of the matter if we knew why people wrote things on stone everywhere in Italy and the provinces. We must look not for the occasion chosen, such as a life ended, a vow made, or an honor voted, but at the decision itself to give those facts some marble commemoration. After all, there have been in history many peoples to whom the idea never occurred, though they were literate. Even in the Roman empire, there were deaths, vows, and decrees unrecorded, more or less often in different times and places.

My central question, Why people inscribed some fact on stone, I cannot answer. Instead, for the moment I pass by obvious lines of conjecture, mere conjecture, to consider only those "different times and places." At the outset it will be useful to inspect a non-epigraphic form of writing, in order to see if all forms should be treated together. If they should be, then my question would be closely attached to the prevalence of literacy. As will appear, however, the epigraphic habit, within (inevitably within) the boundaries of the literate part of the population, traced its own distinct life-line: people who *could* write did so often or seldom according to motives so far unclear. That can hardly surprise since, within living memory, we are aware of changing fashions among the highly educated to write poetry or not, or letters or not. Some such fashion can be sensed over a long span among the Greeks. In the fifth,

fourth, and third centuries B.C., their productivity lay at one level, in succeeding centuries at another, lower level.¹


Papyri and ostraca from Roman Egypt survive in sufficient numbers to invite statistical analysis and thus to teach us something out of the numbers themselves that is not evident in the body of any single text. The most obvious starting point for such analysis lies in the distribution of texts of all sorts over time. Their profile is uneven, as appears from a sampling of over 3,500 that can be dated within 20-year periods (including those texts assigned by their editors to the "early," "middle," or "late" part of a century). Nearly a quarter of the texts counted are ostraca.²

Does the unevenness of the profile arise, as we would wish, at the point of manufacture of the texts and does it thus tell us about Roman Egypt? Or does it arise through the accidents of preserving and recovering them and tell us only about more recent times? The answer is reassuring. The profile for the period following the one here chosen for study has been traced three times: in 1925, 1965, and 1980. It has never changed.³ That stability unaffected by continual increases in the body of the evidence suggests very strongly that we have been drawing a true

¹ In L. Berkowitz, *Canon of Greek Authors . . .* (1977), I count 1353 datable writers, disregarding those assigned to a span of more than 200 years, distributing as halves those that are assigned to two centuries, and assigning as halves to the two preceding or succeeding centuries those listed as being *ante* or *post* a given century. The results are: VIth cent. B.C., 42½ names; V, 142 (+7); IV, 212½ (+6); III, 217½ (+16); II, 111½ (+26½); I, 111½ (+88); A.D. I, 109 (+103½); and II, 130 (29½). I separate and put in parentheses the medical writers, and in the second century I do not count 61 Christian writers, orthodox or heterodox, whose chances of being preserved, by recentness and by their relation to the transmitting processes, seem to me to be of a different order from pagan authors. In the fifth century B.C., I suppose results are somewhat skewed downward by opposite processes, i.e. worse processes of conservation. The general level of activity suggested by the Canon is quite compatible with the half-million and more book-rolls in the Alexandrian library. See P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (1972) 1.329.

² Included were all texts datable among *PAmh.* 14-137; *PFlor.* 1-105; *PHamb.* 1-84; *PMilVogliano* 23-299; *PSI* 153-475; *PRyl.* 74-698; *PStrassb.* 2-78; *POxy.* 34-746, 825-1160, and 2825-3205; *PLon.* 1-1298; *BGU* 697-1201 and 1563-1712; *PMich.* 155-221; *PMerton* 1-100; *PFay.* 19-123; *PCorn.* 6-55; *PAberd.* 13-182; *PMeyer* 3-81; *POslo* 17-193; *PPrinceton* 1-75; *PRendelHarris* 1-100; all of *PKalen.*, *PBonon.*, *PLips.*, *PSocAthen.*, *Pland.*, *PWarren.*, *PVindob.*, *POxford.*, and *PFamTeht.*; and *OTait* vols. 1 and 2 nos. 411-1000.

³ As pointed out by R. S. Bagnall and K. A. Worp, *Miscellanea Papyrologica* (Papyrologica Florentina VII, 1980) p. 14, for the period A.D. 337-540, compared with R. Rémondon, in *Atti dell' XI Congresso int. di papirologia . . .* 1965 (1966) p. 149 Table I.



sample from Egypt of Constantine's reign up to Justinian's. The burden of proof must therefore rest on anyone denying the same truth to a sample drawn from the three hundred years prior to Constantine.

But of course there are some distortions in my graph. The ratio of counted ostraca to papyri, one to three, is an approximation perhaps set a little higher than their actual numbers; and since ostraca are, for whatever reason, a phenomenon mostly of the Antonine reigns, they may exaggerate the rise in the bars for the first 75 years of the second century. Perhaps, too, the proportion of papyri that are hard to date and thus cannot be used at all is greater in the third century (again: for whatever reason), thus producing an underestimate for that period. Then there are the odd hoards or archives that turn up by chance, once belonging to some particular office or individual and therefore to some one time—the hundreds of papyri from the *grapheion* of Tebtunis or the correspondence of a certain Heroninus.⁴ Finally, some excavated

⁴ On the Tebtunis *grapheion*, see A. E. R. Boak, *Aegyptus* 4 (1923) 39, and E. Husselman in *Proc. Twelfth Int. Congress of Papyrology* (1970) 223, the texts falling in the first half of the first century; other similar office hoards, e.g. *PRyl.* 124–152, A.D. 28–42; and Heroninus' correspondence of the A.D. 150s, ca. 160 letters, traceable through F. Preisigke, *Namenbuch* (1967) p. 125 s.v.

towns out of their own history provide documents concentrated in some particular swell of prosperity and population—for example, Antinoopolis' 214 texts beginning only in the third century.

Allowance for these distorting influences, however, is not hard to make both in the assembling of data and in the application of the final results. Moreover, there is some comfort in two facts. First, I have used somewhat different samplings for Graphs I and II: yet, if the latter were re-drawn so as to combine its two categories of texts into single bars, their profile would closely resemble that of Graph I. And I refer again to the consistency appearing in different samples of the fourth- to sixth-century data: there is no reason why that later period should have provided documentation of special reliability. It seems to me safe, then, to rely on the general outline presented above.

Its interpretation is suggested by the profile below, using a somewhat smaller total of texts, just over 3,000.⁵ They are divided into the public—meaning tax receipts, census lists, registrations of births or land transfers, petitions, orders for arrest, judicial hearings, reports of public bodies, and so forth—and private documents such as letters, leases, sales, contracts, loans, wills, prayers, and horoscopes, the writers of all of which had no official contact with the persons they addressed. In interpreting their numbers, allowance must be made for the distortion produced by ostraca, which belong overwhelmingly among the public documents and which are largely datable to Antonine times. Otherwise, the ratio of public to private seems to have remained fairly constant over the centuries until the reign of Diocletian. At that point and thereafter the private outnumber the public.


Rémondon, working with a different period, noticed the same phenomenon.⁶ He attributed it to the simplifying and shrinking of governmental activities. The case is well argued, but useful to our own discussion of an earlier time only in one implication: it implies that the quantity of documents generated in Roman Egypt, during the Principate also, may have reflected the amount of governing that went on and the number of people engaged in its processes.

⁵ Drawing on *OTait*, *PPrinceton*, *PSI*, *PAntinoopolis*, *PThead.*, *PKalen*, *PBon.*, *PFay.*, *PCorn.*, *PMich.*, *POxy.*, *PMerton*, *PMeyer*, *PVarsov.*, *PAmh.*, *PLon.*, *PRyl.*, *PSocAthen.*, *PMichael*, *Pland.*, *PLugd.-Bata.* vols. 1–4, *PFamTeb.*, *PMichKaranis*, *BGU*, *POslo.*, sometimes in selections of texts different from those for graph I.

⁶ Rémondon (note 3 above) 141. In his graph on p. 149 he shows a ratio of public to private differing from my results: the public outnumber the private documents at any given moment. The difference arises from the fact that private documents (e.g. letters) are less often dated so precisely as the public (e.g. tax returns), and Rémondon makes use

II.

NOS. OF PAPYRI



That likelihood certainly seems acceptable in itself. Moreover, it can be used to account for the rise in the number of public documents in the second century. Not of the private ones, however. These seem to reflect general prosperity, being more numerous in good times under the early Antonines, just as they later trace a decline to a third-century low in the 260s and another long decline from Constantine's reign downward to the end of the fourth century. Overall, the frequency of private documents of all sorts in our second graph follows in outline the economic fortunes of the province, as those latter are usually conceived. Together with changes in the amount and shape of government, the economy must be used to explain the one fact that emerges incontestably from the first graph: namely, the broad rise in the second century and the long low from Severus Alexander to Diocletian. The only surprise lies in the continued diminishing of government after Diocletian.

The use to which people put their literacy is not the same thing as the level of literacy itself; if perhaps less interesting, however, it is a great deal easier to measure. The data are most easily sampled in the

only of texts that can be assigned to one specific year rather than to a 20-year period. The texts for his later time-span, however, in their rise and fall over the course of the fourth century resemble my own data if they are computed by one and the same method: Bagnall and Worp pp. 16-21 list their data which, collected in 20-year periods (if the 22 texts for the years A.D. 337-338-339 may be extrapolated to a hypothetical 129 for A.D. 320-339) yield totals of 1297, 101, 92, and 76; while my own texts in the same four periods total 76, 67, 47, and 38. So the lines of our two counts trace nearly the same decline.

Corpus of Latin inscriptions. Making whatever allowance one chooses for accidents in discovery, completeness of publication, the level of a modern nation's interest in the past and the wealth available for research, nevertheless there is surely something to be learned from the distribution of the texts we find there: 156,000 all told (in round figures), of which a majority comes from Italy (77,000, with 40,000 from Rome itself).^{6a} A. Mocsy in his 1966 study of inscriptions was right to take them as a sign of Romanization⁷—right, that is, to see the publishing of statements on stone as a characteristic activity within the Roman (of course, not only the Roman) way of life. In northern Italy, most of north Africa, much of the Danube lands, and throughout Spain and northwestern Europe, it was a characteristic not native but acquired from the conquerors.

Mocsy focusses more narrowly than we need to on a particular kind of statement put on stone: in the form, "Here lies Marcus, who lived 40 years." In large samples of such declarations, the given ages that are multiples of ten (less strikingly, of five) appear more often than they should. They represent approximations. No one knew exactly how old the deceased was, though it was somehow important to try to say how old. The degree of ignorance can be expressed as a percentage and plotted on a map and a time-line. What that shows is the local level of interest in a person's exact age, itself due to various legal consequences. But beyond all that, why bother to put the figure on a tombstone? What purpose would it serve? Mocsy sees the question and rightly answers, that the habit was an aspect of culture, not a practical necessity. It was part of the package that we call Romanization, perhaps the only one that we can hope to describe statistically—other than the entire epigraphic habit itself.

That larger trait of civilization is now beginning to be studied. The results are sometimes quite striking. For example, in such substantial cities as Mainz and Carnuntum to the north, three-fourths of the epitaphs will belong to soldiers, veterans, and their kin.⁸ Epigraphy

^{6a} I see no reason to mistrust the *CIL* as a representative sample of known inscriptions; but in any case, the tables I use also pillage *AE* etc. The total of published Latin texts may be close to double the *CIL*: 280,000, "a high estimate," says E. J. Jory, *BICS* 20 (1973) 147.

⁷ *Acta Antiqua* 14 (1966) p. 407 and esp. 419f.

⁸ See my *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven 1981) p. 200 n. 13 and p. 201 n. 16, with other proofs of the same patterns of frequency among inscriptions of the Rhine and Danube provinces—very much like those of Lambaesis in Africa, below, graph IV.

was an importation brought in by them along with such quintessentially Roman things as castrametation and *disciplina*. The more directly a person stood in line of cultural descent from old Cato the Censor, let us say, the more likely was he to set up some sort of epigraphic record. But so remote and specific a figure as Cato has to be brought in because the term "Roman" in the period of our study might include deeply Hellenized individuals and customs, while "Italian" might include the Greeks of the south or the Celts of the upper peninsula. Indeed, Mocsy can indicate the need for caution in handling the evidence, since he discovers in Italy itself a more marked degree of "Romanization" in the epigraphy of towns and villages than in the epigraphy of the cities.⁹

In asserting a special Roman-ness in epigraphy, we may seek support from K. K. Ery. He notes a difference distinguishing Greek and Roman habits of commemoration of the deceased; and since epitaphs make up so big a part of the epigraphic corpus, his findings are significant: a group like the Romans, careful to record early deaths (given the high proportion that children constituted in the ancient population), will produce many more epitaphs per thousand than the group that pays less attention, like the Greeks, to deaths before age 30.¹⁰ (See graph III.) Where Greeks, then, were numerous in a mixed population, the total number of inscriptions that population would produce would be correspondingly smaller—as Mocsy discovers.

Moreover, inscriptions from Roman Egypt seem to confirm that the epigraphic habit was stronger in Romans than in Greeks or native. So we may infer from the names appearing on the stones, by far the majority of which are Roman.¹¹ But it is well known that the Latinity of nomenclature is reflected generally in inscriptions: Romans or Romanized natives, identifiable by their names, will appear in the epigraphy of the provinces more often than their actual numbers warrant and in a far larger majority than their claim on literacy warrants, likewise.¹²

⁹ Mocsy (note 7 above) 406 f.


¹⁰ K. K. Ery, *Alba Regia* 10 (1969) 60. He notes, p. 56, that in Africa the epigraphic habit even more sharply favored commemoration of the mature and the old. This has been often remarked.

¹¹ In *CIL* 13.1–85, the names that appear include one Greek; one native, the rest Roman (23 army-connected, 33 civilian including a few freedmen with Greek cognomina; similar proportions in 13.6576–6633). In *IGR* 1.1043–1373, all the names are Greek in 31 inscriptions, at least partly Roman in 146, partly Egyptian in only 66 (Isidore, Sarapion, Sephaeros, Panesneus, Ammonius, Sochotes, Nepheros, Petesouchos, Petemenophis, etc.).

¹² Examples abound: e.g. those cited in my *Paganism* (note 8 above) 117 and n. 17. There are some exceptions or oddities, e.g. in second-century Narbonensis, where native

III.

Age-group frequencies among 9980 Greek and Latin tomb inscriptions in Rome



names increase from the first to the second century, see M. Clavel, *Béziers* (1970) 581, or in Lycaonia and Isauria, where native names make up a plurality (40 percent) in inscriptions; Latin 37 percent; Greek 23 percent. See S. Mitchell in *ANRW* II 7:2 (1980) 1065. For an easy check on whether non-Romans put up few inscriptions because they could not write at all, compare the proportions of names of Egyptians in the preceding note with any collection of ostraca: the natives in the latter will bulk vastly larger than the Greek-named, let alone the Roman.

Ery also mentions certain facts generally familiar: that the denser the population (most of all in cities compared to the countryside), and the richer, the more likely to produce inscriptions. But we can add that these two conditions in the provinces coincided more or less with Romanization in its totality; so it is hard for us to know what weight to assign to some minimum level of wealth rather than to acculturation, when we find a group at a given moment taking up the epigraphic habit. The moment itself can be only occasionally sensed, at best assigned to a period of a half-century.¹³


Lassère, in a study of seven centers in the province of Africa, could approximately date over 4,000 of their epitaphs; but for this he was obliged to use categories like "end of Republic/mid first century," "first century before A.D. 75," "first century/beginning of the second." If numerical termini are assigned to these categories, if the texts within each are distributed evenly throughout the time-span of the category, and if they are thus assigned to years and then re-grouped into 20-year spans, the results can be shown in a bar-graph.¹⁴ It makes no pretense to great accuracy. It only renders visual and quickly intelligible the data that Lassère described in his own terms; and various distortions can be sensed. Three of the seven sites canvassed were successively a home for the province's legion, the Third Augusta. Around them veterans settled and married; and all three sites gave rise to civilian centers containing quite untypical concentrations of immigrants from Italy and elsewhere in the empire. One of the three, Lambaesis, also yields "by far the greatest collection of texts found in Africa," as Lassère

¹³ Ery (note 10 above) 52 on the productivity levels; M. Nielser in *Studies in the Romanization of Etruria* (1975) 299 f. on the appearance of epitaphs on cinerary-urn lids among the Etruscans, coinciding with the style called "Roman" because of the weight of the sculptured figures shown, their hairdo, and their wreaths; and M. Bénabou, *La résistance africaine à la romanisation* (1976) 495 f., on "sépultures à caissons," with Latin inscriptions, the form of burial being, like the Etruscan urns, indigenous, but the written memorial being an alien habit. The African material shows a stratum of rising wealth, possibly.

¹⁴ J.-M. Lassère, *Antiquités africaines* 7 (1973) 133-51: 4,160 texts, only two datable to a single year, the rest in 25 categories that touch on the empire, for example, "Augustus," 25 texts, where I have divided that number by the years of the reign, $25 \div (27 \text{ B.C. to A.D. } 14 = 41) = .61$ texts per year over A.D. 1-14. There is also "end of Republic/Trajan," 602 texts running from 40 B.C., the date somewhat arbitrarily chosen, down to A.D. 117, i.e. 157 years = 3.83 per year. For a specific single year, e.g. A.D. 2, I would add 3.83 to .61 to produce the total for that year, and add still more from other overlapping categories. To the categories "early", "mid", and "late" I assign the values 0-9, 40-60, and 90-99.

says; and it was greatly expanded, enriched, and personally visited by the emperor in the 120s, thus accounting for the first rise on the graph.¹⁵ The second rise might be attributed to the well-known patronage offered to the province by a native of the neighboring region, Septimius Severus. One senses, too, the probability that, within Lassère's largest category, "second/third century," the 1,350 texts cannot have been evenly distributed; surely they were bunched toward the middle; and thus they should give a gentler rise and fall to the bar representing ca. A.D. 190-210.

IV.




But in accounting for the chief feature of the graph we cannot be quite certain that it was the emperor Severus at work rather than other, even grander influences; for there is a similar feature in our last graph. It was published by Mrozek in the same year with Lassère's article, in 1973. It assigns some 1,680 inscriptions, from all over the Latin-speaking area, to successive emperors' reigns as far as Diocletian. The texts were those discussed and dated by a dozen scholars in as many

¹⁵ Lassère (note 14 above) 96. Among his seven sites, Theveste and Ammaedara also had been homes to Legio III Augusta. Moreover, the former in particular had benefited from Trajan; and a fourth site, Thugga, especially benefited from Hadrian; so the first 30-odd years of the second century we would expect to see well represented among the epitaphs. Finally, Eénabou, *op. cit.* 551 n. 278, finds Lassère's "chronologie proposée parfois discutable," an undeveloped remark which I cannot control.

works on various aspects of Roman history: military, administrative, religious, and social; and the rise and fall of the graph is less precisely repeated and confirmed by a further 1,970 texts datable only within

V.

Table of Frequency of Latin Inscriptions of the Empire



Source: Mrozek (1973) 115.

half-century spans and 922 within spans of a century.¹⁶ Mrozek's samples neatly complement Lassère's in the areas of life from which they draw, the one scholar looking at the private and domestic, the other scholar also at the public—for instance, at texts inscribed by officials.

Rigorously considered, the two graphs seem incontestably to prove a pronounced increase in the number of all varieties of inscription in every broad area of the Latin-speaking world up to a high point under Severus, and thereafter a much sharper decrease to a low point in the second quarter of the third century. But they do not lend themselves to interpretation in the way that papyri do. Indeed, they do not offer any obvious element that might explain their shape. They do, however, suggest three comments.

First, the epigraphic habit they represent was taken seriously, and by a large part of the population—especially seriously by the very people whom the rest of the world looked up to: property-owners, city senators, imperial agents. Of how many other traits of Roman civilization can we say as much? That is: putting ourselves in the shoes of the man who chose or composed the text to be inscribed and took it to the stone-cutter and paid for the job, surely we find ourselves giving closer attention to that particular train of actions than to anything else we are likely to have done during the week—nay, during the month or the year, perhaps; for with our chosen words we address our whole community or posterity itself. Such close attention constitutes a clear sign of cultural significance viewed from the inside.

Second, it is in terms of this trait that many others are discussed. Modern scholars of the Roman world will say that this or that activity or behaviour was prominent, vital, declining or the like according to the frequency of epigraphic attestation. That assumes, however, that the body of all inscriptions against which attestation is measured does not itself rise or fall—a false assumption. So administrative, economic, social, and religious history need to be rewritten.¹⁷ Furthermore, these

¹⁶ S. Mrozek, *Epigraphica* 35 (1973) 114–16. Of course other lists of inscriptions could be used, having the same distribution across time, e.g. the 230 texts in R. Duthoy's study of *curatores rei publicae*, *Anc. Soc.* 10 (1979) 225 ff.

¹⁷ For example, G. Camps, *Rev. Afr.* 98 (1954) 243 assumes “un caractère officiel et militaire” in the cult of the Mauretanian *dii Mauri* from the dedicants being so often soldiers and officials; but that is the tendency of the epigraphic corpus in almost any frontier province, see the reff. in my *Paganism* (note 8 above) 200 f. nn. 13 and 16; and 202 n. 23 for indication of another error of interpretation arising out of epigraphic evidence. Or again: J. J. Wilkes in his *Dalmatia* (1969) 235 infers changes in the ruling class from persons of a certain type coming to prominence in inscriptions; but that type, made up of indigenes, may simply not earlier have had the epigraphic habit.

several aspects of history when taken all together influence assessments of the fortunes of the Roman empire overall. Yet its downward turn began under Marcus Aurelius, or perhaps under Commodus—so it is agreed by a consensus little changed since Gibbon.¹⁸

This matter of consensus, and the collection of authorities to illustrate it, are needed to introduce my last comment: that it is awkward to explain the high point of the two graphs in political or economic terms, although those would be the instruments of interpretation thrust upon us by modern teaching. Among Lassère's 4,160 texts, only seven postdate A.D. 250; Mrozek takes "exactly the mid-third century as the hinge in the habit of epigraphy,"¹⁹ but the nadir of the imperial currency and the period of anti-empires in the east and west under their various rulers are then yet to come. Their full effects in turn would hardly be expected save after another decade or so. As to the peak of frequency of inscriptions, it should be found in A.D. 150, perhaps, or earlier. I think no one would have expected it to follow in the wake of the protracted several bouts of civil war that marked the ascendance of Severus to the throne, nor in a time of harsh proscriptions and novel taxes. Finally, the initial rise in the number of Latin inscriptions in Italy, back in the Republic, though never carefully examined, clearly would not trace a curve fitting such obvious other curves as the demographic or economic. Accordingly, it can only have been controlled from the beginning to the end by forces other than those conventionally invoked to explain such things. Put more sharply (no doubt too sharply): history is not being written in the right way.

¹⁸ P. Petit, *Histoire générale de l'empire romain* (1974) 153 f., sets "l'apogée" in the period A.D. 96–161 and, in surveying "les ouvrages classiques," finds them in agreement, or linking those late Antonine reigns to the Severan in one age of recession. Cf. further, *ibid.* 192 f. and 414; R. Rémondon, *La crise de l'empire romain* (1964) 77 f. and 85 (decline under Marcus, in terms of security, stability, and productivity); A. Bernardi in *The Economic Decline of Empires*, ed. C. M. Cipolla (1970) 37, recession begins with Commodus' death; J. Vogt, *The Decline of Rome* (1967) 25, "general regression" with the beginning of Severus' reign; M. Rostovtzeff, *Soc. and Econ. Hist. of the Rom. Emp.*² (1957) 377 f. and 411, economic deterioration in the second century, esp. under Commodus; F. Oertel in the *CAH* 12 (1939) 260 f.; and decline in specific regions in the second half of the second century, e.g. Gaul, A. Grenier in *Econ. Survey of Anc. Rome*, ed. T. Frank, 3 (1937) 574; Britain, A. L. F. Rivet, *The Villa in Britain* (1969) 201, recession from late second century; or Africa, R. M. Haywood in *Econ. Survey* *cit.*, 4 (1938) 73, and J.-M. Lassère, *Ubique populus* . . . (1977) 235 and 293. There is some confirmation in the apparent steep decline in maritime commerce after A.D. 200, see K. Hopkins in *JRS* 70 (1980) 105; but the evidence he adduces is not, and on inquiry appears not likely soon to be, in print.

¹⁹ Mrozek (note 16 above) 116.

What those forces were, I have no idea—or rather, no idea that can be substantiated. But clearly they were of a magnitude suited to the seriousness and ubiquity of the habit they modified. Some clue to an explanation may lie in the contrast between statements on papyrus and on stone. What was written on the former arranged itself in more intelligible patterns because it was addressed by one person to another (occasionally to himself, as a memorandum) and because it served some material and evident utility; but what was written on stone almost always addressed nobody in particular—rather, the whole community. Here lies the value in having glanced at other uses of literacy (above, pp. 237 f.). Apparently the rise and fall of the epigraphic habit was controlled by what we can only call the sense of audience. In the exercise of the habit, people (I can only suppose) counted on their world still continuing in existence for a long time to come, so as to make nearly permanent memorials worthwhile; and they still felt themselves members of a special civilization, proud (or obliged) to behave as such. Later, in not bothering any more to record on stone their names or any other claim to attention, perhaps they expressed their doubts about the permanence or importance of that world. Perhaps. At least I cannot see in the evidence anything less than the sign of some very broad psychological shift.

RAMSAY MACMULLEN

YALE UNIVERSITY

HOMERIC ἄΤΗ

Contents: 0 Introduction, 1 Narrative, 2 Description (*Iliad* IX),
3 Social Aspects (*Iliad* XIX), 4 Psychology, 5 Physiology (*Odyssey*),
6 Parallels and Later Developments, 7 Linguistic Form,
8 Summary

*

*

*

0.1 Greek ἄτη is one of those baffling notions which one is apt archly to pronounce untranslatable while at the same time hinting broadly that one understands it perfectly. It also allows one to credit the Greeks either with extraordinary insight or incredible naïveté depending on one's own predilections. The word is important for an understanding of Greek thinking and psychology and merits repeated examination.

0.2 *LSJ* define the word: "*bewilderment, infatuation, caused by blindness or delusion sent by the gods, mostly as the punishment of guilty rashness*"; as in *Iliad* XVI.805: τὸν δ' ἄτη φρένας ἔλλαε. This usage is mostly restricted to Homer. Ἄτη can be personified in Homer (and elsewhere) as "*the goddess of mischief, author of rash actions*," as in *Iliad* XIX.91: πρέσβα Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄτη, ἥ πάντας ἁῖται. *LSJ* go on to distinguish a second aspect of the meaning of ἄτη: "II of the consequences of such visitations, either 1. Act. *reckless guilt or sin*," as in *Iliad* VI.356: Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης "or, 2. Pass. *bane, ruin*," as in *Iliad* XXIV.480: ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄν ἄνδρ' ἄτη πικινὴ λάβῃ. This second, passive, meaning is predominant in tragedy, and from it derive all other meanings listed by *LSJ* save "III *fine, penalty*" exemplified in the Gortyn Law Code (e.g., 11.34).

0.3 The *LSJ* terminology is odd and not in accord with contemporary views of human psychology and behavior. Indeed it appears to be a description of a quasi-human figure rather than the gloss of a word. Nonetheless we can extract from it a definition or conclusion: ἄτη denotes a state which contains within itself both its cause and its consequences. The word can be represented schematically as meaning X, its cause and effect:

ἄτη = [(cause of) X (effect of)]

X is clearly what is to be defined.

0.4 From *Iliad* XIX.91 quoted above we see that beside the noun ἄτη there exists also a verb which *LSJ* lemmatize under ἄω. Not surprisingly the verb has meanings cognate or conformable with those of the noun. *LSJ* again translate in two parts. "*Hurt, damage*, always in reference to the mind, *mislead, infatuate*, of the effects of wine, sleep, divine judgements, etc." as in *Odyssey* 10.68: ἄσάν μ' ἔταποί τε κακοὶ πρὸς τοῖσι τε ἦρως "II. Intr. in aor. Med., *to be infatuated, act foolishly*," as in *Iliad* XIX.95: καὶ γὰρ δὴ νύ ποτε Ζεὺς ἄσας. Here again one has the cause and effect of X, though here the proper formula may well be cause and act X-ly:

(cause one to) act X-ly

0.5 More modern scholars have provided other definitions, mainly because they disagree with *LSJ*'s notions of "sin" and the like.¹ E. R. Dodds holds: "Nor does the word ever, at any rate in the *Iliad*, mean objective disaster, as it so often does in tragedy. Always, or practically always, *ate* is a state of mind—a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness. It is, in fact, a partial and temporary insanity; and, like any insanity, it is ascribed, not to physiological or psychological causes, but to an external "daemonic agency." Mette (5-8) feels that originally the word meant "Schade, Täuschung," and then came to mean "Schädigung der φρένες"; Müller (2) speaks of "Enttäuschung und Schaden" developing later (6) to "Schaden als Folge verkehrten Handelns" and "Schaden ohne eigenes Zutun"; J. Stallmach (37) refers to "Verdunklung der Phrenes, als Ausschaltung des Bewusstseins durch die das rechte Reagieren des Menschen unmöglich gemacht wird," and interprets ἄσας (47): "durch Verblendung, Betörung, Betrug, Ausschaltung der Besinnung oder Aufmerksamkeit schädigen." Dawe,

¹ References are to: E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951), H. J. Mette, "ἄτη ἄτη", *Lexikon der frühgriechischen Epos* 5-8 (B. Snell, Ed.), Göttingen, 1955 ff.; G. Müller, "Der homerische Ate-Begriff und Solons Musenelegie," *Navicula Chiloniensis* (Festschrift F. Jacoby) 1 ff. (Leiden 1956); J. Stallmach, *Ate: Zur Frage des Selbst- und Weltverständnisses des frühgriechischen Menschen* (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, 18) Meisenheim am Glan, 1968; R. D. Dawe, "Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia," *HSCP* 72 (1968) 89-123; R. E. Doyle, S. J., *The Concept of Ate from Homer to Euripides* (to be published by the Fordham University Press); E. A. Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice* (Cambridge 1978).

though basically agreeing with Mette and holding (96) that “it is impossible to hit on a single word which will adequately render the mental condition which it denotes,” observes (95) that the “most common meaning of *ate* is ruin, destruction, disaster, misfortune.”² Similarly Doyle speaks of “blindness, infatuation, folly, ruin.” Havelock (125) translates “disaster” for the noun and “disastered” for the verb, thus incorrectly externalizing the concept. He is good (131–33, 135), however, on the social side of things.

0.6 All of the above-named scholars think of *ate* as a force which causes man to err, a force which is introduced from the outside through divine agency. Man is helpless in the face of such forces and consequently commits acts which will subsequently recoil upon himself. In what follows we will investigate *ate* as dispassionately as can be, given the importance of the subject, and will see that a rather minimalist definition will suit Homer best. We will not follow the word down into tragedy, and will observe here only that man’s apparently natural desire to externalize responsibility for his failures will account for much of this development.

*

*

*

1.1 Though we none of us are aware of the fact at the time, *ate* enters the *Iliad* in book one. Achilles is the first to signal its presence when he calls attention to Agamemnon’s *ate* (I.411–12):

γνῶ δὲ καὶ Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
ἦν ἄτην, ὃ τ’ ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτεισε.³

It is important to observe that Achilles recognizes the *ate* immediately and that he identifies Agamemnon’s act as *ate*: he does not speculate on

² Dawe (100) explicitly denies but does not argue the position to be adopted in this paper—the connection of ἄτη and ἄσσι.

³ ἔτεισε and τιμή are frequent concomitants of ἄτη, from which it is clear that ‘payment’ or ‘honor’ was one of the ways out of an *ate*-situation (see 2 below). *Ate* was always a public matter, and always involved two people (at least). One can look upon an *ate*-situation as diminishing the *time* of another, in which event it must be made up. Clearly, the payment came later to be regarded as a fine or a penalty as in *LSJ* s. ἄτη III and ἄνατος II.2. Payment was therefore from early on a part of the nexus of meanings associated with ἄτη.

motivation but simply identifies.⁴ Achilles knows, of course, as Agamemnon and the reader do not, the consequences of what Agamemnon has done. We as readers and critics will do well to keep in mind that Achilles is both making an allegation with no particular proof of it available and at the same time is making a prediction of what is to happen.

1.2 Agamemnon also has a notion of *ate* and that it may be in the air, but he is not at all clear as to its nature or its effects. In II.111 (IX.18) he complains that Zeus has involved him in *ate*, and that this *ate* consists in an unrealized attempt to take Troy: he almost equates *ate* with 'deception' (II.111-14):

Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτη ἐνέδησε βαρεῖη,
σκέτλιος, ὃς πρὶν μὲν μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν
" Δίον ἐκπέρσαντ' εὐτείχεον ἀπονέεσθαι,
νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλευέσαστο, καί με κελεύει .

There is in fact no reason for him to feel otherwise, since nothing yet has happened to his current plan of taking Troy. Indeed he refers to the incident with Achilles in II.375-78:

ἀλλὰ μοι αἰγίοχος Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἄλγε' ἔδωκεν, 375
ὃς με μετ' ἀπρήκτους ἔριδας καὶ νείκεα βάλλει.
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν Ἀχιλεὺς τε μαχεσσάμεθ' εἵνεκα κούρης
ἀντιβίοις ἐπέεσσιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἥρχον χαλεπαίνων

Though he is not pleased that the quarrel took place, and though he does implicate Zeus, he does not invoke *ate* as a cause or an explanation. In VIII.237 he again blames Zeus and seems to follow up on the thought of II.111, though here he implies that the difficulty may stem from the fact that his men are worthless (VIII.236-37):⁶

⁴ Achilles of course refers to the plan of Zeus as worked out in I.407-10, 503-27. He does not know, however, that his actions will involve him in *ate* as well and that Patroclus will have to die before matters are resolved.

⁵ Whatever the word may have meant to Homer in this passage, it can easily be taken to mean 'fate, lot, doom,' the meaning later on developed in tragedy.

⁶ Homer is very shrewd in his portrayal of Agamemnon and clear in his understanding of *ate*. Agamemnon knows that something is amiss because the army is suffering reverses. He does not or cannot, however, recognize the true source of the difficulty, namely that Achilles is not there. And the reason for Achilles' absence is of course Agamemnon's insulting him in Book I. There are two needs not yet fulfilled: 1) the psychological, in that Agamemnon must recognize that he is responsible; 2) the social and political (3 below) necessity of assigning blame elsewhere. These needs will be met finally only in IX and XIX.

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἥ ῥά τιν' ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλῆων
τῆδ' ἄτη ἄσασας καί μιν μέγα κῦδος ἀπηύρας;

As Leaf (ad loc.) correctly notes, it is a favorite device of Agamemnon's to throw the blame for failings onto Zeus. Agamemnon is far more interested in causation than is Achilles, and naturally so: things are going badly for him and he wants to know the reason. In IX.18 he repeats his assessment of II.111, again in public and again before the troops. *Ate* up till now has been an external force, a force imposed from without, and not a matter of internal motivation and action. He infers its presence from the fact that things are not going well.

1.3 It is only in book IX that Agamemnon finally realizes that his troubles stem from his failure to honor Achilles (IX.115-20):

ὦ γέρον, οὗ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας;⁷ 115
ἄσάμην, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀναίνομαι. ἀντί νυ πολλῶν
λαῶν ἔστιν ἀνὴρ ὃν τε Ζεὺς κῆρι φιλήσῃ,
ὥς νῦν τοῦτον ἔτεισε, δάμασσε δὲ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν.
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἄσάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέῃσι πιθήσας,
ἀψ' ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα. 120

He is now ready to make amends, amends which consist of both words and gifts, as Nestor had suggested (IX.112-13):

φραζώμεσθ' ὥς κέν μιν ἀρεσσάμενοι πεπίθωμεν
δώροισιν τ' ἀγανοῖσιν ἔπεσσί τε μελιχίοισι.

The final resolution of the quarrel will not take place, however, until book XIX because Achilles refuses the gifts.

1.4 Until book XIX the focus of *ate* swings to Achilles, though he himself does not use the word again until XIX.270.⁸ In IX Phoenix advises him to accept Agamemnon's offer of gifts because if he does not, *ate* will light on him. This is the famous allegory of the λιπαί which follow after ἄτη (IX.502-12):

⁷ ἄτας in the plural surely is significant. Agamemnon recognizes that something has gone wrong and that Nestor has hit upon the reasons. One could translate as "disappointments," "acts," "mistakes." The most simple way to proceed is to translate "You have catalogued my acts" and await later determination of the nature (or cause) of these acts. We know now only that Agamemnon is willing to atone for them. (see above n. 3)

⁸ Achilles is the first character to use the word and also the last: *ate* begins and ends with him. Homer twice later (XXIV.28, 480) uses the word, but in the narrative, and does not put it in the mouth of a character.

καὶ γάρ τε λιταί εἰσι Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιο,
 χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθαλμῷ,
 αἶ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' Ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιούσαι.
 ἦ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρὴ τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὐνεκα πάσας 505
 πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν
 βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἶ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω.
 δς μὲν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἄσσον ἰούσας,
 τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καὶ τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοισι·
 δς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καὶ τε στερεῶς ἀποείπη, 510
 λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιούσαι
 τῷ Ἄτην ἄμ' ἔπεςθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτείσῃ.

The moral of the story is clearly that Achilles ought to accept the gifts or else, a moral graphically illustrated later on by the story of Oineus who (IX.536-37):

οἷη δ' οὐκ ἔρρεξε Διὸς κούρη μέγαλοιο.
 ἦ λάθεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν· ἀάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ.

Oineus' *ate* brought on the Calydonian boar and the subsequent troubles between the Aetolians and the Couretes. Meleager withdraws from the battle and does not return until it is too late and the proffered gifts are withheld. The sequence here is ἄτη (Oineus in 537), χόλος (Meleager-553), offer of gifts (576) and prayers from relatives and close friends (584-86).⁹ Meleager finally relents, but too late, and accomplishes the request but without reward. Though the relation between Oineus' *ate* and Meleager's situation is tenuous, Meleager is nonetheless directly affected by it.¹⁰

1.5 Achilles of course does not accept the prayers and the threatened *ate* does come back to haunt him in book XVI when Patroclus could have, but did not, avoid death (XVI.685-87):

⁹ Again we find a bit of psychological shrewdness on Homer's part, for *ate* inevitably involves both parties, both the actor and the person affected. Modern terms which correspond to some extent to ancient categories are remorse and resentment, remorse on the part of the agent and resentment on the part of his victim: we cannot and should not speak of guilt. The whole problem with *ate*, then, is dispelling remorse and resentment.

¹⁰ Elsewhere the innocent bystander is affected, as in VI.356, ἐνεκ' ἄτης quoted p. 273 below. Clearly Hector cannot be held responsible for Helen's or Paris' act. Cf. also XXIV.28 and 23.223:

τὴν δ' ἄτην οὐ πρόσθεν ἔψ' ἐγκάτθετο θυμῷ
 λυγρὴν, ἐξ ἧς πρῶτα καὶ ἡμέας ἵκετο πένθος.

Penelope is in no way responsible, but the πένθος affects her. These passages are clearly important for an understanding of the nature and meaning of *ate*.

Τρῶας καὶ Λυκίους μετεκίαθε, καὶ μέγ' ἀάσθη
νήπιος· εἰ δὲ ἔπος Πηληϊάδαο φύλαξεν,
ἦ τ' ἄν ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα κακὴν μέλανος θανάτοιο. 685

The *ate* which had infected Achilles in book IX comes to roost on Patroclus (XVI.804-6):

λῦσε δὲ οἱ θῶρηκα ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων.
τὸν δ' ἄτη φρένας εἶλε, λύθεν δ' ὑπὸ φαίδιμα γυῖα,
στῇ δὲ ταφῶν· ὀπιθεν δὲ μετάφρενον ὀξεῖ δουρὶ . 805

Now a physical force the *ate* of IX has caused the "stupor" (Leaf's translation) of Patroclus in XVI. It is important to note at this juncture that it is the *same ate*: as with Meleager, the *ate* may have been another's, but it envelops the innocent as well.

1.6 One cannot tell how much more damage would have been done as the result of Agamemnon's *ate* had not Achilles and Agamemnon become reconciled in book XIX. They did, however, become reconciled, and both got their wish to return to battle. Agamemnon admitted to Achilles that he had been wrong in taking his girl, but it was not his fault (XIX.86-89):

καί τέ με νεικέεσκον· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφοῖτις Ἐρινός,
οἳ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῇ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην,
ῥηματι τῷ ὅτ' Ἀχιλλῆος γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων.

He elaborates on his helplessness before *ate* by telling the story of how even Zeus himself was deceived in the case of the birth of Eurystheus (XIX.91-132). After this long digression he finally returns to his theme and concludes his thesis on *ate* (XIX.134-38):

ὥς καὶ ἐγὼν, ὅτε δὴ αὐτε μέγας κορυθαίολος Ἔκτωρ
Ἀργείους ὀλέκεσκεν ἐπὶ πρύμνησι νέεσσιν,
οὐ δυνάμην λελαθέσθ' Ἄτης, ἥ πρῶτον ἀάσθη.
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀσάμην καὶ μεν φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς,
ἄψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι, δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα· 135

By this juncture Agamemnon is clear on a number of points: 1) his *ate* began with the taking of Briseis from Achilles (88-89); 2) the consequence of his act was Achilles' withdrawal and the Greek defeat; 3) he is ready—again, as he was in IX—to make amends.¹¹

¹¹ There is a difference—or rather a number of differences—between the situations of IX and XIX. Achilles was not ready to return in IX, but is ready now. He had wanted

1.7 Achilles is not interested in such, but after Odysseus intervenes to stop his headlong rush into battle, he finally accepts Agamemnon's apology and agrees that *ate* was involved (XIX.270-74):¹²

Zeṽ páter, ἥ μεγάλας ἄτας ἄνδρεςσι διδοῖσθα· 270
οὐκ ἂν δὴ ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔμοισιν
Ἄτρεΐδης ὥρινε διαμπερές, οὐδέ κε κούρην
ἦγεν ἔμεῦ ἀέκοντος ἀμήχανος· ἀλλὰ ποθὶ Ζεὺς
ἦθελ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν θάνατον πολέεσσι γενέσθαι.

Ate is now banished, and the war can proceed to its natural conclusion without obstacles internal to the Greek force. While *ate* was on the scene a great deal of difficulty and suffering took place, but the outcome of the war was not affected. There is, however, every reason to believe that things would have been quite different if *ate* had not been dispelled. *Ate* entered the *Iliad* in book I and departed it in book XIX. We must now turn to an examination of its workings.

*

*


*

2.1 Book IX provides us with an account of how *ate* works and how it is to be cured. As a methodological matter we must at this point distinguish between actor and situation, for if we do not, we cannot understand *ate*. There are to be sure actors who are responsible for various actions, but once the action has taken place a situation comes into being, and it is that situation with which one must deal. Typically such a situation is the relation between two characters. We must assume that once *ate*, however we finally want to define it, enters the scene, we are in an *ate* situation and remain in one until the problem is cleared up. In our case the situation begins in book I and is concluded only in book XIX. From Phoenix's speech we learn that there are three situations or states; 1) normal, whatever that may have been; 2) disruption, i.e., the ἄτη situation; 3) reconciliation, i.e., the λῑταί situation. In the


Agamemnon to suffer but had not wanted to suffer himself—νήπιος. One may if one wishes assign more noble motives for Achilles' action, but childish or rather petulant behavior is sufficiently often rewarded in literature and rather frequently in real life to absolve us of the need of seeking any other explanation. Homer again is shrewd in his psychological observations.

¹² It is crucial to note that though *ate* is involved, it appears rather as the symptom than the cause—the cause is always, save in the allegories of IX and XIX, some divinity. So here Zeus is responsible.

ideal case a disturbed circuit is restored to normal by the acceptance of the prayers:



If, however, the reconciliation fails, the circuit is shorted, and disruption remains:



Presumably another loop through the λῑταί is required to restore the normal order.

2.2 In every *ate* situation there is an agent (A) and a patient (B). (A) does something which adversely affects (B). Sometimes (A) can get away with such an action, in which event there is no *ate* involved: whatever he attempted produced the desired results. Sometimes, though, the desired results are not produced and (B) reacts in an unfavorable way. Under these circumstances (A) may want to cure the disruption occasioned by his earlier action. Before he can do so, though, he must be clear that his own action caused the difficulty, and that he is responsible for it. This he can usually determine from an examination of the situation and (B)'s reaction to it. He will attempt a reconciliation and hence a restoration of the situation existing prior to his own *ate* by means of apology and other atonement. If he is successful in this, the *ate* situation will be cured, balance will be restored, and whatever was in train of happening can now happen. Unfortunately for (A), however, (B) is also an agent, and as such is free either to accept the recompense

or not. Should he choose to accept the apology, all is well; should he not, the *ate* situation remains, but now (B) is as responsible for its existence as was (A) who caused it in the first place. (B) had the opportunity to bring the matter to an end and did not.

2.3 For the purposes of this passage (and for Greek culture generally) the message is clear: if you have—for whatever reason—offended another, try to be reconciled with him. If he refuses, though you are not yet free of responsibility, the *ate* situation extends to the quondam victim as well. Conversely, and this is the point here, if you have been maltreated by another and he is ready to make amends, accept his amends (or else). Such a psycho-social arrangement clearly serves well in a society governed not by law as such but rather by relations of power and prestige. Phoenix illustrates his point with the story of Meleager (IX.529-99) who failed to accept the proffered recompense. Achilles of course does not accept the Prayers, and it is *ate*, now a physical force, which does in Patroklos in Book XVI. *Ate* has deprived Achilles of his friend Patroklos because he refused to accept Agamemnon's offer.

2.4 It matters little that Achilles is not guilty of an overt and more or less unprovoked offense as Agamemnon was: his unwillingness to accept recompense is treated as being as serious as the original offense itself. The point of *ate* is that it constitutes a disruption, and society cannot tolerate such disruptions, particularly among its leaders. Pressure must be brought to bear on these leaders to accept recompense and so get on with the business at hand. *Ate* causes social disruption—in our case Achilles' withdrawal from battle and the subsequent Greek defeat—and it must be rooted out like any other social evil.

*

*

*

3.1 The question, of course, is how to bring an *ate* situation to an end. The embassy in book IX in which Phoenix took part failed: Achilles refused the gifts and (as a result) suffered the death of Patroclus. After the latter's death Achilles wants to return to the battle, and is now as eager as Agamemnon is to restore the situation to normal. Clearly λιπαί are no longer at issue. If they were, then perhaps Achilles would have to offer them to Agamemnon. It is the goal of book XIX to banish *ate*, as Zeus did, and to restore the situation to normal.

3.2 This is not, however, Achilles' goal. He wants only to get back to battle and to march out immediately. He is perfectly willing to let bygones be bygones provided he can immediately take revenge on the Trojans and Hector. Agamemnon in his following speech reminds Achilles that *ate* had entered through his own actions and that he is willing to make the same amends now that he had offered in book IX. Achilles dismisses the offer without considering it because he is not at all interested in gifts or anything of the sort. Things might have been left at this point had Odysseus not intervened. He did intervene, however, and urged Achilles to be patient. On the pretext of feeding the troops he proposes that a formal end be put to the disruptive situation (XIX.171-83):

ἀλλ' ἄγε λαὸν μὲν σκέδασσον καὶ δεῖπνον ἄνωχθι
 δπλεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δῶρα ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων
 οἰσέτω ἔς μέσσην ἀγορὴν, ἵνα πάντες Ἀχαιοὶ
 ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδωσι, σὺ δὲ φρεσὶ σῇσιν ἰανθῇς.
 ὁμνέτω δέ τοι ὄρκον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἀναστάς,
 μή ποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἢ δὲ μιγῆναι·
 ἢ θέμις ἐστίν, ἄναξ, ἢ τ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ τε γυναικῶν·
 καὶ δὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἴλαος ἔστω.
 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτά σε δαιτὶ ἐνὶ κλισίῃς ἀρσεάσθω
 πείρη, ἵνα μή τι δίκης ἐπιδευὲς ἔχῃσθα.
 Ἀτρεΐδῃ, σὺ δ' ἔπειτα δικαιότερος καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ
 ἔσσεαι. οὐ μὲν γάρ τι νεμεσσητὸν βασιλῆα
 ἄνδρ' ἀπαρέσσεσθαι, ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνῃ.

Odysseus knew that *ate* had entered the scene on a formal occasion, an assembly, (cf. XIX.88) and realized that it had to be dispelled in a formal way now on another formal occasion. Otherwise (we are free to imagine) there might have been a residual, lingering resentment (cf. *Iliad* I.80-83) on either side which could cause the problem to erupt again at a later date. The gifts are brought forward for all to see, and a formal ceremony takes place. Talthylbius brings a boar and Agamemnon makes a formal oath that he has not touched Briseis (XIX.258-63).¹³

¹³ It may be ungenerous to suspect that Agamemnon is lying about not having touched Briseis. In fact it matters little whether he did or not: his formal renunciation of her involves also a statement that he did not use her as wife or concubine. His statement is (at least) the equivalent of an annulment of a marriage even after children have been born. On the other hand he may never have touched her because that was not really the point of having her.

He then cut out the boar's stomach and Talthybius cast it into the sea.¹⁴ Achilles in his turn swore an oath (as it were), and formally accepted Agamemnon's account of the episode (XIX.270-75 quoted at 1.7 above).

3.3 The cure of an *ate* situation is an apology formally given and formally accepted. In this instance it involves an oath, a sacrifice and the formal acceptance of the oath. All agree that Agamemnon was in the wrong, that he was not responsible for his actions, and that the incident can now be considered closed. The social utility of *ate* and its divine causation is quite clear from this passage; one can admit to having acted counter to what is best for all without losing face, an important or vital consideration in any culture, but particularly important in one in which psychological motivation was poorly understood and in which political power rested in generally agreed upon superiority. It also more importantly provides a mechanism for reconciliation of opposing parties in a common endeavor. One can isolate a state which both parties can accept as plausible and then attribute that state to external causation. Without *ate* it might have been difficult to specify the offense and the relation between the parties. E. R. Dodds¹⁵ has commented on this aspect of things, entitling his first chapter "Agamemnon's Apology," and his entire book is in some ways an extended commentary on Agamemnon's speech in book XIX. He is right to stress the social utility of a notion like *ate*, but its social utility does not exhaust its importance.

*

*

*

¹⁴ The boar here represents *ate* and Talthybius is acting as Zeus did when he cast *ate* out of heaven. The boar also provides a connection with the story of Meleager and the Calydonian boar in book IX. The important thing is to be rid of *ate* so that things can proceed.

¹⁵ Dodds (3-5) is good on pointing out that guilt is not relevant to Homer and Agamemnon but that responsibility is. He is helpful also in observing that all Homer's hearers agree on Agamemnon's interpretation of affairs. He is wrong, however, when he includes "all instances of nonalcoholic *ate* in Homer under the head of . . . 'psychic intervention'." Here he trips over Homeric psychology which posits as a fact gods and divine intervention and requires divinity in every complete individual. Dodds maintains—incorrectly (10)—that there is a "sharp line which separates humanity from divinity." In fact the divine is always part of Homeric man's psychology. Dodds is wrong also (17) in speaking of "shame": "And we may guess that the notion of *ate* served a similar purpose for Homeric man by enabling him in all good faith to project on to an external power his unbearable feelings of shame." What shame?

4.1 The psychological aspects of *ate* are equally important, and here we must examine the concept as it exists within an individual and not as it develops over time in a social situation. In order to get at the basic nature of the concept we will want to know who was affected, why, and in what way. As we did with the social situation (2.1 above) we will analyze accounts of *ate* into their component parts, not all of which need be present explicitly on any given occasion. The components are: cause (if given or inferable from the context), locus of the action (generally the actor or agent), the act, the result of the act (or the reaction), and finally the consequences of the act as perceived either by the actor or by another.¹⁶ In all cases we must allow for the speaker's ignorance or inability to see the true situation, and even for his deliberate misinterpretation of affairs.

4.2 I begin with the three occurrences of *ate* in book XVI. In line 274 Patroclus accurately analyzes the problem the Achaeans face. They are in trouble because Achilles is absent from the battle, and his absence is in turn due to Agamemnon's slighting him earlier on. Agamemnon is the actor, the act is slighting Achilles, the reaction is Achilles' withdrawal from battle, and the result is the Achaeans' difficulties. Patroclus does not state or does not know what caused Agamemnon to act as he did:

<i>Cause</i>	<i>Actor</i>	<i>Act</i>	<i>Reaction</i>	<i>Consequence</i>
?	Agamemnon	Slighted Achilles	Achilles withdraws	Achaeans in trouble

4.3 Lines 685 and 805 describe the death of Patroclus. Though Patroclus is correct in his analysis of the situation (274), he fails to comprehend that he is intervening in an *ate* situation which cannot be cured by his (or anyone else's) intervention. Hence he goes into battle. *Ate* catches up with him since he does not stay within the boundaries Achilles established for him and is killed. The *ate* which did him in is the same *ate* which Achilles had acquired because he had failed to listen to Agamemnon and accept his gifts. In the first of the two pas-

¹⁶ A similar tabular arrangement is adopted by J. Mattes, *Der Wahnsinn im griechischen Mythos und in der Dichtung bis zum Drama der fünften Jahrhunderts* (Heidelberg 1970) 26-30. There are similarities between *ate* and mania: cf. *Odyssey* 21.297-98 and Mattes 7. In fact, though, the connection is indirect, being mediated by *oinos*.

sages (684–91) the poet comments on Patroclus' folly (685/6: καὶ μέγ' ἄασθη/νήπιος) in not heeding Achilles' advice. The scheme here is:

<i>Cause</i>	<i>Actor</i>	<i>Act</i>	<i>Result</i>	<i>Consequence</i>
Zeus	Patroclus	disobeys Achilles	dies	—

We know, however, that Patroclus' *ate* is not his own really, though it is he that suffers in book XVI; that he acts as an agent or surrogate of Achilles' *ate*; and that the consequences of his act are worked out on Achilles rather than on himself. In 805 *ate* is the agent, Achilles' *ate* that is, when it seizes Patroclus' wits and causes him to stand amazed and defenseless, schema:

<i>Cause</i>	<i>Actor</i>	<i>Act</i>	<i>Result</i>	<i>Consequence</i>
<i>ate</i>	<i>ate</i>	Stuns Patroclus	He dies	Achilles mourns

The *ate* in this book is Achilles' throughout. His refusal to accept Agamemnon's proposal in IX and his foolishness in sending Patroclus to his certain death in battle and his grief at having done so (XVIII.23 ff.) all constitute his *ate*.

4.4 Agamemnon's *ate* is attributed to Zeus as the cause, though we have no direct evidence that he is correct in this. It consisted in or resulted from his failing to honor Achilles (I.412, XIX.88, 270), who in turn withdrew from battle with the consequence that the Achaeans were driven back (I.412, IX.119, XVI.274, XIX.270). Agamemnon is unable to do anything about the Achaeans' plight, regrets it, and endeavors to make amends in accordance with the plan outlined in book IX. Agamemnon has done something which has produced a consequence which he did not anticipate and now regrets. Had the consequence not ensued, he would not have regretted his act and would not have been involved in an *ate* situation. Why did he do it? The answer we have is that Zeus caused him to act in this way (in company with Μοῖρα and Ἐρινός):

<i>Cause</i>	<i>Actor</i>	<i>Action</i>	<i>Reaction</i>	<i>Consequence</i>
Ζεύς	Agamemnon	slights Achilles	Achilles	a) Achaeans
Μοῖρα			withdraws	in trouble
Ἐρινός				b) Agamemnon
				troubled

Agamemnon attributes his action to Zeus. Our psychology does not contain a Zeus, and we are apt positivistically to hold that the essence of an *ate* situation is an act followed by regret for that act.¹⁷

4.5 We can therefore remove causation from the definition of *ate*. One knows that cowardice causes fear, and that φόβος is responsible for φόβος in Greek with no further agency required.¹⁸ Similarly ἄτη causes ἄτη. With cause removed we can focus on the act and its consequences for the actor or for another. For Agamemnon the act was insulting Achilles and the consequence his regret for it, a regret forced upon him by Achilles' withdrawal from the battle and the Greeks' subsequent defeat. The act is itself *ate*, as Achilles had so shrewdly observed (I.412):

ἦν ἄτην, ὃ τ' ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτειοε!

That the consequences of an act are also *ate* is proved by XXIV.480–82:

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἄν ἄνδρ' ἄτη πυκινὴ λάβῃ, ὅς τ' ἐνὶ πάτρῃ 480
φῶτα κατακτείνας ἄλλων ἐξίκετο δῆμον,
ἄνδρὸς ἐς ἀφνειοῦ, θάμβος δ' ἔχει εἰσορόωντας.

This passage clearly shows that *ate* comes upon the man *after* he has slain another, and no amount of comment (cf. Leaf ad loc.) will change this fact. *Ate* was the regret (remorse, grief) for the act which was psychologically part of the act though temporally subsequent to it. The man in *Iliad* XXIV regretted what he had done, but in no way does he (there) ask why he did it. He knows he did wrong, probably in the same way that Phoenix learned of his error in book IX.470 ff.—from the reactions of others. So, too, with Agamemnon, who was told (IX.115–16, XIX.85–86) that he had been deluded.

4.6 We tend always to look for a cause, for a reason, as did the Greeks later on at least, but Homeric heroes sought for the cause (if at all) only after they had determined that they or another was in an *ate* situation.¹⁹ Frequently they found the cause to be *ate* itself (II.111) or Zeus and others (XIX.87). Search for causation is psychologically and logically

¹⁷ Many passages in the poems indicate that regret, remorse or pain is part of *ate*: VI.356, XXIV.28, 480; 4.261, 11.60, 14.232, 23.224.

¹⁸ Indeed, this is the meaning of personification—taking the act (or state) and making it also the cause of the state. Or, put grammatically, placing in subject position what should be the object or the instrument of the action. Cf. Stallmach 88 n. 160.

¹⁹ Cf. Stallmach 30: "Im Gegenteil, erst daran, dass er "Schaden" als Ergebnis seines Handelns erlebt, wird ihm klar, dass er sich verschuldet haben muss." Stallmach's observation is the most important remark in his work and has certainly been influential in my own thinking about *ate*.

secondary to the perception of the consequences of an act and *a fortiori* to the act itself. We tend to focus on the cause and then on the act and its result; the Greeks looked at the consequences and derived the act from them. Act and consequence were both *ate*: the cause of the act, if sought, was found in divine intervention. We can now see that *LSJ* definitions are inaccurate in that they focus on purely intellectual or moral aspects of ἄτη and do not regard it rather as a social transaction and a psychological nexus. In turn they assume that it is a sign of primitiveness of thought and take it as a sort of quaint given of Greek culture.

4.7 It may be possible to penetrate behind the incipient intellectualism of Greek culture and see what physical or physiological basis the notion may originally have had. We know that mental and emotional actions and reactions were in earliest times conceived of as physical transactions. Thus in *Iliad* I.55 Hera physically placed on Achilles' midriff the idea of calling an assembly. The midriff, or φρένες, was to Homer or his predecessors the actual location of thought and feeling, as the heart was later on to almost all Greeks save Plato and a few others who held out for the head. The reason is simple: one feels emotions either in a constriction of the diaphragm or a weight on the chest or in the beating of the heart. Ἄτη, then, should be some sort of feeling in the first instance before it became an abstraction, and it should have had a physical cause. What kind of feeling, though, and caused by what?

4.8 Though generally one is in the habit of treating *ate* as the cause or instigator of an ill-advised act, this is emphatically not the case. It is quite clear from the *Iliad* that the feeling is one of regret or remorse for an act which turned out badly, the kind of feeling that causes one to ask: why did I go and do that? The *Iliad's* answer generally to this question is that a god is responsible (Zeus in II.111 and elsewhere, as well as other gods), but one can easily see that though the gods are thought of as being responsible for the act, they are only indirectly responsible for the *ate* which follows the act. In our own psychology *ate* is the remorse which follows upon some misguided act, and we are not apt to speculate seriously on the cause of the act. The Greeks found the gods to be the cause of misguided actions (as of so much else) and hence by indirection of *ate*. In some cases or perhaps in all the act which causes the remorse is an omission, a failure to honor a mortal (I.412) or a god (IX.508, and cf. the judgment of Paris). *Ate*, when localized, is to be found in the φρένες 'the midriff' or 'the mind' (IX.119, XVI.805, XIX.88) and it is the φρένες that are removed when one acts

in such a way as to produce *ate*. Elsewhere Homer locates *ate* in the θυμός or spirit (IX.533) and the spirit in turn clouds the mind (νόος) and makes it unable to recognize the true situation (X.391, IX.533). *Ate* is, in a word, remorse or regret and follows an act—it does not cause it. It is also the resentment one feels when wronged by another. When resentment is not assuaged—as in book IX—and is prolonged unnecessarily, it can then occasion remorse when the victim finds that he was wrong not to accept proffered amends.

*

*

*

5.1 All of this is quite intellectual and characteristic of the *Iliad*. *Ate* affects only important people—hence it is Zeus that sends it—and it affects their minds. In the *Odyssey*, *ate* is less frequent, and in part at least has different causes. The longest and most interesting discussion of the term in the *Odyssey* is in the speech of Antinoos in 21.288–310. The suitors have all just failed to string the bow, and Odysseus proposes that they allow him to try. Antinoos threatens the beggar with trouble if he should attempt—in his drunkenness—to string the bow (21.293–04):

οἶνός σε τρώει μελιγδής, ὃς τε καὶ ἄλλους βλάπτει, ὃς ἂν μιν χανδὸν ἔλῃ μῆδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ. οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον, ἀγακλυτὸν Εὐρυτίωνα, ἄσος' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο, ἐς Λαπίθας ἐλθόνθ'· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν ὄινῳ, μαινόμενος κάκ' ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόοιο· ἥρωας δ' ἄχος εἶλε, διὲκ προθύρου δὲ θύραζε ἔλκον ἀναΐξαντες, ἀπ' οὐάτα νηλεῖ χαλκῷ ῥίνας τ' ἀμήσαντες· ὁ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἀασθεὶς ἦϊεν ἦν ἄτην ὀχέων ἀεσίφρονι θυμῷ. ἐξ οὗ Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκος ἐτύχθη, οἱ δ' αὐτῷ πρώτῳ κακὸν εὔρετο οἶνοβαρείων.	295 300
---	--

5.2 From this passage we learn that *ate* can come from wine alone, that it need not be sent by a god, and that once again it attacks the φρένες (sense) and θυμός (spirit). The regrettable act here is nothing so intellectual as slighting a colleague, but rather involves getting drunk and essentially running amok. Other *Odyssey* passages allow the gods to send *ate*, but for the most part the act to be regretted was caused by wine (21.288 ff., 11.61) or falling asleep at the wrong time (11.61, 10.68).

The *Odyssey* is thus more physical than the *Iliad*, and allows physical substances to affect the physical body in the area of the epigastrium without divine interference.²⁰

5.3 Stripped of divine motivation *ate* turns out to be the result of an act or an overindulgence that affects the φρένες, the area affected also by other physical manifestations of emotion; and one infers *ate* from a later feeling of physical or mental pain. *Ate* is that awful feeling of doom one has when one realizes that one has overindulged or made a considerable error. By extension it then comes to denote the act which occasioned the feeling and (sometimes) the cause of that act. We may therefore assign a nexus of meaning to *ate*: 'remorse for overindulgence, pain from overindulgence' such as a hangover, or simply 'overindulgence' itself; and by extension—since the connection is the remorse or pain one feels for an act—'remorse for an act' or simply 'an act' (which turned out badly). Delusion is an interpretation the actor places on his act, not a part of the meaning of *ate*.

5.4 The verb ἄω, then, should mean something like 'overindulge (and regret it)' or 'cause to overindulge, stuff.' Evidence for such a meaning comes from the *Odyssey*:

11.61 δσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος.
21.296 ἄας' ἐνι μεγάρω μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο

both of which in effect mean 'he overindulged in wine.' To these can be added:

10.68 ἄασάν μ' ἔταροί τε κακοί, πρὸς τοῖσι τε ὕπνος

in which sleep is an agent, and which really means 'I fell asleep at the wrong time, indulged in sleep.' We may recall that sleep was involved

²⁰ The *Iliad* may not always have been so intellectual. There is an epic line twice cited in ancient sources which does not appear in our vulgate:

ἢ οἶνω μεθύων ἢ μ' ἔβλαψαν θεοὶ αὐτοί.

This line follows:

IX.119 φρεσὶ λευγαλέησι πιθήσας
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἄασάμην
XIX.137 καὶ μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο ἰζεύς,

and indicates that wine could cause *ate* in the *Iliad* tradition as well.

also in the Elpenor episode.²¹ It is difficult to assign a translation to the verb that will do in these cases, but in all of them the subject overindulged in something and came to regret it. The cause of his overindulgence is assigned to wine or a god or one's comrades, but the physical fact is that in all cases the agent regrets his overindulgence in something.²²

*

*

*

6.1 I now propose to provide additional evidence that *ate* means 'overindulgence': it will be of various sorts. There are traces of this meaning in Greek authors later than Homer. In Hesiod's *Works and Days* (230–31) hunger is opposed to *ate*, and both are in turn opposed to apportioning things in abundance:

οὐδέ ποτ' ἰθυδίκησι μετ' ἀνδράσι λιμός ὀπηδεῖ
οὐδ' ἄτη, θαλῆης δὲ μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται.

Interpretation of this passage has proved difficult,²³ but the difficulties vanish if one translates as 'satiety' or 'being stuffed.' Interpretation of these lines is indicated by Heracleitus who twice opposes λιμός to κόρος. His fragment 111 is clearest in this regard:²⁴

νοῦσος ὑγίειν ἐποίησεν ἡδύ, κακὸν ἀγαθόν,
λιμός κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαισιν.

Herodotus also supports the interpretation in that he provides an actual description of what happens when hunger drives one to overindulgence. In 8.117 the army of Xerxes has just escaped the Greeks and crossed over into Asia Minor at Abydos. After numerous bad gastronomic experiences in Greece (8.115), they finally find enough to eat and drink:

²¹ Sleep is also very much a part of Agamemnon's story as well, in that it was in a dream that he conceived the idea of attacking Troy in *Iliad* II. And it is Sleep who demands an ἄσπετον oath (XIV.271).

²² One will recall that Agamemnon also had overindulged, or at least was filled up, in I.103–4, this time with *meneos*.

²³ M. L. West (*Hesiod: Works and Days* [Oxford 1978]) ad 231: "Ἄτη: a vague word, perhaps referring here to spoilage of crops (e.g. by rust) as distinct from their failure, or else corresponding to the λοιμός of 243."

²⁴ Cf. also Fr. 67: ὁ θεὸς . . . κόρος λιμός, ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ>, ὁπότεν συμμιγῇ θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου.

ἐνθαῦτα δὲ κατεχόμενοι σιτία [τε] πλέω ἢ κατ' ὁδὸν ἐλάγχανον, οὐδένα τε κόσμον ἐπιπλάμενοι καὶ ὕδατα μεταβάλλοντες ἀπέθνησκον τοῦ στρατοῦ τοῦ περιόντος πολλοί.

The hunger of 8.115 (ταῦτα δ' ἐποίηον ὑπὸ λιμοῦ) is replaced by satiety, and many of the army die.

6.2 Panyassis, an epic poet of ca. 480 B.C., twice refers to drinking too much as ἄτη, and introduces with it also the notion of ὕβρις which must mean something like 'overreaching' or 'greed' (Fr. 13.7-9 Kinkel):

ἀλλ' ὅτε τις μοίρης τριτάτης πρὸς μέτρον ἐλαύνει
πίνων ἀβλεμέως, τότε δ' ὕβριος αἴσα καὶ ἄτης
γίνεται ἀργαλέα, κακὰ δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀπάζει.

And again in Fr. 14.1, 5-6:

οἶνος δὲ θνητοῖσι θεῶν πάρα δῶρον ἄριστον . . .
πινόμενος κατὰ μέτρον, ὑπὲρ μέτρον δὲ χερεῖων.
ἦ γάρ οἱ ἄτης τε καὶ ὕβριος αἴς' ἅμ' ὀπηδεῖ.

If one overindulges, or drinks beyond the proper measure, then the measure or share of ἄτη and ὕβρις follows.

6.3 Pindar in *Ol.* 1.55 ff. in referring to Tantalus remarks that he could not digest his good fortune, but with satiety (*koros* this time) he received excessive *ate* (*Ol.* 1.55 ff. Snell²):

ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέψαι
μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ' ἔλεν
ἅταν ὑπέροπλον, ἄν τοι πατὴρ ὕπερ
κρέμασε καρτερόν αὐτῷ λίθον.

One will note that *ate* comes after the act and is in the form of a stone hung over him—a reminder or a symbol of his regret. Further we recall that trouble began earlier at a banquet (36 ff.), at which one will, if one follows Panyassis, be moderate. Again in *P.* 2.25 ff. Pindar remarks of the other great sinner Ixion, who in his crazed mind lusted after Hera, that *hybris* roused him to arrogant *ate*:

ἔμαθε δὲ σαφές. εὐμενέσσι γὰρ παρὰ Κρονίδαις
γλυκὺν ἐλὼν βίον, μακρόν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὄλ-
βον, μαινομέναις φρασὶν
Ἦρας ὅτ' ἐράσσατο, τὰν Διὸς εὖναι λάχον
πολυγαθέες· ἀλλὰ νιν ὕβρις εἰς ἀνάταν ὑπεράφανον
ῥωσεν· τάχα δὲ παθὼν εἰοικότ' ἀνὴρ
ἐξαίρετον ἔλε μόχθον.

In *Ol.* 13.10 we learn that *hybris* is the mother of *koros* 'satiety,' from which we can infer a Pindaric nexus of *hybris* leading to *koros* leading to *ate*.²⁵ *Koros* indeed seems to have replaced *ate* later on when the latter came to mean 'delusion' or 'doom.' The two words are combined in the phrase 'insatiable surfeit,' *PMG* 973:²⁶

τὰν ἀκόρεστον αὐάταν

6.4 Other passages from later times could be adduced as well to strengthen the hypothesis that ἄτη originally meant 'surfeit' or 'satiety' or 'upset.' At this point, though, I shall present several informal indications from later sources that gastric disturbances can cause upset and feeling of regret. The evidence stems from later stages of Greek, up to and including modern Greek, and has to do primarily with the character Ephialtes, a figure of Greek legend. Andreas Karkavitsas²⁷ in his novel *The Beggar* writes: "All floated rudderless in a sea of despair and grief. They had something uneasy inside themselves, something treacherous stalked among them. Ephialtes unsubdued lodged in their spirit and forced it to long for things indistinct and yet irreconcilable with their life and its mission." Demetrakos²⁸ in his lexicon records of Ephialtes that it denotes anything which oppressively affects the mind; or a digestive disorder which brings unpleasant dreams and a feeling of ill-being in sleep. Eustathius in his commentary on the *Iliad* (561.10) under Ephialtes also records that it was said of a stomach disorder. J. Lawson in his *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1910) 21 n. 2 states: "A nightmare and the sense of physical oppression which often accompanies it are not traced to so vulgar a

²⁵ B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: the Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885) 229–30 is good on this. "Theognis reverses the genealogy, v. 153: τίκτηι τοι κόρος ὕβριν ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἔπηται, but that makes little difference, as, according to Greek custom, grandmother and granddaughter often bore the same name. It is a mere matter of ὕβρις-Κόρος-ὕβρις." On *hybris* cf. Ann Michelini's interesting article "Ὑβρις and Plants," *HSCP* 82 (1978) 35–44.

²⁶ *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Ed. D. L. Page [Oxford 1962]):

Μετὰ γὰρ τὸ ᾧ φωνήεντος ἐπαγομένου
προστίθεται Αἰολικῶς τὸ ὤ, ὡς . . . ἀάταν, τὴν
βλάβην, καὶ
τὰν ἀκόρεστον αὐάταν·

²⁷ P. D. Mastrodemetres, *O Zetianos tou Karkavitsa* 218–19 (2nd Ed., Athens 1982). My translation of Karkavitsas' novel will appear shortly as: A. Karkavitsas, *The Beggar* (New York, Caratzas, 1982).

²⁸ D. Demetrakos, *Mega Lexikon les Hellenikes Glosses* (Athens 1953).



cause as a heavy supper, but are dignified as the work of a malicious being named *Vrahnas*, who in the dead of night delights to seat himself on the chest of some sleeper, and by his weight produces an unpleasant feeling of congestion." *Vrahnas* and *Ephialtes* have the same properties. Hippocrates noted the same phenomenon in his *Regimen* IV.93: ὁκόσα δὲ ἀλλόμορφα σώματα φαίνεται ἐν τοῖσιν ὕπνοισι καὶ φοβεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, σιτίων ἀσυνήθων σημαίνει πλησμονήν. . . .^{28a} It seems from these passages that there is a connection between nightmares and overeating and in turn with mental anguish. One thinks again of Agamemnon and his dream in book II of the *Iliad*.

6.5 Adjectives descriptive of *ate* indicate that it shares characteristics with *Vrahnas*. Ἄγριον (XIX.88) is really not diagnostic of anything, and λυγρὴν 'baneful' (23.223), though appropriate, is not specific enough to warrant inclusion as evidence. Nor indeed would be βαρεῖν (II.111, IX.18, 15.223), were it not for the idea of weight on one's chest (or mind) which is characteristic also of *Vrahnas*. Book XXIV.480 (discussed at 4.5 above) qualifies *ate* as πυκινή. LSJ s.v. IV give a definition specifically designed for this word and two other Homeric usages: "generally, *strong* of its kind, *sore*, *excessive*." The other definitions of the word which are generally valid for Homer are "I of a thing with reference to the close union of its parts, *close*, *firm*, *solid*," and "II of the parts of a thing, *close-packed*, *crowded*." There is no need for a separate definition IV: πυκινή fits well with an idea of "close-packed" or "firm," as with πυκινὸν λέχος "well-stuffed bed" in IX.621. Πυκινὴ ἄτη is therefore a sort of intensive redundancy: "well-stuffed surfeit."

*

*

*

7.1 I have yet to speak of form.²⁹ The root of ἄτη and ἄω has to be abstracted from attested forms since no canonical present stem appears. In spite of the diversity, however, there is no question that all forms derive from ἄα-. The forms are:

^{28a} Professor Clay points to *Republic* 571 C in which Plato speaks of the wild portion of the soul, filled with food and drink, dominating during sleep (at least in some souls).

²⁹ Hansjakob Seiler, "Homerisch ἄδομαι und ἄτη in *Sprachgeschichte und Wortbedeutung* 409-17 (= Festschrift Albert Debrunner [Bern 1954]) has the fullest and best discussion of forms of *ate*. One will consult also his article in *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Ed. B. Snell and H. Erbse, 1955 ff.) 9-12.

- | | | | |
|----|----|------------------------------------|--|
| 1) | ᾿ | ᾱτη
ᾱσε
ᾱσατο | (frequent)
(11.61)
(XIX.95) |
| 2) | ᾿᾿ | ᾱάσας
ᾱεσίφρων
ᾱεσιφροσύνησι | (VIII.237)
(XXIII.603, 20.183, 21.302)
(15.470) |
| 3) | ᾿᾿ | ᾱάσθη(ν)

ᾱάσατο
ᾱᾱται | (XIX.136, XVI.685, XIX.113, 4.503, 509,
21.301)

(IX.537)
(XIX.91=129) |
| 4) | ᾿᾿ | ᾱασ'
ᾱασεν
ᾱασάμην
ᾱάστος | (21.296)
(21.297)
(IX.116, 119, XIX.137)
(21.91, 22.5) |
| 5) | ᾿᾿ | ᾱάσθη
ᾱασαν
ᾱάσατο
ᾱάστος | (h. Cer. 246)
(10.68)
(XI.340)
(XIV.271) |

7.2 These classes can be reduced in number. In the first place it seems clear that (1) is merely a contracted version of one of the other classes and is to be merged into a disyllabic base, which one we cannot tell *a priori*. (3) can be merged with (2) because a) there is no particular reason to feel that the second -α- of ᾱάσθη is long by nature; b) ᾱάσατο can just as easily represent *ᾱάσσατο as ᾱάσατο;³⁰ and c) ᾱᾱται, if not artificial, must be a contract verb from *ᾱᾱεται: all forms of (3) belong in (2). In class (4) the initial long vowel can be explained in the first three cases as the syllabic augment. In the fourth the second vowel is lengthened as regularly in a compound, though the compound itself is irregular. Clearly the verbal forms of (5) are all augmented and the sigmatic forms should be regarded as being from original -ss-. The root was ᾱσ-, or perhaps ᾱε-, if we follow the lead of ᾱεσίφρων.³¹

7.3 We require a verb meaning 'sate' or 'stuff' with a phonological shape conformable with or derivable from ᾱσ- (ᾱε-). ᾱω (C) is glossed

³⁰ In fact the form with -σσ- is to be recommended both because of ᾱάσθη and because ᾱάσατο would require the assumption either that /a:/ did not pass to /ε:/ in this word (for some reason) or that the second -a- is metrically lengthened on some analogy or other. (cf. my *Metrical Lengthening in Homer* = *Incunabula Graeca* 35 [Rome 1969]). The only analogical change conceivable is that of -σ- to -σσ-.

³¹ On this form cf. Mette *LfgE* 4-5 s.v. ᾱασίφρων. The original meaning of this word will have been 'having a stuffed φρήν,' and will be a representation in compound form of a sentence *φρένας ᾱται or *φρήν ᾱται, and will be the result of *ᾱτη φρένας λαμβάνει (cf. XVI.805).

by *LSJ* as “satisfy,” “but, II. mostly intr., take one’s fill of a thing.” The verb in Homer (and it is epic only) always has a long initial syllable, and hence always falls into class (1) as established for *ate*:

ἄσειν	XI.818
ἄση	XVIII.281
ἄσαιμι	IX.489
ἄσαι	(frequent)
ἄμεναι	XXI.70 ³²
ἄσεσθε	XXIV.717
ἄσασθε	XIX.307
ἔωμεν	XIX.402 ³³

The identification proposed here of ἄω and ἄώ is not generally made both because the semantic equivalence has not been heretofore established and because scholars are in the habit of deriving the verbs from different underlying shapes: ἄώ is thought to come from an **awa-*, while ἄω is derived from an Indo-European root **sā- : sa-* (**seH₂ : *sH₂*).³⁴ Of this latter root the strong form with the long vowel is thought to occur in ἄσαι, while the weaker form with schwa is to be found in ἄτοκος ‘insatiable,’ < **nsatos*, ἄδην < **sad-* ‘to one’s fill’ and Latin *satis* ‘enough.’ It is, however, quite unlikely that ἄσαι derives from **sā-*. Though one can avoid the problem of psilosis on the grounds of an Ionic epic tradition,³⁵ one cannot so avoid the problem of the long vowel. /a:/ > /ε:/ in Ionic, and one cannot get around this fact: one would expect *eta* in all forms of the verb. It must be that /a:/ derives from ἄα or ἄε- (ἄα- or ἄε-), and that the form of the present must

³² On ἄμεναι cf. T. Rüsing in *Glotta* 40 (1962) 162–64 and *LfgE* 627–29. Rüsing takes the form to be an aorist (and not a present) of the type ἔφθην.

³³ ἔωμεν, if connected with ἄσαι, must be an aorist subjunctive like στέωμεν, etc. (cf. Leaf ad loc.), and must in turn point to an earlier **ἄομεν* or **ἄωμεν* of which it is the metathesized variant (perhaps, but not necessarily, via **ῥομεν*). The form causes difficulties on any assumption, but if we wish to connect it with ἄω, **ἄόομεν* > **ἄομεν* > ἔωμεν is not impossible. We need only invoke the analogy (e.g.) of the masculine genitive singular of ā-stems which displays a relation -ᾰο ~ εω.

³⁴ Cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960–72) 159 and P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968–80) 121–22.

³⁵ One will compare in this regard K. Meister’s *Die Homerische Kunstsprache* (Leipzig 1921; repr. Darmstadt 1966) 209 ff. and 225–26, and P. Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* I (Paris 1948) 184–88.

be reconstructed as ἄάω: the semantic side of the equation has been argued above.³⁶

7.4 There is, however, still the problem of the short vowel in ἄστος (ἄτος). This adjective is generally assumed to be a negative compound containing the *-to* participle of ἄω in the root-form *sə- with the meaning 'insatiable' or some such. There is the formal difficulty that one might rather expect *ἄνστος but that can be set aside as not compelling.³⁷ Furthermore the semantic interpretation seems unassailable since Ares (V.388, 863, VII.203) and Achilles (XIII.746) can properly be described as 'insatiable for war' (ἄτος πολέμοιο), and Hector (XXI.218) as 'insatiable for battle,' and Odysseus (XI.430, 13.293) as 'insatiable of wives,' though this last is stretching things a bit. Insatiability is indeed a human characteristic and one to which the Greeks called attention. They also called attention to overindulgence and warned against it and its consequences. I suggest that ἄστος means 'stuffed with' or something of the sort: one who is 'insatiable for war' is so not because he has not already partaken of war but because he has. One cannot be blood-thirsty unless one has tasted blood. ἄστος, then, derives directly from ἄάω and means (or meant originally) 'stuffed,' or in the case in point, 'overfull with war.' Excess implies desire for more: τίκτει κόρος ὕβριν.³⁸

7.5 The true negative prefix of ἄάω (or ἄω) is of course ἀάστος, twice used of ἄεθλος (21.91, 22.5) with a short penult, and once (XIV.271) of the waters of Styx, this time with a long penult. There is no agreement on the exact meaning to be assigned in any of these passages, and I have no good suggestions. A meaning derivative of 'remorse' or of 'sating' seems to me as likely as any of those proposed. That ἄτη is connected in

³⁶ Hesiod (*Scutum* 101) has ἄσται thus proving the disyllabic origin of the verb. Cf. Hes. ἄται· πληροῦται.

³⁷ If the verb once began with the rough breathing, then one might expect the form ἄ- of the negative prefix. Cf. A. C. Moorhouse, *Studies in the Greek Negative* (Cardiff 1959) 15 ff. and M. Lejeune, *Rev. de phil.* 32 (1968) 198-205.

³⁸ The position of the accent causes difficulty for my argument, and one cannot deny that my reasoning would lead one to expect *ἄτός, ἄροτος, however, is a possible parallel, and it may be that the irregular accent caused reinterpretation as a negative compound. The compound, ἀκόρητος used of war and battle in the *Iliad* (VII.117, XII.355, XIII.621, 639, XIV.479, XX.2), argues strongly for the interpretation 'insatiable' or some such. Support for my derivation comes from Hesiod's *Scutum* 101 (of Ares):

ἢ μὴν καὶ κρατερός περ ἔων ἄται πολέμοιο

in a passage which contains both ἄτον πολέμοιο (59) and ἦν ἄτην ὀχέων (93). Clearly the words are connected in the poet's mind, and clearly also ἄτος πολέμοιο refers to one who ἄται πολέμοιο rather than to one who does not. ἄστος must mean 'stuffed with' rather than 'insatiable for.'

some way seems assured both by the fact that an oath is involved (as in XIX.113), and that it is Sleep who demands the oath, sleep which figures frequently in ἄτη situations.³⁹

7.6 The system of derivatives of ἄω 'sate' is built on a root αα- (or αε-). To this root are added the thematic vowel (in ἄται), -(ο)σ- (in ἄσαι), and -τ- (in ἄτη and ἄτος). There is nothing very strange about any of this, but one notices that ἄτος and ἄτη would seem to be the masculine and feminine respectively of the -to participle of αα-. But ἄτη in Homer and in Greek generally is a noun and not an adjective. The question is: if ἄτη is a noun derived from an adjective, what can have been the noun which it once modified? One cannot know, but taking my lead from Panyassis (6.2 above), I would suggest that it was μοῖρα or αἶσα, and we would then have the syntagms (e.g.):

- 1) ἄσαι ἄνδρα αἵματος (cf. V.289)
- 2) ἄνηρ ἄτος πολέμοιο (XIII.746)
- 3) * $\begin{bmatrix} \text{μοῖρα} \\ \text{αἶσα} \end{bmatrix}$ ἄτη οἶνοιο (cf. Panyassis)

That is to say that the verb required the genitive to complete its meaning, both as a finite form and in the -to participle. An excessive amount of wine would be a portion (share, lot) filled with or sated with wine. In the course of time, as happens in such cases, the noun came to be omitted, and the old adjective assumed the functions of a noun.⁴⁰

7.7 A single root will do for all these verbs and forms of verbs, and that foot is ἄα- with a meaning of 'sate' or 'stuff.' Because of other forms attested later on, we are led to posit a digamma originally, and thus for earlier stages of Greek a root *awa- (or *awe-). This is of course the root one establishes for *ate* anyway, and our only innovation is to attach to it the verb ἄω as well. *Awa- has no cognates outside of Greek,

³⁹ Dawe (above n. 1) 103 n. 27 accepts the ancient gloss ἀναμάρτητος 'infallible.' Cf. also A. C. Moorhouse *CQ* 11 (1961) 10-17 and L. Deroy, *Kadmos* 14 (1975) 112-16. Professor Clay (per lit.) suggests that Odysseus' use of the verb ἐκτετέλεσται in 22.5 is ironic, and what had been claimed as an unsatisfiable contest has in fact been 'satisfied.' The competitors have been (or will be) satisfied. Irony there is, and Clay's suggestion may well be right. The suitors will have had their surfeit of arrows, as the event will show. For the connection with ἄω 'sate,' cf. the phrase κεκορήμεθ' ἀέθλων in 23.350.

⁴⁰ If one can accept this argument, it in turn furnishes support for ἄτος meaning 'sated.' A compound should not allow the feminine form ἄτη, since ἄτος should serve both for the masculine and the feminine.

and since we have banished *sā- : *sə-, neither does ἄω. Far from integrating this important concept into an Indo-European context, therefore, we have withdrawn from Indo-European one form of over-indulgence. But perhaps this is right, since *koros* as well is without any convincing Indo-European cognates,⁴¹ and it may be that the moral connotations of overindulgence are a purely Greek (or Mediterranean) addition to the Indo-European repertory of spiritual categories.

*

*

*

8.1 The meaning of ἄτη in Homeric Greek seems best identified as "remorse for an act" or "a remorse causing act." We will remember that for the Greeks an act contained within itself its cause as well, and we will return to the introduction of external causation below (8.3). The use of ἜΑΤΗ as a personification will not surprise given the fact that any abstract noun in Greek is at least potentially personified, or better, regarded as an agent. "Remorse" by itself will do much of the time, as in II.111:

Ζεὺς με μέγας Κρονίδης ἄτη ἐνέδησε βαρεῖη

or VIII.236-37:

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥά τιν' ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλῆων
τῇδ' ἄτη ἄσασας καὶ μιν μέγα κῦδος ἀπηύρας;

or even in VI.355-56 though here "regret-causing act" seems better:

δᾶερ, ἐπεὶ σε μάλιστα πόνος φρένας ἀμφιβέβηκεν 355
εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης,

if one prefers to read ἄτης rather than ἀρχῆς. Regret need not always be for one's own act—though remorse probably must be—as is shown by *Odyssey* 23.223 in which the ἄτη of Helen caused πένθος for Penelope and Odysseus. Remorse alone seems possible as an interpretation of XXIV.480. Elsewhere (e.g. I.412, IX.18) it is the act which seems uppermost in people's minds. "Act and ensuing remorse" serve as meanings.⁴²

⁴¹ Cf. Frisk *GEW* I.918-19 and Chantraine *DELG* I.565-66.

⁴² A meaning of 'remorse' suits in II.111 = IX.18, VIII.237, IX.500, 501, 508, XVI.805, XIX.88, 91, 126, 129, XXIV.480, 21.302, 12.372, 4.261, 15.233. 'Act (causing remorse)' better fits I.412 = XVI.274, VI.356, IX.115, X.391, XIX.136, 270, XXIV.28, 23.223. One will note that both meanings occur in the same passages, a fact which

8.2 The verb ἄω always has the meaning of “stuff,” “sate” in disyllabic forms in Homer (above, 7.3). Traces of the same meaning can be found, however, also in several of the trisyllabic forms usually assigned to ἄάω, as for instance in VIII.236 quoted above. Generally it means “cause to regret” (in the active) and “come to regret” in the middle (and passive), as in IX.537:

ἢ λάθεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν· ἄασατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ,

and the frequent ἄάσθη, particularly in XIX.113 (of Zeus):

ἀλλ’ ὄμοσεν μέγαν ὄρκον, ἔπειτα δὲ πολλὸν ἄάσθη.

In this passage at least ἄάσθη (“regretted it”) must have occurred after the act (as did ἄτη in XXIV.480). A passage well illustrative of the meanings “regret” and “remorse” is XIX.136–38:

οὐ δυνάμην λελαθέσθ’ Ἄτης, ἢ πρῶτον ἄάσθην.

ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ ἄασάμην καὶ μεν φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς,

ἄψ ἐθέλω ἄρέσαι, δόμεναί τ’ ἀπερείσι’ ἄποινα.

Agamemnon in this famous passage admits his responsibility in slighting Achilles. We may translate: “I was unable to forget (or escape) the act for which I felt remorse in the first place. But, since I feel remorse and Zeus took my wits away, I am willing. . . .” A still earlier translation would be: * “I could not escape the surfeit with which I first stuffed myself. But since I did stuff myself. . . .”⁴³

8.3 External causation is definitely part of ἄτη, as indeed it was also of any inexplicable act. One wanted to answer the question: “how could I have (gone and) done that?” Answers will be various, but we may be able within the Homeric poems themselves to follow the development from simple statement of fact to stress on the external cause of that fact. The passages in question are 21.295–96, IX.118–19 (see n. 20), 11.61, XIX.137, and move from the physical to the spiritual, from the factual to the self-serving.

indicates that the distinction in meaning is an artefact of our translation and not of the original. I remember seeing or hearing a play or movie in which a character often repeated the line: “the bitter bird of remorse has its beak in my heart.” This is a modern parallel to the ancient concept.

⁴³ The idea of ‘stuffing’ is rare in the poems, and ‘remorse’ is far more frequent. ‘Stuff’: VIII.237, XIX.136 (?), 11.61, 21.297, 301; ‘cause remorse’: XIX.91, 129, 10.68; ‘feel remorse’: IX.119, 533, XI.340, XVI.685, XIX.95, 113, 136 (?), 137, 4.503, 509.

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 1) 21.295–96 | οἶνος καὶ κένταυρον . . . ᾄσας' |
| 2) IX.119 | ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀσάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέῃσι πιθήσας
[ἢ οἶνω μεθύων ἢ μ' ἔβλαψαν θεοὶ αὐτοί] |
| 3) 11.61 | ἄσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος |
| 4) XIX.137 | ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀσάμην καὶ μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς. |

We may provide paraphrases as follows:

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1) | I got drunk (and caused the consequences) |
| 2) | (I suffer the consequences) <i>either</i> I was drunk <i>or</i> the gods did it |
| 3) | The god <i>and</i> wine caused me to suffer the consequences |
| 4) | Zeus took away my wits and caused me to act |

In 1) the Centaur alone is responsible (or wine is). In 2) the agent admits to the act but is unsure whether he merely got drunk or divinity was at work. In 3) the agent, though he blames drunkenness, blames the god for getting him drunk. And finally in 4) the speaker is quite clear that had Zeus not taken away his wits he would not have acted as he did. Thus we pass from 1) wine, 2) wine or divinity, 3) wine and divinity, to 4) divinity alone. Self-serving explanations are not peculiar to later times.

8.4 The original connection between overindulgence and remorse must have been effected by means of that feeling of doom one is apt to have when one wakes up at night either because one overindulged in food or drink or because one suddenly realizes that one has committed an act which will lead or has already led to unpleasant results. The link is pain or anguish, mental or physical. (In the scheme '–' means 'causes'):

- | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------------------|
| 1) act (nameless) | – remorse | } – awakening at night |
| 2) overindulgence (ἄτη) | – pain | |

Likewise the verb

- | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|------------------------|
| 1) act (nameless) | – remorse | } – awakening at night |
| 2) overindulge (ἄω) | – pain | |

Subsequently—or perhaps even immediately—the term ἄτη and the verb ἄω, originally used to explain only gastric disturbances came

also to denote the anguish of remorse. And just as the act of overindulgence is used to explain the pain resulting from overindulgence, so the act which caused remorse came to be called ἄτη. Night and disturbed sleep mediate the change from the purely physical to what we might call spiritual. The chances are, though, that no transfer of meaning was perceived—the pain alone was perceived and was called ἄτη (or Ἐφιάλτης). And lest we feel too smug when contemplating this primitive cultural situation, we might seriously examine the metaphysical and psychological assumptions which lie behind the modern advertising slogan: “I can't believe I ate the whole thing.”⁴⁴

WILLIAM F. WYATT, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

⁴⁴ Previous versions of this paper were read to audiences at the Classical Association of New England, University of Washington, Smith College, Brown University, and The Johns Hopkins University. I appreciate all the comments I received. Elli Mylonas read over the text and I thank her for her help.

UNSPEAKABLE WORDS IN GREEK TRAGEDY

I

Oedipus (ἄνδροφόνος)

There is a scene in Sophocles' *Oedipus* which, for all its power, has lost the power it once possessed to move its Athenian audience. The only vestige of this power is a confusion in our commentaries on the line Oedipus finally extorts from a prophet who would prefer to remain silent:

φονέα σε φημὶ τάνδρ' οὗ ζητεῖς κυρεῖν (362).

"I say you are the murderer of the man you seek to discover" is a fair translation of the line, but the line, which has been recast by way of commentary and now by way of emendation, has a context which explains its deliberate ambiguity.¹ Indeed, it has a number of contexts. Teiresias says precisely what he wants to say, because there is something he does not want to say. This is clear from the immediate context of this line in the *Oedipus* itself. But the explanation of the inhibition which twists Teiresias' language around a word he will not name comes from the context of this scene (and others we will soon turn to) in the society which celebrated its dramatic festivals in the theater of Dionysos.

First, the immediate context of this line in the text of Sophocles' *Oedipus*: Teiresias' reluctance to speak what he knows about the murder of Laios is framed by language designating the unspeakable and forbidden and it is prepared for by Oedipus' proclamation that no

¹ The ambiguity of this line has inspired three kinds of solutions. First, it can disappear in translation, as in Bowra's: "Thou seekest, and thou art, the murderer," *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 195. Or it can be rewritten to clarify the relation of the relative pronoun, as did Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments*³ (Cambridge 1902) 62; and Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles IV: Oedipus Tyrannos* (Leiden 1967) 94. The last solution has been that of emendation and R. D. Dawe's φονέας σέ φημι κἀνδρ'ας οὗς ζητεῖς κυρεῖν, *Sophoclis Tragoediae* I (Leipzig 1975).

Theban shall speak to the man who murdered Laios.² When Teiresias appears on stage, Oedipus addresses him and pays tribute to the range of his understanding (300–1):

ὦ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία, δίδακτά τε
ἄρρητά τ' οὐράνιά τε καὶ χθονοσιβῆ. . . .

The obvious interpretation of these contrasting terms is that Oedipus' arrangement of words is chiasitic and thus those things which Teiresias can communicate are on the level of what treads upon the earth and the truths of heaven are things he cannot speak of.³ But Teiresias' sense of restraint is not explained by his knowledge of the heavens; he cannot finally bring himself to name some of the things that tread upon the earth at Thebes. And once he intimates what he knows about these (413–25), the chorus speak again of the unspeakable (463–66):

τίς ὄντιν' ἄ θεοπέπει-
α Δελφίς εἶπε πέτρα
ἄρρητ' ἄρρητων τελέσαν-
τα φοινίσαι χερσίν;

These lines frame the encounter between Oedipus and Teiresias and Teiresias' language reminds us that it is "hard to talk about the unsayable."⁴ If the unsayable, or unspeakable, was in fact unsaid, our theme would be silence and not inhibition. But there is a dangerous name that stirs Oedipus to anger. It is never pronounced, but it is

² For the human silence that surrounds the murderer, cf. 238; 352 and 1437; Euripides' *Orestes* 428; 481 and 1605; a silence possibly reflected in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* 1124–25. Cf. Euripides' *Orestes* 73 and the *scholion* which explains the silence before a murderer: οἱ δὲ τοῖς ἐναγέσι προσφθεγγόμενοι αὐτοὶ δοκοῦσι μιάνεσθαι, ὡς καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ (1219) καὶ Ἰξίονι δέδεικται.

³ The connection between the divine and the incommunicable is so well established in Greek that commentators tend to point to the ἄρρητα created by Greek religious scruples; as Jebb, for example, who cites Herodotus 6.135. A better example of the contrast between the human and communicable and the divine and unspoken comes from Herodotus 2.3–4, a passage which is at the beginning of a series of Herodotean silences before a *ἱερὸς λόγος*. (An observation I owe to Charles Kahn's cogent and still unpublished interpretation of Herodotus' reticence over the tradition of the death of Dionysos-Osiris, "The Silence of Herodotus in Book II.") As I shall argue, the similar expression from the *Coloneus* (1001–2, quoted on p. 287 below) describes a tradition that is human and centered on the *πάθος* of the house of Laios.

⁴ This is the inevitable comment of Edmund Leach in his "Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse" in *New Directions in the Study of Language*, ed. Lennenberg (Cambridge, Mass. 1966) 26.

suggested in a peculiar syntax as Teiresias tells Oedipus obliquely that he is the murderer who is bound by his own public curses (350–53):

ἐννέπω σὲ τῷ κηρύγματι
ᾧπερ προεῖπας ἐμμένειν, κάφ' ἡμέρας
τῆς νῦν προσσυνδᾶν μήτε τοῦσδε μήτ' ἐμέ,
ὥς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ' ἀνοοίῳ μιάστορι.

Oedipus' violent reaction makes it clear that Teiresias' words for him, "unholy pollution," can stir up terrible thoughts and feelings (354–55):

οὕτως ἀναιδῶς ἐξεκίνησας τόδε
τὸ ῥῆμα;

Teiresias has "stirred up a word" as if words were things with a dormant life of their own.⁵ But Oedipus fails to register the real implication of Teiresias' painful words. This is not Oedipus' first mistake in this angry scene, for, as he asked for Teiresias' help, he spoke of the murderers of Laios, in the plural (308–9) and provoked the prophet to say that he can see that not even Oedipus' language hits the mark (324–25). This brings us to the line which seems so enigmatic. Teiresias protests that he has been provoked to speak against his will and it is clear that some λόγος lies beneath the surface of this exchange (358–62):

T. σὺ γὰρ μ' ἄκοντα προτρέψω λέγειν.
O. ποῖον λόγον; λέγ' αὖθις, ὥς μάλλον μάθω.
T. οὐχὶ ξυνῆκας πρόσθεν; ἢ ἵκπειρᾷ λόγων;
O. οὐχ ὥστε γ' εἰπεῖν γνωστόν· ἀλλ' αὖθις φράσον.
T. φονέα σε φημί τάνδρὸς οὗ ζητεῖς κυρεῖν.

When Teiresias asks "didn't you grasp my meaning before" (360) he is thinking of the implications of his words to Oedipus, "the unholy pollution of this our land" (353). And this is why he goes on to ask if Oedipus is testing words; that is, is trying to make him say a word.⁶ It is

⁵ Kamerbeek's comment on this verb is on the mark: "the startling word is implicitly likened to a beast, an evil agent that should be left untouched" (above, note 1) ad loc.

⁶ λόγων is Brunck's suggestion, printed in Pearson's Oxford text. Kamerbeek notes (above, note 1, ad loc.): "It is not certain whether L. knew of a reading λόγων, but there is a marginal gloss by a later hand εἰ πείραν λόγων κινεῖς." This emendation and the sense that an unspeakable word underlies the inhibitions of Teiresias' language is the basis of our translation to Oedipus' question:

Didn't you understand?
Are you trying to make me say the word?

not that Oedipus is making a trial of Teiresias by speaking (λέγων) or that he is attempting to make him speak (λέγειν). Teiresias knows that Oedipus is making a trial of words and that one of these words is unspeakable and, finally, unspoken in the *Oedipus*. Teiresias frames this word, but does not pronounce it when he says "I say you are the murderer of the man you seek to discover" (363). This is a line of strained and deliberate ambiguity. Its ambiguity is not to be explained by Teiresias' relation to the god of the oracle at Delphi who "neither speaks out, nor conceals his meaning, but gives us signs."⁷ His sentence is, indeed, a riddle of sorts, but its dialect is not that of Phokis. The inhibitions which twist Teiresias' language around a word he will frame but will not pronounce are pure Attic.

The relative pronoun οὗ inhibits the association of the words φονέα and τάνδρῶς. The name Teiresias frames remains unspoken. It is one of the unspeakable words of Greek tragedy. Oedipus' reaction to its sting shows that he has put the words together and finally understood the implications of Teiresias' first charge against him (364):

ἀλλ' οὗ τι χάρων δῖς γε πῆμονας ἐρεῖς.

The word which is ἄρρητον describes something human: ἀνδροφόνος is the word which causes Teiresias such difficulty and Oedipus such pain. "Murderer," "killer," "homicide"—our sensibilities are inadequate to the word, but in Greek its dangerous field of attraction and repulsion explains the inhibitions of Teiresias' language and Oedipus' violent response to it.

Sophocles: Oedipus the King, translated by Stephen Berg and Diskin Clay (Oxford 1978) 39; cf. 681 where the chorus describe the quarrel between Oedipus and Kreon as a δόκησις ἄγνως λόγων. Charles Segal has some sensitive remarks on this passage and the problem of naming in the *Oedipus* in his *Tragedy and Civilization* (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 243-44.

⁷ The application of Heraclitus (DK 22 B 93) to Teiresias' language seems inevitable and is made by Bowra (above, note 1) 203. "Delphic" speech explains, of course, the "Phocian dialect" of Orestes in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* 564; cf. 887; but, as we shall discover, the dialect of Teiresias' inhibited speech is Attic.

⁸ The evidence has been collected by Louis Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs* (Paris 1952) 81-92. In the *Oedipus*, Oedipus says that he will dispel the pollution that comes from Laios' murder: τοῦτ' ἀποσκεδῶ μῦθος (138). For the word μῦθος, see my note on μῖσμος in line 97 (above, note 6) 100-1. A good example of the feeling of danger before those who carry the stain of human blood comes from a passage in Antiphon's *The Murder of Herodes* which explains the Athenian procedure of holding trials for homicide in a sacred place and in the open air (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 57.4): it is to avoid close contact with those whose hands are stained with human blood (ἵνα . . . οἱ δικάσται

Greek was queasy about human blood and the *miasma* of homicide.⁸ Teiresias' first words for Oedipus, ἀνόσιος μίστωρ (353), imply ἀνδροφόνος, but as they were pronounced Oedipus failed to make the connection (cf. 360). Finally, Oedipus will call himself worse than the name Teiresias refuses to pronounce and something so dangerous that it cannot be repeated in the theater of Dionysos (1287–89, a passage returned to in section III below). The words which express the realities of Oedipus' life are all unspeakable: murder, parricide, and that thing for which there is no generic name in Greek, incest. They are all unspeakable (ἄρρητα) and one of them, ἀνδροφόνος, is forbidden (ἀπόρρητον). It falls under the Athenian law against verbal abuse and it is the civic context of the courts of Athens which helps us recover the power of the unspeakable words spoken or suggested by their avoidance in the theater of Dionysos and the dramatic festivals of Athens.

*

*

*

We discover the word Teiresias can frame but not pronounce in a violation of the law which formalized the social inhibitions before homicide and the word for a murderer. We cannot be sure that this law was in effect when the *Oedipus* was produced, but it seems very likely (from evidence from the fourth century) that it was. In any case, it is the pain and danger of certain names which explains the law that makes them ἀπόρρητα. Νόμος finds its expression in νόμος.

The violation to which we owe almost everything we know about the Athenian law against verbal abuse occurred in the context of a public assembly. Here an Athenian citizen, Theomnestos, was accused of abandoning his shield in battle. The man who brought this public charge against Theomnestos was Lysitheos and his charge provides the background of Lysias' *Against Theomnestos* (10).⁹ The trial for which

μη ἴωσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὴ καθαροῖς τὰς χεῖρας, 5.11), an explanation D. M. MacDowell neglects in his account of this passage, *Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators* (Manchester 1965) 145–46. He is, however, right to emphasize the horror of living under the same roof with murderers; cf. Sophocles' *Electra* 1190 and Plato's homicide law, *Laws* 9.865 A–869 E and especially 868 C–D and 869 A for murder within a family.

⁹ For the hypothesis implicit in the details of this speech (and the version of its argument in Lysias 11), see the sketch of E. S. Shuckburgh, *Lysiae Orationes XVI* (London 1882) 220–21 and the "Notice" of Louis Gernet in his *Lysias: Discours*³ I (Paris 1955) 139–43.

Lysias wrote this speech can be dated to 384/83. Lysias' client, whose identity is unknown, stood as a witness to Lysitheos' charge against Theomnestos. It is Theomnestos' countercharge that our anonymous client had murdered his father that makes him liable to the κακηγορίας δίκη.¹⁰ Both Lysitheos' charge against Theomnestos and Theomnestos' countercharge against Lysias' client graze dangerous words which were forbidden under the law of Athens. To begin with the charge with which this case begins: to say that a citizen had abandoned his shield in battle (ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἀσπίδα, 10.12; cf. 10.1) is forbidden under the law of verbal abuse. The insulting name for such a coward is ῥίψασπις. The great sensitivity to the public disgrace and personal injury of such a charge is recognized by the Athenian of Plato's *Laws* who urges the greatest caution in flinging such a charge and would replace the abusive term ῥίψασπις by the less offensive ἀποβολεὺς ὅπλων for the citizen forced to abandon his weapons. As the Athenian observes earlier, the sting of such abuse can lead to murder.¹¹

Under Theomnestos' countercharge that Lysias' client had murdered his father lies the forbidden word which Teiresias can frame but not pronounce in Sophocles' *Oedipus*, ἀνδροφόνος. Even more injurious is the term πατροφόνος which, it appears, was not explicitly covered by the Athenian law against slander. And here we come to the argument of Lysias' case against Theomnestos: to say in public that a man has murdered his father amounts to calling him the forbidden ἀνδροφόνος. Theomnestos' defense before the arbitrator turns on the letter and not the spirit of the law: the law does not in fact prohibit saying that a citizen has killed his father; it forbids the use of the term ἀνδροφόνος. Theomnestos never called Lysias' client a "murderer"; he merely said that he had killed his father (10.6).

This defense brings Lysias to distinguish between words and their meanings and to argue that the two expressions amount to the same thing. No lawmaker could be expected to draw up a complete list of

¹⁰ Lysias 10 is the main exhibit for the Athenian law against verbal abuse. For our purposes, other relevant passages from the orators come from Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* 21.79–81; *Against Aristokrates* 23.29 and Antiphon, *Tetralogiae* 2β9—all discussed in what follows. For the rest, cf. D. M. MacDowell, *The Law of Classical Athens* (Ithaca 1978) 127–29 and E. Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts, Gräzistische Abhandlungen* 4 (Kohn. Graz 1968) 24–27. Ruschenbusch is inclined to regard the law against verbal abuse as Solonian and selections from Lysias figure as F 32* in his collection, ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ: *Die Fragmente des Solonischen Gesetzeswerkes, Historia Einzelschriften* 9 (Wiesbaden 1966) 79.

¹¹ *Laws* 9.886 E.

abusive terms and their synonyms (10.7). To make his point he exploits the sensitivities underlying the law against ἀπόρρητα and asks Theonnestos if he would allow someone to say in public that he beat the mother who bore him or the father who begot him and not feel that he had been injured by the forbidden words πατραλοίας or μητραλοίας (10.8). And more pointedly and *ad hominem* he asks if Theonnestos would allow someone to say that he had “thrown away” (ῥίψαι) his shield, but prosecute him only if he used the forbidden expression “abandon” (ἀποβεβληκέναι, 10.9). Here we have four of the ἀπόρρητα of the Athenian law against verbal abuse: ἀνδροφόνος, πατραλοίας, μητραλοίας, and, it would seem, ῥίψασσις. Our list is not complete.¹² But these four forbidden words and the names for a parricide and matricide give us a new access to the inhibitions of the language of Greek tragedy and the παρρησία of comedy. They stir up the complex and ambiguous feelings of fascination and recoil before the thought of violence and bloodshed within the family and the killing or disgrace of a fellow citizen. These words do not seem particularly terrible or dangerous to us, but to the Athenian, constrained by the tight bonds of family and *polis*, they were sticks and stones.

There is still another trial from later in the fourth century which helps us recover the force of Teiresias' unspoken name for Oedipus in Sophocles' *Oedipus*. This is the speech Demosthenes composed for Euthykses *Against Aristokrates* (352). It is an important source for the Athenian homicide law and Demosthenes' commentary of this law confirms our explanation of the evasive character of Teiresias' language in the *Oedipus*. The law allows a citizen to put a convicted murderer to death if he returns to Attic soil before his period of exile is up: τοὺς δ' ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν (23.29). Here is Demosthenes' commentary: “You have heard the law, citizens of Athens. Now reflect and consider how well and with what religious feeling the lawmaker framed this law. He speaks of “murderers.” Now observe first that by “murderer” he means the man convicted by a jury, for no person comes under this designation before he has been convicted and found guilty.”¹³

¹² As Gernet says, it is a sample (above, note 9) 139. On the basis of the other offensive names in Lysias 10.10, Gerhard Thür takes ἀνδραποδιότης to have been one of the forbidden words of Athenian law, “Komplex Prozessführung dargestellt am Beispiel des Trapeketikos” in *Symposium: Akten der Gesellschaft für griechische und hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte*, ed. H. J. Wolff, I (Köln. Vienna 1975) 171, n. 46.

¹³ Here I would agree with Michael Gagarin that this passage from Demosthenes illustrates a distinction in the Draconian law of homicide between an “alleged” and a convicted murderer, *Drakon and the Early Homicide Law* (New Haven 1981) 59; cf. *IG* I²

We have had to go to the courts of Athens and into the fourth century to recover the force of a scene and a word that could be framed but which could not be pronounced in the theater of Dionysos late in the fifth. But there are still more terrible words for Oedipus. One of them is parricide; technically it appears not to have fallen under the Athenian law against verbal abuse. Another describes Oedipus' relation to his mother and is truly unspeakable for it remains unspoken. If these unspeakable words did not come under the prohibitions of Athenian law, they came of the inhibitions of the taboos of Greek society.

II

Oedipus πατροκτόνος

In Sophocles' *Oedipus*, the first word for the murder which is at first the object of Oedipus' search is μῖσμα (97); and the word for those responsible for the homicide (φόνον, 100) which is its source is τοὺς αὐτοέντας (107). The word itself was clearly thought to be a term of great power to injure the person to which it was applied as we know, again, from the context of Athenian law, which surrounds so much of Attic tragedy.¹⁴ And Louis Gernet has taken us a long way in our return to the power of this word in a society which felt tainted by shedding of blood which affected first the members of the family and then the city itself. As for the word itself, which first describes the murderers (in the plural) of Laios: "il est, pour l'individu auquel il s'applique un qualificatif substantiel d'une couleur violente."¹⁵ This word is not applied to Oedipus. There are worse names reserved for him: the word which Teiresias frames but will not pronounce; and worse than this, the word *parricide*. And as the search of the *Oedipus* moves from pollution to homicide and the murder of Laios to parricide and Oedipus' discovery that he unwittingly killed his father, the language of the play shows the same inhibitions we have discovered in the language of Teiresias.

115 (= I³ 104) 20–21 as against 30. A passage to support this distinction comes from Antiphon, *Tetralogiae* 289, where the defendant speaks of the shame that will await his children *if he is convicted of murder*: ἐὰν δὲ νῦν καταληφθεῖς ἀποθάνω, ἀνόσια ὀνειδῇ τοῖς παισὶν ὑπολείψω.

¹⁴ For a sensitive treatment of the language of the Oedipus as it reflects that of the law of Athens, see Bernard Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven 1957) 78–98.

¹⁵ "Sur la designation du meurtrier" in *Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1955) 36.

Oedipus cannot at first name the deed the prophet has accused him of and, when he confronts Kreon with Teiresias' painful accusation, he speaks remotely and evasively of "my destructions of Laios," which translates τὰς ἐμὰς . . . Λαΐου διαφθοράς (572-73). Here, Oedipus' choice of a plural is significant since, like other evasive plurals of the Oedipus (and *Oedipus at Colonus*), it deflects attention from the thought of a single act.¹⁶

When it finally comes to the thought of parricide, the dangerous word, πατροφόνος, is framed, but not pronounced. Oedipus will not join the elements of this compound, and he will not describe himself by a term which is its equivalent, within the constraints of the iambic trimeter, until he has fully realized that Teiresias' painful words have become realities; until, that is, he has convicted himself of parricide by his own verdict. In Teiresias' last words to Oedipus, the word for parricide is separated. Oedipus will be revealed as the man who sowed his seed in the same womb as had his father and the man who murdered his father (459-60):

καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς
ὁμόσπορός τε καὶ φονεύς.

Jocasta seems to share the same inhibitions when she tells Oedipus of Apollo's prophecy of the fate of her son, which was thwarted by Laios' death at a crossroads (720-21):

κάνταῦθ' Ἀπόλλων οὗτ' ἐκείνον ἦνυσεν
φονέα γενέσθαι πατρός. . . .

And this is how Oedipus phrases Apollo's prophecy that he would, among the other horrors of his life, become his father's murderer—ὥς . . . φονεὺς δ' ἐσοίμην τοῦ φυτεύσαντος πατρὸς (791-93). He treats the compound in the same way when he explains to the shepherd of Polybos why he left Corinth—πατρός τε χρήζων μὴ φονεὺς εἶναι, γέρον (1001).

This framing of the word πατροφόνος could be explained by the metrical shape of the word, were it not for the fact that there are two other terms for a parricide which fit in the iambic trimeter and are, in fact, used, with shocking effect, once Oedipus has discovered the truth

¹⁶ Cf. *OT* 1359-60; *OC* 527; and *Antigone* 863-66. For the "poetic" plural, cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.6.1407b26; [Longinus] 23.2; and Schwyzler-Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik* II (Munich 1950) 44.

of Apollo's prophecies. It is only in the violence of his howling rage that Oedipus can name himself for what he is. The palace servant who reveals to Sophocles' audience in the theater of Dionysos the horror he witnessed and heard (cf. 1224) in the theater within the palace speaks of all the horrors for which there is a name. But one he cannot bring himself to name; nor can Oedipus (1284–89):

- Εξ. στεναγμός, ἄτη, θάνατος, αἰσχύνη, κακῶν
 ὅς' ἔστι πάντων ὀνόματ', οὐδὲν ἔστ' ἄπὸν.
 Χο. νῦν δ' ἔσθ' ὁ τλήμων ἐν τινι σχολῇ κακοῦ;
 Εξ. βοᾷ διοίγειν κλῆθρα καὶ δηλοῦν τινα
 τοῖς πᾶσι Καδμείοισι τὸν πατροκτόνον,
 τὸν μητρός, αὐδῶν ἀνόσι' οὐδὲ ῥῆτα μοι. . . .

In the passion of his discovery, Oedipus can finally name himself by a name he has avoided joining as a compound, but he cannot join another name, the name for his relation with his mother, in another. We know of the name for him from Hipponax, but the abusive name for Boupalos is nothing that could be pronounced on the tragic stage and nothing which comes easily to Greek in any age or any context. It is the truly unspeakable word of Greek tragedy, for it is never spoken.

As for the word πατροφόνος (and its equivalents, πατροκτόνος and πατροφόντης), it is a word whose power is surrounded by strong inhibitions in the epic and in the civic life of Athens, as well as on the tragic stage. In Phoenix "autobiography" in *Iliad* 9, the word πατροφόνος and the social consequences of parricide seem as fearful as the deed itself (458–61):

- τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ βούλευσα κατακτάμεν ὀξείῃ χαλκῷ·
 ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων παῦσεν χόλον, ὅς ῥ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
 δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνειδέα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων,
 ὥς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμην.

These four lines do not appear in our texts of the *Iliad*. Aristarchos found them too terrible and removed them from his text of the poem.¹⁷ We have noticed Lysias' client's reaction to the accusation of parricide; it is the one word forbidden by the Athenian law against verbal abuse which would move him to find redress in the courts (10.2–3). In his speech *Against Androtion*, Demosthenes characterizes his charge that

¹⁷ They were not printed in a text of the *Iliad* until Barnes' edition of 1711. Barnes restored them from Plutarch, *On How to Listen to Poetry* 8.26 F. Plutarch's comment is precious: ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη φορηθεῖς.

he was responsible for the death of his own father as language which was inhibited, if not forbidden (22.2, ἃ καὶ λέγειν ἂν ὀκνήσειέ τις).

And precisely the same pattern of avoidance and naming occurs in the *Oedipus at Colonus*. In the chorus's interrogation of Oedipus, which rehearses with obsessive curiosity the tale of Oedipus' life, the word parricide is suggested, but then avoided, precisely as it was in the *Oedipus* (542-44):

Χο. δύστανε, τί γάρ; ἔθου φόνον

Οἱ. τί τοῦτο; τί δ' ἐθέλεις μαθεῖν;

Χο. πατρός;

Here we see language recoil before the act itself and not the name that names the actor. But just as in the *Oedipus* this name is available. In the earlier play Oedipus calls himself τὸν πατροφόντην, τὸν ἄσεβῃ (1441) in order to drive Kreon to exile him as a parricide. And in the later play Kreon describes the exiled Oedipus as a πατροκτόνος in order to impress upon Theseus an awareness of the kind of pollution that has found its home in Athens (944; cf. 601). Oedipus' reaction to this charge and the charge of incest (944-49) is as precise a gauge as we could want for the power of unspeakable words in Greek and in Greek tragedy. Oedipus' reaction to Kreon is like his reaction to Teiresias (960): ὦ λῆμ' ἀναιδές, τοῦ καθυβρίζειν δοκεῖς; And it is clear from Oedipus' full reaction that, like Teiresias in the earlier play, Kreon has spoken the speakable and the unspeakable, and this in public (1000-3):

σὺ δ', εἰ γὰρ οὐ δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ἅπαν καλὸν

λέγειν νομίζων, ῥητὸν ἄρρητὸν τ' ἔπος,

τοιαῦτ' ὀνειδίζεις με τῶνδ' ἐναντίον.

In what he has said, Kreon is not just because he had gone beyond the limits of Athenian law. There is a scene in the private setting of an Athenian house which brings this scene from the *Coloneus* back to life. It is this: Meidias and his brother Thrasylochos broke into Demosthenes' house and in the presence of his young sister they insulted Demosthenes, his mother, and his entire family in language Demosthenes could not bring himself to repeat when he recalled this scene, which was the basis of an earlier κατηγορίας δίκη, in his *Against Meidias*: καὶ τὴν μητέρα κάμει καὶ πάντας ἡμᾶς ῥητὰ κᾀρρητα κακὰ ἐξεῖπον (21.79).¹⁸ We do not know what the brothers said, but we do

¹⁸ We have seen this combination of words in *OT* 300-1 (cf. note 3, above). This passage is still another piece of evidence for the Athenian law against verbal abuse; as is *OC* 1000-3, which shows its impact on the language of tragedy. Significant in both

know what Kreon said to provoke Oedipus' anger: he called him a parricide and described a relationship which the palace servant of the *Oedipus* could not bring himself to name.

III

Oedipus, τὸν μητρός . . .

With the servant's repression of Oedipus' description of himself as his mother's . . . , we arrive at the theme of incest and a thing for which there is no generic name in Greek.¹⁹ And we arrive at silence and the recognition of the fearful potency of words to stir things which are queasy to be touched. The law of Athens was silent on these matters. Solon, when asked why he had framed no law against parricide, is said to have replied: διὰ τὸ ἀπελπίσαι.²⁰ And in Plato's *Laws*, the Athenian argues that there should be no law against incest because there is already an "unwritten law" which keeps mankind from actions which can in no way be tolerated by religion, but are hateful to the gods and the height of shame among men. This law the Athenian hears confirmed not only in comedy, but in tragedy, where those guilty of incest,

Demosthenes' speech against Meidias and Kreon's accusations against Oedipus is the fact that the insults which are regarded as unspeakable touch the quick of the family; cf. Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* (22.2, quoted above) and *OC* 960-61. The history of such insults is a long one in Greek; in Byzantine times the practice had the name γενολογῶ; cf. Phaidon Koukoules, *Βυζαντινῶν βίος καὶ πολιτισμός III* (Athens 1949) 294.

¹⁹ For the *aposiopesis*, cf. Charitonides, *Ἀπόρρητα* (Thessalonika 1935) 133. The silence of the palace servant at line 1289 seems to correspond to a silence in the Greek language. It is difficult to guess at the unspoken word by which Oedipus described himself. Perhaps the most telling thing about it is that it was not and could not have been a compound, like Hipponax's abusive term for Boupalos, μητροκοίτης fr. 12.2 West. συμφίον comes to mind; cf. 1358; μιάστορα is another possibility; cf. 1360 and Euripides' *Phoenician Women* 1050. On the dubious inspiration of *Wasps* 1178, Schneidewin emended τὸν μητρός by τὴν μητέρα. The *scholion* on the *aposiopesis* of *Wasps* 1178 makes manifest how wrong this solution is for tragedy: δῆλ' ἐβίνει· λείπει ἐτύπησεν. A. D. Nock once wondered whether "the Greeks had any marked anxieties about incest." Thalia Phillis Howe pointed him both to comparative anthropology and Bowra's discussion of his question (above, note 1) 169; cf. her "Taboo and the Oedipus Theme," *TAPA* 93 (1962) 126, n. 8. Another response to this question comes from the silence of the Greek language.

²⁰ DL 10.59; cf. Cicero, *Pro Roscio Amerino* 70. Indeed, there seems to have been no recognition in the Athenian homicide law of parricide as an offense distinct from homicide; cf. MacDowell (above, note 8) 116.

Thyestes, Oedipus, Makareus, all sentence themselves to death.²¹ These legislators would seem to speak with the wisdom of St. Paul: χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁρμαρτία νεκρά (*Romans* 7.8).

Even in the height of his rage, Oedipus cannot join the name that would describe him in his relation to his mother in a compound. And the palace servant cannot, as we have seen, repeat Oedipus' description of himself: τὸν μητρός, αὐδῶν ἀνόσι' οὐδὲ ῥητά μοι (1289). In a calmer moment, Oedipus shows the proper fear of naming his incestuous relation to his mother when he tells the chorus that he would never have willingly have come to be called "the bridegroom of those from whom he sprung"—οὐδὲ νυμφίος| βροτοῖς ἐκλήθην ὧν ἔφυν ἄπο (1358–59).²² Here again, we find the evasive plural. It recurs when the chorus of the *Coloneus* speak of "the beds of evil name on your mother's side" (527) and in Antigone's description of her own birth (*Antigone* 863–66).

Incest, *Blutschande*, was a true ἄπορητον in Greek. It was also one of the themes of Greek tragedy, as the Athenian stranger of Plato's *Laws* reminds us. Greeks tended to attribute the practice to barbarians.²³ A passage from Euripides' *Andromache* illustrates this tendency. Here the very Greek Hermione can speak with great and mock horror of Andromache's "incestuous" relation with the son of the man who had killed her husband. Her conception of what we call "incest" might seem farfetched until we remember that the concept of incest involves *blood* (173–77).

τοιοῦτον πᾶν τὸ βάρβαρον γένος·
πατήρ τε θυγατρὶ παῖς τε μητρὶ μίγνυται
κόρη τ' ἀδελφῷ, διὰ φόνου δ' οἱ φίλτατοι
χωροῦσι, καὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἐξείργει νόμος.
ἂ μὴ παρ' ἡμᾶς εἴσφερ'.

²¹ *Laws* 8.838 A–C.

²² A failure to recognize the meaning of the plural in the line that follows, νῦν δ' ἄθεος μὲν εἰμ', ἀνοσίων δὲ παῖς, has great consequences and by the interpretation of Hugh Lloyd-Jones makes the *Oedipus* a play of ancestral guilt; cf. *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 112. For the word "unholy" in connection with incest, cf. Aristophanes' *Frogs* 850; for the pollution of incest, cf. Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* 225 and Euripides' *Phoenician Women* 1050. It is this pollution that makes Jocasta unholy.

²³ For Egypt, cf. Herodotus 2.63.4 (the festival of Papremis) and the Oedipal hippopotamos described by Plutarch in his *On Isis and Osiris* 32.363 F. In his commentary to Euripides' *Andromache* 173–76, P. T. Stevens has gathered some passages illustrating the Greek attitude towards the Persians, *Euripides: Andromache* (Oxford 1971) ad loc.

This almost sounds like a description of Greek tragedy. P. T. Stevens' comment on these lines of Hermione is appropriate to the spirit of our inquiry: "Andromache cannot unfortunately quote Hdt. 1.135, where, speaking of Persians, he observes ἀπ' Ἑλλήνων μαθόντες παῖσι μίσγονται."²⁴ Andromache, who was a creature of fifth-century Athens, could have quoted from Greek tragedy and, indeed, incest is a theme in Euripides' *Oedipus* and *Alkmaion at Corinth*. Then there are the "unholy marriages" Aeschylus complains of in the *Frogs*; these were Euripides' importations in tragedy (850). And there were the women who had intercourse with their brothers (1081).²⁵ He is clearly thinking of Kanake in Euripides' *Aiolos*, that drama of incest which provoked an uproar in the theater of Dionysos when one of the characters asked: τί δ' αἴσχρον ἦν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοισι δοκῇ; The answer from the audience, attributed to Antisthenes, was what is shameful is shameful whether it seems so or not to the people who experience it.²⁶ The shock of the Euripidean plays on the theme of incest came, it seems, not from the theme itself, which was a part of the tragic repertory of both Aeschylus and Sophocles (and still other dramatists), but from his explicit and even philosophical treatment of the larger theme of human conventions. Such an explicit treatment of this dangerous subject was barely tolerable in the theater of Dionysos and it was reserved for the privacy of the social thought of the philosophers.²⁷

The theme of incest could be translated from the language of tragedy, with its necessary restraint, remoteness, and seriousness, into the language of comedy. In Aristophanes' *Clouds* we have the comic transformation of the language of Euripides' *Aiolos*. Here is Strepsi-

²⁴ Which one could translate: "With the Greeks as their tutors, they have intercourse with their children"; (above, note 23) 117. The connections Hermione is making depend on the Greek feeling for the pollution of human blood and incest, for which documentation in Moulinier (above, note 8) 81-92 and 64-71 (for "l'acte de chaire légitime"). Teiresias (*OT* 460) articulates the same connection. Howe expresses the connection well when she says of family blood: "it is sacred, and one must neither procreate with it nor destroy it" (above, note 19) 127.

²⁵ In Nauck, *TGF*² frs. 14-41.

²⁶ Nauck, *TGF*² fr. 19 (from the *scholion* to *Frogs* 1474). Plutarch preserves the anecdote of Antisthenes' response to this outrageous question in his *How to Listen to Poetry* 12.33 C.

²⁷ Cf. Plato, *Republic* 5.461 B; Zeno and Chrysippus in Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.* 11.190-92; *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.245-49; and *S/F* III 734-56 (under von Arnim's title, *Cynica*).

ades' version of a *rhesis* he heard Socrates recite in his *phrontisterion* (1371–72):²⁸

ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἦγ' Εὐριπίδου ῥῆσιν τιν', ὡς ἐβίνει
ἀδελφός, ὦ λειξίκακε, τὴν ὁμομητρίαν ἀδελφὴν.

Strepsiades' reacts to this new mode of tragic poetry as if it were a personal insult and he pays Socrates back in kind (1374–75):

κἀγὼ οὐκέτ' ἐξηνεσχόμην, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ἀράττω
πολλοῖς κακοῖς καίσχροισι.

There is a hint of what provoked Strepsiades in one of the very few fragments of the *Aiolos*, a fragment we owe to Aristophanes' parody of this passage in the *Peace* (114–19). What is remarkable about the question put to Aiolos about the intimacy of his children is its tragic restraint:²⁹

ἄρ' ἔτυμον φάτιν ἔγνων
Αἴολε, εὐνάζειν τέκνα φίλτατα;

The question seems to come from the chorus of Aiolos' daughters and it probes the relation between their brother, Makareus, and sister, Kanake. Whatever Makareus said in the *rhesis* Socrates repeated to the old-fashioned Strepsiades, he cannot have used the comic word ἐβίνει.

It is virtually impossible to speak of the unspeakable as it impinges on the language of the tragedies which we have lost. But of Euripides' tragedies which touch on the theme of illicit love within a family we have the *Hippolytus* entire. And in this drama of the passion of a stepmother for her stepson (and a husband's adultery) we have the nurse's words of comfort to the lovesick Phaedra. They seem innocent, if mysterious, when they are first spoken (293–94):

κεῖ μὲν νοσεῖς τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων κακῶν,
γυναιῖκες αἶδε συγκαθιστάναί νόσον.

²⁸ I accept K. J. Dover's text for ἦγ', but would prefer the vulgar and direct ἐβίνει to the metaphorical ἐκίνει of the mss; cf. the scholion to *Wasps* 1178 (quoted in note 19 above). Dover's is right, of course, in his claim that κινεῖν has this metaphorical extension in comedy, *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford 1968) 255.

²⁹ Nauck, *TGF*² fr. 17 (from the scholion to Aristophanes' *Peace* 114). The text is not sure. Σ' has Αἴολος, which Seidler emended to Αἴολε, σ' εὐνάζειν. In his commentary to *Peace* 114, Platnauer interprets the verb to mean "kill" in the sense that Aeolus will "kill" his children by abandoning them; but the verb, although it is in the active and not the middle voice, clearly must mean that Aeolus' children, Makareus and Kanake, are "sleeping together." It is inspired, of course, by *Odyssey* 10.7. For Platnauer's reading of this fragment, cf. his *Aristophanes: Peace* (Oxford 1964) 76.

Barrett glosses the phrase "afflictions we dare not mention" by "some female complaint."³⁰ Perhaps the only relevant commentary on the description of Phaedra's sickness as "unspeakable" is made by the outraged Hippolytus when he has discovered his stepmother's passion for him (601-2):

ὦ γαῖα μήτερ ἡλίου τ' ἀναπυχαί,
οἴων λόγων ἄρρητον εἰσήκουσ' ὄπα.

Sophocles' *Phaedra* seems to have had a similar reaction to the same discovery, but we cannot judge what words Hippolytus found so distasteful.³¹

IV

The case of Orestes

What Teiresias knew was all too human and, in the context of Athenian society, the words to express this knowledge were either forbidden or unspeakable. And in the words finally found to express these unspeakable truths, we encounter a peculiarity of the Greek language: the gods' truth that Oedipus was fated to commit incest with his mother, have children by this union, and murder his father (787-93) can also be felt as an *insult*—ὀνειδῆ (797).³² In Greek, words, even those

³⁰ *Euripides: Hippolytus* (Oxford 1964) 215. The connection between these two passages is strengthened and made explicit by the reiteration of the thought of Phaedra's passion for Hippolytus as a "disease" in 597; the same word describes Pasiphae's passion for the bull in Euripides' *Cretans* (line 12) in D. L. Page, *Select Papyri III (Literary Papyri)* (London 1941) 74.

³¹ The horror of the theme seems to be suggested in frs. 619, 626, 627 and 631, Nauck, *TGF*² (in S. Radt, *TGF IV* [Göttingen 1977] frs. 680, 688, 689 and 693).

³² This explains how a statement of the history of one of the few great houses of Athenian tragedy can be regarded as both free spoken and abusive; as in the exchange between Electra and Clytemnestra in Sophocles' *Electra* 516-633; cf. 1066-69, and Euripides' *Electra* 743-45; *Orestes* 1235-38. As Piero Pucci observes in another context, the Greeks did not easily distinguish between praise and saying the truth about someone, "The Language of the Muses" in *Classical Mythology in 20th Century Thought and Literature* (Texas Tech University 1980) 164. This is equally true of blame. To name, as Aristotle does in his *Poetics*, the names of the few families from whose histories the "finest" tragedies are composed is to name the unspeakable (1453a18). Aristotle's examples are: Alkmaion, a matricide and, in one version, possibly incestuous with his daughter; Oedipus, whose story we know (cf. *OC* 1000-1); Orestes, the matricide; Meleager, who killed his maternal uncles and was killed by his mother; Thyestes, who seduced his

expressing the truth, could be felt as sticks and stones, as we have seen in Strepsiades' violent reaction to Socrates' recitation of what must have been Makareus *rhesis* from Euripides' *Aiolos*. The theme of incest, the true ἄρρητον of the Greek language, has enlarged the scope of this study which began with an inquiry into the source of the inhibitions surrounding a single word in Sophocles' *Oedipus*. To state the themes of many of the tragedies performed in the theater of Dionysos is to express abuse, ὀνειδίη. This is a large theme, for it has as its context the dramatic festivals of Athens and involves a consideration of the social function of Greek tragedy. But to conclude this probe into the unspeakable words of Greek tragedy, let us return to the civic context of tragedy and one of the ἀπόρρητα suggested by Lysias' brief against Theomnestos. His example of a word forbidden by the Athenian law against verbal abuse is "mother beater," μητραλοίας (10.8). More serious and more painful is the word for matricide.

There is no lack of evidence for the horror inspired by the thought of the act itself. Take, for example, the horror inspired by the act of Orestes in Euripides' *Orestes*. The chorus of Argive women ask a question whose answer they know (831–33):

τίς νόσος ἢ τίνα δάκρυα καὶ
τίς ἔλεος μείζων κατὰ γὰρ
ἢ ματροκτόνον αἷμα χειρὶ θέσθαι;

A confirmation of the horror of such an act is the madness that comes as its result, both in the case of Orestes (in both Aeschylus and Euripides) and Alkmaion (in the case of Euripides). If the most terrible crime to be contemplated in Plato's Cretan city is the murder, in rage, of a parent—a crime which deserves "many deaths" (*Laws* 9.869 A)—the deliberate murder of a mother seems even worse than unintentional parricide. Aristotle turns to tragedy and to Euripides' *Alkmaion* to illustrate an extreme case in his analysis of voluntary and involuntary action. In response to Alkmaion's claim that he was justified in his murder of his mother by the compulsion of a father's curse, he comments that there are some acts no one can be forced to commit and the most horrible death is preferable to the crime of matricide.³³ So much

brother's wife, was incestuous with his daughter, Pelopeia, and ate his own children; and Telephos, who very nearly married his mother, Auge—on all of which, Gerald Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) 391–98, is helpful.

³³ *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1.1110a28; cf. 5.11.1136a13; Euripides' *Electra* 1226; Plato's *Laws* 9.869 C; and Dover's note of the Greek sensitivity to the thought of beating one's mother (commenting on *Clouds* 1143, above note 28) 262.

for the deed itself, but, to return to our theme, what of the language that describes the deed?

There is only the suggestion of an answer to this question in our scant fragments of Euripides' two treatments of the tragedy of Alkmaion, but the language of our fragments seems to exhibit a range of possibilities. Silence and repression of the unspeakable does not seem to have been one of them. Matricide can be skirted with fear and hesitation or it can be freely and, for tragedy, brutally stated.³⁴ In Aeschylus, it is clear that Orestes recoils before the thought of matricide; he asks Pylades: Πυλάδῃ, τί δρώσω; μητέρα αἰδεσθῶ κτανεῖν; (899). But it is clear too that naming the deed, once it had been done, is something that strains the inhibitions of speech. Orestes, when he announces to the chorus that he has killed his mother, shifts the heavy burden these words bear by naming the countervailing crime of his mother. And his language reveals the ambiguity of forbidden words (*Choephoroi* 1027–28):

κτανεῖν τέ φημι μητέρ', οὐκ ἄνευ δίκης,
πατροκτόνον μῖασμα καὶ θεῶν στόγος.

In its reaction to these words, the chorus reveals the danger of naming the deed that has been done (1044–45):

ἀλλ' εὖ γ' ἔπραξας, μηδ' ἐπιζευχθῆς στόμα
φήμη πονηρᾷ μηδ' ἐπιγλωσσῷ κακά.

Paradoxically, the words for this deed seem even worse than the deed itself. We can discover this same recoil before naming the crime of matricide and the doer of this deed in Euripides' *Electra* and *Orestes*; and the absence of such restraint is remarkable in Sophocles' *Electra*.³⁵ In the *Orestes*, the crazed Orestes shows the same restraint we observed in Oedipus' treatment of the name πατροφόνος: ὅδ' εἰμι μητρός τῆς ταλαιπύρου φονεύς (392). To which Menelaus responds (393):

ἤκουσα· φείδου δ'. ὀλιγάκις λέγειν κακά.

But Orestes is perfectly capable of being named, within the restraints of the iambic trimeter, by his true and dangerous name: ὁ μητροφόντης ὅδε (479). And in Euripides' *Electra*, when Orestes confronts the

³⁴ Contrast the bluntness of Nauck, TGF² fr. 68.1, μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμὴν, βραχὺς λόγος and Alkmaion's hesitations in fr. 67.1–4.

³⁵ For the treatment of matricide and the name for a matricide in Euripides' *Electra*, note 975–76, 1178, 1194 and 1226; in the *Orestes*, note 479, 481, 587, 887, 935, 1073, 1235 and 1238, 1424, 1559, 1587–88 and 1665.

thought that after he has killed Aigisthos he must next kill his mother, he realizes that he will have to go into exile as a matricide, with his mother's blood on his hands (975):

μητροκτόνος νῦν φεύξομαι, ποθ' ἄγνος ὢν.

But his sister finds another, more comforting term for the brother who murdered her mother: ἀρμόμων πατρί (976). But Orestes still fears the word which will describe him and he falls silent: ἐγὼ δὲ μητρὸς—; τῷ φόνου δώσω δίκας; (977).

The case of Orestes is one of ambiguities—both of acting and of naming; and it is the act of naming that concerns us now. In the case of Orestes, the act and name of murdering the mother who gave him birth is balanced by the counterweight of the fact that in doing so he is avenging the father who begot him. So, as Aristotle noticed in his *Rhetoric*, we are left with an ambiguous choice of epithets for Orestes: we can turn to the base and shameful and call the man μητροφόντης; or we can reach for a better word and call him his father's defender. His choice of the base term μητροφόντης (rather than μητροφόνος) is telling, for it points to an iambic passage in tragedy. And, indeed, his example comes from the confrontation between Orestes and Menelaus in Euripides' *Orestes* and the moment of Orestes' threat to murder Hermione (1587–88):³⁶

Με. ὁ μητροφόντης ἐπὶ φόνῳ πράσσει φόνον;

Ορ. ὁ πατὴρ ἀμύντωρ, ὃν σὺ προῦδωκας θανεῖν.

V

Three forbidden words in comedy

The problem of interpreting a single line in the text of Sophocles' *Oedipus* has taken us to the context of Athenian society and the law against verbal abuse in which Teiresias' language becomes intelligible as an attempt to frame, but leave unspoken, a word which was banned from the civic life of Athens and, it seems, dangerously present in its dramatic festivals. And homicide, parricide, incest, and matricide have taken us some way to an appreciation

³⁶ *Rhetoric* 3.2.1405b22.

of how the language of tragedy responds to themes which were capable of being regarded as acts of abuse, if named. And the theme of incest has taken us into comedy. It is in the notorious παρρησία of comedy that we discover the other unspeakable words which emerge from Lysias' brief against Theomnestos for breaking the legal sanctions against verbal abuse. If homicide, parricide, incest, and matricide are distinctively tragic themes, unspeakable and explosive when finally spoken, the beating of a father or a mother and abandoning one's shield in battle are some of the ἀπόρρητα named in comedy. And, of course, old comedy opens the sluice gate to still other unspeakable words.³⁷ In Aristophanes' *Clouds* the thrashing of his mother and father is a novel thought which Pheidippides entertains with great relish, to his father's horror: τί φῆς; τί φῆς σύ; (1443). The abusive term πατράλῳις is just one of the insults exchanged by the pair of antithetical *logoi* earlier in this play (911). And for Wrong, who has persuaded Pheidippides that he has an obligation to beat his mother, this insult is a shower of gold dust; for Right it is a heavy lump of lead (912–13). We discover those punished for just such a crime in the mud of Hades, in the grimy company of those who have wronged a guest or a host or had a speech from the tragic poet Morsimos copied for their private enjoyment (*Frogs* 146–51). And we only have to remember the ill-omened name Kleonymos to remember the last of the forbidden words recoverable from Lysias' *Against Theomnestos*—ῥίψασσις.

In his note to *Clouds* 353, where Kleonymos is abused by this word, K. J. Dover notices our passage from Lysias' *Against Theomnestos* and wonders why the aggrieved Kleonymos did not bring Aristophanes to court: "Kleonymos perhaps found it imprudent, impractical, or undignified to prosecute Aristophanes."³⁸ I would say impossible. It is not clear that any victim of Aristophanes' sardonic Muse or of festival abuse could have recourse to the Athenian law against verbal abuse to find satisfaction, in a κατηγορίας δίκη, for being pilloried by a poet in a dramatic festival, although it seems that

³⁷ Its παρρησία, or license to say anything and everything, was shocking to many, Athenian and non-Athenian alike. The so-called Old Oligarch is a good example, *The Constitution of the Athenians* 2.18. And comic poetry is silenced in Plato's law against verbal abuse, *Laws* II. 935 E. Its αἰσχρολογία has been studied in Charitonides' Ἀπόρρητα (above, note 19) and now by Jeffrey Henderson, *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy* (New Haven 1975).

³⁸ Above, note 28.

some of Aristophanes' victims tried.³⁹ They seem to have failed. To call Kleonymos a ῥήσαςπις, and Kleisthenes effeminate, and Kinesias lewd, and Euripides' mother a green grocer did not fall under the same restraints during a festival characterized by its comic παρρησία, or sanction to say anything, as the law which made Meidias liable to a γραφή ὕβρεως when, in the next century, he struck the choregos Demosthenes in full view of all of Athens. The dramatic festivals of Athens were, after all, the festivals of Dionysos Eleutherios—the god who came to Athens from Eleutherai in N. W. Attica and the god of freedom, or better, of release. When his statue was brought to his precinct in Athens on a wagon, he was accompanied by terrible abuse and this language was the beginning of the tragic and comic drama which freed his worshippers from the constraints and inhibitions of their civic and family lives.⁴⁰

During his festivals there was a period of freedom in Athens. Pericles called the festivals of his city "periods of respite" from the business and labor of life,⁴¹ but their importance and social wisdom is not that they were days of rest. They were days of release from the severe pressures of life in the family, or *oikos*, and life in the *polis*. They were days in which debts could not be secured, a clear form of binding and

³⁹ The pain of the personal assaults not only of Aristophanic comedy but of old comedy generally seems to have given rise not to prosecutions under the Athenian law of verbal abuse but a decree of the state of Athens against attacking individuals by name, κωμωδεῖσθαι ὀνομασί. Our evidence for this decree comes from the *scholia* to Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 67 and *Birds* 1297; cf. MacDowell (above, note 10) 128. A record of Kleon's attempt to gain redress comes from Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 377–82 and 502–3. It does not seem to have involved an action under the law against verbal abuse (cf. 379).

⁴⁰ Evidence for this practice is collected in Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*² (Oxford 1968) 5 (no. 14) and 7 (no. 26). Remarkable, for our purposes, is a passage from Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, where the orator characterizes the abusive language of his opponent and enemy, Aeschines: καὶ βοῶς ῥητὰ καὶ ἄρρητ' ὀνομάζων, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀμάξης, ἃ σοὶ καὶ τῷ σὺ γένει πρόσσεστιν, οὐκ ἐμοί, 18.122. By this Demosthenes characterizes not only Aeschines and his family (cf. note 18 above), but the freedom of the dramatic festivals of Athens by contrast with the constraints of the workaday life of the *polis*.

⁴¹ Thucydides 2.38: τῶν πόνων πλεῖστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα. Pericles' words do not seem quite to characterize the social function of Greek drama. Closer to the truth are the words of the chorus of Euripides' *Electra* (744–46):

φοβεροὶ δὲ βροτοῖσι μῦ-
θοι κέρδος πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεί-
αν.

Except that the therapy is not for the gods but the human spectators of tragedy.

constraint, and days in which prisoners were released from confinement on bond.⁴² Abuse was a part of the procession that conducted the image of the god Dionysos to his theater. Abuse, the speaking of the unspeakable, obscenity—these are features of other festivals of the Athenian year. Obscenity was a necessary and integral part of the Holoa and αἰσχρολογία was a notorious part of the women's celebration of the Thesmophoria, although we can only conjecture what was said. Even during the celebration of the most solemn festival of the Athenian year, the Eleusinian mysteries, there were the scurrilous "bridge-songs" of the γεφυρίσται, and the dregs of Athens could look up from the banks of the local Kephisos and insult the Kerykes and Eumolpidai who were making their solemn and stately progress, in tragic attire, to Eleusis.⁴³ I mention this last context for the unspeakable words of comedy and tragedy because to understand the ἀπόρητα of the dramatic festivals of Athens one has to begin to inquire into the social function of Greek drama.

DISKIN CLAY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

⁴² Cf. Pickard-Cambridge (above, note 40) 59.

⁴³ Cf. Hesychius and the Suda, s.v. γεφυρίζω.

The conclusion of this essay on the unspeakable words of Greek tragedy is the proper place to acknowledge, with gratitude, the free and generous conversations that have helped shape my thinking on this topic. I thank especially: William Arrowsmith, Jenny Strauss Clay, Charles Kahn, Bernard Knox and the fellows of the Center for Hellenic Studies who heard it in its first version, and Michael McCormick.

CICERO, THE *MEGALENSES* AND THE DEFENSE OF CAELIUS*

Cicero's *Pro Caelio* opens with conspicuous remarks about the fact that the trial of M. Caelius Rufus is taking place during public holidays:

Si quis, iudices, forte nunc adsit, ignarus legum iudiciorum consuetudinisque nostrae, miretur profecto quae sit tanta atrocitas huiusce causae, quod diebus festis ludisque publicis, omnibus forensibus negotiis intermissis, unum hoc iudicium exerceatur . . .

This and later remarks concerning the trial of S. Cloelius have enabled scholars to determine the date of the trial of M. Caelius Rufus. Evidently, Cicero was speaking on the first day of the *ludi Megalenses*, which were celebrated in Rome beginning on April 4.¹ The significance of this date and Cicero's emphasis on it have been only partially noted by critics: Austin has remarked that Cicero arouses sympathy for the defense in his reference to working during *ludi publici*.² And Geffcken has demonstrated how the holiday atmosphere invoked by Cicero turns the case into a virtual comedy, thereby diminishing the gravity of the charges against Caelius.³ But Cicero's allusions to the *ludi Megalenses* continue after these opening remarks, as I hope to show in this paper, and were intended to extend beyond the immediate rhetorical needs of the defense of Caelius. Rather, Cicero's remarks concerning the *ludi Megalenses* should be read within their contem-

*This paper was written under the auspices of a Columbia University Research Grant in the Humanities, Summer 1981. I wish to thank Columbia University for its support for this project, and Alan Cameron and Sarah Pomeroy for reading and criticizing drafts of this paper.

¹ Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, ed. R. G. Austin (Oxford 1960) 3rd ed., 151-52. References cited hereafter are to Cicero's *Pro Caelio* in Austin's 3rd edition. The *ludi Megalenses* were celebrated on April 4 and 10, but we cannot be certain that they extended from April 4 through 10 in the late Republic; see G. P. Hadzsitz, "The Dates of the *Megalesia*," *TAPA* 61 (1930) 165-74, who argues convincingly against an extended celebration in the Republic. The evidence—and the Calendar of 354 A.D. in particular—indicates an extended celebration in the Empire; see A. Degraffi, *Inscriptiones Italiae* XIII.2, *Fasti et Elogia* (Rome 1963) 435-38.

² Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, 41-42.

³ K. Geffcken, *Comedy in the Pro Caelio* (Leiden 1973) 1-8.

porary political context as an attack upon the unconventional religious behaviour of the Clodii.

Cicero's opening statements emphasize not only the date of the trial of Caelius, but the enormity of the charges which necessitated that a trial be held on a day otherwise set apart for religious observation. Cicero then proceeds to undercut the seriousness of the charges against Caelius by showing how insignificant they truly were:

cum audiat nullum facinus, nullam audaciam, nullam vim in iudicium vocari, sed adulescentem illustri ingenio, industria, gratia accusari ab eius filio, quem ipse in iudicium et vocet et vocarit, oppugnari autem opibus meretriciis: Atratinus illius pietatem non reprehendat, libidinem muliebrem comprimendam putet, vos laboriosos existimet, quibus otiosis ne in communi quidem otio liceat esse. (Pro Caelio 1)

In a comic reversal of roles, Cicero pardons the prosecutor, Atratinus, for bringing the case to court on this holiday; he, at least, was motivated by an excess of filial devotion. Cicero makes it quite clear that the real moving force behind the trial, Clodia, cannot be forgiven: *Ceteris non modo nihil ignoscendum (est)* (Pro Caelio 1). From the outset, Cicero portrays Clodia as a jealous lover scorned by Caelius, merely seeking revenge in court.⁴

According to Cicero, the trial of Caelius constitutes an interruption of normal religious and civic observances and is simply the result of Clodia's desire for revenge. But this was not the first time that the Clodii had disrupted traditional religious celebrations. Cicero's contemporaries would recall Clodius' scandalous disruption of the rites of the *Bona Dea* in 62 B.C.,⁵ and they would remember Clodius' actions in 58 when, according to Cicero, he had desecrated the sanctuary of the Magna Mater at Pessinus by selling the priesthood to the unworthy Brogitarus; Cicero had recalled this scandal in his defense of Sestius,

⁴ Perhaps no better testimony for the success of Cicero's portrayal of Clodia's motivations is the fact that his views went virtually unchallenged until T. A. Dorey, "Cicero, Clodia and the *Pro Caelio*," *Greece and Rome* 2nd series 5 (1958) 175-80, who remarked: "Clodia's motives for lending herself to the prosecution's schemes have always been portrayed as vindictive spite and the desire to revenge herself on Caelius for casting her off. But there is no authority for the view apart from Cicero himself." E. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley 1974) 308, has argued that the political realities indicate that Clodia's clan was also involved in this trial.

⁵ For the *Bona Dea* affair, see J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "Fabula Clodiana," *Historia* 15 (1966) 65-73.

delivered approximately one month before the *Pro Caelio*.⁶ Given the family history, Cicero's opening references to the interruption of public *ludi* by one of the Clodii—this time Clodia—would remind his audience that the Clodii had a history for sacrilegious behaviour: the criticism would be implicit in the charge.

Cicero followed these opening statements with several allusions to the *ludi Megalenses* and their celebration which have not been remarked. Moreover, since the day of Cicero's oration was, in all likelihood, the last day of the trial and the day of Caelius' acquittal, Cicero's allusions to the *ludi Megalenses* were, I suggest, intended to remind the audience of the April 4th festivities—the *ludi scenici*—which they were missing;⁷ this, in turn, would arouse sympathy for the defense and hostility against the prosecution for forcing the jury to work during vacation, as well as supplementing the implicit criticism of the Clodii. Thus, when Cicero cites "Q. illa Claudia" (*Pro Caelio* 34) as a paragon of virtue and worthy of Clodia's emulation, he condemns Clodia's behaviour by comparing her to this chaste and pious ancestor, but he also implicitly recalls the *ludi Megalenses* to his audience: Quinta Claudia's renowned virtue was proven when she, despite rumors to the contrary, was found worthy to pull the goddess ashore at Ostia and to convey the goddess, in the form of a black stone, to Rome. The arrival of the Magna Mater was commemorated annually by the *ludi Megalenses*, and Claudia's role in it, according to Ovid, was ritually reenacted on stage as part of the festivities.⁸

Dramatic performances were an intrinsic and traditional aspect of the *ludi Megalenses*. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that an oration delivered on this holiday should have included so many references to Roman drama and mime. Cicero's frequent quotations from the plays of Ennius (18), Caecilius (36–38) and Terence (36–38), and his general references to mime (65–66) in the *Pro Caelio* have been remarked as entertaining elements of the oration which, as Geffcken points out, allow Cicero to compete dramatically with the theatrical productions for the attention of the crowd.⁹ But it has not been noted in

⁶ Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 56; Cicero had also noted this offense in his oration *De Domo Suo* 129, delivered 7 months before the *Pro Caelio*.

⁷ Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, p.viii; Austin notes that Cicero spoke last at this trial.

⁸ Ovid, *Fasti* 4.326; and F. Bömer, "Claudia Quinta," *MDAI(R)* 71 (1964) 146–51.

⁹ Cicero (18) quotes from Ennius, *Medea* and (36–38) from Caecilius and Terence. For a discussion of the dramatic quotations, see R. G. M. Nisbet, "The Speeches," *Cicero (Studies in Latin Literature and its Influence)*, ed. T. A. Dorey (London 1965) 69; Geffcken (note 3 above) 1–8.

discussions of this oration that these quotations had a very specific, immediate context; they would remind the listeners of the theatrical performances at the *ludi Megalenses* which they were missing because of this trial.

Perhaps the most specific reference to the *ludi Megalenses*—so far unnoticed—is Cicero's description of the relationship between Clodia and Caelius. The outlines of this affair, as Cicero tells it, recall the cult myth of the Magna Mater and Attis; the older woman (Clodia/Magna Mater) falls in love with the handsome younger man (Caelius/Attis), but he is unfaithful. (In the myth, a certain nymph is blamed.) The scorned woman seeks revenge; the goddess drives Attis mad and he then castrates himself.¹⁰ (This act of devotion is ritually re-enacted by the priests of the goddess, the *Galli*.) Clodia simply seeks revenge in court.

The humorous parallels between these two love affairs could hardly be unintentional: this myth and the cult practices associated with it were well known to Cicero's contemporaries, as both the literature and recent archaeological discoveries indicate.¹¹ Further, the love affair of the goddess and her young male consort may have been acted on stage as part of the *ludi Megalenses*: the myths associated with several Roman holidays had provided the subject matter for certain of the fragmentary literary mimes of Decimus Laberius, a contemporary of Cicero, as their titles—Anna Perenna, Compitalia, Parilicii, Saturnalia—attest. One of Laberius' plays even bears the title "Galli," presumably signifying a work which starred the eunuch priests of the Magna Mater rather than the "Gauls" since Suetonius (*Divus Augustus* 68) also relates that a mime, apparently pointing to another mime acting the role of a *Gallus* of the Magna Mater on stage, offended Augustus by his remark and obscene gesture.¹² In addition to this

¹⁰ Catullus, *Carm.* 64.17, provides a contemporary view of the Magna Mater as a revengeful, female deity; Theocritus 20.40 and Pausanias 5.11.17 supply Greek models for the myth. Ovid, *Fasti* 4.223–86 provides a full account of the love affair, including the nymph Sangaris who leads Attis astray. Noteworthy is Varro, *Eum.* fr. 33, ed. Riese, who mentions the *Galli*, the eunuch priests of the Magna Mater. See also Catullus' citation of a poem written to the goddess by a contemporary, Caecilius (*Cat. Carm.* 35.8) and Lucretius, *De Rerum Nat.* 2.600–660.

¹¹ For the literary evidence, see note 10 above; for the archaeological evidence, see M. J. Vermaseren, *Corpus Cultus Cybelae Attidisque III. Italia–Latium* (Leiden 1977) 13–199, with bibliography. The obvious limitations of these parallel love affairs—Attis was castrated for his infidelity—must have occurred to Cicero and his audience, but these and any negative implications cast upon Caelius were simply disregarded by Cicero who, after all, was intent upon entertaining the jury.

¹² M. Bonaria, *Romani Mimi* (Rome 1965) 38–77: "Galli," fr. 63.

textual evidence for the sudden popularity of these mimes in the late Republic, votive terracottas from the Palatine sanctuary of the goddess indicate that Attis was worshipped there in conjunction with the Magna Mater as early as the second-century B.C. These artifacts strongly suggest that the god was included in festival performances at this temple before our earliest securely dated evidence for them in the first century A.D.¹³ Thus, when Cicero remarks (*Pro Caelio* 65) that the outcome of this case is more fitting to a mime than a *fabula* (comedy), he may well be referring to these contemporary dramatic and religious performances at the temple of the Magna Mater, held in conjunction with the *ludi Megalenses*.

Cicero's remarks at several points in the *Pro Caelio* thus appear intended to recall the *ludi Megalenses* to his audience. The implicit condemnation of the Clodii which these allusions would convey comes into focus more clearly if we consider the date of publication of the *Pro Caelio*. Delivered on April 4, the speech was presumably edited and then circulated within a few weeks, if Cicero followed his normal practice. From his correspondence (*Ad. Q.f.* 2.6), we can surmise that the speech was not circulated before Cicero left Rome on April 9. This speech, then, did not appear until after Clodius' disruption of the *ludi Megalenses*; on April 8, 9, or 10 of this same year, Clodius had introduced bands of slaves into the theatre, resulting in a riot and the desecration of the games, actions which Cicero attacked in a speech delivered to the Senate presumably in May, 56 (*De Har. Resp.* 21–29).¹⁴

¹³ Vermaseren (note 11 above), records the archaeological evidence. Recent excavation at the Palatine temple provides evidence for space for theatrical productions in front of the temple in the Republican period. See the report by P. Pensabene, "La Zona Sud-Occidentale del Palatino," *Quaderni del Centro di Studio per l'Archeologia Etrusco-italiano* 4 (1981) 65–81. The earliest securely dated representation of the performance of the love affair of Attis and Cybele is a wall-painting from Pompei, dated to 70 A.D.; M. J. Vermaseren, *Corpus Cultus Cybelae Attidisque* IV. Italia–Aliae Provinciae (Leiden 1978) number 29 Pl. VII (The House of Pinarius Cerealis). Other representations of Attis holding up tragic masks may be earlier, but these are not securely dated; see M. J. Vermaseren, *The Legend of Attis in Greek and Roman Art* (Leiden 1966).

¹⁴ J. O. Lenaghan, *A Commentary on Cicero's Oration "de Haruspicum Responso"* (The Hague 1969) 22–31 discusses the evidence for the date of this oration and argues (117) as follows for the date for Clodius' attack: the *pompa* in the circus on April 4 does not coincide with Cicero's description (*De Har. Resp.* 21–29), and, more convincing, it does not seem likely that Clodius would have selected as the occasion for this affair the exact day on which a case involving his family was being tried. Assuming that these *ludi* extend from April 4–9, Lenaghan rules out April 5–7 because Cicero makes no mention of this affair in an account of events in this period (*Ad Q.f.* 2.6). Lenaghan settles on April 8 as the probable date for the incident since, he claims, April 9 was devoted to circus

The disruption of these games was surely politically motivated, and it can be suggested here that Clodius' action was, at least in part, an attempt to win popular support by undermining these traditional aristocratic games.¹⁵ In any case, after this incident Cicero's allusions to the *ludi Megalenses* in a speech concerning the Clodii would have taken on significant political overtones for his contemporaries, and his remarks should be read as part of the ongoing struggle in 56–55 between Cicero and the Clodii.

MICHELE RENEE SALZMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

games in the Circus Maximus and this does not coincide with Cicero's description of the incident as occurring in the theatre (*De Har. Resp.* 20–29). But we cannot be certain that circus games filled the whole day, leaving no time for *ludi scenici* on April 9 (cf. H. Graillot, *Le Culte de Cybele, mère des dieux* [Paris 1912] 85, who suggests the contrary!). Thus, following Lenaghan, it is possible that Clodius' attack fell on April 8 or 9. However, since Cicero does not mention this incident in an account of events in Rome before his departure early in the morning of April 9 (*Ad Q.f.* 2.6), it seems unlikely that the attack occurred on April 8. To argue further with Lenaghan, we do not know if the *ludi Megalenses* were an extended celebration in Cicero's time (see note 1 above), but we can be certain that these *ludi* were celebrated on April 4 and 10, and did not end on April 9, as Lenaghan notes. Therefore, the evidence strongly suggests that Clodius' attack occurred on April 10, 56 B.C.

¹⁵ J. Colin, "Les Sénateurs et la Mère des dieux aux *Megalesia*: Lucrèce 4.79," *Athenaeum* 32 (1954) 346–55, adumbrates this interpretation of Clodius' actions. The aristocratic associations of this cult began with the role of the *nobiles* in conveying the Magna Mater to Rome in 204 B.C. and were continued by practices such as the banquets of the *principes civitatis*; see Degrassi (note 1 above) 435–38.

NERONIAN CLASSICISM

It is a truth universally acknowledged, that Roman literature fell asleep about the time of Ovid's death, but that it awoke to renewed vigour when Nero ascended the throne. What is not however so generally recognised is that this renaissance of literature has a consistent purpose and character, which it will be the aim of this essay to identify and illustrate in its operation.¹ To put the matter briefly, Neronian poetry is a conscious revival in a number of departments of Augustan forms which, so far as we know, had lapsed into disuse in the meanwhile. Above all, Neronian writers rediscovered Horace, and in imitating his genres raised him up to the status of classic, in which later ages confirmed him. But for this timely interest, Horace might have sunk without trace. These are the main propositions of the present essay.

But before approaching the poetry of Nero's reign, we must first glance over the condition of poetry up to that time, and our starting place will be about A.D. 16, when Ovid's fourth book of *Epistulae ex Ponto* was assembled. We must then go on to consider the reputation of the Augustans in the eyes of the generation which survived Ovid. The sixteenth poem of the fourth book of *Epistulae ex Ponto* is Ovid's defence of his reputation; in it he lists some of the celebrities of the day. Plainly only the currently living are there named, of whom some will have been roughly Ovid's age, others rather younger. These are the late-Augustans, and they are now regarded as transitional figures between the Golden and Silver ages.² The list begins appropriately with epic, both the usual mythological stuff (e.g. Carus's *Heracleis*) and the traditional Roman historical epic, which was in effect a panegyric upon one man's military achievement (e.g., Rabirius's *Alexandrian War*, Severus's *Sicilian War*³). In the list also appear at least one

¹ The views here set out at some length were first sketched in the Introduction to my commentary on Lucan, *B.C.* 8.

² More information on these somewhat shadowy figures will be found in Schanz-Hosius's *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (1935), §318 (hereafter S-H, cited by section and page). At §319 other writers are listed. I am grateful to Mr J. C. Bramble for permission to read his chapter in the *Cambridge History of Classical Literature* on 'Minor Figures,' (Cambridge 1982) II, 467-91.

³ Severus may also have composed a work on early Roman history, perhaps a continuation of the *Aeneid*; S-H §317.

didactic poet, Grattius, and one bucolic poet, who may have imitated Virgil, Passer.⁴ But of greater interest are the departments of literature which find no representatives in Ovid's list. These appear to be two: satire and the short lyric, both the chosen field of Horace.⁵

From what Ovid says, it is clear that everyone was writing poetry in a wide variety of genres. What happened in the next fifteen years or so is hard to discern, but the few indications point to a possible shift of emphasis, perhaps due to the taste of Tiberius. Alexandrianism had not yet died out in Rome. One of Ovid's friends, Proculus, avowedly imitated Callimachus ('Callimachi . . . molle teneret iter', *P.* 4.16.32), and another, Tuscus, may have harked back to the master's story of Phyllis in the *Aetia* (*P.* 4.16.20, fr. 556 Pf.).⁶ Tiberius admired the younger Alexandrians and is said to have composed on the model of Euphoriion, Rhianus, and Parthenius; moreover, he placed their works in the public libraries and so encouraged their study (Suet. *Tib.* 70). This had an effect upon scholarship, but we cannot say confidently that it had one on literature.⁷ If only the *Culex* or *Ciris* could be dated

⁴ Passer is resurrected by Housman, *Collected Classical Papers* (1972) III.937ff. Ovid's mentioning *Tityrus*, *P.* 4.16.33, either points to direct recall of Virgil, or the name is chosen as ideally pastoral. Fontanus, who 'Naiadas a Satyris caneret . . . amatas' (*P.* 4.16.35), is reckoned a bucolic poet in S-H, p. 272, but since Naiads and Satyrs have no considerable place in Theocritus or Virgil, Fontanus's bucolic world must have been new, perhaps in the tradition of the anonymous poem in *Bucolici Graeci*, ed. Gow, pp. 168f.

⁵ The larger lyric in imitation of Pindar may prove an exception, but we cannot be sure that Horace is the model for other Augustan Pindarists, such as Iullus Antonius (*Carm.* 4.2), and Titius (*Epist.* 1.3.10; he may be Ovid's Rufus at *P.* 4.16.28). In the first three books of his *Odes*, published about 23 B.C., Horace has some Pindaric poems, e.g. 1.12, but he claims allegiance mainly to Aeolic verse (*Carm.* 3.30.13f.), and was hailed as Alcaeus (*Epist.* 2.2.99). It must have been clear that Latin had now been adapted to lyric measures. The door therefore stood open for anyone who might try to emulate choral lyric (for in Aeolic lyric Horace was unrivalled). Titius, mentioned above, was composing along these lines by 20 B.C., if that is when the first book of *Epistles* was published. And Iullus too ought to have tried his hand before Horace published the fourth book of *Odes* in 16 B.C. or so. My own view therefore is this: the Pindaric poems in Horace's late collection themselves reflect a growing fashion which he had in a small way inaugurated; but in this department he was not necessarily the model. Tiberius's dirge, composed in 2 B.C. for L. Caesar, ought to have been Pindaric (Suet. *Tib.* 70.2). As for lyric in general, Horace claims to have imitators (*Epist.* 1.19.19); Julius Florus is not necessarily one (*Epist.* 1.3.20-25), but Ovid's Perilla may be (*Tr.* 3.7.20).

⁶ 'Nomen habet' does not mean that he called himself Demophoon (so S-H, p. 271) but that the poems made his reputation; cf. Ov. *Ars* 3.219.

⁷ It may have had an indirect effect. Manilius, writing still under Augustus, alludes to the *Messenica* of Rhianus at *Astr.* 3.14.

to this period, then we could point to a renewed (or continued) interest in the epyllion, a form favoured by Euphorion.⁸ Remmius Palaemon, the teacher of Persius, was active under Tiberius, and his poems were composed 'uariis nec uulgaribus metris'; they seem to have been popular (Suet. *Gramm.* 23.3, Mart. 2.86.11 'scribat carmina circulis Palaemon'—if the same Palaemon is meant). 'Nec uulgaribus' ought to mean something other than sapphic, alcaic, or asclepiadic systems. This use of exotic metres recalls the Republican poet Laevius, or perhaps such compositions as Catullus's galliambics. But we have little other information about the sort of genres favoured in this period. For Germanicus and Manilius wrote at the very beginning of Tiberius's reign, and Phaedrus the fabulist continued into the time of Claudius.

From the first satire of Persius however we are given a glimpse of a revitalised Alexandrianism which was still popular with some poets well into the first half of Nero's reign. The themes of these poets are ridiculed, 'Phyllidas, Hypsipylas' (1.34); these may reflect an interest in Ovid's *Heroides*, or they may go back directly to Callimachus and Apollonius. At any rate the phrase 'uatum plorabile siquid' points to elegy, which is derisively named at line 31. Moreover the mythological heroines suggest something other than the subjective love elegy of the Augustans. In the same satire, in a section discussing style (92–106), thematic material is inevitably hinted at, and it is notable that Attis appears, a theme of Catullus, that a made-up line ends with 'cornua bombis' (99), a line ending also found in Catullus (64.263, where too a Bacchic rout is being described), and that Persius includes a spondaic hexameter (95), one of the hallmarks, as Cicero observed, of the once 'dolce stil nuovo' (*Att.* 7.2.1). Further evidence of contemporary taste is seen in the choice of Greek poets whose works were studied in the advanced school of Statius's father.⁹ The school was active, either at Rome or at Naples, during Nero's reign—this is plain from 'taliam dum celebras' at 195 where Statius speaks of the burning of the Capitol in 69—and among the poets lectured on are Callimachus and Lycophron.¹⁰ All taken in all—and it is not much—there are indications

⁸ A *Culex*, perhaps the one we possess, was known to Lucan (cf. n. 36 below) and Martial (14.185); it could have been composed at any time between 19 B.C. and A.D. 60. The date of the *Ciris* is discussed by R.O.A.M. Lyne in his edition (1978) 48–55.

⁹ *Silvae* 5.3.146–58; A. J. Gossage, *Romanitas* 6–7 (1965) 171–79.

¹⁰ The young Statius learnt his lessons well and borrowed a phrase from Callimachus, as Mr P. J. Parsons kindly pointed out to me: F. Bornmann *ZPE* 31 (1978) 35 and *Atene e Roma* 23 (1978) 187. Yet Statius is no Callimachean, however many phrases he may owe to him.



that Alexandrian themes and techniques and models were still a strong influence in this intermediate period. On the other hand, there is no evidence at all that Augustan poets however much they were admired exerted any such influence over poetic composition, with the possible exception of Seneca, whose tragedies will be dealt with in due course.

We are inclined, not unreasonably it will appear, to regard the immediate post-Augustan period as arid. But a contemporary opinion opposes our own. The history of Velleius Paterculus appeared in about A.D. 30, some fourteen years after Ovid's letter from Pontus. Velleius is given to reflecting upon literary history, and in a famous passage at 2.36 he digresses to treat of the flowering of literature in what he regards as the 'Tullio-Augustan' age (he can so define it, since Augustus was born in Cicero's consulate). He regards himself as living in its latter half: 'nostri aevi.' He lists the glories of this double age, starting with Varro of Atax, who closely imitated Apollonius, even to the extent of writing just four books, and Catullus. Closer to his own time he exalts Virgil, Rabirius, Livy, and Tibullus, the only elegiac poet named as such; Ovid is probably included for poems other than the erotic ones which prompted in part his relegation. Tibullus is called 'perfectissim(us) in forma operis sui.' The notable absentee from this list is Horace. Velleius has cut his list short, not out of the sense of a lack of comparable modern talent, but so as not to offend the living: 'nam uiuorum ut magna admiratio ita censura difficilis est.' 'Magna admiratio' is not the judgement of a man who believes that he lives in a period of decline.¹¹

Despite Velleius's satisfaction with the literature of his own day, the period after Ovid's death, we cling with justice to our opinion that his age was fallow. The silence of Quintilian, later in the century, is our guarantee.¹² His list of epic poets, for example, at *I.O.* 10.1.89-91, though not chronological, shows a gap between the late-Augustans, Pedo, Rabirius and Severus on the one hand, and Lucan on the other. Now either the intervening poets gave up the long epic as artistically invalid, or their compositions were feeble. Likewise in his discussion of satire, Quintilian passes straight from Horace to Persius (*I.O.* 10.1.94),

¹¹ And yet this is the view of G. Williams in *Change and Decline* (1978) 8-10. Velleius however says nothing that bears out the assertion. His refusal to name living writers reflects an Alexandrian critical practice followed also by Quintilian (*I.O.* 10.1.54).

¹² Quintilian is however so highly selective that he does not judge Seneca's tragedies, though he knows of them (*I.O.* 9.2.8). We must weigh his silence carefully, but it is almost total in respect of this period between the death of Ovid and the accession of Nero.

and again there is a gap in lyric between Horace and Bassus (*I.O.* 10.1.96). In fact Quintilian names but one poet whose activity falls in this period, the tragedian, Pomponius Secundus, and he is dismissed with little praise (*I.O.* 10.1.99). Martial too is of use in this matter, with his list of books given as gifts: we find Virgil, Propertius, Tibullus, the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, Catullus, and Lucan (*Epig.* 14.186, 189, 193, 192, 195, 194). In a word, nothing between Ovid in Velleius's 'Tullio-Augustan' age, and the reign of Nero. It may therefore be said of the literature composed after the death of Ovid that its appeal did not last. It seems to have taken the traditional line, as reinforced by Tiberius's example, and pursued fresh Alexandrian conceits. But these were played out: Persius attacked the taste, and Quintilian and Martial show no interest in the period. It must be stressed that, whatever his admired contemporaries may have been about, Velleius has a great respect for the achievements of Augustan poetry.¹³

We turn now to the second preliminary consideration and ask to what degree this respect was shared. Caligula, as usual, went his own way. Perhaps out of a personal dislike of Augustus and in honour of his grandfather, Mark Antony, he disparaged those arch-Augustans, Virgil and Livy; his attack on Homer may be related to this, for Homer was Virgil's model, and together these poets inspired a great deal of writing connected with Trojan matters.¹⁴ These judgements moreover may not have been mere crotchets. For Persius, in his first satire, points at some modern poets who despised the *Aeneid* as rough-hewn (96f.). There were other 'obtretractores Vergili' whose attacks were turned by Asconius (his Ciceronian studies were started under Nero, but the Virgilian defence cannot be dated).¹⁵ Therefore, so far as reputation was concerned, the Augustans were not yet wholly above reproach, and some openly criticised them. Horace is neither attacked nor defended, but worse, he is, so far as we know, ignored. The poets themselves at this time appear not to have turned to the Augustans as models. (It

¹³ A point to be noticed, for J. Perret, who in his *Virgile* (1965) 150 rightly noticed the continuation of Latin Alexandrianism, assumed an eclipse of Virgil's reputation at this time. Velleius tells against such a view.

¹⁴ E.g., Macer's 'pre-Homerica,' Camerinus's 'post-Homerica,' Largus's *Antenor*, Lupus's *Return of Helen and Menelaus*, Tuticanus's *Phaeacis*, Pomponius Secundus's *Aeneas*, and perhaps a work of Abronius Silo, quoted by Seneca *Suas.* 2.19.

¹⁵ Virgil's critics are dealt with in S-H §246, but it is far from clear when they lived (except that some are known to Suetonius). For Asconius's work on Virgil, S-H §476, p. 733.

should be stressed that the later poets may well have admired Augustan writers, but not enough to imitate them.)

The schools, however, might be thought to be upholders of Augustan standards (a point to which Professor E. J. Kenney kindly directed my attention). For is it not commonly stated that Q. Caecilius Epirota, the freedman of Atticus and client of Gallus, first introduced lectures on Virgil and other modern poets into Roman education?¹⁶ But this statement is misleading in that it sets aside some valuable details included by Suetonius in *De Grammaticis* 16. Here is what Suetonius says: 'post deinde damnationem mortemque Galli scholam aperuit sed ita ut paucis et tantum adulescentibus praeciperet, praetextato nemini. . . .' Two observations can be made. First, when he began to lecture on Virgil his texts can only have been the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*. (And since we do not know when Epirota died or at any rate gave up teaching, we cannot be sure that he ever used the *Aeneid*.) Secondly, his school is for young adults, and its exclusiveness reminds one of Mrs Pipchin's establishment at Brighton. Epirota was not attacking, but supplementing, the traditional curriculum.¹⁷ He offered an advanced training to budding poets, as a verse quoted from Marsus by Suetonius shows. How soon did such an advanced school bring about a revolution in the 'grammar' schools? We cannot say, nor should we attempt to. It is clear that about a century later in Quintilian's day, Virgil was established as a set text for children (*I.O.* 1.8.5). Suetonius has tried to pinpoint the date of his introduction. Our own knowledge of educational reform would suggest that the process will have been very slow (but, as I should like to believe, accelerated by Neronian taste). At any rate we cannot turn to education in the early principate for a reliable picture of literary taste at this time.

The fashion was challenged as soon as Nero came to the purple in A.D. 54. His accession, for instance, is promptly greeted by two bucolic poets, Calpurnius Siculus and the anonymous writer of the Second Einsiedln Eclogue. These are the first bucolic poets we know of since, some forty years previously, Ovid mentioned Passer (*P.* 4.16.33). More significantly Virgil's *Eclogues* are the model. Calpurnius for example seems to have read Theocritus, but the Greek inventor of the genre is

¹⁶ So, *inter alios*, S. F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, (1977) 213.

¹⁷ H. D. Jocelyn, *The Tragedies of Ennius* (1967) 54: 'it is doubtful whether . . . tragedies long survived the attack of such partisans of modern poetry as Q. Caecilius Epirota.'

now far less important for imitation than his Roman follower.¹⁸ Virgil's lead is followed in another department too, didactic epos, and the *Georgics* find, not so much an imitator, as a continuator in Columella. His work on agriculture appeared in the middle 60s. It will be recalled that Virgil declined to sing of gardens and left the task to one who should come after him (*Geor.* 4.147f.). No-one took the hint until Columella's friend Silvinus urged him to pick up the tale where Virgil had left it. Thus two of Virgil's productions must be seen to be the inspiration of Neronian writers.¹⁹

And what of the *Aeneid*? The relation of Lucan's *Pharsalia* to the *Aeneid* is problematic, and there are as many opinions as there are students of the two poems. One of the chief causes of our difficulty in gauging the tone of Lucan's epic is that he only published three books, probably the first three, and was prevented by Nero's jealousy from publishing more. It follows from this that whatever plan Lucan had in mind when he began his poem, perhaps in 60 or 61, was likely to have been altered, if only in detail, so as to reflect his doubtless changed attitude to the Julio-Claudian house. It may however be hesitantly suggested that Lucan's original plan was complementary to the *Aeneid*. To put it crudely, the *Aeneid* is a national poem, set however in the age of Homeric myth; at various important stages in the poem the reader is reminded that all of Aeneas's hardships (and the hardships of those who oppose him) will issue in the foundation of Rome and in the establishment of his own line in the person of Augustus. Lucan's poem is also on a national theme, the civil war fought between Caesar and Pompey (it is not therefore the usual sort of historical epic, which was in effect an extended panegyric upon a contemporary military hero). At the very beginning of the poem Lucan makes it plain that the issue of all this bloodshed in the reign of Nero was worth it:

quod si non aliam uenturo fata Neroni
inuenere uiam. . . .
iam nihil . . . querimur. (1.33-37)

multum Roma tamen debet ciuilibus armis
quod tibi res acta est. (1.44f.).

¹⁸ Calpurnius's knowledge of Theocritus was seen by Wilamowitz as evidence of Neronian date; *Textgeschichte der griechischen Bukoliker* (1906) 111, n. 3. I should have referred to this when discussing the date of Calpurnius in *JRS* 70 (1980) 175f.

¹⁹ Such Maronolatry is often noticed (e.g. by E. E. Sikes in *CAH* 11.708) but what is striking is the apparent absence of imitation before this period.

Lucan's glib acceptance of the suffering of others is repellent in its heartlessness, but that does not entitle modern critics with tenderer sensibilities to assert that the poet is not convinced of the justice of his own vision of history. Lucan's rhetoric cannot be peeled off to reveal the poet's true sentiments, and it must be recalled that he had no personal stake in a war fought a century before. It has been suggested not implausibly that the tone of the first book of the *Pharsalia* is so mild that the poem itself might have issued in praise of the Augustan settlement, a restored republic under Nero's protection.²⁰ If this view is worth entertaining, then it may be suggested that Lucan intended, at least when he was beginning his poem, not an anti-*Aeneid*, such as we now find in parts of the *Pharsalia*, but rather a complement to Virgil's mythological poem, set in historical times, and praising another Augustus. (That Nero saw himself as another Augustus is a point to which we shall return.)

This view of the relation of Lucan to Virgil is too speculative to convince many. But we can point to a revived interest in Homer and the Trojan saga which must be ascribed to the influence of the *Aeneid*. Labeo translated the *Iliad*, probably not before Claudius's reign. Statius's father composed a prose paraphrase of Homer.²¹ The *Ilias Latina* was composed about this time; its strict metrical practice points to Neronian date. Lucan composed an *Iliakon*, and Nero's own poetic monument was his *Troica* (it will be recalled that in his early youth he had pleaded before Claudius on behalf of the Trojans; Suet. *N.* 7.2). In the *Satyricon* Petronius has Eumolpus require the aspiring poet to read Roman Virgil (118.5), and there is also an iambic reworking of the opening of *Aeneid* II (89). Even in the *Pharsalia* itself Lucan inserts a pointless visit of Julius Caesar's to the site of Troy (9.961-79).

Subjective love elegy was fashionable among Augustan poets. They seem not to have found immediate successors after Ovid. It will be recalled that Velleius singled out Tibullus. In the Neronian age Nerva, the future emperor, must have imitated erotic elegy, perhaps in the bucolic, non-mythological Tibullan mode, for in one of his own poems Nero hailed Nerva as the Tibullus of the day (that however may

²⁰ A. Momigliano in *CQ* 38 (1944) 96-100 = *Secondo contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (1960) 459.

²¹ St. *Silu.* 5.3.159-61; the practice is illustrated by G. Giangrande in *Eranos* 60 (1962) 152-54.

only mean he was felt to be as good as the best; Mart. 8.70).²² Tibullus was of course still being read: Calpurnius imitates a line (3.88 = 1.3.81), and Seneca, in a late work, the *Naturales Quaestiones* (4.2.2), quotes a verse—which he gives to one of his more familiar poets, Ovid! (Does that suggest a recent interest in an as yet unassimilated poet?)

Tragedy deserves a word. Seneca's nine tragedies cannot be dated.²³ He may have written them while in exile, or even while keeping an eye on Nero. If ever they could be dated to a late period of his career then they would admirably illustrate the chief proposition of this paper. As it is, however, we can only see them as much indebted to Augustan poetry, especially to Ovid, for themes, and to Horace for lyric metres (and occasionally matter too). Seneca's *Medea* and *Thyestes* perhaps look back to productions of Ovid and Varius (Lucan too tried his hand at a *Medea*).²⁴

We turn now to Horace's writings. Nowadays we regard Horace as the classic Augustan poet after Virgil. In antiquity too, such a view is found, and Martial and Juvenal link their names (1.107.4, 12.3.1; 7.227). But it would be rash to assume this pairing was always taken for granted. For Horace, it will be recalled, was not mentioned by Velleius. The Elder Seneca has nothing to say of him. Phaedrus alludes to the *Aeneid*, but ignores the arguably more relevant *Sermones* and *Epistulae*. Finally, Seneca never quotes him in his *Dialogues*, some of which were composed early in his career. This strongly suggests that Horace was not yet a standard author. Suddenly, under Nero, this neglect is compensated for with interest. After eighty years Persius revives satire; the life of the poet says that reading Lucilius converted him: however that may be, Horace is his model. Even some *Odes* are laid under contribution (our first quotation from an *Ode* at this time is in Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*²⁵). This revived interest in the satires spread, for Seneca now has recourse to them, and quotes from them in his late *Epistulae Morales*. It will be recalled that Persius's sixth satire

²² Tacitus says that Nero gathered young poets about him in late A.D. 59 (*Ann.* 14.16). If Nerva was then included, we can roughly date his poetic activity.

²³ M. Coffey in *Lustrum* 2 (1957) 150.

²⁴ Seneca's overall debt to the Augustans is handled by R. J. Tarrant in *HSCP* 82 (1978) 258–63.

²⁵ *Carm.* 2.13.34 is quoted at *Apocol.* 13.3. Since this was composed in late A.D. 54 it is clear that at least Seneca's interest in Horace is pre-Neronian. (Arnold warned against too rigidly defining literary epochs by reigns.) I have no doubt that Horace was read and admired before Nero's day. But imitation is another matter.

is, to be formally correct, a letter to Caesius Bassus; it opens with an explanation of where the correspondents are. So we can point to a tentative revival of a form invented by Horace, the verse epistle on a moral theme. 'Orazio satiro' is not the only subject of revival among the neo-Augustans of Nero's reign. The older friend of Persius, Caesius Bassus, took Horace's lyrics in hand, and his own productions won some praise from Quintilian (*I.O.* 10.1.96). His interests were scholarly too, and he wrote a treatise on Horace's metre, which he dedicated to Nero.²⁶ We owe Horace to these Neronian writers. Thanks to them, he entered the mainstream of Latin letters and took his place alongside Virgil. After this epoch he finds fresh imitators in Passennus Paulus and some unnamed lyrists praised by Quintilian; to Tacitus he is a standard author.²⁷

So far we have been looking at contemporaneous revivals of several departments of poetry strongly associated with Augustan poets. Let us turn with circumspection to those parasites upon the bodies of the Muses, scholars. There are two stumbling blocks. First, since scholarship is generally known of from late compilations we cannot always define the character of a scholar's interest or work. Secondly, dating is not possible. We know in our own day that scholarly enthusiasm for Propertius preceded his vogue among poets like Ezra Pound. So it is possible that the work of scholars upon Augustan texts preceded and perhaps even induced the new rage for imitation. We cannot say. At any rate Bassus's work on Horatian metre is certainly Neronian. Virgil's *Aeneid* was edited posthumously by Varius; the next scholar to work on the text was Probus, certainly active in the Neronian age. Perhaps all he did was mark-up a private copy for study.²⁸ That nevertheless is a fresh departure, comparable to Bentley's *Milton*, in so far as the text of a recent poet is seen to deserve a scholar's scrutiny. Probus was said to have 'edited' Horace too. Annaeus Cornutus, Persius's Stoic

²⁶ S-H §385. Bassus was composing lyrics in 62, as the opening of Persius's sixth, and presumably last, satire makes plain. We do not know when he began his work. Perhaps like Seneca (cf. n. 25) his interest pre-dates the new reign. His fragments show un-Horatian metres, not surprisingly. The late metricians only had recourse to him for what could not be found in Horace. Thus what is left to us may not be typical of Bassus's output.

²⁷ Plin. *Epist.* 9.22.2; *I.O.* 10.1.96; *Dial.* 20.5

²⁸ So P. L. Schmidt in *Kl. Pauly* 4.1147; S-H §734, p. 735. A fuller discussion is given by J. E. G. Zetzel in 'Latin textual criticism in antiquity,' (diss. Harvard 1972), 48 ff.

master, also dedicated some of his study to Virgil²⁹; reference has already been made to Asconius. Not until Flavian times, perhaps, did Horace find commentators in Aufidius Modestus and Claranus.³⁰ But these scholars inherit the Neronian interest, which has now taken firm root.

It should now be clear that the Neronian poets established their Augustan predecessors as models to be imitated. But one other important literary figure of the Augustan age may be touched upon by the way, just because he alone was held up as an 'exemplum uitandum': Maecenas. Seneca's *Epistle* 114 is a well-known attack on the great patron's loose morals and prose. It was long ago suggested by P. Lunderstedt (in *Comm. Jenens.* 9.1911) that this attack was topical because Maecenas's prose works had perhaps just been published; if true, that would be another instance of the keen interest taken in the earlier and now classic age. Others have gone on to suggest that Seneca's attack inspired (if that is the right word) the defense found in the *Elegiae in Maecenatem*; this takes speculation very far, since the date of these poems is uncertain (J. C. Bramble sets out the most important contributions, note 2 above, p. 475). Leaving aside the date of the *Elegiae* and of the publication of Maecenas's prose, Seneca's interest is another aspect of the neo-Augustanism of Nero's reign. Indeed, Seneca may have cast himself in the role of the new Maecenas (if he was the patron of, say, Calpurnius Siculus); he had, after all, been as close to the princeps, but he could claim nicer morals and smarter prose: imitation became, as so often, emulation.

It is time to ask to what causes this flood of imitation may be due. One feature of the Neronian literary scene, which recalls the Augustan age, is the friendship that linked the various writers. Persius and Bassus, the restorers of Horace, were closely bound by affection. Persius and Lucan are said to have sat at the feet of Cornutus for instruction in Stoicism. (Indeed Cornutus may have been a freedman of Lucan's father, Annaeus Mela.³¹) Lucan's uncle, Seneca, was always devoted to Virgil and must have exercised great influence upon the literary taste of

²⁹ S-H §451, p. 678, and A. D. Nock in *RE* suppl. 5. 995-1005. Dr Zetzel, whose work is cited in the previous note, treats of Cornutus on pp. 41-44. But it is not, as he says, chronologically impossible that Cornutus wrote after Probus, which is implied in the structure of the DS scholium to *Geor.* 1.277.

³⁰ Cf. Mart. 10.21.1f., *RE* 2.2294 and S-H §475a, *RE* 3.2627.

³¹ So Nock (as cited in n. 29 above).

the Neronian age; it has been suggested that he was the patron of Calpurnius, disguised under the name Meliboeus. Nerva moved in those court circles (to which Calpurnius sought entrance), with Lucan and Seneca, Bassus and Cornutus (only Persius seems to have had no connection of any sort with Nero). Columella, a Spaniard from Baetica, the homeland of the Annaei, shows some slender knowledge of Seneca (3.3.3); he is however the odd man out. A loose community of literary interest can be detected at work. To some degree it centred around Nero, who regarded himself from the beginning of his reign as a new Augustus. Of course both Tiberius and Claudius had also claimed to be walking in the footsteps of the first princeps, but Nero took his Augustanism even further, perhaps, in his early days, under the guidance of Seneca. In his first address to the Senate Nero stated that he would work within Augustus's guidelines (Suet. *Nero* 10.1). His devotion took some odd forms: after his victory in A.D. 60 at the Neronia he honoured the statue of Augustus, and rode in his chariot after returning from Greece (Suet. *Nero* 12.3, and 25.1); he gave his wife Poppaea the name Augusta and formed a special troop of 'Augustiani equites' (Tac. *Ann.* 15.23.1 and 14.15.8). This goes far beyond the policy of Nero's predecessors. It may therefore safely be said that for Nero Augustus was a model to be imitated. This fact ought to have had some influence upon the writers of his day, whether or not they aimed to secure the emperor's notice and move in his company. Moreover the practice of reciting recently composed works would help to spread the revivalist fervour of imitation among the new poets.

If we are correct in identifying Neronian literature as a new and self-conscious imitation of the forms and standards of Augustan literature, then it is appropriate to read Neronian texts generally in this light. Surprises may be in store. For example, the character of Eumolpus in the *Satyricon* needs reassessment. So far as the plot of the novel is concerned Eumolpus is morally deplorable. But the value of his literary views, as set out at 118, has been hotly debated (and my own opinion has long been that most of what he says is common sense). One opinion is that Petronius intends this degraded rhetorician to be an example of threadbare traditionalism. But Eumolpus quotes Horace, and requires a knowledge of his poetry.³² We have seen that Horace was not, up to now, much referred to, and that he is in fact the principal

³² Eumolpus quotes *Carm.* 3.1.1, a reference omitted from the *testimonia* by Klingner.

beneficiary of the Neronian renaissance. By praising Horace, Eumolpus shows himself to be in the vanguard of current taste; so too his praise of Homer and Virgil, and his sense of their value as models, again indicates modern critical views. Moreover he does not praise Alexandrian authors (he links to Homer the lyric poets), nor for instance their Roman adherents, Catullus or Varro. It may therefore be the case that Eumolpus is after all only a mouthpiece at this point for Petronius's own views, a theory that has been put forward before now. The first satire of Persius may also need reconsideration. Recently it has been said to uphold traditions in a decadent period of innovation.³³ But Persius is the innovator, and he attacks a sort of composition long traditional in Rome.³⁴

To sum up: if by a classic we mean a literary work regarded as suitable for imitation, then it was the poets of Nero's reign who, by imitating their works, accorded to the Augustans that classic status to which they aspired—'quodsi me lyricis uatibus inseres.' Nero's reign is moreover a watershed in Latin literature. Up to that time Greek poetry provided the only classics. Whatever use a Roman made of early Latin or even of his nearer contemporaries the models which he aimed to rival were Greek. So Augustan poets hailed each other as Alcaeus or Callimachus (Hor. *Epist.* 2.2.99–101, Prop. 4.1.64); or they claimed that the *Iliad* was soon to meet its match (Prop. 2.34.66). After an apparent relapse into comfortable Alexandrianism, the new poets under Nero were the first to appreciate that Rome now had in the Augustans her own classic poetry. This change of attitude is epitomized by Nero's hailing Nerva as the Tibullus of the day (Mart. 8.70). Now and henceforward, Roman poets are the chief models of Roman poets.³⁵ Lucan, it will be recalled, saw himself as rivalling Virgil, not Homer.³⁶ This change of direction is clearly at work among Flavian poets (many of whom were of course alive in Nero's day). The Flavians now look to Augustans and Neronians as models. Valerius Flaccus reads Apollonius so as to know which Argonautic episodes to omit (because already

³³ M. Coffey, *Roman Satire* (1976) 112.

³⁴ Thus J. C. Bramble in *Persius and the Programmatic Satire* (1974) 183 is closer to the mark in describing Persius as an 'aspiring classicist.' But Bramble is perhaps too sanguine about the depth of admiration of Virgil (184).

³⁵ The point is not new (cf., for example, Momigliano, n. 20), but it does not seem to have been appreciated that the change was sudden and complete.

³⁶ Reference is made to his boast (such it appears to be) that he had started his epic before Virgil wrote the *Culex*; *uita Suet.* apud Hosius p. 332.

handled), and his inspiration for new episodes is Virgilian.³⁷ Statius, despite a Greek education, seems to owe very little to any one Greek source, and he openly avows his debt to the *Aeneid*.³⁸ The standard is now set by Romans for Romans. This critical volte-face was the work of the Neronian poets.

ROLAND MAYER

BIRKBECK COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

³⁷ W. C. Summers, *A Study of the Argonautica of Valerius Flaccus* (1894) 18–41.

³⁸ *Th.* 12.816; for sources S-H §408, p. 536. D.W.T.C. Vessey in *Philol.* 14 (1970) 118 denies even acquaintance with Antimachus.

INTERPRETATIONS

THE SIZE OF THESPIS' CHORUS

At *AJA* 82 (1978) 380–81 figures 10–11, N. G. L. Hammond and Warren G. Moon conveniently publish a Basel black-figured krater (ca. 500–480 B.C.) illustrating, in their opinion, Aeschylus, *Neaniskoi* (frs. 90–95 Mette) and a lekythos at Athens (ca. 470 B.C.) illustrating Aeschylus, *Eleusinioi* (frs. 267–270 Mette). The titles (cf. *Eumenides*) suggest an important choral role that might easily have attracted an illustrator. These remarkable vases each depict six tragic choreuts, the first youths, the second bearded men. Hammond and Moon call each a “hemi-chorus,” assuming a full chorus of twelve. Their source is the late *Vita Sophoclis*. Sophocles increased the number of the tragic chorus from Aeschylus’ twelve to fifteen (Soph. TA23 Radt). But need Aeschylus’ chorus always have been twelve? Might not these new vases illustrate a period in the early history of tragedy when the chorus was six? Thus we should have illustrated a full chorus rather than half a one. There is literary evidence that has not been adduced.

A tentative case may be argued that Thespis’ chorus was six. Among the titles preserved at Souda θ 282.12 Adler is ΗΙΘΕΟΙ. Wilhelm Schmid and Albrecht von Blumenthal drew attention to the similar title of Bacchylides 17 (16) S–M, ΗΙΘΕΟΙ or *Theseus*: see Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur* I.2 (Munich 1934) 49 n. 6 and A. von Blumenthal, *RE* 6A (1936) 63.51–52. The dithyramb concerns the fourteen youths and maidens sent as tribute to Minos. The number of victims in the legend varies with an Attic preference for fourteen: see Hans Herter, *RE Supp.* 13 (1973) 1100.37–1101.13. Thespian tragedy did not allow female roles, introduced first by Phrynichus (*TGF* 3 T 1). That would mean confinement to seven youths. Theseus would have been *hypokrites*, the protagonist of a single actor tragedy, played by Thespis himself. The remaining six would have formed the chorus that gave the play its title. Here perhaps was the origin of an offering of seven youths alone: see Pl. *Legg.* 4.706b and V. *Aen.* 6.21. The earliest chorus of six was forgotten. No tragic script survived 480 B.C.; only titles. That Herakleides Ponticus allegedly forged

plays under Thespis' name (*TGF* 1 T 24 = frag. 181 Wehrli) does not mean that he forged titles nor that Souda's source was duped by his forged titles. Aeschylus' early doubling of the chorus was forgotten and an original twelve entered the tradition. The Hammond-Moon vases together with the Thespian title support an original chorus of six for Athenian tragedy, that survived into early Aeschylus. The shrinking of the tragic chorus to seven or even three in Hellenistic and Imperial tragedy becomes an archaism: see my remarks at *CP* 70 (1975) 32-35.

WILLIAM M. CALDER, III

THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER



THE LAMENT FOR AJAX:
SOPHOCLES' *AJAX* 628-31

In their first stasimon the chorus of the *Ajax* describe what the reaction of Ajax's mother will be to her son's misfortune: "the poor wretch will send forth αἶλινον αἶλινον and not the wail of the pitiful nightingale, but she will wail sharp, piercing songs" (ὄξύτόνους ᾠδὰς θρηγῆσει, 628-31). The problem is, as Jebb saw, that since the nightingale's song is the traditional means for describing a mother's cries at the loss of her child, it is surprising to find it rejected here.¹

R. Kannicht's answer was that it is the musical quality of the nightingale's song that is being contrasted with the wild and primitive cries of ritual lament:

der κομμός . . . in Schreien und Gebärden elementar
hervorbrechende rituelle Klage ist, der γόος ἀηδόνιος
dagegen die musikalisch explizierte und kunstvoll
ausgebildete Form des rührend schönen θρῆνος.²

Yet he was able to cite no convincing evidence for this from tragedy. The nightingale's song in the *Ajax* is called a γόος which is, if any-

¹ "The contrast meant here is plain enough; though in some other places, where the bitter *grief* of the nightingale is the foremost thought, the bird's note is sometimes described as 'piercing.'" R. C. Jebb, *The Ajax* (Cambridge 1896) 100.

² R. Kannicht, *Euripides Helena* (Heidelberg 1969) vol. 2, p. 282. I am indebted to D. Sangeloty for this reference and for bringing the problem to my attention in the first place.

thing, more primitive than the θρῆνος with which it is contrasted.³ In tragedy the nightingale's song is often equated with the θρῆνος (Aeschylus, fr. 749 M; Sophocles, *Electra* 104); since the nightingale's song elsewhere is called ὀξύφωνος (*Trachiniai* 963), it seems unlikely that the contrast with the ὀξύτόνους ὠδὰς is meant to be in terms of intensity.

A solution offers itself once we recall that the content of the nightingale's song is the repeated cry "Itys."⁴ This name has no meaning for Ajax's mother, but the repeated αἴλινον might, especially if it is heard as αἰ λινον αἰ λινον. Λίνος is the name of a song as early as Homer (*Iliad* 18.570) and a mythological person mourned in song by the fifth century (Pindar fr. 128c Snell-Maehler; Herodotus 2.79). For our purposes it is immaterial whether Linos is a song or a person so long as one can separate αἰ from λινον.⁵ Once that is done, the pertinence of singing αἴλινον αἴλινον for Ajax is clear: αἴαἰ is Ajax's own name, as he himself already remarked, "αἴαἰ, who would have thought my name would fit so synonymously (ἐπώνυμον) with my ills" (430-31). Ajax's mother, then, will not sing the nightingale's song of Itys but the threnos containing her own son's name.

Admittedly αἴλινον αἴλινον is a refrain well known to us from the *Agamemnon* (121 = 138) and the word occurs in a threnodic context later (Euripides, *Helen* 172, *Heracles* 348), but the clearest echo and only other example of the refrain itself also supports the claim that αἴαἰ is to be heard:

αἴλινον αἴλινον ἀρχὰν θανάτου
βάρβαροι λέγουσιν, αἴαἰ . . .

(Euripides, *Orestes* 1395 f.)

RICHARD HAMILTON

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE



³ M. Alexiou, *The ritual lament in Greek tradition* (Cambridge 1974) 103.

⁴ See Kannicht 282 for citations.

⁵ The best evidence for this is Pindar, fr. 128c6, Snell-Maehler: ἃ μὲν ἄχεταν Λίνον αἴλινον ἔρνεῖ. Scholars tend to question the connection with λίνος, which goes back at least to Aristophanes of Byzantium, and to prefer a semitic origin: "dieser Ruf wird vom dem semitischen *ai lanu* = wehe uns' abgeleitet" (Abert, *RE s.v.* Linos 716; see also Crusius, *RE s.v.* Ailinson 1009; Alexiou (note 3 above) 218, n. 10 and, for the fullest account, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Euripides Herakles* (Berlin 1889), "Zweite Gesangsnummer," II 119-21 (= II 84-86 in the 1895 edition; 293-95 in the 1933 edition). But now see G. W. Bond, *Euripides' Heracles* (Oxford 1981) 150.

THE TEXT OF ISAEUS, XI, 2

Isaeus begins his speech about the estate of Hagnias with a review of the γένη, the classes of relatives entitled to inherit under the law of intestate succession. The first *genos* consists of the deceased's paternal brothers and their children, "for, as a class, this is nearest the deceased," τοῦτο γὰρ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γένος ἐστίν.¹ If there is no one alive in this class, the inheritance goes to the second *genos*, the dead man's paternal sisters and their children. If there is none of these either, it goes to a third class (τρίτῳ γένει), his cousins.² Isaeus continues, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκλίπη, εἰς τὸ γένος πάλιν ἐπανέρχεται καὶ ποιεῖ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς τοῦ τελευτήσαντος κυρίους αὐτῶν,³ "And if this (class) too fails, the law goes back again into the family and puts the deceased's maternal kin in control of his possessions."

Editors ever since Wyse have generally found this last sentence meaningless and have altered the text as follows: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκλίπη τὸ γένος, πάλιν ἐπανέρχεται.⁴ However, this emendation ignores the very close parallels of phrase found in the speech from the *Corpus Demosthenicum* (XLIV), *Against Leochares*. In §14 the litigant has the clerk read out the law <τὸν> τοῖς τε γένεσι καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω πρὸς ἀνδρῶν τὰς κληρονομίας ἀποδιδόντα. In §63 he says that an adopted son may return to his original family if he leaves behind another heir for his adoptive father. He must not adopt someone to be that heir, he must beget him. Failing that, the estate reverts to the blood relatives: ὅταν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπιλίπη, (sc. δίκαιον) τοῖς γένεσιν ἀποδιδόναι τὰς κληρονομίας.⁵ In this particular case an adopted son did die childless, τετελεύτηκεν ἄπαις, ὥστε γίνεται ἔρημος ὁ οἶκος καὶ ἐπανελήλυθεν ἡ κληρονομία πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐγγύτατα γένους ὄντας (47). §63 states the general rule, §47 the specific application, and it is possible (*mutatis mutandis*) to transpose: τετελεύτηκεν ἄπαις, ὥστε δίκαιον τοῖς γένεσιν ἀποδιδόναι τὰς κληρονομίας and ὅταν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπιλίπη, ἐπανέρχεται ἡ κληρονομία πάλιν εἰς, κτλ.. The striking verbal similarities

¹ XI, 1. Some editors add the article before γένος, giving, "This class is nearest . . .," or "this is the class nearest . . ." Isaeus also refers to these inheritance classes at IV, 11 and 16.

² XI, 2. Modern scholars are not in agreement about which cousins are included in this class; see, for example, my *De Hagniae Hereditate* (Leiden 1976) 4–6.

³ The aorist subjunctive ἐκλίπη is a correction of the present, made by the copyist of the Crippsianus himself.

⁴ William Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge 1904) 681.

⁵ Some manuscripts have the present subjunctive.

in the two discussions of the same law indicate that the manuscript version of Isaeus is the correct one. In both presentations we have a null class, either children of the adoptee (τοῦτ' ἐπιλήπη) or the third class of paternal heirs (τοῦτ' ἐκλήπη). The difference is that in the one instance the law returns to a certain group of relatives and gives them the estate, while in the other the estate itself returns to a certain group of kin.⁶

In the Hagnias trial Isaeus argues that the right to inherit extends to paternal relatives up to and including second cousins; it does not extend to their children. His client is Hagnias' second cousin; the other claimant, the son of a second cousin.⁷ If there are no second cousins or closer relatives on the father's side, the inheritance passes to the maternal kin. This, he says (3), is what "the lawgiver" intends; these are the rules of "the lawgiver." But it did not have to be that way: the lawgiver could have gone outside the family and given the rights of inheritance to more distant paternal kin or members of the deceased's phratry, or even to his in-laws.⁸ He chose not to do so but went, instead, back to the family for an heir and found him among the deceased's maternal relatives. As Isaeus phrases it (12), "The lawgiver did not say, 'If there is no one on the father's side up to second cousins, the sons of the second cousins are to have control,' but he gave the estate to those on the deceased's mother's side."

The sons of the second cousins, therefore, will be outside the family, *as the lawgiver has defined it*.⁹ Now Isaeus does not actually say that the other claimant is ἔξω τοῦ γένους; he is, rather, ἔξω τῆς ἀγχιστείας and ἔξω τῆς συγγενείας.¹⁰ But then in this speech Isaeus tends to use all three words interchangeably.¹¹ We find the same thing in Plato.

⁶ The referee for this paper calls attention to legal contexts where rights or responsibilities devolve εἰς τινα. For our purpose the most interesting are Isaeus, III, 36 and 38 (a dowry reverts to the donor) and Andoc., I, 117, and Isaeus, X, 26, and XI, 22 (inheritance). The verb is γίγνεσθαι or ἐπιγίγνεσθαι; cf. Wyse, *op. cit.*, pp. 478-79.

⁷ XI, 5 and 8.

⁸ These are the relatives required to avenge a murder; cf. [Dem.], XLIII, 57, and *I.G.*, I², 115, restudied by Ronald S. Stroud, *Drakon's Law on Homicide* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968). According to Juliet du Boulay, *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village* (Oxford 1974) 145, while civil and ecclesiastical codes now include second cousins in the kindred but exclude more distant relatives, "the popular emotional conviction [is] that blood relationship persists after the technical limits of relationship have been reached."

⁹ In saying that the law returns to the family, Isaeus is guilty of circularity: the family is what it is, only because the lawgiver has defined it that way.

¹⁰ §§7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 30; §3.

¹¹ One is related (προσῆκων) γένει (17, 30), τῇ ἀγχιστείᾳ (3), κατ' ἀγχιστεῖαν (19), or τῇ συγγενείᾳ (10). One has a share (τινὶ μέτεστι) either κατὰ τὸ γένος (24) or κατ' ἀγχιστεῖαν (33). In examining his opponent, Isaeus' client demands that he specify τῆς ἀγχισ-

After ranking the kin who are eligible to marry an heiress, he recognizes that sometimes none of them will still be living in his ideal city. Thus the heiress may look abroad to the city's colonies for a husband, either a relative or an outsider: ἔάν μὲν συγγενῆς ἦ . . . ἔάν δὲ ἐκτὸς γένους, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντων ἔξω τῆς συγγενείας (on condition that the men in the city are outside the kindred she may marry a colonist who is also outside the kindred).¹²

We can understand, then, what Isaeus means by saying that, when the third inheritance class (τρίτον γένος) becomes extinct, the law returns to the family (γένος) and gives the estate to its members. Although it may seem harsh to use γένος with two different meanings in such a short space,¹³ other authors do the same. Once he establishes the order by which the nearest relatives are to marry an heiress, Plato continues, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸ γένος αἰὶ πορευέσθω κατ' ἀγχιστεῖαν, ἔάν τις παῖδας θηλείας καταλίπη, δι' ἀδελφῶν τε καὶ ἀδελφιδῶν ἐπανιών, ἔμπροσθε μὲν τῶν ἀρρένων, ὕστερον δὲ θηλειῶν ἐνὶ γένει.¹⁴ Editors and translators today generally agree that this means something like, "Let the family [or succession] proceed according to blood relationship both through siblings and siblings' children, first through males, then through females in a single generation," where γένος and γένει cannot mean the same thing.¹⁵ Also, the speaker of *Against Leochares*, after naming the members of the various branches of his family over the past century, offers proof of his narrative: "Well then, o jurors, that our γένος (family or descent) is just as we say, the clerk will read the depositions to you; then after that, the law itself which gives the rights

τείας τὸ γένος (5). When he does not respond properly, the client says to the jury, "You perceive that he cannot say τὴν συγγένειαν (6)." Against a third claimant the opponents could not say a better γένος, but would be exposed as being outside the ἀγχιστεία (30). One can also be outside the συγγένεια (3).

¹² *Laws*, XI, 925B–C; he also says that a man who wants to eliminate a son from his συγγένεια (929A) must prove that he deserves to be expelled from his γένος (929B).

¹³ This is the objection which I made (note 2 above) to Jebb's interpretation, "Failing these also, the law reverts to the direct line [εἰς τὸ γένος, the *direct* lineage on the *maternal* side as opp. to collateral kinship on the paternal]"; see R. C. Jebb, *Selections from the Attic Orators* (London 1888) 381.

¹⁴ *Laws*, XI 924E–925A.

¹⁵ So Taylor, Saunders, Pangle, and Gernet. R. G. Bury in the *Loeb* has "the right of kinship" and "in one line." For earlier versions see E. B. England, *The Laws of Plato*, II (Manchester 1921) 536–37.

of inheritance to the γένοι (inheritance classes) and those nearest on the male side."¹⁶

WESLEY E. THOMPSON

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS



ON THE MARGIN OF CICERO,
PRO CLUENTIO 169 AND 170*

The discovery of Paris, B.N. MS lat. 18104 (X), containing among others extracts from Cicero's *Pro Cluentio*, has had the immediate effect of generating new ideas about some textual problems of that oration. After the extracts were published,¹ X engaged the attention of Silvia Rizzo who devoted to it a separate chapter in her account of the manuscript tradition of the *Pro Cluentio*.² In the present note I wish to examine her assessment of X.

The text of the *Pro Cluentio* has hitherto rested on a bipartite stemma consisting of the superior Cluny tradition (C) and the Monte Cassino branch (M) which produced the vulgate recension. Since the examination of X has revealed that the manuscript carries some genuine readings on the one hand, and does not have any conjunctive errors with either C or M on the other, the thrust of my argument was towards asserting its independence. Consequently I suggested that if X + M or

¹⁶[Dem.], XLIV, 14.

* I am grateful to R. H. Rouse and M. A. Rouse for their help in the preparation of this paper.

¹ See T. Maslowski and R. H. Rouse, "Twelfth-Century Extracts from Cicero's *Pro Archia* and *Pro Cluentio* in Paris, B.N., MS lat. 18104," *Italia Medioevale e Umanistica* 22 (1979) 97-122.

² S. Rizzo, *La tradizione manoscritta della Pro Cluentio di Cicerone* (Tivoli 1979) 83-90.

X + C = the archetype, a number of readings on which the editors disagree could be determined with a measure of certainty.

Although Rizzo takes a different view with regard to the affinities of X (see below), in one respect her position is not substantially different from mine. She too, in the final analysis, accepts those readings which receive support from the new witness.³ In the one case where she opts for a variant unsupported by X, *Clu.* 139 *non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum* (aut C : ac XM) she is aware of the thinness of the thread on which her preference hangs; and her assertion that *Clu.* 170 *eiectum* of M is superior to *et eiectum* of XC is simply that, an assertion.

Rizzo's main thesis is that X and C descended by independent routes from a common parent. Because X comes from France (it was probably written at Chartres or at Bec), this suggestion is not farfetched. The case, however, is not as straightforward when it comes to the textual evidence which she adduces. The argument focuses on *Clu.* 169 and 170 where, according to Rizzo, there are two words of an inorganic nature shared by X and C. Let us take a look at those passages:

169 *inimicitias enim fuisse confiteor; sed homines inimicos suos morte adfici volunt aut quod eos metuunt aut quod oderunt.*

170 *si autem quod oderat Habitus inimicum, idcirco illum vita frui noluit, adeone erat stultus ut. . .*

This is the text of C, which is also the version adopted by Clark in his OCT edition.⁴ M differs from it in a number of essential points: *fuisse*] *inter eos fuisse*; *aut*¹] *ut*; *eos*] *om.*; *si*] *sin*; *inimicum*] *om.*; *idcirco*] *et idcirco*.

The vulgate recension, which is based on M, reads as follows:⁵

169 *inimicitias enim inter ipsos fuisse confiteor; sed homines inimicos suos morte adfici volunt vel quod metuunt vel quod oderunt.*

³ Rizzo specifically mentions the following readings: 139 *illae* XC : *illae orationes* M; 140 *se* XM : *om.* C; 169 *enim* XC : *enim inter eos* M; 170 *condemnato* XM : *damnato* C; 170 *sin* XM : *si* C; 170 *idcirco* XC : *et idcirco* M; 170 *vitae* Habitus XM : *Habitus vitae* C.

She acknowledges X's contributions to the text: 170 *adire* X Naugerius : *audire* M : *silet* C; 199 *crudelitate et scelere* X : *crudelitatem et sceleri* C : *deficit* M; 199 *naturae iura* X Madvig : *naturae nomen et iura* C : *deficit* M; 199 *hominis* X : *homini* C : *deficit* M; 199 *reservavit* X : *reservaret* C : *deficit* M; 202 *iucundum* X Peterson : *iucundissimum* C : *deficit* M.

⁴ M. T. Ciceronis *Orationes: Pro Sex. Roscio, De imperio Cn. Pompei, Pro Cluentio*, al., ed. A. C. Clark (Oxford 1905).

⁵ See M. T. Ciceronis *Opera quae supersunt omnia* 2.1, ed. I.C. Orelli (Zurich 1826).

170 *sin autem quod oderat Habitus, idcirco illum vita frui noluit, adeone erat stultus ut inter ipsos* of this rendition marks an attempt by μ (recentiores derived from M) to improve the text of M. Lambinus' emendation *vel . . . vel* for *aut . . . aut* must have got its start from M's corruption of *aut* to *ut*.

The text of X is in all respects that of C, except that it offers *sin* for *si*. I opted for it as the alternative to both C and M.⁶

These few lines and their respective recensions allow one to grasp the central problem confronting the critic who wishes to deal with the whole oration. Before C had become known the editor's task was rather simple. All he had to do was to follow the Monte Cassino tradition (M) and correct it. Although this procedure had grown in complexity with the introduction by Classen of ST,⁷ two recentiores of the Cluni tradition, the point of reference for the editor continued to be the M text because Classen was unable to identify the source of the readings in the new witnesses.⁸ The turning point for the text of the oration was Clark's reconstruction of the lost Cluni book, the *Vetus Cluniacensis* (C), dated by him to the eighth century.⁹ Now it became clear that many of the ST readings represented genuine tradition and, more important, that the Cluni branch as a whole was superior to the M branch. Since Clark's time the basis for editing the text of the *Pro Cluentio* became C.

To judge from the growing number of departures from it in the subsequent editions of the oration by Früchtel (Teubner)¹⁰ and Boyancé (Budé),¹¹ it would seem that Clark overestimated the purity of the C strain of text. Boyancé is particularly fond of M, no doubt encouraged by his fresh collation of the manuscript which has not been examined

⁶ M's 169 *inter eos* has the classic appearance of an index-word. The reciprocal relation it indicates is easily understood from the context. Cf. R. Kühner and C. Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, 2 pts. of 2nd vol. (Hannover 1966) 2.1, 617, referred to below as K.-S. 170 *sin autem* of XM is more natural for Cicero than *si autem* of C. Cf. K.-S. 2.2, 432. For 169 *eos* XC : om. M; 170 *inimicum* XC : om. M; *idcirco* XC : *et idcirco* M see the discussion below.

⁷ M. T. Ciceronis *Oratio pro A. Cluentio Habito*, ed. I. Classen (Bonn 1831).

⁸ It was only observed that ST were supported on the whole by P, the fragmentary Turin Palimpsest of the 5th or 6th century. Cf. also W. Y. Fausset, "Peterson's Cluentius of Cicero," *CR* 14 (1900) 226-29; R. G. M. Nisbet, "The Budé Pro Cluentio," *CR* N.S. 5 (1955) 73-74.

⁹ See A. C. Clark, *The Vetus Cluniacensis of Poggio*, in *Anecdota Oxoniensis* (Oxford 1905) Classical Series, pt. 10, xvii ff.

¹⁰ M. T. Ciceronis *Scripta quae manserunt omnia* 6: *Orationes: Pro A. Cluentio, De lege agraria, Pro C. Rabirio perd. reo*, ed. L. Früchtel (Leipzig 1933).

¹¹ Cicéron, *Discours* 8: *Pour Cluentius*, ed. and tr. P. Boyancé (Paris 1953).

since the time of Classen. But the whole question of the relation of M to C and their respective value awaits a new study. Boyancé's choices, as I see them, do not always inspire confidence. For instance, at *Clu.* 170 quoted above he follows M's *et idcirco*. This, however, destroys a straightforward *quod-idcirco* correlation and is simply an error of M.¹²

The shift towards M is also exemplified by Rizzo's thesis that *Clu.* 169 *eos* and 170 *inimicum* of XC are two interpolations which tie the witnesses to a common subarchetype. But on what grounds does this challenge to XC's veracity rest?

For the sense of the passages, both *eos* and *inimicum* are as natural as they can be, even though Rizzo raises some doubts as to the suitability of the latter. From *Clu.* 169 on, Cicero finally comes to the main charge against Cluentius, which is his alleged poisoning of Oppianicus the Elder. His line of defense involves demonstrating that Cluentius had no motive for doing away with the man. To be sure there was hostility between them, "but," he cautions, "men desire the death of their enemies either because they fear them, or because they hate them." Rizzo feels that this statement which is of a general character is all that is necessary for what follows, namely for Cicero's specific demonstration that it was neither fear of Oppianicus nor hatred that prompted Cluentius to commit the crime. Why, she asks, would Cicero in this specific context revert to the general designation *inimicus* for Oppianicus?

The answer is not far to seek. Neither the acceptance nor the deletion of *inimicum* substantially affects the sense of the passage. Its retention however seems quite appropriate here because after five lines of OCT, 170 *quo tandem . . . laederetur*, illustrating the first of the two alternatives, *aut quod eos metuunt*, a restatement of the second alternative, *aut quod oderunt*, in *in autem quod oderat Habitus inimicum*, makes for clarity and good sense.

Fortunately Rizzo does not attach much weight to this argument. What tips the scale against XC in her estimate is something else. It is improbable, she insists, that M would twice have committed, at such a short distance apart, the same type of omission simply through oversight. She concludes that M therefore most likely preserves the genuine text and XC its interpolated version, and that someone must have inserted into the parallel *quod*-clauses the two direct objects whose function is so strikingly similar, each taking up the direct object of its main sentence, *eos*, *inimicos* and *inimicum*, *illum*.

¹² Cf. K. F. Nägelsbach (and I. Müller), *Lateinische Stilistik* (Nürnberg 1905⁹) 649-52.

Strictly speaking, we are not dealing here with two omissions; for at *Clu.* 170, instead of *inimicum*, M reads *et* which, as noted above, produces nonsense. It is of course possible that this *et* is simply an interpolation which has nothing to do with *inimicum*. And yet one wonders why M should have chanced to spoil what Rizzo considers a genuine text in this particular place. When the scribe inserts *et* elsewhere in the oration, he usually does so quite intelligently. Thus,¹³ he is fond of using *et* in the sense of *etiam*:¹⁴ 138 *sic* C : *sic et* M; 141 *ipse* C : *et ipse* M; 168 *cetera* C : *et cetera* M. In *Clu.* 54 the addition of *et*, *tota* C : *et tota* M, spoils an antithesis between *verbo* and *re vera et periculo*, but it still yields fairly good sense. Even in *Clu.* 83 *vita* C : *vita et* M, although *et* is superfluous, it does not destroy the grammar of the sentence. And the same goes for M's un-Ciceronian *T. Anni, L. Rutili, P. Saturi et ceterorum honestissimorum virorum* at *Clu.* 182.¹⁵

M's omission of *Clu.* 170 *inimicum* also calls attention to itself for the rhythm it produces. It is true that as we move away from the end of a period (clausula) and pass to its membra and articuli, the rhythm that is rare in the former becomes increasingly frequent in the latter. In general, however, it is fair to say that the membra approximate in rhythm to the clausulae.¹⁶ Also, it is occasionally difficult to decide what should rank as membrum and what should not. For example, when one clause is inserted by hyperbaton into another, the decision whether the inserted clause is a membrum turns on a number of considerations.¹⁷ But the first clause of what Zander¹⁸ calls "appositio correlata," i.e. *qui-is, quod-idcirco*, etc., is always a membrum, no matter in what clause it is inserted. It owes this distinction to the emphatic position it occupies in relation to the clause on which it depends. This being the case, the *quod*-clause at *Clu.* 170 is a membrum, *sin autem, quod oderat Habitus inimicum, idcirco . . .*, and its metrical scheme is of significance.

¹³ Boyancé usually accepts M's readings of *et*. Of the examples quoted here he rejects it only in *Clu.* 83 and 182.

¹⁴ This use of *et* in Cicero is somewhat problematic. See K.-S. 2.2, 8-10.

¹⁵ In good Latin prose the use of *et*, to attach the last member of a series, is avoided. See K.-S. 2.2, 31-32.

¹⁶ See Th. Zielinski, *Der constructive Rhythmus in Ciceros Reden* in *Philologus*, Suppl. 13 (1920), H. D. Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm* (Cambridge 1922).

¹⁷ See Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm*, 18. Throughout, I follow Broadhead's conception of colometry. Zielinski's division of a sentence into membra and articuli is artificial. Cf. Zielinski, *Der constructive Rhythmus*, 21-35 and 99-111 (his metrical analysis of Cicero's *Pro Ligario*).

¹⁸ C. Zander, *Eurythmia* 1 (Leipzig 1910) 403f., 423.

Let us now test *Clu.* 170 in respect of rhythm, taking first the XC testimony, and then the M evidence which is favored by Rizzo. In the first case we have *quod oderat Hābītūs inīmicūm*, i.e. Broadhead's C¹²2 (cretic with double resolution + trochee),¹⁹ a good clausula with a distinct "Schlusscharakter," common in Cicero.²⁰ In the second case the result is rather disastrous. The *quod ōdērāt Hābītūs* is a strongly negative ending, i.e. Broadhead's S²2¹ (spondee with a resolution of the second length [= dactyl] + resolved trochee).²¹ It is to be noted that, where it counts, Cicero avoids the resolution of the length following a dactyl. S²2¹ violates what Zielinski termed O²³-Verbot: "die Auflösung der auf den Daktylus folgenden Länge wird vermieden."²²

In view of these considerations I do not see how M's omission of 170 *inimicum* can be defended. Nor is it clear to me why 169 *eos* of XC is in any way objectionable. Rizzo derives some encouragement (in addition to her main argument) for its elimination from the fact that Schönberger suspected it,²³ and some editors, Orelli, Ramsay, and Peterson, followed M in their editions.²⁴ Given the history of the textual criticism of the *Pro Cluentio*, it is quite obvious why these editors could have ignored the testimony of C. But after Clark's discovery, matters are different; and to ignore C today, Boyancé's edition notwithstanding, some reason other than personal preference is necessary.

It is of course disappointing that taken on their merits, neither XC's *eos* nor M's omission supply any noteworthy basis for discrimination. Since the *aut*-clauses when long enough are nearly always membra,²⁵ I should think that at *Clu.* 169 Cicero paid some attention to the rhythm. But whether we follow XC or M, this does not appear to be the case. Indeed, *aūt quōd ēōs mētūūnt* yields Broadhead's TI2¹ (trochee +

¹⁹ For the inner parts of the sentence, I prefer Broadhead's method according to which a clausula is the last two feet of a sense-group. Zielinski's cretic (base) -trochaic (cadence) approach often fails since the clausula may be co-extensive with a colon of only two feet. In such cases Zielinski borrows syllables from another colon.

²⁰ See Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm*, 105. For Zielinski this clausula is L 1¹². See Th. Zielinski, *Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden* (Leipzig 1904) 56-59 and his *Der constructive Rhythmus*, 55-56.

²¹ See Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm*, 108.

²² Zielinski, *Das Clauselgesetz*, 115.

²³ See J. K. Schönberger, *Tulliana*, Diss. (Würzburg-Augsburg 1911) 84, 105.

²⁴ See Cicero, *Opera* 2.1, ed. Orelli; *The Speech of Cicero for Aulus Cluentius Habitus*, ed. W. Ramsay (London-Glasgow 1859); M. T. Ciceronis *Pro A. Cluentio oratio*, ed. W. Peterson (London 1899).

²⁵ See Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm*, 24.

iambus + spondee with the first length resolved), a negative and rather unusual combination of feet.²⁶ The I2 rhythm is almost invariably preceded by a long syllable and composed of one word, e.g. *oportebat*. Such combinations are decidedly positive. On the other hand, before any marked pause in a sentence, e.g. in *membra*, Cicero avoids using an iambic word, e.g. *eos*, in the penultimate foot.²⁷ Furthermore, when the iambic word is preceded by trochaic or dactylic rhythm, this involves what Zielinski calls "Complosion," a comparatively rare phenomenon.²⁸ This is precisely what we have in *aut quod eos metuunt*, whose strained rhythm, however, is to some extent relieved precisely because of *eos*, insofar as this and a few other iambic words produce only "leichte Complosion."

But *aut quod metuunt* is no better, as it contains Broadhead's S2¹ (spondee + spondee with the first length resolved).²⁹ The S2 combinations are in general very negative. Nevertheless, even the heroic clausula S2² (spondee with the second length resolved + trochee), although reputedly negative, is less so than S2¹, which is the rhythm of *aut quod metuunt*.

However, these difficulties with *Clu.* 169 *eos* XC : om. M need not concern us any longer. Rizzo's argument for linking X to C has enough to contend with from the evidence of *Clu.* 170 *inimicum*; and M's omission of *eos* in *Clu.* 169, when taken alone, can scarcely commend itself vis-à-vis the superior authority of C, even if X had not been brought to light, and even if XC are in fact derived from a common parent.

TADEUSZ MASLOWSKI

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA



²⁶ See Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm*, 72, 93, 94, 99, 107. TI2¹ is Zielinski's P 1³. See Zielinski, *Das Clauselgesetz*, 160, and *Der constructive Rhythmus*, 58.

²⁷ But such combinations are frequent in the articuli. See Zielinski, *Der constructive Rhythmus*, 58.

²⁸ See Zielinski, *Der constructive Rhythmus*, 74–87.

²⁹ See Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm*, 108.

OVID, EMPEDOCLES AND THE MINOTAUR

After describing Ovid's treatment of a particular declamatory theme, the elder Seneca remarks on his vocabulary (*Controv.* 2.2.12): *verbis minime licenter usus est nisi in carminibus, in quibus non ignoravit vitia sua sed amavit*. To prove his point he repeats a story from Ovid's friend and fellow poet Albinovanus Pedo,¹ that when Ovid agreed to let his friends delete three lines from his work, provided he himself might choose three to be saved at all costs, the two sets, when compared, were identical. One of these verses is *Ars Amatoria* 2.24 (cf. *Tristia* 4.7.18):²

semibovemque virum, semivirumque bovem

But neither Ovid's friends nor modern commentators have noticed that this line only follows another's example. Empedocles' poem *Περὶ φύσεως* had described an intermediate stage in the world's development in which parts of different animals were found combined, more or less haphazardly, into various monstrous forms:

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι
 βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπρωιρα, τὰ δ' ἔμπαλιν ἐξανατέλλειν
 ἀνδροφυῇ βούκρανα, μεμειγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν
 τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῇ σκιεροῖς ἡσκημένα γυίοις.

Many creatures were born with faces and breasts on both sides, *man-faced ox-progeny*, while others again sprang forth as *ox-headed offspring of man*, creatures compounded partly of male, partly of the nature of female, and fitted with shadowy parts.³

To describe his human-headed cows and cow-headed men Empedocles used four compound adjectives, of which the first-fourth and second-third have the same initial elements (βου-, ἀνδρο-) and the first-third and second-fourth use synonyms for the second element (-γενής / -φυής, -πρωίρος / -κρανός).⁴ He placed each pair of adjectives in the same position in adjacent lines. Ovid's adaptation in his description of the

¹ See *Ex Ponto* 4.10, Seneca *Suas.* 1.15 = p. 115ff. Morel, Tacitus *Ann.* 1.60.2, Martial 1 preface, 2.77.5, 5.5.6.

² The other is *Am.* 2.11.10 (the third is not given by Seneca).

³ *VS* 31 B 61, transl. Kirk-Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957) fr. 446, p. 337.

⁴ On -πρωίρος in compounds see Fraenkel on Aesch. *Agam.* 235.

Minotaur⁵ was even more skilful; he used only three elements (*semi*-, *-bos*, *-vir*) to create two noun-adjective pairs, which he grouped symmetrically not in adjacent lines, but in the matching halves of the pentameter.⁶

Seneca and others may have thought Ovid guilty of *licentia* in his vocabulary here, but one other ancient critic would have approved completely: . . . *nova fictaque nuper habebunt verba fidem, si / Graeco fonte cadent parce detorta* (*A.P.* 52–53).⁷

J. S. RUSTEN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY



FRONTINUS *AQ.* 76.2: AN UNNOTICED FRAGMENT OF CAELIUS RUFUS?

“Nisi ego cum tabernariis et aquariis pugnarem, veternus civitatem occupasset.” Thus Caelius Rufus, curule aedile, casually to Cicero in a letter written in February of 50 B.C. (*Fam.* 8.6.4). A contest with water-men was likely the occasion on which Caelius delivered a *contio* entitled *De Aquis*. A century and a half later, Julius Frontinus, newly appointed *curator aquarum* under Nerva, undertook a personal scrutiny of Rome’s water supply. Vast quantities of public water, he discovered, were lost by fraudulent distribution and theft. In concluding his careful documentation, Frontinus refers to Caelius’ speech (*Aq.* 76.1–2):

⁵ Ovid must have seen (as has Guthrie, *In the Beginning* [Ithaca 1957] 45, 126 n. 21) that the ἀνδροφυῖ βούκρανα include the Minotaur among others. With βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα Empedocles may have pictured the human-faced and bull-bodied river gods, one of which appeared on the coinage of Acragas’ metropolis Gela (G. K. Jenkins, *The Coinage of Gela* [Berlin 1970] I 165 ff.).

⁶ In the same spirit of play Simonides altered the word order of a line to suit both a hexameter and a trochaic tetrameter, and he too was criticized: Simonides fr. 17 West (cf. Timocreon fr. 10 West and R. Kassel, *ZPE* 42 [1981] 15–16).

⁷ On Horace’s meaning see Brink ad loc. βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα and ἀνδροφυῖ βούκρανα seem to have been well known by themselves (Arist. *Phys.* 2.7, 198b29, Soph. *Trach.* 12–13; Diels on *VS* 31 A 1 [vol. 1, p. 280.10] suggested that Timon fr. 49 Wachsmuth ridiculed compounds such as these), so that no detailed knowledge on Ovid’s part of Empedocles’ poem need be assumed—although such a knowledge is a likely inference from *Metamorphoses* 1.5–88.

ac de vitiis eiusmodi nec plura nec melius dici possunt quam a Caelio Rufo dicta sunt in ea contione cui titulus est "de aquis." quae nunc nos omnia simili licentia usurpata utinam non per offensas probaremus: inriguos agros, tabernas, cenacula etiam, corruptelas denique omnes perpetuis salientibus instructas invenimus.

The emphatic *nunc*, *nos*, and *simili* have been taken to mean that Frontinus is likening his own discoveries to those of Caelius. No one has observed that the sentence *quae nunc . . . invenimus* may be a direct quotation from Caelius' speech.

"Concerning misdemeanors of this sort nothing more nor better can be said than was said by Caelius Rufus." The *vitia eiusmodi* are those which Frontinus has summarized in the preceding sentences to account for large discrepancies in the available supply of water from various aqueducts. Foremost in importance, because it involved abuse of official responsibilities, was the *fraus aquariorum*, "quos aquas ex ductibus publicis in privatorum usus derivare deprehendimus" (75.2). Then there was impropriety on the part of landowners who had tapped the conduits for themselves: "formas rivorum perforant" (75.3). Alas, these were perennial problems. "Caelius Rufus had said the last word on that subject, but all the old abuses continued."¹ In the sentence which follows Frontinus points to another *vitium*, one which had developed out of inadequate record-keeping: "nam quod falsis titulis aliae pro aliis aquae erogabantur, etiam si inter leviora ceteris vitia, inter ea tamen quae emendationem videbantur exigere numerandum est" (76.4). An elaborate reference and emphatic rhetoric: the passage *ac de vitiis . . . invenimus* is more than a parenthetical comment to the effect that problems facing Frontinus were nothing new. It is the pointed flourish with which Frontinus concludes his disclosure of *fraus aquariorum*. *Nam quod* introduces a matter which is trivial in relation.

Nec plura readily suggests that Frontinus refers to Caelius' speech as a whole, *nec melius* a compliment to the exhaustive and thorough rehearsal of abuses which Frontinus himself has only touched upon. Yet Frontinus is no name-dropper, and the precision of his reference is very striking. I should therefore prefer to take *nec plura . . . possunt* as an economical equivalent to *nec plura dicenda sunt nec melius dicere possum*: "Nothing more need be said, nor can I say it better." For an author then not to give a direct quotation is impossibly tantalizing. If

¹ M. D. Reeve, "Back to the Source," *LCM* 6.5 (1981) 141, a note restoring the transmitted reading (*si inter*, not *sunt*) at *Aq.* 76.3.

Frontinus finds himself unable to convey the situation in a more vivid and convincing manner, the reader expects, even deserves, to hear the authoritative words of Caelius. With an opener as affirmative as this, it would have been otiose to add a conventional signal for direct quotation (e.g. *cuius haec sunt verba*).² *Nec plura* on this view anticipates the emphatic brevity of the quotation, *nec melius* its contemporary validity.

Look more closely at *quae nunc . . . invenimus*. What is the antecedent of *quae omnia usurpata*? If the words are Frontinus' own, they look most naturally to *vitiis*, especially in light of *leviora ceteris vitia* in the subsequent sentence.³ But *vitia usurpata* is not quite Latin, and—especially with *usurpata* (sc. *esse*)—there is a certain awkwardness in taking *quae omnia* as a generalizing plural, standing for the circumstances Frontinus has just delineated. If, on the other hand, this is a quotation, syntactical precision is not essential, for the sense emerges unambiguous from the context into which Frontinus has chosen to insert the quotation and from the series of instances which follows (*inriguos agros . . . invenimus*).

Use of the first person (*nos, probaremus, invenimus*) proves nothing as to authorship, but *nunc* and *simili* are potentially troublesome. Improprieties in Frontinus' day were indeed similar to those with which Caelius had grappled. But Caelius was not the first Roman magistrate to take action against fraud and abuse in the administration of the public water supply. Elsewhere Frontinus tells us that the task of putting an end to *fraudes privatorum* was part of a senatorial mandate given to the praetor Marcius Rex in 144 B.C. (7.1). Earlier still, the censors of 184 had concerned themselves with the same issue: Livy 39.44.4 "aquam publicam in privatum aedificium aut agrum fluentem ademerunt"; Plut. *Cato maior* 19.1 οἱ τὸ παραρρέον δημόσιον ὕδωρ ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἀπήγον εἰς οἰκίας ἰδίας καὶ κήπους. It was no doubt in this connection that Cato spoke *de aqua* against L. Furius (Serv. *ad Aen.* 4.244; cf. Livy 39.42.6). Caelius, in 50 B.C., might very plausibly have rehearsed the precedents for his own actions; he may even have culled some choice phrases from Cato's speech. *Nunc* and *simili*, then, fail to prove that these are Frontinus' words; rhetorical effectiveness is

² Cf. *Aq.* 94.3 *haec enim sunt verba eius legis*, 97.5 *adiectum est ita*, 99.5 *quod infra scriptum est*, 103.5 *cuius haec verba sunt*, 105.5 *senatus consulto quod subiectum est* (similarly 107.3, 110.2, 124.4, 126.6), 128.4 *subscripsi verba legis*. For indirect citations Frontinus uses *apud . . . legimus* with or. obl. (7.4, 97.2).

³ *Thes. L.L.* IX/2, 494.43f.

indeed enhanced if Frontinus took the passage verbatim from Caelius' *contio*.

Usurpata 'unlawfully assumed' and *offensa* 'misdemeanor' or 'infraction' might seem inappropriate to Republican Latin. For readers in Frontinus' time, to be sure, the sentence could mean "We wish there were some way other than by pointing out flagrant transgressions (*per offensas*) to prove that all such things are now illegally practiced (*usurpata*) with comparable license." Surely, though, it runs more smoothly if the key words carry less restricted senses: "We wish there were some way other than by provoking indignant reactions (*per offensas*⁴) to prove that all such things are now habitually practiced (*usurpata*) with comparable impunity (*licentia*)."

The attitude of the ancients was unequivocal (*Aq.* 94.3-4): "apud antiquos omnis aqua in usus publicos erogabatur et cautum ita fuit 'ne quis privatus aliam ducat quam quae ex lacu humum accidit.' . . . et haec ipsa non in alium usum quam in balnearum et fullonicarum dabatur, eratque vectigalis statuta mercede quae in publicum penderetur." As for watering fields, "agri vero qui aqua publica contra legem essent inrigati publicabantur" (97.3). Taverns, garrets, and places still worse had not the slightest right to deliveries of public water. The crescendo of righteous indignation (*tabernas, cenacula, corruptelas . . . omnes*) is most unlike Frontinus: note the less vivid *omnibus negotiationibus* (115.3) and the impatient but more dignified *balneis ac fullonibus et relatu quoque foedis ministeriis* (91.5), used for circumstances Frontinus had investigated for himself. Unbashful vigor would better suit Caelius.

Nor are details inconsistent, though none is in itself decisive. *Tabernas* reminds us that Caelius squabbled with *tabernarii* as well as *aquarii*.⁵ *Perpetuis salientibus* finds its closest parallel (*perpetuum salientem*) in a phrase ascribed to Caelius by the compiler of *De Dubiis*

⁴ Frontinus uses *per offensas* in precisely the same way at the close of his treatise (perhaps a deliberate echo of the present passage): *Aq.* 130.4 "in reliquos vero opto ne executio legis necessaria sit, cum officii fidem etiam per offensas tueri praestiterit." I cheerfully concede that this parallel can easily be used to argue for Frontinus, not Caelius, at 76.2.

⁵ Shackleton Bailey (on *Fam.* 8.6.4) observes that Caelius' dealings with *tabernarii* may have been over weights and measures. The *aquarii* presumably are neighborhood officials; cf. Frontinus 97.8 "aediles curules iubebantur per vicos singulos ex iis qui in unoquoque vico habitarent praediave haberent binos praeficere, quorum arbitratu aqua in publico saliret."

Nominibus (Keil, *G.L.* V, 590.21).⁶ The sense in which *corruptelas* is used may exemplify archaizing cleverness or urbane crudeness:⁷ either was typical of Caelius' style. Finally, although *instructās invēnīmūs* is beyond reproach, the clausula could be *instructās invēnīmūs*, revealing a present tense which would be unique in Frontinus' reports of his own discoveries.⁸

Nec plura nec melius dici possunt: I should like to believe that Frontinus found in Caelius' speech a passage succinct and quotable, so appropriate in fact that it has passed unquestioned as Frontinus' own.

R. H. RODGERS

NEW HAVEN, VERMONT



⁶ Peter *HRR* I, 164 no. 61 doubtfully ascribes this to the historian Coelius Antipater (cf. *OLD* s.v. 'saliens'). Meyer *ORF* 473 accepts the *De Aquis* of Caelius Rufus.

⁷ Cf. *Thes. L.L.* IV, 1063.74ff.

⁸ Note especially 23.2, 64.1-4, 112.2, 115.3, 130.2-3. The present is used to state general truths (e.g. 34.5, 112.4) and for reference to documents or sources (e.g. 7.4, 10.2, 11.1, 95.2, 96, 109.4).

REVIEWS

DONALD KAGAN. *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1981. Pp. 393. \$25.00.

This book consists of fourteen chapters, divided into two parts, and an unnumbered chapter called "Conclusions." The first part deals with "The Unraveling of the Peace." The second part, comprising chapters 7-14, presents "The Sicilian Expedition." There are twelve maps, a bibliography, and three indexes.

The prose is easy to read. Mostly the narrative expands the information provided by Thucydides, supplementing it with items from Plutarch and Diodorus, and the manner is reminiscent of a more leisurely age. There is charm in such sentences as: "Rarely have men been more weighted down in mind and spirit than this miserable remnant of the proud and confident forces that had sailed from Athens" (337). On problems of historical reconstruction Kagan is usually content to choose judiciously between the views of his predecessors. He pauses frequently to assess the wisdom of the policies and strategies pursued.

He argues that the Athenians were mistaken in concluding the peace of Nicias and the ensuing alliance with Sparta. These agreements, he maintains, brought disadvantages to Athens and benefits to Sparta. He holds that the peace was bound to break down. "There was little, if any, goodwill on which to build an enduring peace" (30). He refrains from inquiring into the responsibility of the various participants for the failure of the peace, and he fails to note the perhaps paradoxical originality of Thucydides' claim that the events of all twenty-seven years constituted a single war. Probably the most memorable conclusion emerging from the first part of the book is that the talents displayed by Alcibiades in the early years of his active career were diplomatic but not strategic.

Inaccuracies on matters of detail are infrequent but serious. For the constitution of Corinth in 395 Kagan (36) draws on Nicolaus of Damascus fr. 60. That fragment describes the regime installed on the overthrow of the Cypselids but does not say how long the same condition was preserved. For the ostracism of Hyperbolus Kagan accepts C. Fuqua's date of 416; he does not explain how *ἐξωστράκισαν τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἐξ ἔτη* (Theopompus fr. 96b) can be construed to mean: "they ostracized Hyperbolus for the standard term of ten years and he died in the sixth." Kagan (p. 295, cf. 195) mentions Charicles as one of the men commissioned to inquire into the mutilation of the Hermae and adds in a footnote: "And. 1.36, where he is also called an extreme democrat." In fact Andocides says that Charicles "seemed at that time to be very well disposed towards the people." Of the Melians Kagan (148) says: "the Athenians included them on their tribute lists beginning in 425." They were included on an assessment list or lists but not on a quota list.

Those who lack leisure may content themselves with reading the final chapter, "Conclusions," where the characteristic ideas of the book are presented and developed. Kagan argues with subtlety that Thucydides's narrative of the Sicilian expedition invites an interpretation diverging from the one which Thucydides himself offered. When the assembled Athenians first resolved to send an expedition, they decided to despatch a force no greater than their total forces sent to Sicily during the Archidamian War and their objectives were correspondingly limited. Alcibiades planned, now and later, to rely on his diplomatic talents and win over Sicilian cities. But four days later, when the assembly met again, Nicias tried to deter the Athenians by magnifying the force required for success. The Athenians responded by voting a massive expedition. The very size of this force frustrated diplomatic approaches to Sicilian cities, for these regarded Syracusan ambitions as a less formidable evil. The strategy which might still have succeeded was that of Lamachus (Thucydides 6.49; cf. 7.42.3), to make an immediate attack on Syracuse. Indeed late in 415 Nicias defeated the Syracusans outside the city, but he failed to follow up his victory because he lacked cavalry. He had not asked the Athenians for cavalry, when preparations were under consideration. Kagan suggests that this error was "more a failure of purpose than of judgment" (242). In tracing the subsequent development of the siege he stresses the errors of Nicias. He finds that Thucydides's interpretation on the other hand attributes less blame to Nicias than was deserved and that it points to another culprit: "Thucydides wants his reader to understand that the main cause of the disaster was the post-Periclean democracy, unchecked by the wise restraining leadership of a powerful and intelligent statesman, misled by thoughtless and ambitious demagogues, abandoned therefore to its own ignorance, greed, superstition, and fear" (371).

This thesis is impressive. It leads one to ask how Kagan understands the political forces at work in Athens. In the preface he undertakes "to reveal, especially, the close relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy," but in this respect the book is weak. Kagan does not inquire into the nature of the groupings whose interaction resulted in decisions of the Athenian assembly. He believes that there was an "aggressive faction" or "war faction" (61-62). On the other side he presents "the peace forces" (50) or "the friends of peace" (92). He appears to believe that there were two and only two "factions" in Athens, for commenting on the destruction of the Melians he says (153): "Nothing in the ancient record reveals that either Athenian faction opposed the growing frightfulness of war." Kagan does not say how the reader is to conceive an Athenian "faction"; does "faction" mean merely those who voted one way on a particular issue in the assembly, or does Kagan suppose that members of a "faction" met together beforehand and made plans? The latter alternative is more likely, for in reporting a meeting of the assembly in 415 Kagan says (186) that Nicias "appears to have made no preliminary arrangements with supporters." Perhaps, then, a "faction" could make preliminary arrangements. Be that as it may, one may ask what, if anything, the "factions" had to do with the groupings which took part in the ostracism of Hyperbolus. As Kagan (146) recognizes, Alcibiades approached Nicias and "their combined forces guaranteed success against Hyperbolus." This incident implies the existence of groups constituted by ties of a more personal nature than mere

devotion to the cause of peace or war. The groups implied resemble those recognized by Thucydides at 8.54.4 (cf. 65.2); each of these existed for the purpose of helping its own members against the other groups in the rivalry of law-suits and elections. Kagan discusses these groups in connection with the scandals of 415 and repeats two venerable misunderstandings: "The clubs were secret societies" and "most seem to have leaned toward oligarchy" (205). But a group which helped its members in Athenian law-suits and elections could not remain secret, and oligarchic consequences only came about when Peisander persuaded the groups to move from competition to collaboration.

RAPHAEL SEALEY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

WESLEY D. SMITH. *The Hippocratic Tradition*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 264. \$12.95.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the medical consumer has begun to express a growing unease concerning the manner and method of medicine. On the one hand, he stands in appropriate gratitude for continued improvements in surgery, pharmacology, and public health; yet on the other hand, he has started loudly to voice a discontent and anger over the staggering costs and apparent inhumanity of medical care, operating in seeming contradiction to venerated models inherited from classical antiquity. Medicine is in the beginning stages of another fundamental 'revolution' as it wrestles with the implications of genetic engineering and numerous other technical matters, as well as the basic questions of doctor-patient relationships. A century hence, students of the late twentieth century will make note of this shifting, much as medical historians have often noted the remarkable transition in the late nineteenth century of medicine from its Hippocratic and Galenic heritages to a medicine—in both theory and practice—dominated by the germ theory and medical technology. No longer useful were the intellectual constructs of a humoral pathology since one could presume a physical and measurable cause for specific diseases, and once laboratory pharmacology added its technology, the development of 'magic bullets' followed soon through chemistry and microbiology. The New Medicine of the twentieth century had forsaken its classical bearings, even though physicians and organized medicine continued to espouse the so-called "Hippocratic ideal." Curiously enough, until very recently, the consuming public liked what it heard, and medical history also reflected that acceptance, as it sought the "heroes of medicine" as forerunners of the splendid new approach of the heady and optimistic twentieth century.

It is in view of this underlying historic context that Smith has written his book, even though his subject is the intellectual history of medicine in classical antiquity. More accurately, the focus of this important study is how idealism has warped the view of medicine and medical systems of the past since Galen's own time, and thus Smith's arrangement of the sections of the volume makes good sense as he leads the reader carefully through a complicated series of textual questions, not surprisingly controversial far beyond the confines of classical scholarship or even the broader fields of the History of Medicine.

Smith sees the beginning of modern Hippocratism naturally enough in the Renaissance, and Paracelsus' fulminations against holdover scholastic medicine provide convenient statements to document an early sixteenth-century creation of the Hippocratic ideal. Even though Paracelsus only generalized about how Hippocrates studied Nature in the pursuit of excellence in medical dietetics and therapy—and as Smith shows, Paracelsus made his sweeping judgments on the basis of Latin, not Greek texts—the influence of this approach to the ancients was almost immediate. Smith could have adduced similar techniques in the writings of Vesalius, Fuchs, Mattioli, and many other figures in sixteenth-century medicine, anatomy, and medical botany: reaction is particularly strong against parroting authority *qua* authority, and "Galenists" and "Galenism" were current and logical targets of the medical humanists. If there is an internal weakness in the methodology followed by Smith in *Hippocratic Tradition*, it is the lack of social, political, and technological context for the success of humanistic reaction against a "medieval" Galenism: if one is to comprehend the rapid changes overtaking medicine in the European Renaissance, there is a necessity to consider the new technologies of typography, book manufacture, and woodcut illustration, as well as the political and social setting of medicine in northern Italy, Switzerland, and southern Germany in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. But Smith has a clear and reasonable goal: to delineate the origins and cumulative impact of a new Hippocratism in medical practice, and how the intellectual history of the development of European Hippocratism can elucidate why students of ancient medicine (whether physicians or classical scholars) believed in a "good" Hippocrates and a "bad" Galen.

Hippocratic Tradition shows, first, how nineteenth-century French and German historians of medicine portrayed 'a' Hippocrates as the ideal physician, and how the same historians could logically downgrade Galen to the rank of compiler, especially in view of the numerous statements of Galen himself that proved he was simply a follower of the Great Coan. Moreover, as Smith deftly wends his way through the intellectual *milieu* of Littré and the re-discovery of Hippocrates earlier in the seventeenth century by Thomas Sydenham, there slowly emerges a picture of scholarship on ancient medicine in which Hippocrates *had* to exist and who was required to be the Father of Medicine—all in spite of the extant texts in a collection of books under the name of Hippocrates and in contradiction to the statements of Galen, who had used the Hippocratic ideal for his own purposes. Yet Smith is no ordinary debunker: we read accurate summaries of the scholarly labors of Le Clerc, Boerhaave, Sprengel, Neuburger, Wellmann, Blass, Ilberg, Edelstein, Deichgräber, and many others, as each scholar (several were classical scholars as well as physicians) sought either to elaborate upon the divine Hippocrates or to account for the collapse of the "genuine" writings in the face of the discovery of fragments of Meno's tract in papyrus late in the nineteenth century. Smith is gentle and respectful as he notes flaws in all such scholarship as it proved what it wanted to prove: that ancient Greek medicine was a superb—albeit primitive—mirror of the best in modern medicine, an idealized system of diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment that gave comfort and reassurance to practicing physicians even as they were moving inexorably into the New Medicine of antiseptic surgery, anesthesia,

microbes, and an organic chemistry marshalled for the extirpation of man's most ancient enemies among the epidemic diseases. *Hippocratic Tradition* presents many aspects of how and why physicians clung to an ideal that could not fit into a modern world of nerve gas, atom bombs and space shuttles, and Smith proposes answers to these important questions through the skilled employment of classical philology. There is no quickie sociology here, no inane structuralism that somehow explains everything with a deceiving and deceptive simplicity, and best of all, no assumption that any single Hippocratic or Galenic tract can truly illustrate the "real" Hippocrates. Smith insists that a patient reading of the works in the Hippocratic *corpus*, as well as the multitudinous statements and arguments by Galen concerning what Hippocrates said or did not say, or what he meant or did not mean, will tell us more about medicine and its theoretical assumptions in ancient Greece and Rome than any modern hypothesis that rests on only one or two, or even several dozen, treatises found under the names of Hippocrates and Galen.

But did the historical Hippocrates write any of the tracts in the collection known as the Hippocratic *corpus*? Hippocrates is attested well enough in the famous passages in Plato's *Phaedrus*, 270c-d, but the "genuine works" have eluded precise identification even after Littré proposed a quasi-canonical listing that would include the Hippocratic *Epidemics* I and III, *Prognostic*, *Airs Waters Places*, *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, and *Ancient Medicine*. Smith shows, in particular, the circular reasoning that led Littré to assume *Ancient Medicine* as a work by Hippocrates: Littré had taken Galen's arguments on the presumably Hippocratic *Nature of Man*, and turned them upside down, to suggest that the inductive method in *Ancient Medicine* is what is reflected as Plato describes the approaches of Hippocrates. And as Smith notes, Littré had to assume that the *corpus* of Hippocratic works as we have them were assembled sometime in the third century B.C., most probably at Ptolemaic Alexandria. Basic for any conclusions about the "genuine works of Hippocrates" were the judgments of Galen, coupled with the assessments of Erotian. It was quite sad, as Littré admitted, that the 'History of Medicine' as compiled by Meno, a student of Aristotle, had been lost, but since it was no longer extant, one could assume that the account of Meno must have been available to scholars from the fourth century B.C., and that assumptions about genuineness found in Erotian and Galen were founded upon Meno. When fragments of the lost 'history' by Meno were recovered from an Egyptian papyrus in 1891 (and published in 1893 by Hermann Diels), the elaborate superstructure of "genuine works by Hippocrates" was easily demolished, even though Diels advanced a weak argument that the Meno text (called the *Anonymus Londinensis*) did show a compilation of the Hippocratic *Breaths*. *Anonymus* shortly caused scholars to give up on their efforts to prove genuine works, but they clung to Littré's notion that Hippocrates was the founder of "scientific" medicine. Aside from concocting a clearly separate Cnidian tradition, which would mark Coan medical science that much more, the general view of "genuine works" was best summarized by Ludwig Edelstein, who argued for a Hippocratic mythology and that the actual works had been lost.

Smith now proposes a radical thesis, based upon close analysis of *Phaedrus*, *Anonymus Londinensis*, and the Hippocratic *Breaths* and *Regimen*: the

Regimen is a genuine work, supported by both Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Anonymus Londinensis*, with the crucial passages in *Anonymus* V, 35 and 44, and VI, 4, 7, and 11, as compared with *Regimen* 56, 74 and 75 (Littré, VI, 568–70 and 614–16). Added are reflections Smith sees in Plato's *Timaeus*, 84d–85c when compared with *Anonymus* XVII and XVIII, and then linked with the *Phaedrus* and the earlier sections of Hippocrates' doctrines in *Anonymus* V and VI. Smith's reading of the Greek is defensible, and the parallels adduced are reasonable, but one must accept the notion that the Aristotelian *perisomata* of Meno is a kind of refinement of the broader concept of *anathymiaseis* (e.g. in *Parts of Animals* 686b34–35), and that one can tie both the narrow meaning and its wider parent with the Hippocratic *physai*. Ingenious. If one accepts the basic premise that Meno "... made up a line of reasoning for Hippocrates in a manner similar to that of the master himself, Aristotle ..." (*Hippocratic Tradition*, p. 56), then Smith has constructed an argument for the authorship of the *Regimen* supported by the texts. But if one does *not* accept this underlying assumption, then Smith's construct for the genuineness of the *Regimen* is no more valid than the earlier hopes of Littré and Diels, not to mention Francis Adams in the mid-nineteenth century, who yearned for the solid proof of a Hippocrates who wrote something we can read and who can be cited as the Father of Medicine. It seems, however, that Smith has reached his conclusion concerning the *Regimen* not from any desire to make modern medical practitioners more comfortable, or to preserve some shadow of a "real" Hippocrates so beloved in the general histories of medicine, but from a careful reading of the Greek texts in the Hippocratic *corpus* as well as the fundamental testimony in *Anonymus*. It is possible that Smith may be right, but classical scholars and medical historians will be forced to do what Smith has done, either to disprove or support this new hypothesis: read the Greek texts. A fruitful beginning by a skeptic of the "Smith hypothesis" would be to find out if the Hippocratic works show a common occurrence of the Aristotelian *anathymiaseis*, and if other contextual arguments can be made in other Hippocratic treatises. It is certain, however one may react to this initial proposal by Smith about *Regimen* that the arguments themselves are sound, and that anyone wishing to test them must have the Greek texts in hand and—most importantly—comprehend them in the full context of the Hippocratic *corpus*, as Smith has demonstrated.

Although Smith's suggestions for the Hippocratic *Regimen* will engender the most debate among specialists in ancient medical history, the centerpiece of *Hippocratic Tradition* is the lengthy, complicated, and very readable second chapter, "Galen's Hippocratism." Too often ignored are the fulsome and extended commentaries by Galen on works he presumed Hippocratic, and as a medical practitioner and scholar, he fashioned a Hippocrates and Hippocratism that suited his own image of himself as well as what he thought a good clinician should be. Galen's teachers figure importantly, not simply as potted mini-biographies in a build up for the flowering of Galen's self-asserted genius, but as pieces of the intellectual whole that would result in the self-contradictions in the enormous mass of Galenic writing that has come down to us. Smith does not attempt to explain away or smooth over these shifts of opinion, as too many medical historians have done when confronted by the bulk and arrogance of Galen's polymathic command of medicine, philosophy, and the sciences of

his day, but we gain a perceptive view of a Galen who assumed that the Hippocrates of old must have been like he was, since medicine demanded a knowledge of philosophical tenets, clear logic, clinical experience, and dissections buttressed by some sort of overriding theory that would make teleological sense. Smith's Galen emerges with all of the sharp edges and occasional insights that marked his models, Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Now that we possess excellent texts of Galen's *Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (ed. Philip De Lacy [CMG, 1978 and 1980]) and *Prognosis* (ed. Vivian Nutton [CMG, 1979]), we can profitably reflect how Smith's Galen nicely matches the chalcenteric and jagged Galen in the texts and translations of Nutton and De Lacy. Looming, of course, is the question of just how many of the works under the name of Galen are indeed "genuine," but Smith has provided some excellent guidelines and probing questions to ask of the Greek texts, when medical historians begin to divest Galen of his mythologies.

Galen's Alexandrian heritages complete this pioneering study, and in company with P. M. Fraser's normally careful account (*Ptolemaic Alexandria* [Oxford 1972], esp. Vol. I, pp. 338-76), the medical historian and classicist now has a picture of Alexandrian medicine consistent with the extant sources, stripped for the most part of the hoary mythologies that teem in the usual history of medicine. Asclepiades of Bithynia is rightly seen as a bond between Alexandrian medicine and the version of medicine and medical theory that became prominent in the late Roman Republic, and as mirrored in the *De medicina* of Celsus, composed sometime before A.D. 37. *Hippocratic Tradition* is a true pathfinding book, replete with sources and questions about those sources, and Smith has signaled the methodology and probably the direction which the current and lively activity in the scholarship on Greek and Roman medicine will follow.

JOHN SCARBOROUGH

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

SANDER M. GOLDBERG. *The Making of Menander's Comedy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980. Pp. vi + 148. \$20.00.

As many learned who attended the recent production in Princeton of Euripides' *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, the text of a play resembles nothing so much as a score of music: we can read it, we can edit it, but sooner or later we want to see how it works when it is played on the stage. Our opinion of any drama can be substantially changed by seeing it performed. Sander Goldberg's book, a revision of his 1977 dissertation (Indiana University), brings this perspective to the comedies of Menander. He seeks to show "how Menander's plays worked on the stage as plays" (v). Like J. L. Styan (*The Elements of Drama*, 1960), Michael Goldman (*Shakespeare and the Energies of Drama*, 1972), and of course Oliver Taplin (*Greek Tragedy in Action*, 1979) Goldberg believes that "a text is really only part of a play. There are also details of actual production—staging, delivery, and the like—and . . . there is the effect the play aimed to have on its audience" (5). The aim of his book is "to bring the plays to life, to identify the

techniques that make them work as plays and to demonstrate the vast potential of the ancient tradition that was to grow in so many different directions" (12). He bases his study on five plays: *Aspis*, *Perikeiromene*, *Epitrepontes*, *Samia*, and *Dyskolos*.

We have enough of Menander's Greek to get an excellent idea about how individual scenes and even more substantial parts of his plays worked. We can detect immense variety and a development over his career. But anyone working through Sandbach's OCT and the Gomme-Sandbach commentary might well ask whether it is possible to write the same kind of book about Menander that Michael Goldman wrote about Shakespeare or that Oliver Taplin wrote about Greek tragedy. A lengthy fragment like the *Aspis* reveals a theatrical genius at work, but a performable script stops with Smikrines' lines at 465–68 and trails off with only parts of lines; e.g., Kleostratos' speech at 491 ff. (ὦ φιλότῳτη [γῆ . . . προσεύχομαι . . . πόλλ' ὄν σέ. κ.τ.λ.]). This is not enough for translators to play with or actors to act with. Save for the *Dyskolos* and *Samia*, how can we ever hope to know what Menander's comedy was like, in action?

The important achievement of Goldberg's book is that he does indeed succeed in showing how Menander's comedies worked on stage. He gives us a strong sense of the complete plays they originally were, not the shreds and tatters they have become. He is imaginative, yet sensible about what remains for him to work with. He uses the plays that are too fragmentary to be performed as texts to illustrate different aspects of Menander's dramatic technique. He then brings what he learns from those pieces and fragments of plays to the two texts which are performable: the complete *Dyskolos* and the *Samia*, which is complete enough to be performed, and a better play.

The book's seven chapters are intelligently organized and written so that anyone can follow; readers will be reminded of K. J. Dover's *Aristophanic Comedy* (1972), a book whose breadth and erudition influences this one. Two introductory chapters give a rapid introduction to the subject. The first, "From Old Comedy to New", is actually broader in its scope than the title suggests; Goldberg has as much to say about Menander, Molière, and Shaw as he does about Menander and Aristophanes. He also explains the importance of metrics, and he even manages an amusing crash-course in papyrology, in translation, to give readers a clear sense of just how Menander reaches us, and what problems the editor and critic of Menander must contend with (10–11).

Chapter II, "Mapping the Terrain", outlines his critical method. At first glance the plots and the stock characters of New Comedy may seem to have little variety. Although names and places may change, we seem to encounter the same family structure, intrigue, and illusion. But New Comedy is more complex than that. Goldberg sees three sources of creative variation constantly at work in Menander, all three of which he argues are the reason for his high reputation in antiquity as an equal even to Homer: a "mixture of modes," or "... the complex of devices and diction with their attendant connotations that in the drama of Menander's time was characteristic of either tragedy or comedy and thus either serious or light" (22). Secondly, he distinguishes between the plot of a comedy and the situations from which that plot is built. The plot is defined as "the succession of situations that makes the individual play . . . situation is the arrangement of chessmen at a given moment, plot is

the sequence of moves that constitutes the actual game" (25). Finally, there is an "alteration of elements familiar from the tradition," such as gatekeeper scenes and delayed prologues. Goldberg then turns to an analysis of Menander's comedies with these "tools," "the same tools used in the making of it" (28).

The *Aspis* illustrates mixture of serious and light modes. For Goldberg, it is a play "unique and therefore interesting to an audience, by its contrast in tone" (41). He sees the play as one "whose extremely successful theatricality comes from the blend of humour, pathos, and sophisticated parody made possible by the skillful mixture of modes" (43). *Perikeiromene* is used to draw the obvious but important distinction between stock situations and Menander's manipulation of them in a plot: "By distinguishing between his situations, which are standard for his genre, and his plots, which are determined by his own ordering of them, we can articulate the source of his diversity and his reputation as a constructor of plots" (57-58). The *Epitrepontes* illustrates Menander's refashioning of the recognition scene from tragedy and Old Comedy: ". . . Menander chooses to utilize the emotional potential more characteristic of tragedy, and his technical problem then becomes one of manipulating his comic structure to support his seriousness . . . this makes for a play rich in texture and original in structure" (71).

These preliminary discussions lead to the two chapters on the most substantial surviving plays, *Dyskolos* ("a play of combinations") and *Samia* ("a play of successful combinations"). Goldberg has a fine and sensitive reading to offer for both works. Chapters VI and VII are the richest part of his book, although I would not advise readers to dip into it without a glance at what precedes. The comparison of the *Dyskolos* and *Samia* is especially good: "The pain of characters in the *Dyskolos* was largely external, caused by working in a field or falling down a well. Hints of mental turmoil are subordinate and, as we have seen, resolved mechanically. Unease in the *Samia* is internal. Moschion's reluctance to tell the truth and Demeas' misapprehension and fear for their relationship generate the action and control its direction from within" (107).

Goldberg ends by turning to Aristophanes of Byzantium's familiar rhetorical question, here rendered "Menander and life, which of you imitated which?" Modern discussions that draw on ancient *obiter dicta* are not always welcome or new; one thinks of the many times Quintilian's report card on the Latin elegiac poets has been put to use. But this is a persuasive discussion of just how much "life" we are to read into Aristophanes' ὅ . . . βίη: not as much as we might think. "Our perception of a scene as 'lifelike' is . . . actually a response to specific features chosen for their ability to evoke the whole" (119). "Only a small piece of life is imitated on Menander's stage, and only a small piece is necessary. Our own response does the rest" (121). He concludes that "Menander's originality lies not primarily in the building blocks of his comedy, for these lay at hand in the tradition, but in his use of them" (121). *The Making of Menander's Comedy* does indeed help us see what Menander's comedies are like, in action.

JAMES TATUM

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

G. E. M. DE STE. CROIX. *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1981. Pp. xi + 732. \$49.50.

This book is one of the most exciting, provocative and challenging works on ancient history to have appeared in recent times, and is of immense importance to all historians of the Graeco-Roman world. Ste. Croix has written from the unshakeable conviction that historical change in antiquity can be explained only through Marxist categories of analysis, a flagrantly controversial starting point which at once threatens to upset much received opinion. Ste. Croix is not even prepared to present his ideological position as one of a number of alternatives from which historical explanation, as opposed to historical description, can be derived. Rather, he castigates all other methods of analysis, and some of their most distinguished practitioners, with polemic and humour, using his own interpretation of Marx to give a highly personal yet simultaneously objective (no paradox; cf. p. 31) analysis of changes in the Greek world from the archaic period through the seventh century A.D. I doubt that Ste. Croix will convert the whole profession to his cause. But because of the great wealth of insights brought to bear on a multiplicity of topics, no one in the future will be able to neglect the book and its major theme, the exploitation by a propertied elite of the bulk of the ancient population.

The chronological sweep of the book is vast: in pursuing the study of historical change Ste. Croix has no hesitation in dealing at one fell swoop with the age of Greek tyrants and the classical Greek era, the Hellenistic world and the rise and fall of Rome's empire. (Despite the formal exclusion of the Roman West there is as much in the book for the historian of Rome as of Greece.) Consequently I cannot attempt here to summarize all the author's findings (Ste. Croix conveniently presents a conspectus of the book on pp. 3-7). Instead I shall first notice a handful of topics where his treatment appears inadequate, and then I shall make a few comments, inevitably superficial in view of the limitations of space, on the overall methodology. Any criticisms offered, however, should not be understood to detract from the book's overall merits.

To begin, Ste. Croix clearly views democracy as a force which mitigates exploitation and he thus holds in high regard the democracy of classical Athens (pp. 283 ff.). The subsequent movement towards absolutist government in the Hellenistic and Roman ages marks for him an unpalatable development. Nothing is said, however, about Athenian imperialism (cf. p. 603, n. 26), an important omission despite reference to *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1972) 34-49 etc., for, given the lack of attention to Athens' brutal suppression of various of its allies and to the dependent problem of reconciling internal equality with external domination, Athenian democracy assumes here, to my mind, far too favorable an aura. (At pp. 345-46 Ste. Croix is overly defensive.) Secondly, in his discussion of the development of slavery at Rome (pp. 228 ff; cf. p. 452), Ste. Croix takes a largely conventional view of slave breeding, more pronounced under the Empire than under the Republic as warfare ceased to provide sufficient numbers of slaves, but with the perceptive modification that breeding adversely affected servile labor performance. However, the conventional view may now well require some adjustment in light of

the demonstration of the importance under the Empire of the regular slave trade (W. V. Harris, "Towards a Study of the Roman Slave Trade," *MAAR* 36 [1980] 117-40); and I see no reason why a view that slave girls born in urban households at Rome under the early Empire were siphoned off to farms in order to provide labor and future wives for farm slaves should not have applied much earlier in time (Susan Treggiari, "Family Life among the Staff of the Volusii," *TAPA* 105 [1975] 393-410; cf. also "Questions on Women Domestics in the Roman West," in *Schiavitù, manomissione e classi dipendenti nel mondo antico* [Rome 1979] 185-201). Inter al., App. BC 1.7 is not discussed in the context of breeding (not defined) under the Republic (cf. p. 208), though as early as Plautus (*Merc.* 509), shepherding could be assumed a traditional occupation for slave women. Next, following A. H. M. Jones, Ste. Croix is sceptical about the use of the Roman imperial coinage as an instrument of propaganda (p. 394), perhaps excessively so. When the rebel slave leader Eunus minted a coin in Sicily showing Demeter and proclaiming himself 'King Antiochus' (Greenidge and Clay, p. 284), it must be assumed that its 'message' was intended for all social ranks. It is no less plausible that later emperors expected and desired their achievements, real or imagined, to be communicated to their subjects, and that both coin types and legends were carefully selected and comprehensible (cf. Luke 20.24-25).

Each historian, then, will find matters which call for further debate or amendment (the recent findings of J. H. D'Arms, *Commerce and Social Standing at Rome* [Cambridge, Mass. 1981] may well affect Ste. Croix's ideas at p. 178 and elsewhere, to give another example). But such disagreements of emphasis or interpretation do not affect Ste. Croix's basic conceptual framework (stated in the first part of the book, in contrast to the more practical second part), in which the key items are his understanding of 'class' and 'class struggle.' Since Marx himself did not provide formal definitions of these terms, Ste. Croix has to extrapolate his own from Marx's writings and in so doing he makes a contribution not least to Marxist historiography. The definitions are straightforwardly set out at pp. 43-44:

1. "*Class* (essentially a relationship) is the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation . . .", which is "the appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others . . ."

2. "*A class* . . . is a group of persons in a community identified by their position in the whole system of social production, defined above all according to their relationship . . . to the conditions of production . . . and to other classes"

3. "*class struggle* . . . the fundamental relationship between classes . . . involving essentially exploitation, or resistance to it."

The immediate question, then, is whether these categories offer a useful tool for historical analysis. In my view, a great weakness in the definition of class arises at once from Ste. Croix's exclusion of class consciousness as a necessary ingredient of it (recognized but not conceded, p. 57): "The individuals constituting a given class may or *may not* be wholly or partly conscious of their own identity and common interests as a class, and they may or *may not* feel antagonism towards members of other classes as such" (p. 44, my emphasis). Again, the class struggle "does not necessarily involve collective action by a class as

such . . ." (p. 44). Any observable group, therefore, no matter what the differentials within it, can be categorized as a class by Ste. Croix, as for instance women (see 98 ff.), because its members can be shown to have been subjected to exploitation. (Contrast Carl N. Degler, *At Odds* [New York 1980] 323: "Class . . . acts as a divisive force for [women] as it has not for blacks nor for immigrant groups . . . The history of women's organizations in the early 20th century, as well as the history of more recent women's groups, suggests that the ideal of a bond of sisterhood that transcends the divisions between working class and middle class women is a utopian conception, however appealing and even essential the idea may appear to many women.") Because the tendency of some women in modern Western society increasingly to think of themselves as a cohesive, homogeneous bloc has no counterpart in antiquity, this absence of class awareness, applicable also to slaves, makes the notion of class struggle hard to accept as fully as does Ste. Croix himself. On the basis of 3. above, one could, I think, reasonably assume that "struggle" (see also p. 339, "the really fundamental kind of antagonism in society" and p. 49, "a permanent feature of human society above primitive levels"), connotes a two-way process in which active participation in contention is identifiable on both sides. Certainly there are indications of active resistance from the oppressed against the privileged in antiquity, in the form of peasant uprisings, secessions, brigandage, servile revolts and fugitivism, etc., and I assume that the nature of the ancient literary evidence conceals much else of a similar kind that is simply not known. Yet the overwhelming impression with which I am left by Ste. Croix's book is that such resistance was exceptional, rather than sustained or permanent, and that in the main the "struggle" took the more common form of a one-way process in which the privileged ruthlessly victimized the lower social groups to their own advantage, without any significant concerted opposition making itself felt as an expression of class identity. (N.B. p. 286, with reference to the classical *polis*: "This struggle was of course very *one-sided*: it expressed the master's dominance . . ." [my emphasis].) How could it, indeed, when the absence of class homogeneity allowed such little potential for organized resistance? Moreover, it seems to me that the Roman slaveowning elite in particular, as part of a one-way operation, purposefully worked against the emergence of class feeling among slaves by allowing the latter access to a very wide range of occupations, the social consequence of which was fragmentation among the servile population at large. The forms of observable slave resistance, accordingly, do not have to be taken as symptoms of class struggle in a technical Marxist sense, only of individual, smallscale, or ad hoc protest, futile more often than not.

Thus the broadness and flexibility of Ste. Croix's definitions create some difficulties. His concept of a 'slave society,' to take another example, is very different from others recently expressed, in which stress has been laid primarily on the proportion of chattel slaves within an overall population (K. Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* [Cambridge 1978] 99-100; cf. M. I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* [New York 1980] 79-80); it is based on the negative idea of "unfree labour," i.e. "mainly that of slaves, although various forms of what we may properly call serfdom . . . and debt bondage," which was "widespread," have to be incorporated also (p. 226; cf. pp. 52, 173, 209). The

result is an antithesis only between rich and poor, antagonism between whom was of course recognized in antiquity itself, but for the historical explanation of which, again, Marxist categories are not necessarily applicable. In sum, therefore, the book is eminently successful in its demonstration of elite exploitation of dependent social groups, but I am not fully persuaded that Marxist class struggle has been revealed as the obligatory concomitant of that exploitation.

To what extent was exploitation conscious or unconscious on the part of the propertied elite? It would perhaps be too much to expect a simple answer to the question to prevail for all the historical situations with which Ste. Croix has dealt, and perhaps the truth lies anyway in a combination of motivations both perceived and unperceived by the elite. Nevertheless, Ste. Croix deals with the problem in equivocal fashion: at times he chooses language which unambiguously expresses deliberate intent on the elite's part to maintain its own supremacy; but elsewhere he is more sceptical, or less confident, speaking only of the effects of elite supremacy on the historical process (compare and contrast, for example, pp. 306, 461-62, 502). I am left with another impression, therefore, that while Ste. Croix has identified an interplay between varying conscious and unconscious processes, he has not achieved a fully coherent or consistent view of the whole. (I for one, however, would be prepared to believe that conscious manipulation by the elite was far more common than is usually imagined.) I think it should be added, too, that Ste. Croix's preoccupation with showing the superiority of his methodological approach over those of other historians produces a distorted picture of what others have achieved, particularly M. I. Finley (on slavery) and F. Millar (on the Roman emperor), two of the more eminent scholars vigorously attacked, in whose work there is surely a certain degree of explanation!

At p. 374 Ste. Croix states, "My purpose in this book is to reveal the realities of life in the Greek (and Roman) world, mainly as they affected the vast majority of the population, rather than the much more pleasant features of that life which the ruling classes commonly perceived or imagined." Whatever the reader's individual reactions to the Marxist point of departure, there can be little doubt that that purpose has been realized. Ste. Croix has conceived his book on a scale like that of the works of the greater classical historians, and with comparable didactic intent. The achievement is magnificent, on the grand scale, though to be approached and evaluated as one approaches and evaluates Thucydides or Tacitus.

K. R. BRADLEY

UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA

PETER GREENHALGH. *Pompey*. Vol. 2: *The Republican Prince*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981. Pp. xv + 320, [4] p. of plates, ills., maps. £18.50.

Pompey would be pleased. In four years, there have appeared three biographies in English, the latest a two-volume work, of which the second volume

is now under scrutiny. This volume provides a very good, scholarly study of Pompey's career from 58 B.C. until his death.

Greenhalgh (henceforth, G) writes well. He describes Pompey's theater and its accompanying structures vividly (54-57). Wit is abundant; for example concerning Pompey's games at the dedication of the theater, G writes, "The actors who had returned to the stage out of respect for Pompey were those who had left it out of respect for themselves" (58). Occasionally, G's wit and fondness for metaphor go too far: "The vermin which thrived on corruption and disorder fled from the relative sterility of Pompey's Rome to find a more congenial host in Gaul, and the effect of this accumulation of parasites on Caesar's already hyperthyroidal condition was a dangerous stimulation of the persecution complex which he began to indulge as convenient justification of increasingly antisocial behavior" (91). Conversely, G often cuts Gordian knots with seeming ease: "By the law of the ten tribunes Caesar had been guaranteed the right to stand for the consulship *in absentia*. But the right to stand *in absentia* did not imply, as Caesar later claimed, that he was to be allowed to keep his provinces and armies beyond the legal termination of his governorship" (102).

Minor factual errors or dubious interpretations? Of course. First, Sulla's presentation of lions probably occurred in 97, not "93" (58). Second, G accepts Plutarch's report (*Crassus* 16.4-5) that Crassus asked Pompey for help by escorting him through a hostile crowd out of the city as he left for his province of Syria and the projected Parthian war (60-61). Granted that "... Pompey was less concerned about Crassus the general than Crassus the politician. He was only too pleased to encourage a formidable political manipulator to direct his energies into distant wars, . . ." (61). Nevertheless, inasmuch as Crassus's main goal was to achieve parity in *dignitas* with Pompey, I believe that Crassus would *not* have "swallowed his pride and appealed to Pompey" (*ibid.*). Since Plutarch's *Crassus* alone includes the report of Pompey's aid, as distinct from the activities of the opposing tribune Ateius Capito, is it not likely to have derived from, to have been concocted by, one of the numerous Pompeian *litterati*? Third, while G is correct that "... it is not clear how . . . [Petreius] had become so closely attached to Pompey to secure the appointment to Spain, . . ." (174), he should have noted the man's thirty years plus of military experience, as of 62 (Sall., *B.C.* 59.6, explicit; cf. Cic., *Sest.* 12).

Let us turn now to the big picture. G, while several times conceding Caesar's leadership abilities, is consistently hostile to his political position. Conversely, unlike many moderns, G thinks very highly of Pompey's political and military abilities (from 58 B.C. on). Thus far, I concur. While luck does play a major role in war and politics, Pompey was far too successful, for far too long to have been a nincompoop or even of only moderate ability. All the same, he must have made mistakes! One hears of precious few from G. I fear that G succeeded so well in getting inside Pompey's head that he began to see the world through Pompey's eyes. It is typical that Helvius Mancia's stinging rebuke of Pompey's cruelty (Val. Max. 6.2.8) is *not* one of the numerous ancient passages quoted (or even mentioned).

Pompey, it seems, was a master politician, who for long viewed Caesar as a protégé and the latter's successes in Gaul "as extensions of his own" (23). Indeed, even in 52, "Pompey was too big a man to feel anything but admiration

for the conquests of his protégé, and he entertained a soldier's contempt for the unmilitary Catos and Bibuluses . . ." (89). Here we have a blend of perceptiveness and misjudgement. I believe that G fails to perceive Pompey's refusal to renew the marriage alliance with Caesar as (evidence for) a major turn, that he postdates Pompey's suspicion of Caesar, and that, in general, he overrates Pompey's admittedly great influence.

G may well be correct that Pompey fought at Pharsalus *not*, primarily, because of pressure from other *principes*, but because attrition was "no longer realistic" (245) and he thought that he would win. Since, however, his superiority in cavalry was so vast that his dependence on it was thoroughly predictable (249), should not Pompey have *anticipated* some Caesarian counter? Was Pompey not culpable?

Overall, G has provided a very detailed and well-written study of Pompey's final decade, offering many new insights and acute interpretations. Unfortunately, G is not sufficiently critical of Pompey's political or military performance. Pompey would be very pleased.

BARRY R. KATZ

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

KITTY CHISHOLM and JOHN FERGUSON. Rome: The Augustan Age. Oxford University Press in association with The Open University Press, 1981. Pp. xxv + 708, 16 pls. Cloth, \$54.00; paper, \$29.95.

The Open University in Great Britain has expended money and energy in developing materials for courses aimed at non-traditional students. Whatever the value of these particular courses (and they are controversial), we all benefit from the resulting collections of translated source materials on various topics. Most of the translations in this volume have been culled from earlier publications, though Chisholm, Ferguson and their associates will make their own translations when previous efforts are unavailable or unsuitable. Ferguson and Chisholm have collaborated before in this project but, so far as I know, this volume is the first to be prepared by Oxford University Press. Translations of source materials serve both students and scholar-teachers, especially when they are—as this volume is—comprehensive and generous in scope. This book comes, then, not only under good aegis but with good auspices as well.

The book is divided into two parts and includes (*mirabile dictu!*) a detailed index of sources. Part I (pp. 1–301) has six subdivisions lettered A to F with the individual pieces of evidence numbered sequentially within each lettered grouping. It "contains the sources necessary for a detailed study in depth of Augustus from his rise to power in 44 B.C. to his death in A.D. 14" (p. v) and treats documentary matters, politics and power, administration, new traditions, art and architecture, and Augustan poetry. Part II (pp. 303–699), arranged thematically in nine subsections (G to O), "provides the primary sources for the study of the intellectual and social context of the Age of Augustus, the development of the Principate under his successors, and the development of Rome as a city" as well as "sources for case studies of four Roman provinces"

(p. v). Specifically, Part II treats Cicero's *De Officiis* Book III, Lucretius' *On the Nature of the Universe*, the Roman outlook, architecture (primarily based on Vitruvius' *De Architectura*), the succession (through Claudius), Rome and the northern Gauls, Germany, Britain, and Judaea. The book opens rather naturally with a fresh translation of the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* and closes with an excerpt from Pliny's letter on the Christians (*Ep.* 10.96.7); taken together these two pieces of evidence neatly characterize the range of this book. Obviously the conception of the Augustan Age here employed is a large one.

A variety of translators' hands has its own merits and demerits, but neither the quality nor the evenness of the translations is at stake here. Similarly, in a book of this nature and size there will be the inevitable omissions, and a reviewer might not find one or two of his favorite *loci*. Simply ticking off the omissions, then, will be an unsatisfactory procedure here. Let us examine instead a few selected topics for the impressions a careful reader may or may not carry away.

"Freedom of Speech" (B47) retails the anecdote of how a drunken senator insulted Augustus at a banquet one night and how the next morning, sober, he tricked the *princeps* out of a generous gift as a mark of continuing friendship (*Sen. Phil. Ben.* 3.27.1-4). But freedom of speech became a more serious issue in the last years of Augustus and under Tiberius. Ca. A.D. 12 Titus Labienus saw his own writings burned *per inimicos*. Labienus was short on friends in any case (*libertas tanta, ut libertatis nomen excederet et, quia passim ordines hominesque laniabat, Rabies vocaretur*), but even his personal enemy Cassius Severus was offended by the burning (*Sen. Rhet. Contr.* 10, *praef.* 5-8). In a landmark case Severus himself was tried before Augustus in A.D. 12 for libelous writings of his own (*Tac. Ann.* 1.72). These incidents are not without precedent or consequence and should not have been omitted. The editors' brief introduction to B47 might have guided the reader to B22 where *App. Bell. Civ.* 5.13.132 records that after defeating Sextus Pompeius, Octavian "burned the writings which contained evidence concerning the civil strife." Common sense tells us that *Suet. Jul.* 56.7 on Augustus' suppression of boyhood scribbblings by Julius Caesar should not be recounted under the misnomer of "literary pursuits" (B49b). At the least, Augustus is seen here shaping our record as much as he is in the *Res Gestae* or in the statue of him from Prima Porta (pl. 4). Likewise, the editors unfairly terminate Tacitus' narrative (*Ann.* 4.34-35) of the trial of Cremutius Cordus in A.D. 25 after Cremutius' speech (I52), and they do not record either the public burning of his writings or their reappearance under Caligula. (The reader may well be spared, however, Tacitus' concluding sermon about the nature of tyrannical force and the literary record—all the more, given the subsequent impact of Cremutius' books!)

The Forum Augustum (E5) and the temple of Mars Ultor (E6) deserve notice. They also appear in pl. 6, but a plan of the temple might have been included to show how Augustus' unwillingness to dispossess reluctant private owners compromised not only his own plans for the forum but the usual rectangularity of a Roman temple as well. Brief introductory notes by the editors direct us elsewhere in the volume for incidental information of Suetonius and Augustus that bears on the program of the forum. Despite the editors' claim to 37 B.C., we do not know in what year construction was begun on the



forum (though the bulk of it seems to belong between 19 and 2 B.C.); nor does archaeology provide a round temple or even an *aedicula* of Mars Ultor on the Capitoline, contrary to the apparent indications of Dio 54.8.3 (not cited) and of the coins (neither mentioned nor illustrated). And, further, 12 May seems clearly associated with the dedication in 2 B.C. of the rectangular temple in the Forum Augustum (cp. C. J. Simpson in *JRS* 67 [1977] 91–94 where no Augustan temple or shrine of Mars Ultor will suit both 1 August and the misinformation of Dio 60.5.3, also not cited here). On dating the Augustan *ludi Martiales* from 12 May 19 B.C. (A3), the editors follow not Augustus' own view (*RG* 22), but Mommsen's as repeated from their source, V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius*² (Oxford 1970) 48, though the calendars cited there do not yield the date these *ludi* were first celebrated. Finally, given the importance of both *imitatio Alexandri* and *imitatio Augusti*, the omission of Pliny *HN* 33.93–94 is puzzling. There we find that Augustus located in the busiest part of his forum two paintings by Apelles representing Alexander the Great, and that later by Claudius' order the features of Augustus were substituted for those of Alexander.

In other matters of politics and religion, Jos. *AJ* 20.167–71 is cited for false messiahs during Felix' procuratorship of A.D. 52–58/9 (039), and the reader is referred there to *Acts* 21:37–38 (046) where Paul was apparently mistaken for an Egyptian revolutionary. Oddly, then, the armed Peter—who cut off the ear of the *doulos* of the high priest at Gethsemane (John 18:10 and 26)—is excluded from the appropriate passage (045) which begins at John 18:28. Though the incident, but not the agent's name, is recorded in the three synoptic gospels, it appears nowhere in this volume. Yet Peter's action both substantiates the Roman view of these events and may illuminate the political and theological ambiguities among Christ's adherents on the question of an earthly or a spiritual kingdom as late as *Acts* 1:6 (046). The ethnocentric limits of depending only on Greek and Latin sources is marked when the Dead Sea scrolls are not used to illustrate the essentially Jewish context of Christ's sermon on the mount (043). Finally, carefully excising the details of Simon Magus' career (*Acts* 8:9–13 and 18–24) at 046 approximates Augustus suppressing the youthful writings of Julius Caesar: we want to know the competition as well as the alternatives.

Coins are virtually restricted to illustrating the Julio-Claudian family tree (pl. 16). Two exceptions occur. First, "a coin showing the Arch of Augustus, voted by the Senate in 19 B.C. to commemorate the return of the Roman standards captured by the Parthians" (pl. 5a). More precise information could be given. This type occurs on *aurei* and *denarii* minted in Spain during 18/17 B.C. (Tr. Pot. VI); and the legend (CIVIB·ET·SIGN·MILIT·A·PART·RECUP·) is more informative than that of other familiar coins (SIGNIS RECEPTIS) and also reflects the exact language of the actual inscription on the arch (*CIL VI* 873). The other exception is "a coin of Claudius" (*RIC* Claudius 9) which has its obverse and reverse described in the style of catalogues but is not identified by denomination (*aureus* and *denarius*) or year (A.D. 46/7, Tr. Pot. VI). This coin belongs to the series showing Claudius' triumphal arch inscribed DE BRITANN and advertising his anti-Augustan frontier policy (cp. Dio 56.33.5–6). On other economic matters, Strabo 3.2.5 on Spain, as the reader should be informed, and 17.1.7 on Alexandria (C37a–b) do give an impression of Roman

trade; but the latter passage calls for a cross-reference to Pliny *HN* 12.41.84 (126). There Pliny reckons that 100 million HS *per annum* are siphoned to India, China, and Arabia as the cost of Roman luxuries; but the reader should be warned of the perilousness of numbers in manuscript traditions, even if Pliny could have calculated this amount accurately in the first place.

Neglected authors include the two Senecas. Seneca Rhetor is used to parrot a few hackneyed topics for schoolboys (I24a) but is ignored for his rich social and anecdotal information. From the younger Seneca's letters we get familiar excerpts of *Ep.* 7 on the brutality of the games (I47) and 47 on the excesses of Roman slaveholders (I64). Among others that might have been sampled we note *Ep.* 78 on Seneca's own motivation in resisting suicide, 88 with his thoroughly inadequate defense *de liberalibus studiis*, and 108 on his Augustan boyhood and its attendant philosophic faddism. It is inevitable to turn *Ep.* 114, which expounds the connection between personality and literary style, to Seneca's own writing; more to the point, however, this letter, taken with Horace's *Ars Poetica* (also omitted), could have provided something not available in this volume, viz. direct critical access through contemporary eyes to the literary prose and poetry gathered here.

Enough. My critique only begins to explore the way the editors introduce and arrange a small fraction of their generous sampling. Every handbook of collected evidence requires caution of its users; and an extensive collection like Chisholm and Ferguson's (708 pages) risks being misrepresented by a reviewer who probes intensely into a few areas of his own choosing. Yet the book remains useful. A student making his way through these materials will—neither unusually nor outrageously—need occasional guidance. Unfortunately the expense of this useful volume will restrict its circulation among students more than any reviewer's probe. The price of even the paperbound edition—thirty dollars—better suits the library's budget than the student's.

F. E. ROMER

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BOOKS RECEIVED

- BLOCKLEY, R. C. *The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire: Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus.* Liverpool, England, Cairns, 1981. Pp. ix + 196. £12.50. (Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs, 6)
- BLOMQVIST, JERKER. *The Date and Origin of the Greek Version of Hanno's Periplus.* Lund, Sweden, CWK Gleerup, 1979. Pp. 68. No price stated.
- BONIFAZ NUÑO, RUBEN. *Ovidio, Metamorfosis Libros VIII-XV.* Ciudad Universitaria, México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1980. Pp. cdxii + 197. No price stated. (Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum mexicana)
- BROGYANYI, BELA. *Studies in Diachronic, Synchronic, and Typological Linguistics: Festschrift for Oswald Szemerényi on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday.* 2 vols. Amsterdam, Benjamins, 1979. Pp. xiv + 994. No price stated. (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, 11)
- BROWN, PETER. *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity.* University of California, 1982. Pp. viii + 347. \$22.95.
- CARROLL, KEVIN K. *The Parthenon Inscription.* Durham, North Carolina, Duke University, 1982. Pp. vii + 74. \$5.00 (Greek, Roman and Byzantine Monographs, 9)
- CATALDI, S. et al. *Studi sui rapporti interstatali nel mondo antico.* Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore, 1981. No price stated.
- CLASSEN, CARL JOACHIM. *Die Stadt im Spiegel der Descriptiones und Laudes urbium in der antiken und mittelalterlichen Literature bis zum Ende des zwölften Jahrhunderts.* Hildesheim and New York, Olms, 1980. Pp. 128. No price stated. (Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 2)
- COTTON, HANNAH. *Documentary Letters of Recommendation in Latin from the Roman Empire.* Meisenheim am Glan, Hain, 1981. Pp. vi + 54. DM 18. (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, 132)

- DONLAN, WALTER. *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Lawrence, Kansas, Coronado, 1980. Pp. xiv + 222. \$15.00.
- GINSBURG, JUDITH. *Tradition and Theme in the Annals of Tacitus.* New York, Arno, 1981. Pp. v + 152. No price stated. (Monographs in Classical Studies)
- GROTJAHN, RÜDIGER, ed. *Hexameter Studies.* Bochum, West Germany, Brockmeyer, 1981. Pp. vi + 263. DM 29,80. (Quantitative Linguistics, 11)
- GUNDERT, HERMANN. *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf.* Utrecht, HES, 1978; reprint of 1935 ed. with addenda. Pp. 179. No price stated.
- GUTWEIN, KENNETH C. *Third Palestine: A Regional Study in Byzantine Urbanization.* Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1981. Pp. xiv + 416. Cloth, \$25.75; paper, \$15.50.
- HAVELOCK, ERIC A. *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences.* Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 362. Cloth, \$25.00; paper, \$8.95. (Princeton Series of Collected Essays)
- HENGST, DANIEL DEN. *The Prefaces in the Historia Augusta.* Amsterdam, Grüner, 1981. Pp. vi + 188. Hfl. 50.-/ US \$20.00.
- INGREMEAU, CHRISTIANE. *Lactance: La colère de dieu.* Paris, Cerf, 1982. Pp. 418. Fr. 310. (Sources Chrétiennes)
- IOPPOLO, ANNA MARIA. *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico.* Naples, Bibliopolis, 1980. Pp. 374. L. 16.000. (Elenchos, 1)
- LABELLARTE, ROCCO. *Passato, Presente . . . nelle Troiane di Euripide.* Bari, Adriatica, 1982. Pp. 147. L. 10.000.
- L'antiquité classique*, vol. 50 (1981), Brussels, 1981. Pp. 837. No price stated.
- MANDILARAS, B. G. *Πάπυροι καί παπυρολογία.* Athens, 1980. Pp. 137, 70 pls. No price stated.
- METZGER, BRUCE M. *New Testament Studies.* Leiden, Brill, 1980. Pp. x + 234. Gld. 68.00.
- MICHAEL, CHRISTOS A. *Ὁ κωμικὸς λόγος τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνους.* Athens, University of Athens, 1981. Pp. 324. No price stated.

- MORELAND, FLOYD L., ed. *Strategies in Teaching Greek and Latin: Two Decades of Experimentation*. Chico, California, Scholars Press, 1981. Pp. 145. No price stated.
- POLOMÉ, EDGAR C., ed. *The Indo-Europeans in the Fourth and Third Millennia*. Ann Arbor, Karoma, 1982. Pp. x + 186. \$21.50. (*Studia Linguistica Extranea*, 14)
- PUCCIONI, GIULIO. *Il problema della monografia storica latina*. Bologna, Pàtron, 1981. Pp. 57. L. 5.000.
- QUET, MARIE-HENRIETTE. *La mosaïque cosmologique de Mérida*. Paris, Bocard, 1981. Pp. 278, 16 pls. No price stated.
- RIZZO, ALFREDO. *Scienza impura: pagine di filologia e umanità*. Roma, Storia e Letteratura, 1981. Pp. xxviii + 238. L. 20.000. (*Storia e letteratura*, 148)
- ROSÉN, HANNAH AND HAIM. *On Moods and Tenses of the Latin Verb*. Munich, Fink, 1980. Pp. 48. No price stated.
- SABBATINI TUMOLESI, PATRIZIA. *Gladiatorum paria: annunci di spettacoli gladiatorii a Pompei*. Rome, Storia e Letteratura, 1980. Pp. 179, 14 pls., 2 maps. L. 30.000. (*Tituli*, 1)
- SALINAS, RAFAEL. *Cesar: Guerra civil*. Ciudad Universitaria, México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1981. Pp. ccxxix + 174, 9 maps. No price stated. (*Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum mexicana*)
- SCHIROLI, MARIA GRAZIA. *Lucio Anneo Seneca, de tranquillitate animi*. Bologna, CLUEB, 1981. Pp. 180. L. 9.000.
- SOVERINI, PAOLO. *Problemi di critica testuale nella Historia Augusta*. Bologna, Pàtron, 1981. Pp. 179. L. 10.000. (*Edizioni e saggi universitari di filologia classica*, 30)
- STEPHANIS, I. E. 'Ο δοῦλος στίς κωμωδίες τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνη. Thessalonica, University of Thessalonica, 1980. Pp. 221. No price stated.
- Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, vol. 28 (1978). Amsterdam, Gieben, 1982. Pp. xviii + 510. \$55.00.
- TENGSTRÖM, EMIN. *A Study of Juvenal's Tenth Satire: Some Structural and Interpretative Problems*. Göteborg, University of Göteborg, 1980. Pp. 59, Sw. Cr. 50. (*Studia graeca et latina gothoburgensia*, 42)

- TURNER, P. *Papyri Greek and Egyptian Edited by Various Hands in Honour of Eric Gardner Turner on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday*. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1981. Pp. xx + 236, 20 pls. No price stated. (Graeco-Roman Memoirs, 68)
- VERNANT, JEAN-PIERRE. *The Origins of Greek Thought*. Cornell University Press, 1982. Pp. 144. \$15.00.
- WRIGHT, JOHN. *Plautus, Curculio: Introduction and Notes*. Chico, California, Scholars Press, 1981. Pp. 46. \$9.75 (A.P.A. Textbook Series, 6)
- ZUCCHELLI, BRUNO. *Varro logistoricus: studio letterario e prosopografico*. Parma, Istituto di Lingua e Letteratura Latina, 1981. Pp. 90. L. 8.000.

JOHNS HOPKINS



Pindar's Victory Songs

translated by Frank J. Nisetich

foreword by Hugh Lloyd-Jones

In the first translation of Pindar into a contemporary poetic idiom, Frank Nisetich gives new life to the greatest of the ancient Greek poets. All extant odes are translated, and the edition includes extensive background information on Pindar and his times, the genre of the victory song, and the style of ancient Greek poetry. For students of Greek poetry, mythology, and civilization, and for poetry readers in general, Pindar's victory songs should gain a new life.

"A devotedly lucid presentation. The phrasing, ordering, and spacing of these versions has authority and style." — *Robert Fitzgerald, Harvard University*

\$27.50 hardcover; \$7.50 paperback

Song and Action

The Victory Odes of Pindar

Kevin Crotty

"An original and substantial contribution to Pindar scholarship. With good sense and good style, Crotty explores the techniques of this most difficult of Greek poets, achieving a synthesis that outdoes any other contemporary treatment." — *Gregory Nagy, Harvard University*


\$15.00

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

FOUNDED BY BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE, 1880



❧ WINTER 1982 VOLUME 103 NUMBER 4 ❧

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

DISKIN CLAY, EDITOR

Georg Luck, James W. Poultney, John Pollini, Michael L. McCormick
Frank Romer, Book Review Editor
Candida Allanbrook, Secretary

Benjamin D. Meritt, *Honorary Editor*

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY • Volume 103 • Number 4 • Winter 1982
ISSN 0002-9175

Copyright © 1982 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

All rights reserved. No portion of this journal may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the formal consent of the editors and publishers. For copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law, the copier must pay a fee of \$1.00 per copy through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, Massachusetts 01970. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. It is the journal's policy to require the assignment of copyright from all authors.

The *American Journal of Philology* publishes original contributions in Classical Studies, particularly in the fields of Greek and Roman Literature, Textual Criticism, Classical Linguistics, Ancient Philosophy, History, and Greek and Latin Epigraphy. It is published quarterly: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. Subscription price: \$36.00 Institutions, \$15.00 Individuals. Foreign postage is \$2.50 additional. Single issues: \$8.00 each.

Subscriptions, address changes, advertising, and other business correspondence should be sent to The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Division, 34th and Charles Streets, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A. Claims for replacements of missing issues must be received within three months (six months for foreign subscribers) following publication of the issue.

Postmaster: please send form 3579 to the above address.

Indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals and in Book Review Index.

Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland, and at additional mailing offices.

Composition by Bet Sha'ar Press, Inc.

The Printers' devices appearing on the front cover of *AJP* have been selected from among the ones especially created in stained glass for the Hutzler Undergraduate Reading Room on the Homewood Campus of The Johns Hopkins University. They represent the devices by Aldus Manutius (Spring), Robert Estienne (Summer), Joannes Frobenius (Fall), and Christopher Plantin (Winter).

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 103, No. 4

WHOLE NUMBER 411

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK
Two Blameless Homeric Characters 361

FREDERICK M. AHL
Amber, Avallon, and Apollo's Singing Swan 373

ARTHUR KEAVENEY
The King and the War-lords:
 Romano-Parthian Relations circa 64-53 B.C. 412

RAOUL MORTLEY
The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa 429

INTERPRETATIONS 440

JAMES DALY
The Name of Philoctetes: *Philoctetes* 670-73

M. D. REEVE
Statius, *Silvae* 3.3.149

BERNARD FRISCHER
Burying Latin *Cenotaphium*

RICHARD F. THOMAS
The Right Way to Dress (On Artemid., *Onir*, 3.24)

ERIC P. HAMP

Glōria

R. WHITNEY TUCKER

Five-Vowel and Seven-Vowel Dialects

REVIEWS

450

G. B. KERFERD

The Sophistic Movement (Peter W. Rose)

PETER JOHN RHODES

A Commentary on the Aristotelian ATHENAION POLITEIA

(John J. Keaney)

ALBERT SCHACHTER

Cults of Boiotia (Linda Collins Reilly)

THOMAS WIEDEMANN

Greek and Roman Slavery (Chester G. Starr)

EDWARD CHAMPLIN

Fronto and Antonine Rome (Ronald Mellor)

T. D. BARNES

Constantine and Eusebius (H. A. Drake)

D. A. RUSSELL

Criticism in Antiquity (Helene P. Foley)

BOOKS RECEIVED

470

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

TWO BLAMELESS HOMERIC CHARACTERS

A familiar feature of Homer's use of adjectives is what has come to be called the "generic" use. The adjective refers to what the character or the phenomenon is habitually, even though the word may be irrelevant or even inappropriate on a given occasion. The clothes of the Phaeacian royal family are "bright" even when they are dirty clothes on their way to the laundry (*Od.* 6.74). Aphrodite is laughter-loving even when she is in great pain and complaining to her mother about the wound that Diomedes has given her (*Iliad* 5.375).

These occasional inappropriate adjectives created a problem for the Homerists of antiquity, and they devised a solution (attributed in the scholia to Aristarchus). Their λύσις was: οὐ τότε ἀλλὰ φύσει "not at that time, but by nature."¹ My first purpose here is to discuss what is perhaps the most notoriously inappropriate Homeric adjective and to suggest the possibility that the problem it presents may be solved by a reversal of the λύσις of Aristarchus: οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ τότε "not by nature, but at that time."

The late Anne Amory Parry, with her posthumously published monograph *Blameless Aegisthus*,² has brought into the forefront of our attention once more the centuries-old crux in line 29 of the first book of the *Odyssey*: why, in referring to the seducer of Clytemnestra and the murderer of Agamemnon, does Homer use the expression ἀμύμονος Αἰγίσθοιο, traditionally translated "blameless Aegisthus"? I say centuries-old because the scholia show that the Homeric scholars of antiquity were puzzled by this adjective in this context. A person who relies on the standard edition of the *Odyssey* scholia, edited by Dindorf

¹ Milman Parry included a good discussion of these matters (with generous quotations of the ancient sources) in his doctoral thesis of 1928. This material is now conveniently available in *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971) 120-24.

² Leyden, E. J. Brill, 1973.

and published at Oxford in 1855, will see that the ancient critics were concerned about the problem, but he may be disappointed at finding only two solutions. First, maybe the adjective refers to Aegisthus' noble stock. That is, he is a nobleman, if not a noble man. This idea has found adherents since antiquity, and the great Victorian commentators, Merry and Riddell,³ suggest that the word may refer to "gentle birth." The standard German commentary of Ameis-Hentze accepts "edler Geburt" as one possibility.⁴ The other interpretation mentioned in the Dindorf scholia is that the adjective refers to Aegisthus' virtue before the adultery. The scholia do not elaborate on this suggestion, but the idea, I suppose, is that the use would be like that in Homer's phrases applied to the aged Priam and Nestor, εὔμελίῳ Πριάμοιο, "Priam of the goodly ashen spear," and ἱππότη Νέστωρ, "Nestor the horseman," the epithets referring to qualities that distinguished these venerable worthies in their younger days. This idea is not lacking in ingenuity, but it has not attracted attention in modern times.

Fortunately, we have a much more extensive collection of the scholia on the first 309 lines of the *Odyssey* published between 1888 and 1890 by Arthur Ludwich⁵ and reprinted in 1966 with a very short preface by Hartmut Erbse.⁶ Ludwich cast a much wider net than Dindorf (indeed, Erbse suggests, at times possibly too wide), and he gives us scholia with some further ideas about ἀνύμων in this passage. One is that it refers to Aegisthus' comeliness. Many moderns, including Bedell Stanford,⁷ have inclined to the view that the word refers to Aegisthus' appearance, and this theory has been carried to the ultimate extreme by Mrs. Parry in her effort (unsuccessful, I think)⁸ to demonstrate that the basic meaning of ἀνύμων in Homer is something like "handsome," and that this meaning is reasonably appropriate in all the 116 passages in which Homer uses the word.⁹ The ancients also anticipated another

³ *Homer's Odyssey Books I-XII*. 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1886.

⁴ *Homers Odyssee*. 11th ed., Leipzig & Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1900. This idea was abandoned in the thirteenth edition, revised by Paul Cauer. He gives only "untadelig" as a translation and notes that it is striking to have the word used of Aegisthus.

⁵ *Scholia in Homeri Odysseae A 1-309 auctiora et emendatiora*. These scholia were published in a series of five Königsberg "Programs" appearing in 1888, 1889, and 1890.

⁶ Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung.

⁷ *The Odyssey of Homer*. 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1959.

⁸ Cf. my review, *CP* 72 (1977) 167-73.

⁹ Mrs. Parry tells us in the concluding chapter of her book (p. 156) that after she had "finished writing all of the detailed discussion of ἀνύμων," she discovered that much of her theory had been anticipated by Martin Hoffman in a thesis published in 1914. Actually her basic position had been anticipated more than a hundred years ago by F. A.

common contemporary doctrine, as we see from Ludwich's scholium which says, οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρόπου ληπτέον "not to be taken as referring to character."

Eustathius also commented on blameless Aegisthus in his vast Byzantine compilation. His remarks are now conveniently available in the English translation of Parry's dissertation.¹⁰ "The Homeric Zeus here speaks of the wicked Aegisthus as 'blameless,' not referring to his crimes . . . , but to his natural virtues: he had high birth, beauty, intelligence, and other things of the same sort." Again later, "ἀμύμων is said of Aegisthus and others who, though unworthy in other respects, are yet blameless in their valour, or blood, or in other like characteristics."

In sum, we may say that the *Odyssey* scholia and Eustathius make it clear that the ancient critics pretty well exhausted the explanations of ἀμύμων in line 29 that were available before the appearance of the nineteenth-century Analysts and, in our century, Milman Parry. The Analysts do not need to concern us here. They regularly looked with the greatest suspicion on the first book of the *Odyssey* and found in it the activity of various hacks who worked on the *Odyssey* job.¹¹

In 1928 Milman Parry, with the publication of his thesis on the traditional epithet in Homer, revolutionized our way of looking on Homer's adjectives. In these post-Parry days, many suspect that ἀμύμονος Αἰγίσθοιο is only a careless use of formula, an oral slip, a rather extreme example of the phenomenon illustrated by the poet's πότνια μήτηρ, the "queenly mother" of the disreputable town beggar Irus.

Although the various commentators, ancient and modern, have presented a number of solutions for ἀμύμονος Αἰγίσθοιο, they are fairly well agreed that the adjective is odd and calls for comment, and they tend to argue that the word is used here in an unusual sense. One feature almost universal among the moderns who have commented on the word is a warning against taking ἀμύμων as referring to Aegisthus' character, a warning that also appeared in the scholia. It *must* not be taken in a moral sense, we are repeatedly told.

Paley in notes on a number of passages in his edition of the *Iliad* published in 1866 (London, Whittaker & Co.; George Bell). Commenting on blameless Bellerophon (a personage of outstandingly blameless character) in *Iliad* 6.155, Paley translates ἀμύμων "handsome" and goes on to say, "this is undoubtedly the general sense of ἀμύμων in Homer, when applied to persons."

¹⁰ See note 1 above. P. 122.

¹¹ The standard Analytical remedy was excision. The curious may consult, e.g., A. Kirchhoff *Homerische Odyssee*, 2nd ed. Berlin, Wilhelm Hertz, 1879, pp. 166-67.

Among these ancient and modern suggestions, I prefer the one involving a careless use of formula, and I think that this may be right. I should like to explore here, however, a different possibility. Homeric scholarship being what it is, it is unlikely that the idea has not been suggested before. But, even if it has been presented before, it seems not to have made any impression, and so, new or not, it may deserve a hearing.

In commenting on Irus' queenly mother, Bedell Stanford, after noting other ideas, suggested that "it is not impossible that his mother actually was a lady."¹² To anticipate my conclusion, I shall here suggest that in this passage in Book 1 Homer meant that Aegisthus really was blameless, and I mean blameless in a moral sense.

It will be well to begin by noting the other adjectives used of Aegisthus in the *Odyssey*. There are two of them. What might be called Homer's standard epithet for Aegisthus, since it occurs five times, is δολόμητις defined by Liddell and Scott as "crafty in counsel, wily." (Incidentally the only other character to win this epithet in Homer is Clytemnestra. A word of slightly different spelling but identical in meaning is in the *Iliad* applied by Zeus to his wife Hera.) The other adjective used of Aegisthus, and, like ἀμύμων, used only once, is ἀναλκις, "wanting in strength, impotent, feeble." I do not contest the Liddell and Scott definitions of these words, and it may well seem that these words characterizing Aegisthus as a wily weakling do not greatly strengthen my case for the view that ἀμύμων in line 29 of Book 1 is meant to be a complimentary reference to Aegisthus' character.

Keeping in mind, however, the distinction between τότε and φύσει, we must consider the contexts in which these three words appear. In all five passages describing Aegisthus as crafty in counsel a character in the story is talking. In Book 1 Athena (disguised as Mentès) tries to spur the somewhat lethargic Telemachus to action by reminding him of the glory Orestes won by killing wily Aegisthus (300); and in Book 3 Nestor uses Orestes and wily Aegisthus for the same purpose (198). Telemachus then picks up the phrase and asks how wily Aegisthus could manage to kill a much better man (250). A bit later Nestor tells Telemachus that Aegisthus ruled over Mycenae for seven years until Orestes came and killed wily Aegisthus (308). In the fifth passage (4.525), the old man of the sea describes to Menelaus how wily Aegisthus set a spy to watch for Agamemnon's homecoming.

¹² See note 7 above. Vol. 2, p. 300, note on 18.5.

When characters are trying to impress upon Telemachus how glorious was Orestes' deed, we can hardly expect them to speak well of Aegisthus. Nor can we expect it of Proteus, when he is reluctantly telling Menelaus how his beloved brother was murdered. Nor is it a cause for surprise that Telemachus, having twice heard Aegisthus called wily, should use the same word himself. And, finally, in planning and carrying out the murder of Agamemnon, Aegisthus really was crafty.¹³

The epithet ἀναλκις, "feeble," also appears in the long conversation between Nestor and Telemachus in Book 3. Nestor tells Telemachus that after Orestes killed wily Aegisthus he held a funeral feast for the Argives over his loathsome mother and feeble Aegisthus (310). Again, Orestes holds the center of attention, and the context would naturally suggest an unkind epithet for Aegisthus. In all of these passages, I should say, the adjectives refer to Aegisthus' character as it was φύσει.

This brings us back to the point from which we started, ἀμύμονος Αἰγίσθοιο in line 29 of Book 1. What is the context here? It is important that we have this context clearly before us, and, since textual details are of no importance, I give it in the Loeb Library version of my old Stanford teacher, Augustus Taber Murray. The translation is in a style not now in fashion, but it has the merits of clarity and fidelity:

[The gods] were gathered together in the halls of Olympian Zeus. Among them the father of gods and men was first to speak, for in his heart he thought of noble Aegisthus [this is our blameless Aegisthus], whom far-famed Orestes, Agamemnon's son, had slain. Thinking on him he spoke among the immortals, and said:

"Look you now, how ready mortals are to blame the gods. It is from us, they say, that evils come, but they even of themselves, through their own blind folly, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained. Even as now Aegisthus, beyond that which was ordained, took to himself the wedded wife of the son of Atreus, and slew him on his return, though well he knew of sheer destruction, seeing that we spake to him before, sending Hermes, the keen-sighted Argeïphontes, that he should neither slay the man nor woo his wife; for from Orestes shall come vengeance for the son of Atreus when once he has come to manhood and longs for his own land. So Hermes spoke, but for all his good intent he prevailed not upon the heart of Aegisthus; and now he has paid the full price of all."¹⁴

¹³ In two other passages Aegisthus is connected with craftiness: in 3.235 Athena/Mentes uses the phrase Αἰγίσθοιο δόλψ, and in 4.529 Proteus says that Aegisthus δολίην ἐφράσσατο τέχνην.

¹⁴ *Homer: The Odyssey*, Vol. I, London, Wm. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, various dates, p. 5.

There are more things here than just the word ἀνύμων which tempt one to comment. First, we may note that the other adjectives applied to Aegisthus occurred in speeches by characters in the poem. ἀνύμων is here used by Homer himself. I do not know if this is significant, and I do not build on it, but it is one of the facts of the case, and it may indicate that this is Homer's own judgment on this character in this situation.

Then again, a question that is likely to arise in the mind of a reader of this passage is why the gods showed this special concern for Aegisthus. What we have here is a literary motif: the gods make an effort to keep a person from doing what the standards of his time would lead one to expect him to do. The motif also appears in the first book of the *Iliad*. As Achilles is drawing his sword to kill Agamemnon, who has grossly and publicly insulted him, Hera sends Athena down to urge him not to kill Agamemnon. So here in the *Odyssey* the gods send Hermes down to try to keep Aegisthus from taking vengeance for the outrage committed against his father. Athena is successful. Achilles sheathes his sword, and Agamemnon is saved for a different death some months later. Hermes fails. Aegisthus gets his revenge and dies for it. In both instances, the epic traditions, "the facts of history," are preserved. It is easy to see why Hera and Athena would want to save the life of the commander of the army that they hope will take Troy. We do not know why the gods wanted to save Aegisthus. It does not seem like the Homeric gods to have the kindly idea of trying to stop a blood feud. We know that Homer's gods are inclined to be whimsical, but Zeus seems very serious here. We are just not in a position to fathom their motive. If their concern for Aegisthus tells us anything about Aegisthus' character, it would seem to speak well of him.

We should notice, too, that there is not a word here from Homer or from Zeus to suggest that there was anything morally wrong in what Aegisthus did. (And Zeus was clearly not in a position to be very critical about adultery.) Aegisthus is simply cited as an illustration of the way human beings bring trouble upon themselves. He provides an unusually impressive illustration because he was given a solemn divine warning: if he seduces Clytemnestra and murders Agamemnon he will certainly die for it. We must ask why Aegisthus chose to disregard this warning—a warning moreover presented to him by a god in person, not, for instance, through an oracle.

The best answer to this question, I think, is to be found in a passage near the end of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (1577–1611). Up to this

point in the play, we have been occupied with Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, and Cassandra, and we have been conscious of Aegisthus only as a figure who we know is lurking somewhere in the palace. He now appears, stands over the body of the dead king, and makes a long speech to a very unfriendly audience, the group of senior citizens who make up the chorus. The speech deserves to be read as a whole. I give here some extracts from Lattimore's translation:

Now I can say once more that the high gods look down
on mortal crimes to vindicate the right at last,
now that I see this man . . .

sprawled in the tangling nets of fury, to atone
the calculated evil of his father's hand.

For Atreus, this man's father . . .

drove my father forth,
Thyestes, his own brother . . .

forth from his city and his home.
Yet sad Thyestes came again to supplicate
the hearth. . . .

But Atreus, this man's godless sire,
set a feast for him . . .

[and] served my father his own children's flesh
to feed on . . .

[He] with no thought for the featureless meal before him ate
that ghastly food whose curse works now before your eyes. . . .

Out of such acts you see this dead man stricken here,
and it was I, in my right, who wrought this murder. . . .

Justice brought me home again . . .
Now I can die in honor again, if die I must,
having seen him caught in the cords of his just punishment.¹⁵

Denniston and Page have many unkind words to say about this speech in their commentary,¹⁶ but they properly tell us in their note on line 1607, "nobody could deny that the surviving son of Thyestes was bound by law, human and divine, to take the life of Atreus' son in return for the murder of Thyestes' family." Similarly on line 1577 E. Fränkel tells us, "[Aegisthus'] legal claim against the son of the man who had committed such frightful atrocities against Aegisthus' father and brothers and himself is fully valid not only from the speaker's

¹⁵ *Aeschylus: Oresteia*, translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 86-87.

¹⁶ *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957, p. 217.

point of view but from the poet's as well."¹⁷ For our present purpose it is enough to say that the speech makes abundantly clear why Aegisthus was prepared to do what he did even though he knew that he would pay for it with his own life.

We now return to Homer and ask a more important question: What would Homer (and presumably his audience) think of a man who avenged as Aegisthus did a great wrong done to his father? Homer's answer is unequivocal, because he portrays for us in the *Odyssey* another vengeful murderer: Orestes. And again and again, as we have seen, Orestes is not merely praised; he is held up before Telemachus as a model to be followed by any self-respecting young man of his time and class. True, Aegisthus' murder of Agamemnon was crafty, treacherous. Homer happens not to describe for us just how Orestes killed Aegisthus, but we do have three accounts in the fifth-century tragedians, and in every one Orestes achieved his end by craft. It seems to be assumed that this is the only way to bring about the death of a king. Moreover, we should not forget that the crime which Aegisthus avenged also involved the most gross treachery.

All in all, it may fairly be said that Orestes and Aegisthus are just alike in the crucial point that concerns us here: each of them took it upon himself to exact vengeance for a great wrong done to his father. If there is any difference, Aegisthus' conduct was the more justified, because the wrong done to his father was so outrageous that it stands out even among the horrors of Greek mythology. He was also the more heroic, since he had been assured in the most solemn manner that if he did exact vengeance he would certainly die for it. And it is this aspect of Aegisthus' character that is being talked about in the passage of the *Odyssey* containing the phrase "blameless Aegisthus." And it is this aspect of Orestes' conduct that is held up as a model for Telemachus. I submit that Homer meant us to see that in this action Aegisthus was as blameless as blameless Orestes. In line 29 we do not need to find some unusual meaning for the word ἀνύμων, and we do not have a careless use of formula. When, in a passage concerned with Aegisthus' taking vengeance for his father, Homer said "blameless Aegisthus," he knew what he was doing, and he meant what he said. τότε Aegisthus was blameless.

So much for the *Odyssey's* blameless Aegisthus. I turn now, more briefly, to another disreputable blameless character, a man in the *Iliad*

¹⁷ *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, Vol. III, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1950, p. 742.

whose blamelessness may seem at first sight even more strange than the blamelessness of Aegisthus. At the beginning of the fourth book, Homer deals with the problem of getting the war started again now that Menelaus' victory over Paris threatens to end it. After some teasing of Hera, Zeus tells Athena to go down and see to it that the Trojans break the truce and so start the war again.

Athena swoops down to the Trojan plain and, disguising herself as a son of Antenor, goes looking for "godlike" Pandarus. She soon finds him, "Lycaon's blameless, mighty son," εὔρε Λυκάονος υἱὸν ἀμύμονά τε κρατερόν τε (89). And it is this blameless Pandarus who, tempted by the hope of honor and wealth, is easily moved to fire a treacherous shot at the unarmed Menelaus. The shot would presumably have been fatal had not Athena flown with the speed of thought to Menelaus' side in time to divert the arrow so that it falls on a spot where Menelaus seems to be covered by at least four layers of leather and metal. Even so the arrow scratches Menelaus' belly, and the blood streams down over his pretty legs.

Here again we find the word ἀμύμων applied to a person whose character seems not to be above criticism, and critics from antiquity to the present have wondered why Homer called him blameless.

The scholia have preserved some ancient answers. The gloss on ἀμύμονα in line 89 runs thus in Sch. T.: σώματι ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ γένει. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τρόπῳ.¹⁸ (There is a similar note in other scholia.) Part of this is familiar to us from the *Odyssey* scholia treating of blameless Aegisthus: the word refers to physical comeliness or distinguished family, and it does not refer to character. But there is one significant new idea: τέχνῃ. Maybe the word refers to Pandarus' skill in his craft as an archer. The Didymean scholia put the matter more clearly: ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄψογον τῇ τοξικῇ.¹⁹ (A number of scholia also explain in this way his being called godlike [ἀντίθεον] in line 88: "The man equal to Apollo in archery is godlike. Homer speaks in this way of those who excel in something.") The idea that Pandarus is called ἀμύμονα here because he is a faultless archer has appealed to some moderns. Samuel Clarke, for example, in his edition published at London in 1729, commented: "Non, omni virtute praecellentem; erat perfidus: sed, τοξικῆς scientia singulari peri-

¹⁸ *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, ed. H. Erbse, Vol. I, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1969, p. 461.

¹⁹ There is no modern edition of the Didymean scholia. I take this from the Aldine edition (Venice, 1621, folio 102). It may also be found in, e.g., J. Barnes' edition of the *Iliad* (Cambridge, C. Crownfield, 1711), p. 148.

tum." Paley in his edition of 1866 (see Note 9 above) simply translates ἀμύμων in line 89 "a skilful archer." Paley compares the passage in 8.273, where the word is applied to Teucer. On that line he comments thus: "ἀμύμων elsewhere . . . 'good-looking,' here means 'irreproachable' as an archer. Compare iv 89.194. *Od.* viii 246 . . ." The first of these citations is our Pandarus passage. In 4.194 we have Asclepius, the blameless doctor. In the *Odyssey* passage, Alcinous tells Odysseus, "We Phaeacians are not blameless boxers or wrestlers." Paley might well have cited other parallels. Mrs. Parry (see note 2 above) has conveniently listed on pages 172-73 of her monograph the instances showing ἀμύμων used "with nouns denoting an activity or profession." We see from this list that the word is applied to prophets, doctors, charioteers, boxers and wrestlers.²⁰ These passages are interesting in that they show ἀμύμων used with specific reference to a particular skill, and to that extent they lend some support to the idea that in calling Pandarus ἀμύμων Homer was thinking of his skill in archery. Their usefulness, however, is considerably lessened by the fact that in them the particular skill is specifically indicated.

As far as I have noted, Paley was the last commentator to accept the scholiasts' idea about blameless Pandarus. Leaf²¹ has no note on the line, and Ameis-Hentze-Cauer²² translate the word "untadelig" and say that it usually refers to external qualities, noble birth, or physical comeliness. The latest commentator, Willcock,²³ says nothing.

There is, as it happens, evidence in this very passage that Homer did at this point have much in mind Pandarus' skill in archery. After reporting Athena's tempting words to Pandarus and just before the account of the actual shot, Homer devotes seven lines to a detailed account of just how Pandarus got his bow. The description of the actual shot, moreover, is almost uniquely elaborate, being rivalled only by the passage in the *Odyssey* describing the preliminaries to Odysseus' shot through the axes. Moreover, the lines about godlike Pandarus and Lycaon's blameless son are repeated in Book 5, when Aeneas goes looking for Pandarus. And Aeneas' first words when he finds Pandarus emphasize his unique reputation as an archer: "Pandarus, where are

²⁰ Mrs. Parry did not include wrestlers in her list, but surely the adjective in *Od.* 8.246 goes with both nouns.

²¹ *The Iliad*, ed. Walter Leaf, Vol. I, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1900.

²² *Homers Ilias*, 5th ed., Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1900.

²³ *The Iliad of Homer, Books I-XII*, ed. M. M. Willcock, Basingstoke & London, Macmillan, 1978.

your bow and feathered arrows and your reputation? No man competes with you in this, nor does anyone in Lycia boast that he is your superior" (5.171-73). Here the epithet "blameless" is immediately followed by words stressing Pandarus' skill in archery. It may be significant, too, that we are told in 2.829 that Apollo himself had given Pandarus his bow.

One might conclude from these references that Pandarus' bow and his skill as an archer were famous in the pre-Homeric tradition. At least such a conclusion seems more likely than to assume that Homer invented Pandarus and, as Eustathius thought, introduced into the Trojan Catalogue in Book 2 a reference to the bow as preparation for the role he will play in Book 4. These two features of Homer's narrative, the rather surprising mention of the bow in Book 2 and the unusually elaborate account of its creation and use in Book 4, make it plausible to argue that Pandarus' skill in archery was in the forefront of Homer's mind when he called him "Lycaon's blameless son."

For my present purpose, the interesting feature of the suggestion that ἀνύμων in this passage refers to Pandarus' skill as an archer is that it connects blameless Pandarus with my suggestion about blameless Aegisthus. Once again Homer calls blameless a character who is obviously full of faults. But the adjective becomes understandable and appropriate if it can be interpreted as referring to a particular aspect of this personage in the particular context in which the adjective occurs. An adulterer and murderer can be said to have conducted himself in a way beyond reproach when he took vengeance for an outrage inflicted upon his father. A rascal easily persuaded to shoot treacherously at an unarmed man during a truce is an outstandingly able archer, and in this respect one can find no fault with him.

If these explanations for blameless Aegisthus and blameless Pandarus have any plausibility, we see here further evidence that Homer may not have been so casual in his use of epithets as he often seems to be. Normally, his epithets are best explained as wholly ornamental and used almost automatically, without conscious thought. But a number of studies published in the last decade or so have presented cases for the belief that there are passages in Homer where the poet has used some conscious thought in selecting an adjective. The degree of persuasiveness in the numerous arguments that have been presented for conscious artistry in Homer's use of epithets varies greatly. But taken together the arguments do make a reasonably good case for believing that Homer may now and then have chosen an epithet for its effectiveness and not

just because it happened to fit the meter. The passages involving blameless Aegisthus and blameless Pandarus are different from those that have normally played a role in this field of Homeric studies, but my analysis does suggest a deliberate choice of the epithet "blameless" and not a careless one.

I do not mean to imply that the situations involving Aegisthus and Pandarus are alike. In one, the epithet is applied to conduct on a particular occasion. In the other, it refers to a skill for which the character is famous. But, although the situations are different, the two passages do show the similarity of an epithet which is "generically" unsuitable, but which can be interpreted as fitting the context in which it occurs. Aegisthus was on the whole an unworthy character properly referred to as a wily weakling. But he acted correctly in avenging the outrage committed against his father. In a context in which this action is the focus of attention, he can justly be called ἀμύμων—οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ τότε, not by nature but at that time. Homer's picture of Pandarus is unfavorable, and we do not weep for him when he is killed in Book 5. And when Homer called him ἀμύμων in Book 4, he was playing a scoundrelly role. Such was his character both τότε and φύσει. But no one could find fault with his skill as an archer, and if it is this aspect of his nature that Homer has in mind he may quite properly call him blameless. In both of these passages, it was the context that determined the choice of the surprising adjective.

FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

AMBER, AVALLON, AND APOLLO'S SINGING SWAN

This paper explores the northern elements in the Greek Apollo. It does not argue for a "northern" rather than an "eastern" or Anatolian deity but takes for granted that Apollo is an intricate fabric of "northern" and "eastern" elements. In treating the vertical threads we presuppose, rather than deny, the horizontal.

Our chief concerns are those traditions linking Apollo with the North: the singing swans that draw his chariot and the amber legend with which his name is often associated.

I. Socrates, Orpheus, and the singing swan

Towards the end of Plato's myth of Er, famous souls, ready to be reincarnated, choose different forms for their new existence:

ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τὴν ποτε Ὀρφῆως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἰρουμένην, μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι . . . ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως.

(*Republic* 620A)

Er said he saw the soul that had once been Orpheus choosing a swan's life, because of her hatred for womankind. Since she had died at their hands, she did not wish to come into being again by being born in a woman. . . . He also saw a swan switching around to choose a human life, and other "musical" creatures likewise.

To avoid woman, Orpheus' soul chooses rebirth as the grammatically masculine swan; yet his soul is grammatically feminine. Alliteration underscores the paradox. It plays on *gyne* (woman), *genesthai* (become), *gennasthai* (be born), and *kyknos* (swan), recalling *Cratylus* 414A, where Socrates connects, etymologically, *gyne* (woman) and *gone* (birth). The swan awaiting rebirth chooses to be human. Thus Orpheus' soul and the swan—not the swan's soul, we note—seem to be alternating forms of one another.

Swans are proverbially beautiful singers, and able to predict their own deaths (Oppian, *Cynegetica* 2.540–50). To be swanlike is to greet

one's death with a song of exceptional beauty. So the choice made by Orpheus' soul is appropriate. Old, prophetic bards are often compared to swans in Classical poetry: κύκνος ὡς γέπων ᾄδιδός (Eur. *Heracles* 691–94). Vergil employs this idea in *Aeneid* 10.191–92 where he describes the metamorphosis of the Ligurian prince Cygnus (i.e. Swan) into a swan:

dum canit et maestum Musa solatur amorem
canentem molli pluma duxisse senectam.

While lightly singing and solacing his sad love with song, he whitely aged with soft feathers.

The vowel in *cano*, when extended, brings the singer to old age and whiteness. He becomes, like Horace in *Odes* 2.20, a swan.

Plato attributes this prophetic, swanlike quality to Socrates' old age. He transfers Apollo's swan from poetry to philosophy, a move Plutarch felt needed justification hundreds of years later.¹ In *The E at Delphi* 387C–D, Plutarch's Theon observes: "Apollo takes pleasure in the singing of swans and in the strumming of lyres. Why be surprised that he embraces and loves that part of discourse he sees philosophers using best and most often, since he is genuinely fond of dialectic?"

In a famous passage (*Phaedo* 84D–85B), Socrates hopes his own prophecy will match that of swans "who, though they also sing in earlier times, sing especially well when on the point of death, because they are about to go off to the god whose servant they are." They do not sing from grief: "Since they are Apollo's birds, they are prophetic. They know beforehand that what is in Hades' (or, to use the etymology of the *Cratylus*, "the Unseen") realm is good—and they take delight in a different way that day than they have ever delighted before."

Socrates' mission, Plato says, began with Apollo's oracle at Delphi (*Apology* 20E–21E). It ended, Plato points out, when the sacred ship returned from Apollo's Delian festival and Socrates was executed (*Phaedo* 58A–B; *Crito* 43C–D). Socrates' career is bounded by Apollo's major shrines; and his death is linked with the island of Apollo's birth.

¹ For the swan as Apollo's bird, see D'Arcy Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (London and Oxford 1936) 184. In Latin it is also Venus' bird. On its dying song, see W. G. Arnott, "Swan songs," *GR* 34.2 (1977) 149–53. My thanks for help with this paper go to: A. Ramage, P. Kuniholm, J. Garthwaite, S. Farrand, M. Winkler, S. Rogers, R. Hannah, J. Weinstein, and, above all, Richard Caldwell and the University of Southern California.

Here is how Callimachus describes Apollo's birth:

κύκνοι δὲ θεοῦ μέλποντες αἰοῖδοι
 Μηόνιον Πακτωλὸν ἐκυκλώσαντο λιπόντες
 ἑβδομάκις περὶ Δῆλον, ἐπήεισαν δὲ λοχείῃ
 Μουσάων ὄρνιθες, αἰοιδότατοι πετεηνῶν·
 ἔνθεν ὁ παῖς τοσσάσδε λύρη ἐνεδήσατο χορδὰς
 ὕστερον, ὅσσοι κύκνοι ἐπ' ὠδίνεσσιν αἶσαν . . .
 ὄγδοον οὐκέτ' αἶσαν . . .

(*Hymn* 4.249–55)

The swans, the god's prophetic singers, left Maeonian Pactolus, singing as they flew, and circled Delos seven times. These Muses' birds, most poetical and most prophetic of all winged creatures, sang at the delivery bed like bards. Because of this, the child later bound seven strings to his lyre, matching the number of times the birds sang over the pains of his birth.

The swans, whose finest song is usually reserved for their own deaths, hail the birth of their god. They are his poetic soul.

Ancient authors disagree as to what this finest swansong sounded like. Pliny (*NH* 10.32) denies swans sing at all. Philostratus (*Imagines* 1.9) describes the song as caused by the west wind (Zephyrus) blowing through the bird's feathers. Modern observers fare a little better.

E. A. Armstrong talks of the trumpeting of the whooper swan and the "wing-music" of the mute swan.² J. Fisher suggests that the whoopers—if you are bored—"sound like donkeys braying for their mothers"; but then again, "they may bring you from your sleeping tent as trumpeters of morning with their . . . magic music of bells."³ D'Arcy Thompson comments: "The concrete or literal interpretation is quite inadequate; it is beyond a doubt that the swan's song (like the Halcyon's) veiled, and still hides some mystical allusion."⁴

H. W. Robinson, however, gives an important clue with this description of a dying swan's song:

Wings fixed, he commenced at once his song which was continued until the water was reached nearly a mile away. Never before or since have I heard anything like the song of this stricken swan. It sounded at times like the running notes of an octave, most plaintive in character and

² E. A. Armstrong, *The Folklore of Birds* (London 1958) 47.

³ Cited in L. G. Paca *The Royal Birds* (New York 1963) 45.

⁴ Paca (note 3, above) 42.

musical in tone and, as the sound was borne to us, mellowed by the distance, we stood astounded and could only exclaim, "We have heard the song of a dying swan."⁵

The seven discrete notes of the octave—the eighth is a repetition, an octave higher, of the first—correspond to the swan circles over Delos honoring Apollo's birth, inspiring him to give the lyre extra strings.⁶ Apollo is the octave's divine discoverer as Pythagoras was its human discoverer. Hence Apollo's special magic to poets, and to Plato and Pythagoras, so concerned with music, number, and cosmic harmony.

Apollo, the swan's god, is the center of their revolutions, just as his Delphic shrine is the *omphalos*, the egg-shaped navel and center of the universe.⁷ We may also think of the harmony of the universe's seven outer spheres rotating about the center in *Republic* 10.616B–D—in the very myth of Er where Orpheus' soul chooses to be a swan.

The number seven, like the swan, is Apollo's. His festivals all fall on the seventh of the month.⁸ At Delphi his birth was celebrated on the 7th Busios; at Athens and Delos on the 7th Thargelion; at Cyrene on the 7th Carneios.⁹

Similar traditions cluster around Socrates and Plato, reputed to have been born on the same days as Artemis and Apollo respectively: the 6th and 7th Thargelion.¹⁰ Further, Socrates is said to have dreamed, the night before Plato became his student, that a swan flew into his breast; this dream may have been commemorated in a monument near the Academy (Pausanias 1.30.3).¹¹ Plato never claimed he actually *was* Apollo, as Lucian says Pythagoras maintained he was Apollo reincarnate.¹² But Apollonian symbolism, and Pythagoreans—much given to

⁵ Thompson (note 1, above) 183.

⁶ Callimachus, *Hymn* 4.249–55.

⁷ See H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1956) vol. 1, p. 6 and note 9; p. 14.

⁸ M. Nilsson, *Primitive Time Reckoning* (Lund 1920) 333–36.

⁹ Plutarch, *Greek Questions*, tr. with notes by W. R. Halliday (Oxford 1928) p. 60 (on 292D–F).

¹⁰ Plutarch, *Questions at a Banquet*, 717 D–E; Diogenes Laertius 2.44 (Socrates' birthday); 3.2 (Plato's). For Socrates, Plato, and Delphi see Parke and Wormell (note 7, above) vol. 1.401–6.

¹¹ For soul birds, see E. A. Armstrong (note 2, above) 211–24; G. Weicker, *Der Seelenvogel* (Leipzig 1902).

¹² *The Dream or the Rooster* 16; cf. *Dialogues of the Dead* 415 for Pythagoras as Euphorbus or Apollo; Diogenes Laertius 8.4 and 11. Compare the "innocent" account of Apollonius' birth in Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 1.5: cries of swans (suggesting Apollo), Zephyrs blowing (Hyacinth). His mother was "carried down into sleep" while her attendants were in a meadow gathering flowers (Persephone).

such symbolism—gathered around Socrates and Plato during their lives.¹³ We should suspect, as Porphyry did, that Socrates was not joking when he called the swans his fellow slaves (*On Abstinence* 3.286). The very drug so destructive to swans destroyed Socrates. Hemlock is fatal to swans—κύκνων δὲ κώνειον ὀλεθρος—Aelian observes (*On the Characteristics of Animals* 3.7).

To Plato, Apollo and his swans symbolize the injunction to self-knowledge, and the cyclical nature of being, no longer bounded by birth or by woman who gives birth, by the genetic forces defining the beginning and end of biological life. Callimachus makes a similar suggestion by poetic alliteration of *kyknoi* (swans) and *ekyklōsanto* (circled) in the passage cited above, as does Euripides in *IT* 1103–1105.

Singing swans mark the circling year with their migrations. When the Greek spring came, the swans would vanish towards the north, and not return until autumn, when everything else was starting to die. Their life-cycle was strangely reversed.

II. Swans and Hyperboreans

Lucian describes a fruitless search along the Po in Northern Italy for the fabled singing swan. When he asks his boatmen where the swans are, they say they have seen a few occasionally in the shallows, but that they make a feeble and musically uninspired croaking (*Amber of the Swans* 5).

The mute swan the boatmen describe is “rare as a breeding bird” in Italy; it was probably no more common in antiquity either in Italy or in mainland Greece, especially the Peloponnese.¹⁴ The singing swan or whooper would have been less common still. It breeds slightly below the Arctic circle; it might *winter* in north Italy—around the Po, as myth suggested—or in north Greece, but not breed there.¹⁵

¹³ J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London and Edinburgh 1892), for the myth of Er as Pythagorean and Apollo Hyperboreus as the chief Pythagorean god (97, note 3; 216–17); cf. his *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford 1911) notes, pp. 1 and 9 and R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge 1955) 29–31; Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.48; 3.11.17.

¹⁴ M. A. Ogilvie in *The Swans*, ed. P. Scott and the Wildfowl Trust (London 1972) 34. Swans were probably as rare in Egypt as in Egyptian hieroglyphs. Early Egyptologists interpreted the determinative for *htm* (perish) and *sh̄tm* (destroy) as “swan”; but J. Weinstein points out to me that the determinative is a white-fronted goose (cf. A.H. Gardiner *Egyptian Grammar*³ (Oxford 1957) Sign List G38, 471 and 583. Taking goose hieroglyphs as swans might appeal to Pythagoreans: for “perish” and “destroy” are popular Greek etymologies for Apollo.

¹⁵ Ogilvie (note 14, above) 43–44, reports nests as far south as 61° N.

In spring, when the impregnating Zephyrs blow, the swan leaves Greece; the hyacinth and delphinium die. Hence, perhaps, the rivalry between Apollo and Zephyrus as lovers of Hyacinthus—a rivalry which gives Hyacinth the chance to ride in Apollo's swan chariot, but causes his death.¹⁶ The west wind cannot bring fruitfulness to Hyacinth. Apollo, in whose chariot he rides, would be carrying him *away* from the Greek springtime to the Hyperborean lands beyond the north wind.¹⁷

The Hyperboreans are a holy people in an earthly paradise, who experience no disease, no fighting, no old age (Pindar, *Pythian* 10.31–34). They live peacefully and close to the sea, Herodotus says, summarizing what would be, if extant, the oldest reference to them: the *Arimaspea* of Aristeas of Proconnesus (4.13).¹⁸

You cannot reach the Hyperboreans either by land or sea, says Pindar (*Pythian* 10.29); and most stories of travel to and fro involve flight. Further, there is something *otherworldly* as well as northerly about their land.¹⁹ They live "in the farthest regions just below the temple of Apollo," the scholiast on Pindar, *Olympian* 3.18 declares, citing Pherenicus.²⁰ Antonius Liberalis and Iamblichus mention such a northern temple; Philostratus describes it (*Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 6.10–11).²¹ Diodorus says the temple is on an island no smaller than Sicily, round, and in the far north; Apollo was specially fond of it

¹⁶ Ibid. 47–49. Migrating swans would be present in Greece from October to May. See J. Kear in *The Swans* (note 14, above) 119–20.

¹⁷ Philostratus the Younger, *Imagines* 14. Cf. Lucian, *On Sacrifices* 4; *Dialogues of the Gods* 238; Athenaeus 139D; Pausanias 3.1.3; 3.19.5. The Zephyrs blow when trees bud (Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 3.4.2)—around February 8th (Pliny *NH* 16.39). See Pliny *NH* 8.167; 16.39 for wind-fertilization of animals; for Hyacinth, Apollodorus 1.3.3; H. Sichtermann, "Hyakinthos," *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Arch. Inst.* 71 (1956) 97–123; F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso Metamorphosen X–XI* (Heidelberg 1980) 66–72; L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford 1896–1909) 4.265; M. Mellink *Hyakinthos* (Utrecht 1943); cf. Polybius 8.28.2; First Vat. Myth. 117; Second Vat. Myth. 181; Apollodorus 3.10.3.

¹⁸ See J. D. P. Bolton, *Aristeas of Proconessus* (Oxford 1962) 22–23, 52–62, 100–3, and 195–97; cf. p. 71 and Pherenicus, fr. 272.

¹⁹ Bolton (note 18, above) 74–183.

²⁰ The Xanthus and Danube are mentioned as routes there: Pindar, *Olympian* 3.13; 8.46; cf. Bolton (note 18, above) 71.

²¹ *Metamorphoses* 20; *Life of Pythagoras* 91; cf. Bolton (note 18, above) 69 and 192; C. J. de Vogel, *Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism* (Assen 1966) 22–23; 142–57; 301–6; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1964) 135–79; Pausanias 10.5.9; Plutarch, *Pythian Oracle* 17; Heracl. Pont. fr. 51 W; Diodorus 2.47–48.

because it was the birthplace of his mother Leto (2.47). Perhaps the temple and its precinct recall the Hesperides and the ancient garden of Phoebus where Boreas carries the abducted Oreithyia:

ὕπέρ τε πόντον πάντ' ἐπ' ἔσχατα χθονὸς
 νυκτός τε παγὰς οὐρανοῦ τ' ἀναπτυχὰς
 Φοίβου τε παλαιὸν κῆπον . . .

(Strabo 7.3.1)

Over the entire ocean, to the world's limits, to night's springs, to heaven's counterfolds and Phoebus' ancient garden.

The fullest account is Aelian's (*On the Characteristics of Animals* 11.1), derived, he says, from Hecataeus of Abdera:

When the sons of Boreas and Chione (i.e. North Wind and Snow) . . . have performed the holy rites, there swoop down from the so-called Rhipaeian mountains swans in huge clouds. After they have gone around the temple, as if purifying it by their flight, they land in the temple precinct which is very large and very beautiful. And whenever the bards sing in their own inspired way to the god, and the harpists accompany the chorus with a harmonious melody, the swans join together in the music, and never sing a single note out of tune or discordant. But they take their cue as if from a conductor and sing along with those of the native inhabitants who are learned in the sacred melodies. Then, when the hymn and the customary honor to the god has been completed, this—if you'll pardon the expression—winged choir I have mentioned, having sung and intoned his praises, departs.

Certain elements in Aelian may be based on Delian ritual; some may survive in popular Christian notions of paradise. Others resemble north European myth.

The Hyperboreans themselves supposedly came to Delos with offerings, travelling from their homeland to Scythia, thence to the Adriatic, before entering Greece (Herodotus 4.32–35). Two girls, Hyperoche and Laodice, were their ambassadors, escorted by five men known as *perphorees* during their first visit: seven in all. Two other Hyperborean girls—sometimes Arge and Opis, though their names vary—came to Delos at the same time as Apollo and Artemis. They were honored in a hymn composed by Olen of Lycia, author of other ancient hymns sung by women at Delos.²² The two Hyperborean maidens could be

²² Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their Gods* (Boston 1950) 76–79 and Bolton, 22–23. W. Sale, "The Hyperborean Maidens on Delos," *Harvard Theological Review* 54 (1961) 75–89. Olen was either Lycian (Herodotus, loc. cit.; Pausanias 5.6.8) or Hyperborean (Pausanias 10.5.4).

doubles of or rivals for Leto and her sister Asteria, perhaps even for Artemis and Apollo. For the names given them by Callimachus, Loxo and Hecaerge, recall Apollo's own names Loxias and Hecaergos (*Hymn* 4.305).²³

The link between the Hyperboreans and the cults of Apollo is well attested in antiquity. Nowhere is this clearer than in the tradition that Apollo himself travelled to and from the land of the Hyperboreans in a swan chariot: κύκνοι τ' ἦσαν τὸ ἄρμα (Alcaeus, fr. 1-4 Bergk).²⁴ He drives, Nonnus observes, not a swift horse, but a winged swan: κύκνον ἄγων περρόεντα, καὶ οὐ ταχὺν ἵππον (*Dionysiaca* 38.202).

III. The *Phoenix* and the swan

Apollo is called Letoides after his mother Leto, although the naming of a son after his mother by matronymic is not common Greek practice.²⁵ Herodotus suggests it is uniquely Lycian.²⁶

If Wilamowitz is right, the name Leto is a variant of the Lycian word for woman: *lada*.²⁷ Apollo is then linked with a Lycian, or a more generally Anatolian female divinity whom tradition, at some point, took to be his mother.

Very little in the Apollo myths is clear. Even Delos, his birthplace, shifts shape and identity, beginning as a kind of divine meteorite originally called Asteria who "like a star, leaped from heaven, fleeing marriage with Zeus" (Callimachus, *Hymn* 4.36-38). Some sources suggest Asteria was Leto's sister who fled heaven, like Astraea in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1.149-50; she was first turned into a stone, then Ortygia (i.e. Quail Island), then Delos.²⁸ Even as an island, she wandered before

²³ Pausanias 9.27.2; Diodorus 2.47.7; [Plato] *Axiochus* 371A; Servius on *Aen.* 11.532. Bolton (note 18, above) 185, n. 5. One maiden, or her namesake, accompanies Diana in *Aeneid* 11.532-63 and 836-67.

²⁴ See D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1959) 244-52; Himerius, *Orations* 14.10. For Apollo in a swan (chariot), see H. Sichtermann, loc. cit. (note 17, above) and H. Metzger, *Les Représentations dans la céramique attique du IV^{ème} siècle*, Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 172 (Paris 1951) 171.

²⁵ Guthrie, (note 23, above) 83.

²⁶ Guthrie, loc. cit. argues that "the emphasis on the mother is rather an Anatolian than a peculiarly Lycian characteristic."

²⁷ *Glaube der Hellenen*, vol. 1 (Berlin 1931) 324-28 and vol. 2 (Berlin 1932) 28-30; cf. his earlier "Apollon," *Hermes* 38 (1903) 575-86.

²⁸ Hesiod *Theogony* 18; 196-225; 408-10; 918-20; Hyginus *Fab.* 53; 55; 140; Hom. *Hymns* 3.16; Apollodorus 1.4.1; Ovid *Met.* 6.157-381; Statius *Ach.* 1.388. Cf. J. Fontenrose, *Python: A Study of the Delphic Myth and its Origin* (Berkeley 1959) 13-22.

becoming the birthplace for her sister's children, who were born to the god *she* had fled heaven to escape. Leto and her sister Asteria, subsequently Delos, seem like variants of one tradition.

Leto's usual symbol is the *phoenix*: the palm tree which gave her support and rest during her labor.²⁹ Now although palms, Pliny notes, grow in Europe, they are sterile there: the palm bears fruit only in a hot climate.³⁰ Leto's *phoenix* is at its *northern* limits in Delos much as Apollo's swan is at its *southern* limits. If the swan and *phoenix* were solar symbols, as we shall see they probably were, this odd feature might help explain why Delos was home to a cult of the solstices.³¹

The *phoenix*, in Pythagorean symbolic interpretations of Egyptian hieroglyphics, represents the year. "It is the only tree producing a branch at each rising of the moon; it completes the year in twelve branches. . . . To represent a month, the Egyptians show either a palm tree or a moon inverted" (Horapollo 1.3; 1.4). So Leto is linked with the *phoenix*, symbolic of the moon and the lunar calendar. But the *phoenix* is not the only hieroglyphic symbol for the year. The primary symbol is "Isis, that is to say 'woman': Ἰσὶν, τοῦτέστι γυναικᾶ" (1.3).³² If Leto's name itself means "woman," her *phoenix* and "woman" would be interchangeable anyway.

Of the palms Pliny mentions one variety is able to die and be reborn from itself: *intermori ac renasci ex seipsa*—an ability shared with the *phoenix* bird "who, it is thought, takes its name from this palm" (NH 13.42). In Egyptian, as in Greek, *phoenix* designates both the mythical sun bird, the phoenix, and the palm tree; as bird, it is a waterfowl, itself reputedly born beneath a tree.³³ The *phoenix* bird

²⁹ Callimachus *Hymn* 2.4–5; 4.210; Hom. *Hymns* 3.117; *Odyssey* 6.162–65. For Apollo's Delian palm, see Pausanias 8.43.3; Cicero, *de Leg.* 1.1; Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 4.13.2; Pliny NH 16.99; cf. the Delian palm Odysseus compares Nausicaa to in *Odyssey* 6.160–63. For Leto's tree as the olive, see Callimachus fr. 194; *Hymn* 4.262.

³⁰ NH. 13.26–28; cf. Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 2.2.10; 3.3.5.

³¹ Cf. C. H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1979) 109. Syrie, island of the solstices in *Odyssey* 15.403–6 is often identified with Delos. Cf. P. Walz, "ΤΡΟΓΙΑΙ ΗΕΛΙΟΙΟ: notes sur l'Odyssée, XV, 404," *Révue des Études Homériques* 1 (1931) 3–15; W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer* (London 1959) 256–57.

³² On Isis and Leto see V. F. Vanderlip, *The Four Greek Hymns of Isidorus and the Cult of Isis*, American Studies in Papyrology, 12 (Toronto 1972) 18–19; J. Tatum, *Apuleius and the Golden Ass* (Ithaca 1979) 184.

³³ On the bird *phoenix* see A. Lloyd, *Herodotus: Book II, Commentary 1–98* (*Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain* 48) (Leiden 1975–76) 317–22 and Thompson (note 1, above) 306–9.

comes to bury its father at the temple of the Sun in Heliopolis (Herodotus 2.73). Horapollo observes:

When they want to denote a soul (ψυχὴν) spending a lot of time there, they depict the *phoenix* bird because it lives longest of all creatures in the world; it denotes a great flood, because it is a symbol of the sun—ἡλίου ἐστὶν ὁ φοῖνιξ σύμβολον—which is greater than anything else in the universe.

(Horapollo 1.34)

The *phoenix* bird is usually male. But the *tree*, though usually female, may be either masculine or feminine. The *male* tree flowers, the *female* produces its fruit without flowering (Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 1.13.4). In *phoenix*, then, we find a *tree* symbolizing the female, birth, the twelve-month year, and the moon. We also find a *waterbird* symbolizing the male, centuries, the sun, and the soul. Most of these elements are present in the cults of the twin gods Apollo and Artemis. Indeed the bisexual *phoenix* may correspond to the Phoibos and Phoibe names linked to Apollo and Artemis, the sun and the moon. Phoibe, in fact, is the name of Leto's mother in some versions of the myth.³⁴ Through Leto and the *phoenix*, Apollo is linked to woman, to Egyptian and near-eastern lunar and solar symbolism, and to notions of time.

This lore is interwoven with the Hyperborean Apollo and his swan. For the swan, like the *phoenix*, is important to the calendar. The *phoenix* bird marks the movements of centuries; the swan the shorter cycles of individual human life—it migrates *annually*.³⁵ As the *phoenix* tree marks the months by the growth of its branches, the swan gives the divisions of seven dividing the month. The *phoenix*, Philostratus says, is the size and appearance of an eagle; and it shares with the swan the ability to sing its own death song (*Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 3.49).

³⁴ See Apollodorus 1.2.2; Hesiod, *Theogony* 136, 404, 409 with M. L. West ad loc. in *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford 1976); cf. Pliny *NH* 4.66.

³⁵ The *phoenix* also signifies in hieroglyphs a man returning from a prolonged residence abroad (Horapollo 1.35). In A.D. 34 the *phoenix* itself was reported to have returned: Tacitus, *Annals* 6.28. Plutarch (*Isis and Osiris* 354 E-F, and 363 F) compares Pythagorean symbolism with Egyptian hieroglyphs. J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride* (Cambridge 1970) 287, denies hieroglyphs are used symbolically. But see Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 8; Clement Alex. *Stromata* 5.555; Horapollo 2.39 has a metaphorical swan hieroglyph.

In Delos we find the *phoinix* tree, but not the *phoinix* bird. Instead we have the swan. Callimachus finds the subarctic bird and tropical palm at ease together in their love of Apollo:

ἐπένευσεν ὁ Δῆλιος ἡδύ τι φοῖνιξ
ἐξαπίνης, ὁ δὲ κύκνος ἐν ἡέρι καλὸν αἶδει.

(*Hymn* 2.4-5)

The Delian palm gives a sweet and sudden nod, the airborne swan sings beautifully.

We might now ask a double question. Did the *phoinix* tree displace a northern fruit-bearing tree, and did the swan displace the *phoinix* bird to yield the curious blend of northern and middle-eastern elements in Apollo? Is the swan, like the *phoinix*, a solar waterbird—making its middle eastern counterpart superfluous in Delos, island of the solstice cult?

IV. Leda and the swan

The most famous Greek female associated with swans is Leda, the Spartan princess often identified as mother of Castor and Pollux, and of Helen and Clytemnestra. Leda's name has been traced to the same word for "woman" we find in Leto.³⁶

The familiar story tells how Zeus, disguised as a swan, raped Leda. But there are other versions. An old legend has Helen as child of Nemesis; the egg she is hatched from is brought by Hermes to Leda who acts as a surrogate brooding-hen.³⁷ In Attic pottery of the fourth century B.C., representations of Helen's birth usually show an egg on an altar; on either side of the altar are Castor and Pollux, Leda, and sometimes, Tyndareus. When a bird is shown, it is an eagle, not a swan.³⁸ Euripides' *Helen* sheds further light. Helen introduces herself as child of Tyndareus, then comments:

³⁶ A. H. Krappe, "ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΚΥΚΝΟΣ," *CP* 37 (1942) 353-70, especially p. 363: "*Leda*, Dor. *Lada* cannot be separated from *Leto*, Dor. *Lato* (whence Latin Latonia). The word is generally thought to be the equivalent of Gr. γυνή, "woman," and the goddess would then be woman par excellence." Cf. Wilamowitz (note 22, above). Krappe's article has been well but cautiously received: see Guthrie (note 23, above) 82 and Dodds (note 21, above) 161-62, note 36.

³⁷ See H. Metzger (note 24, above) 277-86; cf. J. D. Beazley, *Etruscan Vase Painting* (Oxford 1947) 39-40.

³⁸ For a list see Beazley, (note 37, above) 40; cf. *ibid.* p. 41, numbers 2, 4, 7, 12, 13; also Metzger, (note 24, above) 277-79; F. Chapoutier, "*Léda devant l'oeuf de Nemesis*,"

Some say, of course, that Zeus flew to my mother Leda, taking the shape of a bird, a swan, who deceitfully consummated their union while fleeing pursuit by an eagle—ὅπ' αἰετοῦ δίωγμα φεύγων.

(*Helen* 17-22)

This odd story—Helen calls it a *logos*—introduces a motif of two birds who battle each other throughout Greek and Latin literature, beginning in *Iliad* 15.692: the swan and the eagle. In *Aeneid* 1.393-400, Venus describes an attack on a flight of twelve swans by a single eagle, described as Jupiter's bird, *Iovis ales*. The swans survive, as swans usually do in these fights, for reasons given by Aristotle in *Historia Animalium* 9.615B and elaborated by D' Arcy Thompson:

The mythology of the swan is inseparable from the phenomena attending the constellation Cygnus. The stellar swan lies in the Milky Way, "the river of Heaven," near to the constellation Lyra . . . it rose a little in advance of the Eagle, but, lying more to the north, it only set some time after the Eagle had gone down, that is to say it was attacked by the Eagle but in turn defeated it . . . at its own rising the Virgin (Leda) was in mid-heaven, and the twins Castor and Pollux were just setting in the west.³⁹

Adding to the astronomical complexity is the fact that the eagle is a *solar* bird associated with Zeus.⁴⁰

Thompson suggests that Leda was originally herself a swan attacked by an eagle; and A. H. Krappe identifies *Leda*, as Wilamowitz does *Leto*, with "woman."⁴¹ Thus the bird attacking Leda would more logically be an eagle than a swan. What happened mythically may be as follows: since tradition eventually made the swan male, the swan and Leda had to be distinguished. The eagle became superfluous; its presence in pottery and in the *Helen* is the survival of an older tradition which had yet to rationalize all the separate elements.

Perhaps the story originally told how the eagle caught the swan, as in Statius' *Thebaid* 9.858-62, during its moment of rest on the water;

BCH 66-67 (1942-43) 1-21; R. Kekule von Stradonitz, *Die Geburt der Helena aus dem Ei* (Berlin 1908). Helen is often shown as the child of Nemesis; cf. Apollodorus 3.10.7.

³⁹ Thompson (note 1, above) 184; also 7, 12, 183-85 for conflicts between eagles and swans. Exceptions to the "victorious swan" are the similes of Turnus killing Lycus (*Aen.* 9.563-66) and Dryas killing Parthenopaeus (*Thebaid* 9.858-62).

⁴⁰ Thompson (note 1, above) 3-4 for the eagle as Zeus' bird and as a solar emblem; p. 184 for the swan and Apollo. Swan and eagle combine in Pythagoras' white eagle (Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 132; Aelian, *VH* 4.17; Pausanias 8.17.3 (with Thompson, p.178.)

⁴¹ Note 36, above.

swan-maidens, E. A. Armstrong observes, can be caught only when they are on water, when they have removed their wings: at the moulting season.⁴² They can be kept only until they find their wings and fly away.

The Leda myth involves much "twinning." Two different birds are associated with her, one, I suspect, originally male (the eagle), the other originally female (the swan). There are two sets of twins: one male (Castor and Pollux), one female (Clytemnestra and Helen).⁴³ The only combination missing is twins of which one is male and the other female. But if we concede Wilamowitz's and Krappe's arguments that *Leto* and *Leda* derive from words meaning "woman," Leto and Leda are themselves doubles.⁴⁴ Therefore Apollo and Artemis complete the series; they are twins of which one is male, the other female.

The individuals within the resulting "pairs" differ in interesting ways. Clytemnestra and Helen are two "swan" maidens who marry two "eagle" men: Agamemnon and Menelaus, Aeschylus' "eagle-brood."⁴⁵ Clytemnestra stays home, but kills her husband when he returns with yet another swan-like, prophetic woman, Cassandra.⁴⁶ Helen leaves her husband—as migrating swan-maidens tend to—but is recaptured. This treachery of swan-maidens explains another feature of the myth of Er, where Agamemnon's soul chooses rebirth as an eagle:

τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ Ἀγαμέμνωνος ἔχθρᾱ δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου
γένους διὰ τὸ πάθος ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον.

(*Republic* 620B)

The next up after her (i.e. Orpheus' soul) was the soul of Agamemnon. Through hatred of the human race because of what she had suffered, she exchanged human form for that of an eagle.

There is no learning, only hatred, from suffering. The misanthropy of Agamemnon's soul is symbolized by her reincarnation as an

⁴² Note 2, above, 47–61, especially p. 55; in Apollodorus 3.10.7, Leda turns into a goose to avoid rape—so Zeus turns into a swan.

⁴³ Cf. Armstrong (note 2, above) 50: "underlying the twin legends is the belief in double paternity . . . when a god intervenes, twins result. . . . The intervening divinity is often thought of as appearing in animal form." The paternity of Castor and Pollux is also disputed: W. H. Roscher *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (Leipzig 1897–1902) 1.1154–55; Farnell (note 17, above) 224 and Halliday (note 9, above) 117–18.

⁴⁴ See note 36, above.

⁴⁵ Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 103–9.

⁴⁶ *Agamemnon* 1444–47.

eagle. Orpheus, who was also destroyed by as well as born of woman, rejects woman. Agamemnon, more soured by swan-maidens, rejects humanity totally. On the one side we have the swan, the prophetic poet, and Apollo; on the other the eagle, the warrior, and Zeus. The prophet, like the waterbird that is his (or her) symbol, oscillates between sexes.⁴⁷ For in Greek literature, whiteness symbolizes the feminine (as it does in pottery), as well as swans, and northerly people, much as a tan color symbolizes the masculine, eagles, and other people. The swan symbolizes not only Orpheus, but Cassandra. There are even prophets who, like Teiresias, change sex.

Of the remaining pairs, Apollo and Artemis are of opposite sexes and eventually become identified with the Sun and Moon respectively. Castor and Pollux are brothers, one immortal, one mortal, alternating between light and darkness. If the eagle and swan were not just rivals, but rival symbols of light, a common linking motif would emerge among all the pairs: that of the light and the banished light.

V. The swan priest

Of the seven mythic heroes named Cygnus (i.e. "Swan"), the best known is Ares' son who built a temple of skulls to Apollo at Pagasae. This Cygnus is killed by Heracles in the Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles*.⁴⁸ In another version, derived from the Cyclic poets and alluded to in the AB scholia to *Iliad* 23.346, Heracles and his horse Arion defeat Cygnus in a chariot race at Pagasae. Both versions connect Cygnus with Pagasae and with Apollo. Farnell argues that, despite Apollo's wrath with him in the *Shield*, Cygnus was originally "the friend or priest" of Apollo, whose name suggests "the Hyperborean priest of Apollo."⁴⁹

The Hyperborean connection is secure enough. Cygnus' battle with Heracles is introduced by a description of Heracles' shield, on whose rim Ocean is represented, teeming with noisy swans (315–17).

⁴⁷ See M. Gimbutas, *The Gods and Goddesses of Old Europe 7000–3500 B.C.* (London 1974) 112–50, especially 132–36 (the bisexuality of the water-bird deity).

⁴⁸ *Shield* 57–140; 318–480; cf. Stesichorus fr. 12 (Bergk) cited by the scholiast on Pindar, *Olympian* 10.15 and 17.

⁴⁹ Op. cit. (note 17, above) 4.273. See however J. Fontenrose (note 28, above) 68. Cygnus' unpleasantness suggests preference for Heracles in the tradition and a darker side to Apollo himself. For human sacrifice at Apollo's feasts, see Farnell 4.267, note 6 and 4.274–79. Parke and Wormell (note 7, above) 340–44 recognize the rivalry, even enmity, between Heracles and Apollo. Orpheus too was once Apollo's rival.

The seven Cygnuses—like Socrates—are in stories which “always emphasize their death and their association with Apollo.” Farnell concludes (p. 273):

Therefore, though the lexicographers give us seven, we may believe in one ‘swan,’ a shadowy, sacerdotal figure of the north Greek or “Hyperborean” Apolline worship, who dies in the service of his god, and whose legend is carried about, and becoming confused, begets many other ‘swan,’ who play strange, sometimes epic, parts, but whose actions and sufferings betray something of their original significance.

Cygnus’ fights pit priest against warrior, an antagonism as old as the *Iliad*, paralleling the antagonism of the priestly bird, the swan, to the warrior bird, the eagle. Apollo’s bird fights Zeus’. So the enmity between Zeus’ child Heracles, and Cygnus is predictable.

The most complete Swan hero in Classical literature is the warrior priest Amphiarus in the *Thebaid*. Like Orpheus, Amphiarus is a prophetic singer destroyed by a woman—his wife, Eriphyle—who yearned to possess Harmonia’s necklace and betrayed Amphiarus to get it. Amphiarus is Apollo’s priest, buried alive when his chariot crashes into the underworld where, Sophocles’ chorus suggests, he becomes “king of the dead” (*Electra* 837–39). He is the first of the Argive seven to die in the Theban war (*Thebaid* 7.795–823). The motto on his shield is the Apollonian “conquered Pytho” (4.221–22). His troops are from Apollo’s town, Amyclae, and from Eurotas “home to swans—*oloriferi Eurotae*” (4.233; 227). His soldiers wear a *Ledaeus apex*, surely a crest of swan-feathers (4.236); he himself is a vision of snowy whiteness when he competes in the chariot race at the first Nemean games:

ipse habitu niveus, nivei dant colla iugales,
concolor est albis et cassis et infula cristis.

(*Thebaid* 6.326–31)

He himself wore clothing the color of snow, and snow-white was the team that put its neck into the yoke. His helmet and his priestly band match the whiteness of his plumes.

His lead horse is named *Cygnus*: bred from Castor’s famous horse Cyllarus while Castor was away with the Argonauts (6.528–30). Amphiarus and Cygnus might have won full honors in the race, had Neptune not intervened to ensure that his horse *Arion* came in first—though

without its charioteer (6.499–530). The similarities with the Hesiodic race at Pagasae are surely obvious.⁵⁰

Other elements show Amphiarus is a swan priest of the Cygnus type: he takes the omens for the war of the Seven against Thebes from a flight of swans attacked by seven eagles (3.527–47). The swans, of course, survive the attack; the eagles, except for one, perish. Among the fallen eagles Amphiarus sees himself. The swan-priest, compelled to become a warrior, dies as one of the eagles.

The linking of swan and horse in the chariot race imagery in the *Thebaid* recalls Plato's description of the human soul as a chariot drawn by two horses, one good, one evil. (*Phaedrus* 244–47).⁵¹ The good horse is high-necked and white—suggesting a swan—the evil horse stout-necked and dark—suggesting an eagle, hawk, or raven. It is the Orpheus and the Agamemnon in each of us. Man's soul, being imperfect, cannot control its chariot, loses its divine feathers and falls to earth where it must dwell. The idea of the soul losing its wings and falling suggests the Icarus myth; but its fall, unlike Icarus', is a *temporary* loss of feathers—a birdlike moulting. It will fly again and return to the sky.

The notion of humans having difficulty controlling their horses, however, suggests above all Phaethon. And Phaethon is certainly on Statius' mind in the chariot race. Heracles' erstwhile horse Arion which comes home first ahead of Cygnus, is not driven by its new owner, Adrastus, king of Argos. It is driven by Polynices, son of Oedipus, who

⁵⁰ Arion was the child of Poseidon who turned himself into a stallion when Demeter eluded his attack by changing into a mare (Pausanias 8.25.4–7); first mentioned in *Iliad* 23.346–47; first owned by Oncus, next by Heracles, finally by Adrastus, Eriphyle's brother and Amphiarus' brother-in-law (Pindar, *Nemean* 9.12–62). Amphiarus is everywhere associated with horses and chariots; his horse is named only in Statius' *Thebaid*. See also note 113, below.

⁵¹ Parmenides, fr. 1 (= Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* 7.3 and Simplicius *De Caelo* 557.25) describes his progress to knowledge as a journey in a chariot with blazing axle; and he is escorted by the Heliades. More detailed than Plato's is Dio Chrysostom's Zoroastrian cosmic chariot (*Discourse* 36). This is not, as T. Gomperz claimed, Dio's invention (*Griechische Denker*, vol. 1 [Leipzig 1896] 65) but, as L. A. Campbell observes: "a Magian conception of the elemental powers of the cosmos, roughly contemporary with the Mithraic mysteries" (*Mithraic Iconography and Ideology, Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain* 11 [Leiden 1968] 157; also 159–62 and plates XXII and XXIII for correspondences with the Mithraic chariot of the Dieburg relief). See also S. Gilman, "The Uncontrollable Steed: A study of the Metamorphosis of a Literary Image," *Euphorion* 66 (1972) 32–54.

is unable to control his borrowed, divine horse, and falls out of the chariot. Statius pointedly compares Polynices' failure and fall with that of Phaethon (6.316-25).

VI. The singer metamorphosed

Of the seven swan heroes one is often connected with north European peoples. Pausanias 10.30.3 tells us:

The swan—the bird, that is—is famous as a musician because they say a musician named "Swan" became king of the Ligurians who live on the other side of the Eridanus, beyond the Celtic kingdoms; when he dies, by Apollo's decision, he was turned into the bird of that name, so they say.

The identification of "Swan" as a Ligurian involves a word-play with the Greek λιγύς: "clear and melancholy."⁵² In the *Palatine Anthology* (2.72 [414]), Vergil is described as a "swan, clear-voiced and melancholy—λιγύθροος κύκνος," a beautiful multiple entendre. Vergil was from Gallic-speaking Mantua, close to the Po, reputed home of singing swans. And the melancholy of Vergil's poetry is inescapable. Further, in *Aeneid* 10.185-203, Mantua's contingent coming to Aeneas' aid is listed right after the Ligurian squadron, led by Cinyrus. Cinyrus is accompanied by Cupavo, son of Ligurian Cygnus who was transformed first into a swan, then into a constellation through grief at his friend Phaethon's death.⁵³

The most familiar version of the Phaethon myth, Ovid's, also mentions Ligurians. *Metamorphoses* 1.747-2.380 tells how the Sun's son, Phaethon, is permitted to drive his father's chariot for a day. The result is a disastrous cosmic fire, ended when Jupiter destroys Phaethon with a thunderbolt. Phaethon's body, still burning, crashes

⁵² In Homer, λίγως suggests lamentation: the sound is not only clear but melancholy (*Iliad* 19.20; *Odyssey* 10.201; 11.391; 16.216; 21.56). E. Livrea, *Apollonii Rhodii Argonauticon Liber IV*, Biblioteca di Studi Superiori, vol. 60 (Florence 1973) on *Argon.* 4.605 adduces Oppian *Cynegetica* 3.103 which catches something of this flavor: μύρονται λίγως δδινόν γόον.

⁵³ For the variants of Cinyrus' name, see R. A. B. Mynors, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford 1969) ad loc. I prefer *Cinyre*: the Heliades' grief is described as "κινυρόν . . . γόον" in *Argon.* 4.605; Livrea (note 52, above) points out ad loc. that κινυρός occurs only here in Apollonius, and only once in Homer (*Iliad* 17.5). κινύρομαι, uncommon earlier, is popular with Alexandrians and their successors. A Ligurian prince whose name suggests lament in both his nation and his name (λιγύς and κινυρός) might have appealed to Vergil.

into the river Eridanus; his sisters, the Heliades, weep until they become trees and their tears amber. Phaethon's friend Cygnus is metamorphosed into a swan.⁵⁴

Why, we must ask, is Swan a friend of the Sun's child?

VII. The solar chariot

Anne Ross observes:

The swan comes into full prominence as a cult bird in the Urnfield and Hallstatt phases of European prehistory. The evidence strongly suggests that this bird was especially associated with the solar cults which were widespread in Europe, and which can be traced from the Bronze Age, into the Iron Age, certain of the motifs eventually being incorporated into early Christian iconography.⁵⁵

The swan was a cult bird in Northern Europe during the height of Celtic power from, roughly, the end of the Bronze Age to the fourth and third centuries B.C. when the Celts sacked Rome and wrought havoc in Greece and Asia Minor.

There are remarkable rock engravings along the Scandinavian Baltic coast, and the west coast of Norway dating from the sixteenth century B.C. depicting, among other things, swans, horses, boats, and

⁵⁴ In most versions Phaethon falls into the Eridanus; in Lucretius 5.397-405, he simply falls to earth. *Aen.* 10.185-203 has the Heliades changing into *poplars* (Ovid does not), but does not mention Apollo. Euripides' *Hippolytus* 732-51 refers to the Heliades' tears and the Eridanus; see W. S. Barrett, *Euripides' Hippolytus* (Oxford 1964) 299-306. The evidence is summarized by F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso Metamorphosen*, Buch I-III (Heidelberg 1969) ad loc., and by J. Diggle, *Euripides' Phaethon* (Cambridge 1970) 4-32 and 180 ff; A. H. Krappe, "Phaethon," *Review of Religion* 8 (1944) 115-29; Livrea (note 52, above) 159-282; J. G. Frazer, *Apollodorus, the library*, Loeb Classical texts (London 1921) 388-94; also A. Bouché-Leclerc, *L'Astrologie Grecque* (Paris 1899) 373 and 439 and the sources cited, especially Firmicus 2.2.2: *quam nos Iovem vocamus, Aegyptii* Φαέθοντα vocant; cf. the Commagene Lion inscription identifying the three bright planets: Πυρρόεις Ἡρακλ[έους], Στῆβων Ἀπόλλωνος, Φαέθων Διός.

⁵⁵ *Pagan Celtic Britain*, Studies in Iconography and Tradition (London 1967) 234; cf. P. Gelling and H. Davidson, *The Chariot of the Sun and Other Rites and Symbols of the Northern Bronze Age* (New York 1969) 117: "The principal new element which appears in Scandinavia in the second half of the Bronze Age consists of the bird and the associated bird-ship, both ultimately connected with the sun . . . the artist wished to represent two separate actions: flying by day and swimming by night. The bird chosen . . . must have been the most powerful they knew of those able to do so—the swan"; cf. J. de Vries, *Keltische Religion* (Stuttgart 1967) 132: "Das Pferd und der Schwann . . . sollen ausserdem einen Sonnenkult andeuten."

other figures in a context of solar imagery. In a brilliant paper, Ernst Sprockhoff showed how this imagery developed into the concept of a solar chariot, and how this solar chariot came from northwest Europe to Greece.⁵⁶

Sprockhoff traced the development from a horse-drawn sun image—which had its highest artistic realization in the fourteenth century B.C. Trundholm chariot found in Denmark—to a swan chariot—the most remarkable of which is the Dupljaja model of around the twelfth century B.C. found in Yugoslavia.⁵⁷ The bronze Trundholm “chariot” is a horse mounted on wheels followed by a solar disk, mounted on wheels. The Dupljaja model is a chariot; in it is inscribed a solar disk upon which an anthropomorphic figure rides. The chariot poles develop into swans at the extremities: The swans *are* the chariot, just as the Alcaeus fragment would have us believe was true of Apollo’s chariot: *κόκνοι τ’ ἦσαν τὸ ἄρμα*. “The model,” it has been observed, “is essentially the exact equivalent of the Trundholm chariot, with birds taking the place of the horse, and a human figure replacing the upright disk.”⁵⁸

In the Dupljaja model the sun motif has been subordinated to the anthropomorphic representation; the swan entirely replaces the horse. No longer is there an *obviously* solar, driverless chariot with horse and sun; only a swan chariot with an anthropomorphic driver.

The swan makes clearer sense as a solar bird in northern Europe than in the Mediterranean: its departure heralds the prolonged winter; its return the prolonged summer light. Hence, no doubt, the solar swan *boat* in Scandinavia, where the sun appears to move across the surface of the water rather than to set during summertime, as it does among the Laestrygonians (*Od.* 10.81–86). In the south, the swan’s return heralds winter and coldness; its departure, spring. We should *expect* a paradoxical element in the Greek swan tradition. As with the Dupljaja chariot, we must remove the anthropomorphic figure to detect the solar

⁵⁶ “Nordische Bronzezeit und frühes Griechentum,” *Bremer Archäologische Blätter* 3 (1962) 28–110 = *Jahrbuch des römisch-germanischen Zentralmuseums* 1 (1954) 28–110; cf. Armstrong (note 2, above) 3–24; Gelling and Davidson (note 55, above) *passim*.

⁵⁷ For illustrations, see M. J. Mellink and J. Filip, *Propyläen Kunstgeschichte*, Band 13 (Berlin 1974) plate LIV and p. 326; Gelling and Davidson (note 55, above), frontispiece for the Trundholm chariot. For the Dupljaja model see Mellink and Filip, plate 332 and pp. 302–3. For analytical illustration of the Dupljaja model, see Sprockhoff (note 56, above) Tafel 7.

⁵⁸ Sprockhoff (note 56, above) 71; Gelling and Davidson (note 55, above) 119.

symbol. But beneath Apollo and his swan chariot, such a symbol lurks, as Clymene's lament in Euripides' *Phaethon* suggests:

ὦ καλλιφεγγὲς Ἥλι' ὥς μ' ἀπώλεσας
καὶ τόνδ' · Ἀπόλλων δ' ἐν βροτοῖς ὀρθῶς καλῇ,
ὅστις τὰ σιγῶντ' ὀνόματ' οἶδε δαιμόνων

224–26 (Diggle)

Beautifully gleaming Sun, how appallingly you have destroyed me and him! How rightly you are called Apollo among mortals by anyone who knows the unspoken names of gods!⁵⁹

As Apollo lurks beneath Helios, "sun," so "brightness" and "light" lurk beneath the Greek word *kyknos*, "swan." According to some etymological explanations *kyknos* derives from an Indo-European root meaning "shine."⁶⁰ The solar myths linked with the swan in Greek suggest that Greeks too were aware of its solar implication. Further, Latin gradually set aside the word for swan it already had, and shared with Celtic—*olor*—in favor of the more mysterious *cygnus*, which is *kyknos* Latinized.

Numerous Roman writers derive *ignis*, "fire" from *gnasci* or *gigni*, "to be born."⁶¹ Varro points out in *Lingua Latina* 5.64 that what in his day is written G was, by the ancients, written C: *antiquis enim quod nunc G C*; and he explains Ennius' etymology of Ceres from *gerit* (produces) in this way. *Cygnus* could then be related to (*g*)*igni*: the bird born by fire, the northern *phoenix*, if you will.⁶² Something similar was

⁵⁹ The earliest certain identification of Apollo and Helios; see Diggle (note 54, above) ad loc. and pp. 147–48, who argues convincingly that Aeschylus *Suppliants* 212–14 makes this identification too. *Agamemnon* 1080–82 is the earliest detected pun on Apollo and the verb ἀπόλλυμι (Diggle, p. 146).

⁶⁰ E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque* (Heidelberg/Paris 1923) 582 suggests a common root with Sanskrit *çócati*, "shine" and compares ἀλφός and its Latin cognate *albus*.

⁶¹ Lucretius 1.891–92; 783–84; cf. J. M. Snyder, *Puns and Poetry in Lucretius* (Amsterdam 1980) 131–32. Note also Vergil's description of Cygnus' son's helmet (*Aeneid* 10.188): *formaeque insigne paternae*; Cygnus was metamorphosed in grief at Phaethon's fiery death. The element *ignis* lurks for the ancient writer trained in Plato and Varro in *insignis* and *cygnus*.

⁶² On *olor* see A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine*⁴ (Paris 1967) 461 and the comparisons with Celtic *ela* and *eleirch*; cf. Thompson (note 1, above) p. 1 on ἔγλυ, a bird name probably cognate with Latin *olor*, Irish *ela* and Welsh *alarch*. On Varronian etymologies see R. Schröter, *Studien zur Varronischen Etymologie* I (Wiesbaden 1959); F. Cairns, *Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome* (Cambridge 1979) 90–110; J. Starobinski, *Les Mots sous Les Mots* (Paris 1971); also J. Rijlaarsdam, *Platon über die Sprache* (Utrecht 1978).

probably on Plato's mind when he wrote of Orpheus' soul becoming a swan, with all the word plays on woman, birth, and coming into being that occur there.

The swan, then, like the *phoenix* is a sun bird, and it seems to have triumphed over its eastern counterpart in the cult of Apollo.

We now turn to a myth recorded by Apollonius in *Argonautica* 4.611–17 just after his narration of the Argonauts' arrival at the Eridanus where Phaethon's body smoulders, and where his sisters drop their amber tears into the water:

But the Celts have another story: that these are the tears of Apollo, son of Leto, which are carried on the swirling waters, tears beyond number that he shed when he came to the Holy Hyperboreans. He left the gleaming heavens, exiled from his father, and angry about his son whom lovely Coronis had borne to him at the Amyrus estuary. That is the way the story is sung among those men.

The reference is to Apollo's son Asclepius, killed by Zeus for, in effect, conferring immortality on mankind, for being a healer.⁶³ Again we are reminded of rivalry between Apollo and Zeus. But we should also note that Asclepius was born, according to Pindar, *Pythian* 3, after being rescued from his dead mother's womb while she was being cremated on a funeral pyre.⁶⁴ Thus the child is born, *phoenix*-like, from the flames and is himself destroyed by fire. In this Celtic version Apollo has replaced the Sun, Asclepius has replaced Phaethon. The swan has vanished, as have the amber-bearing trees. In place of a grieving bird and grieving trees we have the grieving Apollo.

Other versions of the solar chariot myth show different divergences from what is now the Ovidian canon. In Plato's *Timaeus* 22C–D, Amasis says there is an Egyptian version of Phaethon's death which explains it as "a realignment of things in heaven that move around the earth." Similarly Manilius, *Astronomica* 1.729–49: the Milky Way is the track of the sun's former course, changed when Phaethon lost con-

⁶³ Apollo's explanation in Euripides' *Alceste* for his banishment and servitude; cf. Roscher (note 43, above) 1.617 and 2.1.1388; Livrea (note 52, above) 188–89, on *Argonautica* 4.611–17.

⁶⁴ The cult of Apollo and Asclepius was common in Thrace and the Balkans, and often solar. See L. Zotović, "Les Éléments orientaux dans le culte des cavaliers danubiens et quelques nouveaux aspects de ce culte," in *Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain* 68 (Leiden 1978) vol. 3, 1351–78; M. Oppermann, "Betrachtungen zum Kult des Thrakischen Reiters auf dem Territorium der VR Bulgarien," *ibid.*, vol. 2, 898–914.

trol of his father's chariot and scorched a fresh circuit in heaven. Manilius reiterates the point in 4.834–40 and concludes that “all things change over a long period of time; then they return again to their old selves: *in semet redeunt* (839).”

Philoponus says the visionary Empedotimus once called the Milky Way “the roadway for the souls traversing the Unseen World (i.e. Hades) that is in the sky” (On Aristotle, *Meteorica* 1.8). Bolton comments:

. . . For Empedotimus the circle of the Milky Way is at the same distance from the earth as the circle of the sun—it is the boundary of Pluto's realm, Hades. This would accord with a Pythagorean belief that the Milky Way marks a former orbit of the sun (Arist. *Met.* 1.8 345^a 14).⁶⁵

We should surely add D'Arcy Thompson's observation of the swan, cited earlier: “the stellar Swan lies in the Milky Way, ‘the River of Heaven.’” This northerly swan constellation emerges, then, from the wreck of Phaethon's chariot, from the River of Heaven.

At the heart of the swan myth is its astral significance. Phaethon “dirtied up the clean universe with his ashes—*Phaethontea mundum squalere favilla* (*Thebaid* 1.221),” not just the earth. When he died the swan became a star. Perhaps, when things “revert to their previous state,” the swan star will again become the swan sun, much as Plato's fallen soul in the *Phaedrus* will grow its wings and fly again.

VIII. Amber and the sun

Like Delos before Apollo's birth, the river Eridanus migrates about the map, and, from Aratus' time, becomes a constellation, replacing the older “River” (*Phaenomena* 359–60). In astral terms the Eridanus is a small scale duplicate of the Milky Way. So we must preface any discussion of the Eridanus with the caveat that it leads two existences, like Heracles' wraith in the *Odyssey*, one among the gods.

Ancient tradition generally has Phaethon fall into the Eridanus, but does not agree where the Eridanus is. Aeschylus identifies it with the Rhône (fr. 73 Nauck² = fr. 107 Mette); Herodotus knew, but did not believe, the tradition that it flowed into the northern ocean where amber is supposed to come from (3.115). Later writers identify it with the Po, even though there is no more trace of amber in the Po than of

⁶⁵ Bolton (note 18, above) 202, note 11 and 151–53; Cicero *Rep.* 6.16.

singing swans on it.⁶⁶ Amber was probably traded down from north Europe to the Adriatic via Po and the Rhône. But neither river was the *source* of amber.

Amber was prized for its perfume, warmth, electrical properties, and ability to preserve life in its resin.⁶⁷ It was a symbol of the sun itself in parts of Baltic Europe. "In the culture of the ancient Balts," Arnolds Spekke notes, "amber discs are the oldest known symbols of sun worship."⁶⁸ To Greeks and Romans amber was also suggestive of the sun. Pliny (*NH* 37.31) says amber is called *electrum* because the sun is called *elector*; and Homer compares an amber necklace to the sun in *Odyssey* 18.296.

The two northern sun symbols, swans and amber, surely met in the Baltic, and along the western "amber shores" of Jutland, the areas producing the traceable amber of European antiquity. For it has been established that most amber in Mycenaean sites is Baltic.⁶⁹ The amber sources were reached in antiquity from the Black Sea, up the Bug and Dniester rivers, thence to the Vistula and out into the Baltic; the return route would have followed the Oder or Elbe, then the Rhine to the Saône/Rhône or the Po.⁷⁰ And the possibility of seaborne trade between Greece and northern Europe is finally being seriously considered. Harding and Hughes Brock suggest seaborne as well as river trade occurred between the Baltic and Greece in three phases: "about 1600 B.C., possibly also about 1500 B.C., and about 1200 B.C." After that, reduced trade reached Greece via the Adriatic. The Britons, they suggest, may have served as middlemen between the Mycenaean buyers and the

⁶⁶ Marseilles, at the estuary of the Rhône/Saône "Eridanus," was founded by Phocaeans who fled from Asia Minor in 540 B.C. Before leaving they threw red hot iron into the sea (Herodotus 1.165). For the Po as an amber source, see Krappe (note 37, above) 354-56.

⁶⁷ See Pliny, *NH* 37.30ff; Martial, *Epigrams* 4.32; 59; 6.15. Martial suggests insects preserved in amber have eternity as jewels.

⁶⁸ *The Ancient Amber Routes and the Geographical Discovery of the Eastern Baltic* (Stockholm 1957) 3; cf. T. Suliminski, *Prehistoric Russia* (London 1970) 270-76.

⁶⁹ See A. Harding and H. Hughes Brock, "Amber in the Mycenaean World," *BSA* (1974) 145-70, with an appendix by C. W. Beck, pp. 170-72. For Beck's other works, see their footnotes 2, 46-48, and 50.

⁷⁰ See Spekke (note 68, above) *passim*; also C. F. C. Hawkes, *Pytheas: Europe and the Greek Explorers* (Oxford 1975) 4-7; S. Piggot, *Ancient Europe* (Edinburgh 1965) 189-99; J. M. de Navarro, "Prehistoric routes between Northern Europe and Italy defined by the amber trade," *Geographical Journal* 66 (1925) 481-507.

amber harvesters; but they decline to speculate whether the sea-traffic went on Mycenaean or British ships.⁷¹

For amber the middlemen would probably have traded tin, without which the Bronze Age could not have happened. Experts on ancient metallurgy agree "there is now good evidence for trade in amber and tin between northern Europe and the British Isles, and some evidence for the extension of this trading pattern down the river valleys of Europe into the Mediterranean and Adriatic."⁷² The Greeks either went north for tin or north Europeans brought it to Greece by trade or by southward migration.⁷³ There is a parallel between the southward migration of the solar swan and the trade in Baltic amber and British tin.

Greek land and sea contact with north Europe in the Bronze Age must not be ruled out because later generations did not have such contact. This would be like saying that trade between Britain and the Mediterranean before the Arab conquest of Spain and Morocco is

⁷¹ Note 69, above, pp. 152–53. In late Helladic I and II, they note, amber imports were, with the exception of Thebes, restricted to the Peloponnese, and might have come down by a chain of gift exchange.

⁷² R. Maddin, T. S. Wheeler, J. D. Muhly, "Tin in the Ancient Near East: Old Questions and New Finds," *Expedition* 19.2 (1977) 35–47 (p. 42); cf. J. D. Muhly, *Copper and Tin: The Distribution of Mineral Resources and the Nature of the Metals Trade in the Bronze Age*, *Trans. Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 43 (March 1973) and his *Supplement to Copper and Tin*, *ibid.* 46 (May 1976) (Hamden, Connecticut) 77–136. H. McKerrell, "The Onset of Tin Bronze Usage in the Near East and Western Europe," in *The Search for Ancient Tin* (Washington, D. C. 1978) shows that the further east one moves from the tin sources in Britain and the Atlantic coast, the lower the percentage of tin in the bronze. Diodorus 5.22 tells of the overland transport of tin in classical times; Caesar *BG* 6.17, says the Celts' chief god and patron of all arts was Mercury, whose metal was tin; tin is the metal of Celtic Europe and the West. In Plato's Atlantis, set up in concentric circles as ancients thought the planets were, the inner circle around the central island was coated with tin; cf. Proclus on *Timaeus* 14B and Bouché-Leclerc (note 54, above) 315.

⁷³ "The Mycenaeans would not themselves have gone to Northern Europe or the British Isles, but would have become prosperous by controlling the southern—presumably maritime—end of the trade-route," Maddin, Muhly, Wheeler (note 72, above) 42; cf. Harding and Hughes Brock (note 71, above) 159. On movements of people in the late Bronze Age see *Bronze Age Migration in the Aegean*, ed. R. Crossland and A. Birchall (Park Ridge, New Jersey 1974); J. Chadwick, "The Prehistory of the Greek Language," *CAH*³ 2.2, 805–19; F. A. Winter, "An historically derived model for the Dorian Invasion," *Symposium on the Dark Ages in Greece* (Philadelphia 1977) 60–71, argues that Hellenistic Celtic settlements in Asia Minor may be a model for what happened in the late Bronze Age: "it cannot be assumed that the presence of foreign settlers like the Hellenistic Celts and the Bronze Age Dorians will be manifest in archaeological materials of the kind that have been the focus of study in the past" (p. 65).

unthinkable because it was rare after the conquest. The rise of Carthage, the struggles with the near East, Celtic expansion and bellicosity in the Hallstatt and La Tène periods, would have decreased trade contacts between Greece and the north in Classical times.⁷⁴ Further, the decline of bronze in favor of iron reduced the critical need for such contact.⁷⁵

When Greeks began to find their way to North Europe as Carthage weakened—or ceased to be hostile—they were quite possibly rediscovering old routes, not finding routes for the first time. Past memories were preserved in myth and local tradition, and were regarded with considerable suspicion. One such tradition is found in the myth of Phaethon and Cygnus.

The Hellenistic Greek credited with the (re)discovery of north Europe is Pytheas of Marseilles, who travelled around Britain, into the North Sea and the Baltic. His voyage was made about a century before Apollonius' *Argonautica*—a fact of importance for interpreting the epic—some time between 326 and 265 B.C.⁷⁶ Modern scholars accept his voyage as genuine, though they differ as to where he went. Most ancients were skeptical, as Lucian was, of all travellers' tales.

The part of Pytheas' journey that concerns us is reported by Pliny, *NH* 37.35–36. Pytheas reported that a people named Gotones (Goths, probably) live near an inlet of Ocean, named Metuonis, which extends for 6,000 stades.⁷⁷ A day's sailing away is an island named Abalus (or Abalum) to which, in springtime, matter is washed up from the frozen

⁷⁴ On the later decline of trade between Greece and the north, see Hawkes (note 70, above); R. Carpenter, *Beyond the Pillars of Hercules* (New York 1966) 190–98; P. J. Wells and L. Bonfante, "West Central Europe and the Mediterranean: the decline of trade in the fifth century B.C." *Expedition* 21 (1979) 18–24 do not mention Carthage.

⁷⁵ On iron in Greece, see T. Wertheim, "Pyrotechnology: Man's first industrial uses of fire," *American Scientist* 61.6 (1973) 670–82, especially 674 and fig. 5. The earliest iron used seems to have been meteoric, "iron from heaven": see R. Maddin, "Early iron metallurgy in the Near East," *Transactions of the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan* 15 (1975) 59–68, especially 61–62.

⁷⁶ See K. G. Sallmann, *Die Geographie des Älteren Plinius in Ihrem Verhältnis zu Varro* (Berlin 1971); Hawkes (note 70, above); Carpenter (note 74, above) 143–98; D. Stichtenoth, *Pytheas von Marseille: über das Weltmeer* (Cologne 1959); cf. F. Kaehler, *Forschungen zu Pytheas' Nordlandsreisen* (Halle 1903). Hawkes argues for the earlier date, around 320 B.C., Carpenter for the later.

⁷⁷ Some MSS read *Guionibus*, an otherwise unknown people; A. H. Krappe, "Avallon," *Speculum* 18 (1943) 303–22 (p. 302) suggests *Teutonibus*, which is unlikely and unnecessary. *Gutonibus* or, better, *Gotonibus* is the most sensible, yielding "Goths" who, in Ptolemy's time, were living in Götaland in Southern Sweden, close to where scholars place the amber islands.

sea: *concreti maris purgamentum*. The inhabitants use it as wood for fire—*pro ligno ad ignem*—and sell it to their neighbors the Teutoni. Timaeus, Pliny adds, believes this, but calls the island Basilia. It is certain, he continues (37.42) that amber is created—*gigni*—in the islands of the northern Ocean and that it is called *glaesum* by the Germans. Hence Roman troops called one of the islands *Glaesaria* when Germanicus campaigned there (A.D. 16). In *NH* 4.104 Pliny confirms his report. Across from Britain in the German Sea are the *Glaesariae* which more recent Greek travellers have called *Electrides* because *electrum*, i.e. amber, is born there (*nascetur*).⁷⁸

Pliny uses a lot of Varronian etymologies in his discussion of amber, as the excerpts show. The notion of fire in wood, *ignis in lignis*, which Lucretius (1.891–92) mocks, appears in Pliny's *pro ligno ad ignem*. His odd use of verbs indicating birth, and, in the case of *gigni*, fiery birth, shows his awareness of the myth of amber's "birth." His statement that amber is called *electrum* because *elector* was a name for the sun reminds us that amber is a sun "product."

Pliny correctly identifies *glaesum* as the (Germanic) word for amber. It comes, as does *kyknos*, from a root meaning "shine," whence the English "glisten" and the modern direct derivative "glass." The amber islands, then, are shining islands, appropriately linked with the sun and the swan.⁷⁹

IX. Cronus and his sea

We have seen that Apollo's mother and his temple, replete with swans, are associated with a Hyperborean island. Is there a northern island, corresponding to Delos, that would explain these Greek legends that seem related to or derived from Northern tradition?

Pliny in *NH* 4.95–96 describes the northern amber coast as extending from the river Parapanisus (which seems to be in the east) to the promontory of Rusbea. The sea on the *eastern* side of the promon-

⁷⁸ For Timaeus see Sallman (note 76, above) 75–84. Diodorus 5.23 helps: opposite Scythia and above Gaul is an island in Ocean called Basilia where amber which occurs nowhere else on earth is found; cf. Pliny, *NH* 4.95 who reports that Xenophon of Lampsacus (see Sallman, p. 85 and note 96) called the island Baltia; Pytheas, Basilia.

⁷⁹ On the etymology of *Glas* and its relationship to *OE glaer*, see F. Kluge, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache* (Berlin 1967) s.v. "Glass"; cf. C. T. Onions, *Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* (Oxford 1966) s.v. "glass"; cf. the notes on "Schwann" and "Swan" and their derivation from an IE root meaning "sound"; cf. Sanskrit *svanás*, "noise." "Swan" is the singing swan.

tory is called *Morimarusa* by the Cimbri, which Pliny renders as "Dead Sea—*mare mortuum*." Beyond is the Cronian Sea: *ultra deinde Cronium*. We do not know for sure what "Cronian" means. It is generally accepted as a version of Celtic *croinn*, "frozen"—though it also resembles Celtic *cruinn*, "roundness, universe" and, to a lesser extent, *cronach*, "sickle."⁸⁰ It *could* mean Universal Sea, i.e. Ocean, as easily as Frozen Sea. Pliny tells us what *Morimarusa* means. So the task is to determine the language. It is not Germanic; but it could be Celtic, either Goidelic or Cymric: *muir* (sea), *marbh* (dead); *mor* (sea), *marw* (dead). If the Cimbri called the sea *morimarusa*, they were probably Celtic rather than Germanic.⁸¹

The *Morimarusa* is never mentioned again. The Cronian Sea occurs often, usually as either the North Sea or "Ocean." Greek writers identify it with Cronus, Zeus' father. The *On Rivers*, attributed to Plutarch, says Cronus fled beyond the Caucasus mountains to Boreas' resting-place, and gave his name to the northern sea next to it (5.3).⁸²

Only Apollonius, *Argonautica* 4.448–556, sets the Cronian Sea in known land: off the Italian coast. Now Apollonius was hardly a fool when it came to geography. He is the first writer to mention the Rhine (4.631); and his knowledge is almost certainly based on accounts by Pytheas, Timaeus, and other explorers and geographers.⁸³ But he does

⁸⁰ *Croinn*, "frozen," might be the Celtic for *mare concretum* in Pliny *NH* 4.104; see Carpenter (note 74, above) 178.

⁸¹ T. G. F. Powell, *The Celts* (London 1958) 163: "It is important to forego . . . ethnological deductions about the Cimbri on the basis of their geographical starting point. The personal names of their leaders . . . are all purely Celtic, and passages from Diodorus, Strabo, and Pliny could all be taken as showing that the Cimbri spoke a Celtic language. "Teutones" itself is a Latin form of the Celtic word for "people" as . . . in the Irish *tuath* and in the Gaulish deity name *Teutates*." Classicists usually take the Cimbri to be Germanic; the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (s.v. *Cimber*) describes them as a German tribe but cites an example stating that *Cimbri* is their name *lingua Gallica*; cf. H. Furneaux, *Cornelii Taciti De Germania* (Oxford 1894) on *Germ.* 37.1. A number of "Germans" in Tacitus are probably Celtic: the prophetess Velaeda (*Hist.* 4.61, *Germ.* 8.3; cf. Statius, *Silvae* 1.4.90; Dio 67.5) comes from across the Rhine, yet her name is the Celtic for prophet (cf. Irish *fil(d)*).

⁸² Since Ocean supposedly flowed round the world, the northeasterly direction of the Caucasus is no problem. For many Greeks the Black Sea was the end of known land. The river Phasis, and beyond it, the Caspian, were the streams of Ocean; cf. Bolton (note 18, above) 55–59 and map 1.

⁸³ Apollonius (*Argon.* 4.627–35) describes Eridanus as *rising* at the world's end, at the Gates of Night, and spreading into three branches, one going to Ocean, one to the Ionian sea, one to the Adriatic. He mentions the Rhine in 4.631—knowledge derived from Timaeus or Timagetis, who derive it from Pytheas; Livrea (note 52, above) ad loc. and on *Argon.* 4.599 and 4.635; cf. Sallmann (note 76, above) 75–84. Also Diggle (note 54, above) 4–32.

have a wicked sense of humor. When he says he will launch us into the Cronian Sea, when he talks of Phaeacians, and invokes the Muses' special help, we have hopes of high, fantastical adventures. Writers from Hesiod (fr. 63–64) and Mimnermus (fr. 11.5–7) had taken their Argonauts to the world-encircling Ocean. But not Apollonius. He tells us we will find these adventures in Italy and in the islands off the coast of Marseilles, the Îles d'Hyères.⁸⁴ We will go through the Cronian Sea to Marseilles: Pytheas' home town. Apollonius strikes a wicked blow at Pytheas' claims of sailing in northerly Cronian Seas. Apollonius and other Alexandrian poets, notably Callimachus in *Aetia* fr. 7.19–21, are largely responsible for the Mediterranean geography of Greek mythic voyages accepted by modern scholars.

Plutarch gives the most spectacular accounts of the Cronian Sea.⁸⁵ His friend Demetrius of Tarsus went to Britain late in the first century A.D. and visited an island off the coast inhabited only by a few holy men whom it was a crime to attack.⁸⁶ There he learned of another island where Cronus is imprisoned in lasting sleep, attended by demi-gods and guarded by Briareus.⁸⁷ A similar story appears in the *On the Face in the Circle of the Moon* 941A, where the sea around Cronus' island is called the Cronian Sea, and the island itself Ogygia or one of the islands near Ogygia, beyond the Pillars of Heracles. The peoples of Cronus finally adapted to non-Greek language and customs (941D); but their Hellenic spirit was rekindled by Heracles. Then Plutarch's narra-

⁸⁴ M. Euzenat, "Ancient Marseilles in the Light of Recent Excavations," *AJA* 84 (1980) 133–40. Apollonius moves the Ligurian islands, usually identified with the Îles d'Hyères off Marseilles, east of the Rhône (4.553–54), places the Holy Island of Amber, *Electris*, as the *closest* in of all the amber islands (4.505–6). Apollonius who loves to mock earnestness and pretense is probably responsible for, rather than evidence of, some local traditions, like those in Pliny *NH* 3.115–31, that "the Argonauts passed here."

⁸⁵ *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* 419E–420A; *On the Face in the Circle of the Moon* 941A. For the latter see H. Cherniss and W. C. Helmbold, *Plutarch Moralia*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) and Y. Vernière, *Symboles et Mythes dans la Pensée de Plutarque* (Paris 1977) especially 45–85 and 241–94; cf. Livrea (note 52, above) on *Argon.* 4. 269; 327; 428; Bolton (note 18, above) 56–57 with notes 20–22 (pp. 190–91).

⁸⁶ Demetrius visited Britain in Domitian's reign and may be the Scribonius Demetrius whose two bronze dedications in York still survive (*Roman Inscriptions of Britain* 662 and 663)—though these seem crudely executed for a man of distinction. See R. M. Ogilvie and I. A. Richmond, *Tacitus Agricola* (Oxford 1975) 33.

⁸⁷ *Obsol. Oracles*, loc. cit. Briareus guards Cronus and the Titans in Hesiod, *Theogony* 729–35; cf. *Argon.* 4.574 (with Livrea's note); Charax, fr. 16 (*FHG* 3, p. 640); Clearchus, fr. 56 (*FHG* 2, p. 236); Aelian, *VH* 5.3 = Aristotle fr. 678.

tor tells of the oracular powers and dreams Cronus has as he sleeps in a cave deep in golden rock. He even anticipates in his thoughts everything Zeus does (941E–942B).

Max Pohlenz was right in seeing northern European legend at the bottom of this; but subsequent scholars have been reluctant to consider this possibility, even though Plutarch's narrator claims the story comes from the peoples in the vicinity of this island five days' sailing from Britain, beyond the Pillars of Heracles.⁸⁸ Cherniss notes that the Pillars of Heracles are said to have had the older names of "Pillars of Briareus," and, before that, "Pillars of Cronus."⁸⁹ "Pillars" is a poor rendition of the Greek *stelai*, as Carpenter points out; we would do better to call them "Boundary Stones."⁹⁰ They are boundaries between one world and another.

Cronus' island, like Pytheas' Abalus, is set in the Cronian Sea, and like Abalus—and the Hyperboreans—lies beyond the limits of our knowledge. Cronus' eternal sleep is a kind of death: his Boundaries *are* those between life and death as well as the Straits of Gibraltar. Reality is double, as Plutarch suggests in *On the Face*, when describing the

⁸⁸ RE Band II, 2013. There is no need to presume Poseidonius is the source, as he suggests. Demetrius would have had his own observations and reports. Possibly parallel to Cronus among Northern gods is the Celtic deity usually named Cernunnos, represented on the Altar of the Four Gods found in Paris in 1711, and who may be the same as the deity represented on the Gundestrup bowl found in Jutland and dating to the period of the Cimbrian migrations (second and first centuries B.C.); see J. Whatmough, *The Dialects of Ancient Gaul* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970) 511–20; cf. E. C. Cawte, *Ritual Animal Disguise* (Cambridge 1978) 197. The text of the Altar inscription is uncertain; Whatmough reads Cernenus rather than Cernunnos. The god on the Gundestrup bowl (universally agreed to be of Celtic manufacture) wears stag's antlers on each of which is a Celtic torque. See Mellink and Filip (note 17, above), plate 412 and accompanying commentary; cf. Lucian's Cronus satires where the god is represented returning not in chains, but radiant and carrying a sickle (*harpē*). In Goidelic Celtic, sickle is *cronach*. Saturn, the Roman Cronus, is usually blessed, happy, symbolic of freedom; see Bouché-Leclerc (note 54, above). He was *Phainon*, "the shining one," to the astronomer; Diodorus 2.30.3 says the Babylonians called him "the Sun"—or, as Bouché-Leclerc has it—"the Old Sun" (p. 93, note 2); cf. Servius on *Aeneid* 1.729. Saturn is the best planet for physicians (Seneca, *NQ* 7.29) and is taken by neo-Pythagoreans and neo-Platonists to be god of time (Chronos): Tertullian, *Ad Nat.* 2.12; Augustine, *City of God* 6.8; Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 1.8.6–7; Sallustius, *On the Gods and the Universe* 3. Some of Cronus' "exiled Sun god" lore resembles that of Apollo and Asclepius. Plutarch's myth of Cronus recalls Critias' Atlantis in Plato, *Timaeus* 21A–25D and *Critias* 108E–121C. And in Atlantis there is a central island "beneath the sun" (115B).

⁸⁹ Note 74, above, p. 182.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 156.

migration of dead souls to their habitation on the moon. He calls the dead Demetrians; and his explorer friend who travelled northern seas and learned their mysteries was called Demetrius.⁹¹ Perhaps the Cronian Sea and the Morimarus, the Dead Sea, are much the same.

Irish storytellers distinguish, between 'adventures' (*echtraí*) and 'voyages' (*immrama*), "the latter involving visits to a number of other-world islands."⁹² Greeks did not; but they were aware of the coexistence of "literal" and "symbolic" meanings in a text. This is what Plutarch says so intrigued Pythagoras about Egyptian hieroglyphs, which he took to have a metaphorical as well as a literal meaning (*On Isis and Osiris* 354E-F; 363F).⁹³

X. Abalus and Avallon

Pliny's explanation for *Glaesariae* is plausible: the Amber (Glass) Islands. Abalus is more puzzling. The obvious connection is with Celtic *abal(l)o*, or *avallo*, usually (and too precisely) translated: "apple." There is also a local Celtic name Abal(l)us, and a god Abel(l)io worshipped in Aquitania.⁹⁴

The doublet Glass Island/Apple Island is best known in Arthurian tradition; and A. H. Krappe argued a connection between that Arthurian tradition and Pliny's Glass Island/Abalus doublet.⁹⁵ Scholars have praised Krappe, but shied away from his theory. So we must go over some of the ground again, but in a rather different way.

Around A.D. 1191, the monks of Glastonbury Abbey, on the orders of the recently deceased Henry II, excavated at Glastonbury for the tomb of King Arthur. It was rumored that Arthur had risen from the grave as Arthur, son of Geoffrey of Anjou and Constance of Brittany. Henry, out of antiquarian interests, and for political reasons, wanted to show no resurrection or metempsychosis had occurred.⁹⁶ So did the Church.

⁹¹ See Vernière (note 84, above) 271-94; Plutarch, *On the Face* 943B; *On Isis and Osiris* 367D-E.

⁹² Alwyn and Brinley Rees, *Celtic Heritage* (London 1961) 314.

⁹³ See notes 14 and 35, above.

⁹⁴ See Whatmough (note 89, above) 333; 528; 548; cf. Krappe (note 77, above) 313, note 1.

⁹⁵ See notes 36 and 77, above; cf. E. Faral, *La Légende Arthurienne* (Paris 1929) 1.304.

⁹⁶ See L. Thorpe, *Gerald of Wales: The Journey through Wales/Description of Wales* (Harmondsworth 1978) 279-83.

To destroy the undead, you trace him to his tomb, expose him to light, and he turns to ashes: to put it another way, you make him a creature of history rather than of myth. To prove you have a vampire's grave, everything must correspond to the tradition.

William of Malmesbury gave the formula for identifying Glastonbury as Avallon, the traditional burial place of Arthur, in his *The Antiquity of the Church at Glastonbury* some forty years before the excavation; and there was strong local tradition to this effect.⁹⁷ The excavation itself is described by Gerald of Wales in *De Principis Instructione* 1.20 and *Speculum Ecclesiae* 2.9. Gerald also outlines the tradition. Glastonbury is known by two names: 1. *Inis Avallon*, "that is to say 'Apple Producing Island'—*insula pomifera*—for the place once abounded in apples, which are called in British (Celtic) *aval*." 2. *Inis gutrin*, "that is to say 'Glass Island'—*insula vitrea*; whence the Saxons who succeeded the British used to call it Glastonbury. For *Glas* in their language means *vitrum* and *buri* means *castrum* or *civitas*." He adds that Avallon may also derive from one Vallo, who lived there a long time ago.

William's account is identical, except that he calls the mysterious Vallo "Avalloc" and says he lived there with his daughters "on account of the secret of the place—*propter loci secretum*."

Gerald concedes that no apples grow there in his day; and that the place is not an island, but a *quasi insula*. Yet the monks claim to have found an impressive tomb and not only Arthur's body, but Guinevere's, complete with a lock of hair that drove a monkish excavator wild, but turned into dust as he seized it. Finally a cross was found with an inscription announcing that this is the *famous* Arthur—*inclitus rex Arthurus* (not a lesser Arthur); that the burial place was Avallon—in *insula Avallonia sepultus* (tomb inscriptions usually assume you know where you are); that Guinevere is Arthur's *second* wife.

Glastonbury specialized in bodies of the famous. It also claimed to be the place Joseph of Arimathea came to—the Joseph who placed Jesus' body in the tomb. As R. S. Loomis observes, it was "a school of forgery." In an age of forgery, we might add.⁹⁸

The ingredients of this tradition suggest a parallel between the Arthurian Avallon and Glass Island legend and Pliny's Abalus and

⁹⁷ See S. Pearce, *The Kingdom of Dumnonia: Studies in History and Traditions in South Western Britain A.D. 350–1150* (Padstow, Cornwall 1978).

⁹⁸ R. S. Loomis, *The Grail from Celtic Myth to Christian Symbol* (Cardiff 1963) 249–70; Thorpe (note 95, above) 282, n. 632 compares the Piltdown forgery.

Glaesariae, as Krappe has convincingly argued.⁹⁹ We might add to Krappe's arguments that "Glass Island" makes better sense in terms of Pliny's "Glaesariae" and amber than in terms of Glastonbury and "glass." Although Glastonbury had a glass-making industry in the 9th and 10th centuries A.D., Gerald does not seem even to have known about it, much less used it to justify his argument.¹⁰⁰

Pytheas had surely encountered the original "Glass" Islands; whether he had encountered the original Avallon is another matter. For Abalus will not yield its mysteries quite so easily. But possibly there was, around 300 B.C., in Southern Scandinavia, land of amber, swans, Bronze Age inscribed drawings, and the Trundholm chariot, a community using both Germanic and Celtic languages that had the same mythical doublet we find at Glastonbury fifteen hundred years later. This should not be too surprising. From this area Germanic settlers came to England in historical times, and, according to Celtic tradition, at Celtic invitation. They had probably been coming for centuries before, and may have constituted a bilingual society with the Celts. The trade routes between the Wessex culture and Scandinavia date back to neolithic times. And Glastonbury is at the western fringes of the Wessex culture.¹⁰¹ When the Romans left Britain in A.D. 410, the movements of people and cultures, blocked for three and a half centuries, resumed.

XI. The song of the sea

Celtic mythic heroes are often lured to otherworld lands by strange women and strange music. In the *Voyage of Bran*, Bran is lulled to sleep by mysterious music. An unknown woman appears, telling him she holds a branch from the apple-tree of Emhain, and informing him of an island around which sea-horses gleam. He travels towards it and meets Manannán MacLir, king of the sea, who tells Bran that Bran is returning to Ireland after many years. Upon his return, Bran announces his identity but is told no such person is known, but that the Voyage of Bran is one of Ireland's ancient stories.¹⁰² Similarly Cormac is given a

⁹⁹ Notes 36 and 77, above.

¹⁰⁰ See Lloyd Laing, *The Archaeology of Late Celtic Britain and Ireland* (London 1975) 267; cf. C. Radford, "Glastonbury Abbey," in A. Ashe, *The Quest for Arthur's Britain* (London 1968) 105.

¹⁰¹ See Rhys Carpenter (note 74, above) 166.

¹⁰² A. and B. Rees (note 92, above) 314-16.

silver branch with three golden apples that make music, lulling him to sleep. He then travels to a kind of paradise where there are houses thatched with white bird wings.¹⁰³

The mysterious woman, the island, the song of sleep, apples or other fruits on the island, and waterbirds—usually swans—are common motifs in Irish myth. To travel to otherworld islands is to voyage into sleep, death, and timelessness—to sleep the sleep of Cronus, to travel in his sea, or in the Morimarus. The voyager may return like the time-traveller in Einstein's thought experiments to find that a year for him has been centuries for mankind. Such is Bran's fate.

The island of Avallon is this kind of otherworld island. Gerald (*Speculum Ecclesiae* 2.9) observes contemptuously: "The Britons, who believe anything, and their bards came up with the myth that a woman with magical powers, named Morgan, removed Arthur's corpse to the Island of Avallon to heal his wounds. . . . When he has recovered, he will return."

The mysterious Morgan has a special place in Celtic lore: "a fairy, eternally young. . . . Her place of abode is beneath the sea. . . . By moonlight she combs her fair hair with a comb of fine gold, and she sings in a harmonious voice a plaintive melody whose charm is irresistible. The sailor who listens to it feels himself drawn towards her, without the power to break the charm which drags him onward to his destruction."¹⁰⁴ In this Morgan we see traces of Sirens and Loreleis; and her name, in Breton or Welsh, suggests "song of the sea." Indeed, the *Fata Morgana* were known to all sailors until recent times. Arthur's escort to Avallon, then, is distinctly otherworldly, as is his wife Guinevere, whose name means "White Ghost": *Gwenhwyfar*.¹⁰⁵

Greek myth has its own mysterious songs of the sea. The best known is that of the winged sirens, whom Sophocles calls "daughters of Phorcys" (fr. 861, Pearson), and whose song is described in *Odyssey* 12.156–200. There is also the singing garden of the Hesperides, beyond Ocean, whose song is often baleful to sailors.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Ibid., 310–13; cf. 305–7 and *The Wasting Sickness of CuChulainn*.

¹⁰⁴ W. Evans Wentz, *The Fairy Faith in Celtic Countries* (Oxford 1911) 200.

¹⁰⁵ In Irish myth there is a male Morgan whose daughter lives in the sea and is sought by Art, son of Conn. Art stops at an island full of apple trees, beautiful birds and bees, and beautiful women living in a house thatched with bird feathers. See A. and B. Rees (note 92, above) 260–62; Irish myth also has three bloodthirsty and ugly *morrigna*, "great queens" (ibid., 35–36). For *Fata Morgana*: R. S. Loomis, *Wales and the Arthurian Legend* (Cardiff 1956) 105.

¹⁰⁶ See M. L. West (note 34, above) on *Theogony* 274–79.

By the singing Hesperides other daughters of Phorcys, "ruler of the sea" as he is called in *Odyssey* 1.72, live: the Graiae and the Gorgons. The latter Aeschylus describes as three "swan shaped" women (*PB* 795). Although the gorgons, like the swan maidens of central Asiatic tales, are generally represented as ugly in Greek myth, Pindar suggests (*Pythian* 12.16) that even Medusa has "beautiful cheeks"; and in modern Greek usage, gorgons are singing mermaids.¹⁰⁷ The whiteness of the gorgons, like the whiteness of swans, may be either attractive or ugly. Diodorus (5.32) says Celtic children are born old (i.e. whitish haired), as is Cygnus in Hesiod, fr. 237; and we have seen the phenomenon elsewhere: the swan is symbolic of the old poet as well as of the eternally youthful god of poetry. Further, Pindar tells us (*Pythian* 12.23) that Athena imitated the gorgons' song when she invented the "melody of many heads," a puzzling phrase which could suggest music in several vocal parts.¹⁰⁸

The morgans of Celtic tradition have something in common, then, with the Greek gorgons. A curious linguistic similarity brings them even closer. R. S. Loomis has pointed out there might well be a Celtic M/G doublet: the British underworld king Maelwas may appear as Galehos (Galahad).¹⁰⁹ Since *mormo* is attested as a variant of *gorgo* in Greek, it is possible that *morgan* and *gorgo* have a common Indo-European origin.

The most famous gorgon, Medusa, was killed by Perseus—like Heracles, a son of Zeus. As in the Cygnus legends, we note the hostility of Zeus' children to those associated with swans. According to Pindar, *Pythian* 10.45, Perseus killed Medusa in the land of the Hyperboreans, near the singing Hesperides, perhaps, where the gorgons were said to live.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1910) 184.

¹⁰⁸ See Dodds (note 21, above) 162; cf. Bolton (note 18, above) 102. There is no evidence for polyphony in the few surviving fragments of Greek music: E. Pöhlmann, *Denkmäler Altgriechischer Musik*, Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft, Band 31 (Nuremberg 1970). But as the Greeks knew of musical intervals within the octave there is no reason why they could not have made chords. G. K. Gresseth, "The Homeric Sirens," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 203–18, notes that in Greek art sirens look like gorgons and are always winged (213; 215). "Siren" may be from *Seir* "sun": J. Zwicker, *RE* 31, p. 290.

¹⁰⁹ R. S. Loomis, *Arthurian Tradition and Chrétien de Troyes* (New York 1949) 257.

¹¹⁰ Pindar, *Pythian* 10.45; Bolton (note 18, above) 62.

Two children spring from Medusa's blood: Chrysaor and Pegasus. Of these the first is father of Geryon—who lived in an island called Erytheia in the far west of Europe, and who was killed by Heracles.¹¹¹ The other is Pegasus. Medusa supposedly slept with Poseidon before her death. From this union of horse-god and swan maiden, a white winged horse with strong solar symbolism is appropriate issue.¹¹² Pegasus, like the swans, soon takes his place with Apollo and Music, astrally as well as in purely literary contexts. This association of horse and musical bird is found in Celtic myth too. In the *Mabinogion*, the banqueters delighting in the feast at Harlech, all seven of them, spend seven years listening to the song of the white birds of Rhiannon, the Welsh equivalent of Epona.¹¹³ And the poet who would rival the song of the great birds had first to attire himself in a cloak of birdfeathers to sing the magic song that beguiles time.¹¹⁴

The most interesting feature of Celtic music, Gerald suggests (*Description of Wales* 1.13), is that you never hear a song with only one vocal part. Out of ancient custom, not through training, he says, the Welsh differ from other people. They sing in multiple parts. The men of Yorkshire—itsself, though Gerald does not mention it, part of the once Celtic Elfed—sing in two parts, a skill learned from Scandinavians. Everyone else uses only one vocal line. Given the conservatism of Celtic culture in general, the tradition of multi-partite singing may be of great antiquity. It might account for the awe Greeks felt for the music

¹¹¹ On Chrysaor and Geryon, see Hesiod, *Theogony* 280–94 and 979–83 with M. L. West's notes; Apollodorus 2.4.2; 2.5.10. On Pegasus, see N. Yalouris, *Pegasus* (Westerholm 1976) XII–XXIV; cf. Yalouris' "Astral Representations in the Archaic and Classical Periods and their Connection to Literary Sources," *AJA* 84 (1980) 313–18.

¹¹² See Yalouris, *Pegasus* (note 112, above) figure 2 and p. XV.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 48; 264; cf. F. Benoît, *L'Héroïsation Équestre* (Aix en Provence 1954) and H. Hubert, "Le mythe d'Épona," *Mélanges Linguistiques offerts à M. J. Vendryes* (Paris 1925) 157. Fine testimony to the swan-horse relationship occurs at the Pazyryk burials in Siberia, dating from the fourth and third centuries B.C. where horses were buried with all the humans. In the fifth barrow, as ornaments over the burial wagon, were four felt swans: S. Rudenko, *Frozen Tombs of Siberia*, tr. M. Thompson (Berkeley 1970) 41–44, 117, and plates 131 and 166. Swans also decorate bridles (p. 152; fig. 64; plate 97A). The excavation confirms Herodotus (4.71–75) and Strabo (7.4.8) on the Scyths. Horses were the Scyths' commonest sacrificial animal (Herodotus 4.61); cf. J. Puhvel, "Victimal hierarchies in Indo-European animal sacrifices," *AJP* 99 (1978) 345–62. The association of horse and swan in burials may explain the swan charioteer Amphiarus, "king of the dead."

¹¹⁴ N. K. Chadwick, *Poetry and Prophecy* (Cambridge 1942) 58; cf. A. and B. Rees (note 92, above) 17.

of the swans and their people in northerly lands. Someone who has heard multiple vocal harmony might go on to contemplate the nature of chords.

XII. Apollo's third tree

A Byzantine writer, Ioannes Geometres, observes that while other trees were attributed to Aphrodite or Dionysus, the apple, palm, and laurel alone were consecrated to Apollo.¹¹⁵ Servius says a man named Melus, born on Delos, was metamorphosed into an apple when he hanged himself from a tree in grief at Adonis' death.¹¹⁶ Thucydides tells of a cult of Apollo Maloeis at Mitylene (3.3.3); and Lucian mentions apples as prizes at the Pythian games.¹¹⁷ We could suggest that, though the northern swan replaced the *phoenix* sun bird in the Apollo cult, the middle eastern *phoenix* palm replaced the northern apple: *aballo*.

Unfortunately Greek *mēlon* means almost any kind of fruit; it also means "sheep," as Servius notes when talking about Melus. Byzantine lexicographers under *mēla* list "all *quadrupeds*."¹¹⁸ As the Greek *mēlon* is impossibly broad, our "apple" is impossibly narrow. Littlewood's study of apple symbolism understandably fails to include quadrupeds; but neither does it cover trees bearing edible nuts. The omission is significant because Celtic *aballo* or *avallo*, normally rendered "apple"—as in modern Welsh and Breton—is not necessarily restricted to fruit. In Scots Gaelic, *abhall* means "orchard," not just "apple."¹¹⁹ Its range includes Greek *kēpos*, "orchard" as well as the fruitier side of *mēlon*.

Latin writers help here. Silius (*Punica* 8.543) describes the Italian town Abella as poor in agricultural produce. But Vergil calls it "apple-producing," "the orchard town"—*maliferae Abellae*—in *Aeneid* 7.740. Yet when Romans thought of Abella, hazelnuts—*Abellanae* or *Abellinae*—not apples usually came to mind (Celsus *De Medicina* 3,27B; Pliny *NH* 15.88).

¹¹⁵ See A. R. Littlewood, "The Symbolism of the Apple in Greek and Roman Literature," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 147–81 (p. 160).

¹¹⁶ On *Eclogues* 8.37; cf. Littlewood (note 115, above) 148 and Callimachus, fr. 485.

¹¹⁷ Lucian, *Anacharsis* 9; cf. Athenaeus 3.80E and Littlewood (note 115, above) 168–69 with notes 46 and 47.

¹¹⁸ Littlewood (note 115, above) 164–65 and note 35.

¹¹⁹ M. MacLennan, *A Pronouncing and Etymological Dictionary of the Gaelic Language* (Edinburgh 1925) s.v. *abhall*.

Hazelnuts are often found with apples in North European burials, including the famous Oseberg ship.¹²⁰ Both store well, and surely were staple foods for seafarers on journeys, providing all necessary sustenance. People would want these same fruits for the journey of death. Appropriately the hazelnut tree, like the apple, was important to Celts and Germans, as Alwyn and Brinley Rees show in their description of the Well of Segais, or Connla's Well:

Like Mimir's Well at the root of the Scandinavian world tree, this well was the source of inspiration and knowledge. Over it grew the nine hazels of wisdom "out of which were obtained the feats of the sages." The hazelnuts dropped into the well and caused bubbles of mystic inspiration to form on the stream that issued from it. Alternatively the nuts were eaten by the salmon in the well, or they were passed into the river Boyne. Those destined to partake of the nuts of the salmon obtained the gifts of the seer and the poet.¹²¹

There was such a well at Uisnech called by Irish poets the "navel" of Ireland.¹²² The world tree, the nine hazels of wisdom, the poetic and prophetic gifts won by those who partook of the fruit, are matched in Apollonian lore. The parallel between this "navel" and the *omphalos* at Delphi has often been made; and Apollo's sister was honored as Artemis Caryatis in the Laconian town of Caryae—town of the nut-trees (Gk. *karya* = particularly hazelnuts, according to Theophrastus).¹²³

Apollo's name, as Krappe suggests, may derive from the Celtic *aballos*.¹²⁴ It has no clear etymology in Greek. To Socrates in the *Cratylus* Apollo was "the Deliverer: *Apoluon*," "the Purifier: *Apollouon*," "the Eternal Shooter: *Aeiballon*," "the Together in Harmony: *Alpha*," both the "Destroyer: *Apolo*" and "the Destroyed: *Apolola*." He sought a Greek etymology explaining the god's nature.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ H. R. Ellis Davidson, *Pagan Scandinavia* (London 1967) 120; T. Sjøvold, "Osebergstil," in *Kulturhistoriskt Lexikon för Nordisk Medeltid*, Band 13 (Malmö 1968) 38–42; cf. E. F. Halvorsens on the apples of Iðunn, *ibid.* Band 7 (Malmö 1962) 330–31.

¹²¹ Note 92, above, p. 161. For divination with hazelnuts see Petronius, *Satyricon* 137, where Oenoea makes her judgment from whether the nuts float or sink.

¹²² Note 92, above, p. 159.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 159 and note 55, p. 388 for sources.; cf. Parke and Wormell (note 7, above) 1, p. 6 and note 9, p. 14; Pausanias 3.10.7; Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 1.21.1; 3.2.3.

¹²⁴ A. H. Krappe (note 77, above) 319–22; Ernout and Meillet (note 62, above) 3, say there is reason to believe Italic kept the words for apple attested in Northwest Indo-European.

¹²⁵ *Cratylus* 405B–D.

Romans took a different approach. In a passage cited earlier, Vergil describes Cygnus whitening into a swan while singing (*Aen.* 10.191) His transformation takes place among the poplar leaves and the shade of his sisters: *populeas inter frondes umbramque sororum*. Ovid develops this in *Metamorphoses* 1.157. The rivers of the country—*popularia flumina*—come to visit the recently metamorphosed Daphne's father; among them is the poplar-bearing—*populifer*—Spercheios (1.579). In 2.515–16, Phaethon's fires turn entire nations with all their peoples—*cumque suis . . . populis*—into ashes. Finally, Phaethon has flame ravaging—*populante*—his red hair (2.319). There is a multiple word-play on the base *popul-* which becomes "popular," "poplar," and "destroyed." Ovid does *not* tell us into what trees Phaethon's sisters were changed, nor does he name the Sun Apollo. Like Euripides' Clymene in the *Phaethon*, he leaves this for the reader to discover.

Modern explanations of Apollo's name look rather like Socrates' and Ovid's: we try *Apolo*, "destroy"—Ovid's *populante*; *Apellon*, "black poplar tree"—Ovid's *populus*; finally *Apellai*, "public meetings"—Ovid's *populus*.¹²⁶ Roman poets made much of the Phaethon legend's poplars because they created a set of wordplays which translated etymologies from Greek, and linked the god with solar myths.

XIII. Conclusion

I doubt there is one original "northern" Apollo any more than there is one original "eastern" Apollo. Apollo's name, like his swan and his oracle, does not speak or hide; it gives signs of its meaning. His fruit-bearing trees, like his swans, have a symbolism not obvious in a Greek context. The palm was the life-sustaining plant for the Egyptians, the apple and hazelnut trees for more northerly people. The Greeks found the olive and vine more vital. Apollo yielded primacy to Dionysus and Athena. But the vegetation deity lurks in his name, his mysterious Hyperborean orchard, the Hesperides, his connection with the Hyacinth myth, with Artemis' hazelnut tree, and Leto's palm.

The solar cult linked with the "Orchard God" combines the swan and tree symbols inasmuch as "swan" means "the shining one" in Greek, and inasmuch as the tears Apollo sheds for his dead son, or the tears of Phaethon's sisters, in other versions, are amber: solar "fruit." Apollo's Hyperborean temple or garden to which he travels in his swan

¹²⁶ See Guthrie (note 22, above) 73–74, notes 1 and 2.

chariot, his links with the amber myth, and with the enchanting music of the northern and western seas: these are the vertical threads of his identity.

Since amber is found in numerous Bronze Age sites in Greece, but much less from then on until Roman times, the solar swan and the amber legend, if not the name Apollo, probably arrived during Mycenaean times. It is even possible that bronze, amber, and the solar swan cult came to Greece as the result of migration rather than simply trade. Myth shows us how vigorously Zeus' son Heracles fought against peoples of the north and west, and how hard the solar swan had to fight for its identity against rival cults whose solar symbolism was more obvious to Mediterranean peoples.

At some point the swan cult either combined with or changed from being a female solar cult and became a dominantly male cult. "Sun" is feminine in Germanic, and often in Celtic, not masculine as in Greek and Latin. The Celtic Sun god Grannos, with whom Apollo is identified in Roman times as Apollo Grannos, is female.¹²⁷ Greek and Roman myths, like Crpheus' soul, preserve traces of this sexual ambiguity.

Apollo owes much, including his name, to the north. There may even be traces of an Apolline deity in the mysterious Vallo and Avellach after whom Gerald of Wales and William of Malmesbury say Avallon might be named. At the roots of the northern Glass Island and Avallon tradition is probably an Apollo-like island god linked to swans, singing maidens, amber, and the sun—a god who offers some prospect of a return from the enchanted voyage of death. This deity may well be the common ancestor of both Apollo's wondrous home, so beloved of poets, Pythagoreans, and Plato, and of Avallon to which the dying King Arthur is transported for millennial rebirth.

FREDERICK M. AHL

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

¹²⁷ Irish grian; old Celtic grannos. See T. O'Rahilly, *Early Irish History and Mythology* (Dublin 1946), 289–94. For Apollo Grannos, see *CIL* 3.5588 and Dio 77.15.6; cf. A. Holder, *Alt-Celtischer Sprachschatz* (Leipzig 1896–1913), vol. 1, 2037.

THE KING AND THE WAR-LORDS: ROMANO-PARTHIAN RELATIONS CIRCA 64-53 B.C.

In a recent article I examined the relations between Parthia and Rome in the years circa 95-circa 64 and came to the conclusion that, in this period, Parthian foreign policy was essentially pacific. To secure their borders the Parthians were anxious to be on good terms with all of the neighbouring powers. The Romans, for their part, recognised Parthia as a great power to be treated with respect. They were prepared to bully her in order to achieve their own ends but they shrank from entering into conflict with her.¹ The present paper examines how this state of affairs came to an end and a period of confrontation between the two great powers was ushered in.

For some time after Pompey concluded his treaty with the Parthians (circa 64) nothing untoward occurred to upset harmonious relations between the two nations. However, in 58/57 Phraates II was murdered by his sons Orodes and Mithridates. The parricides then quarrelled and Mithridates fled to the Roman province of Syria. There he found the governor A. Gabinius and was able to persuade him to aid in his restoration to the throne. But, after getting as far as the Euphrates, the expedition came to an abrupt end when Gabinius, in return for a large bribe, directed his attention towards restoring another forlorn royal exile, Ptolemy XI Auletes, to his kingdom, Egypt. Mithridates stayed a little time with the Romans but eventually, seeing that nothing was to be gained, he returned home to raise the standard of rebellion. The venture, however, was not a success and he was put to death by his rival. By late 55 Orodes was the sole king of Parthia.²

This, in outline, is the course events took. Obviously what must concern us here is the question, did Gabinius have any justification for his attempted assault on Parthia? There would appear to be three points in his favour. First of all, Cicero tells us that he, like his consular colleague L. Calpurnius Piso, had been granted an *imperium infinitum*.³ On the face of it this should mean that he could conduct military

¹ "Roman Treaties with Parthia circa 95-circa 64 B. C.," *AJP* 102 (1981) 195-212.

² See N. C. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia* (New York 1968 reprint) 75-78.

³ *de Dom.* 23,55. Cf. also *de Dom.* 24.

operations wherever he wished. Secondly, Cicero also says that Clodius had put into his hands *Syriam, Babylonem, Persas*.⁴ Finally, there is the actual Parthian situation to consider. Rome had a treaty with the king of Parthia but who was the king? Was he the incumbent Orodes or the refugee Mithridates? If Rome decided to recognise the latter, then Gabinius might very well be said to have acted correctly in trying to put him back where he belonged.

A closer examination, however, reveals that none of these arguments has much to recommend it. Scholars have expressed doubt as to whether the phrase *imperium infinitum* has any technical validity and have suspected that it is purely a rhetorical term.⁵ In the present case such misgivings would seem to be well founded. As we shall see, Cicero, elsewhere, would appear to imply that Gabinius' *provincia* did have set territorial limits and what he says appears to be confirmed by Dio 39.56 who expressly says that, by restoring the Piper to his throne, Gabinius breached the *Lex Julia de maiestate* in two ways. He had made war on his own initiative and had left his *provincia* without the senate's permission. For this he was put on trial when he returned to Rome.⁶ As B. A. Marshall observes,⁷ this must invalidate the claim that he had *imperium infinitum*. Had he had permission to go where he wished then he could hardly have had to face prosecution upon returning to Rome.

Having thus removed the first point in Gabinius' favour, we may now proceed to consider the other two in the context of an investigation to discover what, in fact, was the extent of Gabinius' *provincia* and for what purpose he held it. Certain facts are beyond dispute. Syria was the province and it was intended that Gabinius should make war there. Cicero emphasizes the great amount of money and troops Gabinius collected for the war effort and he is corroborated by Appian. The Greek author also tells us that the province was now, for the first time, to receive a consular governor. He further adds that the military preparations and the change in status were designed to combat the attacks of the Arabs on the area.⁸

⁴ *de Dom.* 60. Cf. *de Dom.* 124: *Syrarum Arabum Persarumque*. Note also Strabo 16.1.28.

⁵ H. E. Butler and M. Cary, *Cicero de Provinciis Consularibus* (New York 1979 reprint) 86; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "Roman History 58–56 B.C. Three Ciceronian Problems," *JRS* 47 (1957) 16–18; Sh. Jameson, "Pompey's Imperium in 67, some constitutional fictions," *Historia* 19 (1970) 534–42.

⁶ *MRR* 2.218.

⁷ *Crassus: A Political Biography* (Amsterdam 1976) 140.

⁸ *Cic. de Dom.* 23,55, in *Pis.* 37,57, *Post Red. in Sen.* 18; App. *Syr* 51. Appian says that Gabinius was getting ready to attack the Arabs when Mithridates diverted him.

Thus far, the picture we have painted is unexceptional. But, though the term *imperium infinitum* is imprecise and rhetorical, something must lie behind it. Gabinus' *provincia* must have been, in some way, out of the ordinary for Cicero to have used such a phrase in its regard. And it would appear that one thing unusual about the *provincia* was its extent. Cicero himself says, *cum fines provinciae tantos haberet quantos voluerat*.⁹ This surely implies that Gabinus' *provincia* extended beyond the borders of Syria. Furthermore, since we know from Appian that Syria underwent a change in status because of Arab attack, it is legitimate to infer that Gabinus could leave the province proper to carry the war into the lands of these enemies. At the very least he must have had the right to indulge in a policy which we would call 'hot pursuit.' In addition to this, we also know that he was allowed to operate against the pirates in the waters off Syria.¹⁰ But we may go further and claim that Gabinus did not just have, as part of his *provincia*, Arabia and the coastal waters alone, but also all of the lands which bounded Syria. We have two pieces of evidence to support this assertion.¹¹

In the first place, there is what we know of the powers exercised by Gabinus' consular colleague, Piso. It is unlikely that either of the two *pestibus rei publicae* would allow the other to gain greater power than himself and a scrutiny of the evidence for Piso's *provincia* bears out the contention that its essential features were the same as that of Gabinus. He, too, held an enlarged province, commanded large supplies of men and money and could set his own boundaries.¹² However, we also know that Piso seems to have exercised some kind of control over the lands surrounding his province. Although the exact extent of the province of Macedonia is disputed,¹³ the list of places which Cicero says Piso controlled—*Achaïam, Thessaliam, Boeotiam, Graeciam, Macedoniam omnemque Barbariam*—surely indicates that, in addition to Macedonia itself, he also controlled the surrounding districts.¹⁴ It

⁹ *In Pis.* 49. Cf. also *In Pis.* 57 and *Plut. Cic.* 30.1.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Dobiasz, "Les premiers rapports des Romains avec les Parthes," *Archiv Orientalni* 3 (1931) 250–51.

¹¹ It should be noted that we cannot invoke Gabinus' actions in Judaea to support our theory since the area was *de facto* considered part of the province of Syria. See P. C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1908) 222–23 and further n. 22 below.

¹² *MRR* 2.193.

¹³ See the discussion of Butler and Cary op. cit. 83–86.

¹⁴ *de. Dom.* 60. Cf. *In Pis* 37: *Achaia, Thessalia, Athenae, cuncta Graecia*.

may also be noted that Cicero makes much of the fact that *liberos populos* were put into his hands.¹⁵ In view of the established similarities between the two *provinciae*, which we noted a moment ago, it is surely legitimate to infer from this that Gabinius also had the neighbouring territories included in his *provincia*.

To support this view we have the explicit testimony of Cicero on the matter. It will be recalled that he claimed Syria, Babylon, Persia and Arabia were given to Gabinius by Clodius.¹⁶ This, of course, would seem to imply that a war with Parthia was envisaged. However, as we shall see, public opinion at Rome was hostile to such a venture and we must, therefore, ask ourselves if Cicero is to be trusted on this point? Our experiences with *imperium infinitum* should teach us to be wary. We should certainly remember that, in view of his feelings about Clodius, Cicero could be capable of accusing the tribune of any enormity. Further, Gabinius may not have particularly wanted Parthia in 58. After all, he does not seem to have shown any interest in the place until Mithridates arrived on the scene. Thus, it could be argued that Cicero, in effect, is saying here, not "you specifically granted these named areas," but rather "as a result of your making a vague grant of the neighbouring lands, without specifying what you meant, Gabinius was able to commit aggression."

On reflection, however, this view is unacceptable. In the first place, if Cicero could accuse Clodius of any crime, the latter was, to be fair about it, the sort of person who could carry it out. More important, those who were in a position to have Parthia added by name to the *provincia*, namely Clodius and Gabinius, also appear to have had the motivation for doing so.¹⁷ And, we may add, there is a suspicion that Pompey may have had a hand in the affair. It is true that the only other time we hear of Clodius taking an interest in Parthian affairs is later in the same year. Then, as part of a campaign to upset Pompey's Eastern settlement, he set the younger Tigranes at liberty, obviously intending he should return home to make trouble in Armenia. It does not, however, necessarily follow from this that a breach of the treaty with Parthia would at all times be displeasing to Pompey. It is salutary to recall, for instance, that, when Crassus set out for his expedition, he received Pompey's benediction.¹⁸ From this we may legitimately infer that, in

¹⁵ *De Dom.* 23, *In Pis.* 90, Cf. Butler and Cary, op. cit. 87.

¹⁶ See n. 4

¹⁷ On the general background to what follows see R. Seager, *Pompey—A Political Biography* (Oxford 1979) 96–110.

¹⁸ *Plut. Crass.* 16.3–4.

some circumstances, Pompey was not unwilling to see his friends attack Parthia. Now Gabinius is generally agreed to have been a loyal Pompeian and remained such after his chief split with Clodius. Yet, this loyal creature mounted an assault on Parthia which could, to say the least of it, have endangered his master's treaty. Such an act by such a person is explicable only if we accept that, from the outset, the notion that Gabinius might provoke the Parthians was not displeasing to Pompey.¹⁹ Further, Gabinius himself should not be depicted as being in ignorance of the possibilities Parthia offered. So far from having his interest in Parthia awakened by Mithridates, he was, in fact, already aware, as a result of his service under Pompey some years previously, of what might be accomplished in war against that nation.²⁰ We may, therefore, plausibly suggest that Clodius, whose interests in the East were well known,²¹ hoped now, as later, to reap some benefit by stirring up trouble in Parthia. Later in the year, he would use Parthia to embarrass Pompey but now, as his political ally, he was prepared to work to the advantage of his friend Gabinius by adding the place to his *provincia*.

This does not exhaust all of the arguments in favour of the view that Cicero is telling the literal truth when he says Parthia and the other lands bordering Syria were assigned by name to Gabinius. We may note that Cicero, when not indulging in rhetoric about *imperium infinitum*, speaks of fixed frontiers. This surely fits better the picture of a *provincia* comprising specifically named territories rather than one composed of Syria and in addition "neighbouring lands." Had Gabinius' grant been of the latter sort then he could hardly have been accused of crossing the boundaries of his command in order to operate in Egypt. Finally, if in virtue of a vague grant, Gabinius had carried on wars outside of his province, it is difficult to see how Cicero, in the circumstances, would have missed the opportunity to include Egypt among the places which suffered from his ministrations as the direct result of Clodius' loosely phrased *lex*.²² That he does not is a powerful argument for accepting that the places which comprised Gabinius'

¹⁹ Nor, it may be remarked, was his interference in Egypt. Cf. A. M. Ward, *Marcus Crassus and the late Roman Republic* (Colombia and London 1977) 249–53.

²⁰ See Keaveney, op. cit. 207.

²¹ Cf. E. Rawson, "The Eastern Clientelae of Clodius and the Claudii," *Historia* 22 (1973) 234–38.

²² Fixed Limits: *In Pis.* 49.57 For the non-appearance of Judaea in any list n. 11 above.

command were explicitly spelled out by Clodius and that those are the very places Cicero enumerates for us.

Thus, Parthia was indeed part of Gabinius' *provincia* and this, at first sight, provided him with what Debevoise styles, "the straw of legality" for his invasion. It was, however, a broken straw for we have reason to believe that Gabinius could enter the neighbouring lands *only if it were in the interests of Rome (or Syria)*. The basis for this contention is Strabo 12.3.34. There we are told that the senate, when it learned of Gabinius's proposed Parthian expedition, forbade it. Although this prohibition probably did not carry much weight with the man who was soon to invade Egypt, nevertheless it is important that it was made for it demonstrates that the senate felt it to be within its power to stop Gabinius. In view of what we know of Gabinius' *provincia* I would suggest that this power is most likely to have derived from a clause in his *lex* similar to that which I have just postulated. As in the past, the senate did not wish Rome to become involved in a war in Parthia. They judged it not to be in Rome's interest to interfere in that area and so they commanded Gabinius to desist.²³

We must, therefore, conclude that, in making war on Parthia, Gabinius had violated the terms under which he held his province. His action, then, was nothing more than a piece of naked and illegal aggression. We may now turn to consider Crassus, the other man who attacked Parthia at this time.

His attack on Parthia may be most conveniently examined under three broad headings: motive, opportunity and pretext. About Crassus' motives there can be little doubt. A man such as he could not but be lured by the prospect of the immense wealth to be gained from an expedition of this sort, especially when he saw what Pompey had accumulated. The desire to win military *gloria* was an equally powerful factor. Indeed, Plutarch claims that he hoped to surpass the achievements of Lucullus and Pompey.²⁴ So, on his return, the wealth and prestige he had gained would enable Crassus to surpass his triumviral partners in *auctoritas*.²⁵

²³ By way of contrast, it should be noted that nobody objected to Gabinius acting against the pirates. This was obviously felt to be in Rome's interests. One may recall also at this point Dio 39.56 on the powers Gabinius possessed.

²⁴ *Crass.* 16.2

²⁵ On these points Ward, *op. cit.* 281-82, is to be preferred to Marshall, *op. cit.* 147-49. One detail of the latter's discussion deserves attention. He wonders why Crassus was branded as being greedy while Pompey escaped. The answer lies in the attitude of

Nor is there much doubt about the opportunity. When Crassus was maturing his plans, Parthia was still in a state of civil war and conditions were thus ideal for foreign intervention, as Gabinius had shown. True, Orodes was undisputed ruler by the time Crassus arrived in the East but Dio specifically says the Roman general still hoped to topple him because his throne was, as yet, insecure.²⁶ Marshall, *op. cit.* 144–46, indeed, claims that the unrest in Parthia represented a threat to Roman interests in the area. However, it is difficult to see how this could be and Marshall's arguments do not appear to be very strong. He first of all points out that Festus *Brev.* 17 and Zosimus 3.23.3 speak of stirrings among the Parthians. It must be remembered, though, that these are very late authors who write in an abbreviated fashion and are often inaccurate and unreliable. Of course, if we only had these two authors then, perforce, we should be obliged to accept what they say. But, as we have at our disposal fuller and more accurate sources,²⁷ we ought surely to have recourse to them first. When we do, we find a completely different story: there the Parthians are described as peaceful and non-aggressive. Further, what we know of the situation as it then stood tends to support what is to be found in these better sources. The Parthians had, up until this, been pacific and there would appear to be no reason why they should now alter this policy. In addition, no source, good or bad, details a single incident which would lend substance to such vague phrases as *rebellantes Parthos*. We must, therefore, reject the evidence of Festus and Zosimus in favour of more reliable authorities.²⁸ Marshall also claims the Romans recognised the threat posed by Parthia when they appointed a consular governor to Syria. He cites App. Syr. 51 in support of this notion. Unfortunately Appian says the threat was seen as coming not from Parthia, but from the Arabs. Finally, Marshall points out that the fact that two client kings could rebel from Rome and go over to Parthia shows how easily the Pompeian settlement could be upset. But, as he himself admits, these defections did not take place until after Crassus' defeat. And this is precisely how one would

their peers. Pompey gained his wealth as a by-product of conquest—something perfectly acceptable to the Roman nobility. Crassus, however, laid the foundations of his fortune by less acceptable means and was therefore denigrated, and even when, as here, he attempted to add to his fortunes in socially acceptable ways the taint clung fast.

²⁶ 40.12.1

²⁷ See the relevant pages of *MRR*.

²⁸ If anything lies behind these notices, it is probably a garbled reference to the civil war in Parthia.

expect matters to fall out. Previous to the defeat, it would be madness for any client to desert the powerful Romans in order to join with a Parthia distracted by war or ruled by an insecure king. It is surely more reasonable, therefore, to suggest that, so long as Parthia was weak or in turmoil, she could not pose a threat to Rome, even if she wanted to. Preoccupation with internal disturbances would effectively prevent her indulging in international adventures. Indeed, we may go further and say that, far from being a danger to Rome, unrest within was really a threat to Parthia itself since it offered opportunities to adventurers such as Gabinius and Crassus.

It would thus appear that, completely without provocation, Crassus was about to launch an attack on a kingdom which had a treaty of friendship and alliance with Rome.²⁹ This was clearly recognised at Rome where a substantial body of opinion roundly condemned Crassus as a treaty-breaker.³⁰ While it may be urged that such opposition was politically motivated,³¹ we should not deny either that a very real concern was felt for the possible consequences of his act. The two sets of motives must be seen as intertwining and reinforcing each other. Religious sanction appears to have been the main weapon in the hands of Crassus's opponents. First of all the auspices were declared unfavourable but Crassus simply ignored this. Then one of the tribunes, Ateius, tried to have Crassus arrested. With the failure of this ploy too, the tribune proceeded to more extreme methods. Positioning himself by the gate as Crassus left the city, the tribune uttered the most fearful curses against the departing proconsul.³² The authenticity of this story has been doubted but without good reason.³³ If we look at the matter in context, it will be seen that our information is worthy of credence. Crassus, it will be remembered, was about to break a solemnly enacted treaty. The Romans were in no doubt as to what would happen in these

²⁹ We know that the Romans usually expected a new king to renew his predecessor's *foedus*, cf. Keaveney, *op. cit.* 200. We are nowhere explicitly told Orodes did this. However, in view of the fact that both at Rome and in Parthia a *foedus* was held to exist (see below), we must assume that he had done so, at some stage or other.

³⁰ App. *B. Civ.* 2.18; Plut. *Crass.* 16.3–6. See K. E. Ziegler, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich* (Wiesbaden 1964) 33 n. 72 and 73.

³¹ On this aspect see Ward, *op. cit.* 276 and 280.

³² Cic. *de Div.* 1.29; App. *B. Civ.* 2.18; Plut. *Crass.* 16.3–6. Does Cic. *ad. Att.* 4.13.2 refer, in an oblique manner, to this incident?

³³ Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* (Basle/Stuttgart 1963 reprint) vol. 1, 104, n. 2; A. D. Simpson, "The Departure of Crassus for Parthia," *TAPA* 49 (1938) 532–41.

circumstances: 'the anger of the gods would fall on the guilty party'.³⁴ Ateius, therefore, by cursing Crassus, was trying to ensure that divine wrath would not be directed against the Roman people as a whole since they were guiltless but should come down on the commander who was the real culprit. Florus (1.46.1-3) may have got the name of the tribune wrong but he was in no doubt as to what he was about: *Metellus exeuntem ducem hostilibus diris devoverat*.³⁵ And when Crassus did ultimately perish, he was prepared to see in this the vengeance of *dii foederum ultores* (1.46.6).³⁶

Considering these circumstances, it is strange, at first sight anyway, that Crassus made no attempt to justify himself or to give some kind of excuse, however flimsy, for what he was doing. Indeed, on the one occasion, of which we know, on which he was invited to explain himself, he refused to do so. The king's emissaries were told they would have their answer in Seleucia.³⁷ It would also appear odd that our ancient authorities, with one exception, do not remark on this reticence. So far as I am aware, only Dio (40.12.1) notes μήτε ἔγκλημά τι αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέρων. This situation is sometimes paralleled in the modern literature as is witnessed, for instance, in the somewhat abrupt way in which Crassus' expedition is introduced in one well-known textbook.³⁸ The solution to this rather puzzling behaviour most probably lies in the nature of Crassus' *provincia* for it would seem to be there that Crassus found such justification as there was for his campaign.

³⁴ Flor. 1.46.6. See L. E. Matthaëi, "The Classification of Roman Allies," *CQ* 1 (1907) 190.

³⁵ Cf. Lucan 3.126.

³⁶ In this connection we may draw attention to how Cato, some years later, proposed to deliver up Caesar to some Germans whom he had attacked during a truce in order that the gods might punish only the impious commander and not the city as a whole (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 51. 1-2). See further the careful discussion of Ziegler, *op. cit.* 39-42. Mommsen, indeed, thought that only the story of the *obnuntiatio* could be accepted. In so doing, he does not appear to have considered how the curses were the natural corollary of Crassus' ignoring the will of heaven as shown by the unfavourable auspices. For an able rebuttal of Simpson's arguments see Ward, *op. cit.* 285 n. 50. It is also of interest to note what Cic. *Pro Sest.* 71 says about the departure of Gabinius and Piso. It is obviously a matter of regret to him that they did not meet a fate similar to that of Crassus, after departing in like circumstances. Ironically Ateius was afterwards accused of falsifying the auspices and of having caused the disaster to Crassus (Cic. *de Div.* 1.29-30). This sheds light not on the events of 55 but on the atmosphere in Rome after Crassus' defeat, cf. n. 62.

³⁷ Plut. *Crass.* 18.1-2

³⁸ H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (London 1976, 4th Ed.) 127-29.

Without a doubt, he was given Syria as his province and he was to succeed Gabinus there.³⁹ We are also told that he received the "neighbouring lands."⁴⁰ It seems most natural to take this as meaning that he too received, by name, precisely those lands (including Parthia) which Cicero says were given to Gabinus. What we know of Crassus' operations, aside from the war with Parthia, suggests this was so.⁴¹ However, he also had certain powers in addition which were denied to Gabinus. The latter was subject to recall at any time while Crassus was to keep his province for five years. Further, as the senate's prohibition on attacking Parthia shows, Gabinus was put under some constraint with regard to whom he might assault but no such bar was placed on Crassus. He was given the right to make war, by land and sea, against any nation he wished.⁴² Thus, we can see why Crassus did not feel the need to offer any justification for what he was about to do. The terms of the *lex*, under which he received his *provincia*, justified his acting towards the Parthians as he himself saw fit. Once that kingdom had been assigned to him he was, strictly speaking, answerable to nobody for what he did with it. He had been elevated to an extraordinary position and could act in an extraordinary fashion without having to offer any explanation whatsoever for his behaviour. Having been given complete freedom of action, he saw no reason to render an account of his stewardship.

It can, of course be argued that Crassus did not act wholly on his own initiative but was, in fact, the agent of Rome.⁴³ Plainly, the basis for this claim must be carefully examined for, if it were true that Crassus as proconsul had received the command of a war against Parthia, then obviously the blame for what happened would not lie on himself alone, but on the whole of Rome. While most of our sources do not mention a Parthian war being granted in conjunction with Syria and some go so far as to especially state that such a war was not in fact given,⁴⁴ others do say that Crassus did receive a Parthian command.⁴⁵ Against the

³⁹ *MRR* 2.215.

⁴⁰ *App. B. Civ.* 2.18; *Dio* 39.33.2.

⁴¹ See (with caution) Marshall, *op. cit.* 139-40.

⁴² *Plut. Cat. Min.* 43. 1; *Dio* 39.33.2. The latter power was presumably to be exercised only in the territories which comprised his *provincia*.

⁴³ This, in essence, is the view of Marshall, *op. cit.* 139-46.

⁴⁴ *Vell. Pat.* 2.46.2; *Plut. Crass.* 16.3; *App. B. Civ.* 2.18; *Dio* 39.33.2. This last passage does not contradict *Dio* 40.12.1, *pace* Marshall, *op. cit.* 142. See further the discussions above and below.

⁴⁵ *Livy ep.* 105; *Fest. Brev.* 17; *Eutrop.* 6.18.1; *Oros.* 6.13.1; *Plut. Pomp.* 52.3. Marshall, *op. cit.* 164 n. 17, thinks *Livy ep.* 106 implies that Crassus made war on his own initiative but this is not necessarily so.

sources which tell this latter tale arguments, similar to those used when discussing some of the authorities for the view that Parthia posed a threat to Rome, may be invoked. With the exception of Plutarch, all of the authors who speak of Crassus receiving the command in a war against Parthia wrote in a very abbreviated fashion. The distinction to be drawn between, on the one hand, a grant of Syria and of certain surrounding lands with the possibility that war with Parthia could follow and, on the other hand, the outright assignment of a war with that kingdom may be a subtle one but it is, nevertheless, real for all that. It is not, however, one which we would expect writers of this kind to make, especially when a war did result from Crassus' tenure of the province.⁴⁶ They are far more likely to present a simplified version of the true state of affairs.⁴⁷ In any case, the bulk of our detailed information harmonises better with the notion that Crassus received Parthia as part of a group of surrounding nations than it does with the idea that he received an explicit mandate to make war on that kingdom. First of all, as J. M. Cobban remarks,⁴⁸ a Parthian war "would have been an unnecessary addition in view of his general exemption from the *lex Julia*." In other words, as we have argued, Crassus had already obtained all the powers he needed to achieve his object and, by his failure to justify himself, showed he knew this was so. As we saw, his *provincia* did not greatly differ from that of Gabinius.⁴⁹ The latter had already provided a model for what might be done with an unusual *imperium*. Therefore, all that was really necessary now was to remove the frail constraint which had been placed on Gabinius with regard to whom he might go to war. This was effectively done by allowing Crassus absolute

⁴⁶ It should be noted that, among moderns, Marshall, *op. cit.* 142, does not seem to make it either. See n. 44 above.

⁴⁷ Against the evidence of Plut. *Pomp.* 52.3 a number of observations may be made. Firstly, it is contradicted by *Crass.* 16.3. and, as we shall see, what that passage tells us seems to fit the facts of the situation better. With regard to the *Pompey* passage we may also point out that it occurs in a place which abounds in errors. For instance, Pompey is there assigned Africa although he does not, in truth, seem to have obtained it, cf. Ward, *op. cit.* 274-75. If Ward is right in seeing this as a garbled reference to some supervisory rights over Numidia and Mauretania, then the mention of a Parthian war may be a confused version of Crassus' actual powers with regard to the area—powers which Plutarch elsewhere describes correctly. In this connection the coupling of Syria and Egypt in *Cat. Min.* 43.1 provides a useful parallel. There Plutarch seems to have included Egypt in the *provincia* because, influenced by Crassus' earlier interest in the place, he thought it was one of the "neighbouring lands." Cf. Marshall, *op. cit.* 140-42.

⁴⁸ *Senate and Provinces 78-49 B. C.* (Cambridge 1935) 96.

⁴⁹ It may be noted that this seems to be the opinion of App. *Syr.* 51.

freedom to attack anybody he liked and thus there was no need of a special grant of a Parthian war. We may also point out that reaction to Crassus' expedition both at Rome and in Parthia was unanimous and tends to support our view. At Rome, we learn that, while Crassus had not been given a specific command against Parthia, everybody knew he was going to attack her. We may recall how Ateius went to some lengths to distance the Roman people from his action—something which surely indicates that they did not will it.⁵⁰ When Crassus invaded Parthia the king's ambassador told him that, if the expedition had been sent by the Roman people, then it meant war to the finish. But, if Crassus was acting on his own initiative, then Orodes was prepared to be lenient.⁵¹ The king was evidently well informed about what went on at Rome⁵² and, even if he was unlikely to have appreciated the niceties of Roman constitutional practice, he had, nonetheless, grasped the essential point: Crassus himself was responsible for the decision to go to war.

So, it was in virtue of the powers given him as governor of Syria that Crassus began the war. On a charitable view, it is possible to suggest that Crassus was faced with two conflicting legal claims. Faced, on the one hand, with his own power to wage war at will and, on the other, with the obligations imposed by a *foedus*, he came to the conclusion that the former overrode the latter. Most modern scholars, however, would, I suspect, share the more severe view which many of his fellow countrymen took of Crassus' action. Sweeping and all as the powers conferred on him were, they could never entitle him to set a *foedus* at naught. And when he did so, he was committing an enormity. He showed an utter disregard for some of the most sacred duties and obligations which a Roman could undertake, held the *mos maiorum* in contempt and flew in the face of heaven. Like Gabinius, he used a perverted interpretation of the terms of his *provincia* in order to attack those whom Cicero—and this, as we shall see, is no rhetoric—numbered among the *pacatissimis gentibus*.⁵³

⁵⁰ Marshall, *op. cit.* 144, says Ateius' veto was apparently directed against a Parthian war and therefore the war was official, since *obnuntiatio* could only be directed against something formally constituted. However, the *obnuntiatio* could surely be directed simply against the Syrian *imperium*, the terms of which opened the way to a Parthian war.

⁵¹ Plut. *Crass.* 18.1

⁵² See the comment of Debevoise, *op. cit.* 82.

⁵³ *de Dom.* 23.

And what of the Parthians? Although our sources do tend to concentrate heavily on the Romans, it is, nevertheless, possible to outline their response to these events. It would seem that, at this time, the Parthians still desired to be on friendly terms with Rome and maintained the same peaceful stance as they had for some thirty years previously. Between Pompey and Gabinius we have no record of their having violated the treaty and, in fact, it was the Romans who first broke the *foedus*. Their continued quiescence, even in the face of Gabinius' deliberate provocation, was probably due to their own internal problems. When he invaded they were preoccupied with civil war and then, when Orodes became sole king, he was seemingly too unsure of his own position to indulge in foreign adventures. He obviously judged it best to ignore the whole incident.

This desire to avoid confrontation does not, however, allow us to accept Dio's statement that the Parthians did not expect the Roman invasion, a view which the light resistance Crassus encountered when he crossed the Euphrates would seem, at first, to support.⁵⁴ History, it is true, does furnish examples of nations who wilfully blind themselves to the threat of external aggression until it is too late but the Parthians should probably not be numbered among them. The increasingly belligerent attitude of the Romans, culminating in Gabinius' recent adventure, must have taught them to be on their guard. And, as we saw, the intentions of Crassus himself were no secret to Orodes. The failure to have sufficient troops at the ready can also be explained in other ways. The Parthians had only a small standing army and time would be needed to muster the full levy.⁵⁵ In any case, Orodes, still unsure of his throne, was probably reluctant to bring together the nobles, some of whom might act to overthrow him, until it was absolutely necessary. His fears on this score are well illustrated by his subsequent murder of the Surenas.⁵⁶

At any rate, ignorant or not, the Parthians could, as was acknowledged by a section of opinion at Rome, claim to be the victims of unprovoked aggression. Hence, they were able to accuse Crassus of having violated every treaty made between the two nations, when he crossed the Euphrates.⁵⁷ But, more than that, there is evidence which

⁵⁴ Dio 40.12.2. Cf. Debevoise, *op. cit.* 81.

⁵⁵ On the Parthian army see M. A. R. Colledge, *The Parthians* (London 1967) 65-66.

⁵⁶ Plut. *Crass.* 33.5

⁵⁷ Oros. 6.13.2; Flor 1.46.4; cf. Keaveney, *op. cit.* 201 n. 28.

would also suggest that, even now, they were striving still to save the relatively harmonious relationship they had enjoyed with Rome up until this. It will be recalled that, when Crassus invaded, Orodes told him that, if he came as Rome's general, then it meant war to the end. However, if this was a piece of private enterprise, then he would take pity on his adversary. A statement like this, coming from the intended victim to the man bent on his destruction, can only make sense if we are prepared to accept that Orodes was aiming at a policy of containment. He certainly intended to stop Crassus but he also wished to make it clear, by emphasising his awareness of the dubious legality of that general's enterprise, that it need not have a permanently damaging effect on Romano-Parthian relations. Once Crassus had been taught a necessary lesson, then normal relations could be restored. To put it another way: Orodes was prepared to treat this serious invasion as the Parthians had treated the minor border incursions of the past and then allow matters to resume their former footing.⁵⁸

What we know of the circumstances of Crassus' death is in harmony with this view.⁵⁹ The Roman general had taken refuge on a hill. The Surenas, by means of prisoners, let it be known the king did not want total war with Rome and to avoid this was prepared to treat Crassus kindly. He then came in person to offer a truce and a safe-conduct to Crassus. The Roman general came down from his perch to sign a treaty by which, yet again, the Euphrates was designated as the border between the two powers. However, a brawl developed and the proconsul was killed. Although both our sources attribute treacherous designs to the Parthian commander, Dio does also say that Crassus was prepared to trust him.⁶⁰ And we would argue that he was right to do so for what the Parthians offered has all the marks of being genuine. Fixing a definite frontier at the Euphrates and securing their frontiers against their neighbours had always been the main aims of the essentially non-aggressive Parthian foreign policy and here these same objects were being sought again. Furthermore, the terms offered and

⁵⁸ In this connection we may recall Orodes' reaction to Gabinius' assault.

⁵⁹ Sources: Plut. *Crass.* 30-31; Dio 40.26-27. 1-2.

⁶⁰ See further the remarks of Ziegler, *op. cit.* 33-34, and Debevoise, *op. cit.* 90-92. The fact that Crassus probably had little option but to comply with the Surenas' wishes does not affect this view. The Parthians now had the Roman where they wanted him and, as I argue in the text, were thus in a position to redeem their earlier promise of merciful treatment. Furthermore, the Surenas must have been acting on royal instructions. He would hardly propose a treaty which did not meet with the king's approval.

the sentiments expressed are the natural corollary to Orodes' original statement. Then, he had said he did not want outright war with Rome despite the severe provocation he was under. Now, he was attempting to live up to that declaration. Having chastised the Romans, he was prepared, as before, to forget the transgression in return for a worthwhile treaty. After what had happened to Crassus, it was one which the Romans might now hesitate to violate.⁶¹

It was a plan which might just have succeeded. With Crassus alive, but disgraced, the aggressive policy he had pursued could not but fall into disrepute and the peace party at Rome would be in the ascendant. Once he was killed, however, all that changed. All of Rome agreed that this great blow to her prestige and power could only be avenged by a successful war against the enemy. This attitude was to influence Roman policy towards Parthia for decades.⁶² The Parthians, for their part, clearly recognising that the quarrel had thus been rendered implacable, now abandoned their quiescent stance and went over to the offensive.⁶³

Having examined these matters in some detail, we may now finish by offering a few general conclusions. It is obvious that Gabinius is, in some ways, a figure of importance. He it was who first abandoned the older Roman policy of treating Parthia with a certain circumspection and chose instead the path of confrontation. We should not, however, give him all of the dubious credit for this switch in tactics since the change may be seen as stemming directly from a development which had taken place in Roman policy in the previous few years. It will be recalled that, in their diplomacy, the Romans had often tried to bully the Parthians and that Pompey had gone further than any previous commander with this risky brinkmanship. So, for Gabinius, who had aided him in the game, it was but a short and easy step from provocative border incursions to a full scale invasion to topple a king from his throne. Indeed, as I have suggested, Pompey himself may not have been wholly averse to this change in tactics. One factor which also seems to have aided these sinister developments was the crushing of Mithridates of Pontus. The necessity to have the powerful Parthians either as neutral observers or active allies while they grappled with the Pontic king

⁶¹ Debevoise, *op. cit.* 90, suggests Orodes wished to secure the person of Crassus. If so, he may well have had it in mind to keep him as a hostage to ensure future Roman good behaviour.

⁶² Cf. D. Timpe, "Die Bedeutung der Schlacht von Carrhae," *MH* 19 (1962) 104-29.

⁶³ See Debevoise, *op. cit.* 95.

would seem to have been one of the reasons why the Romans treated that kingdom gingerly. However, with their old enemy at last gone from the scene, there was now less reason to treat Parthia with respect. It is surely no accident that, when Pompey first arrived in the East, he was quite deferential to the Great King but, once Mithridates was crushed, he began to treat him with contempt.⁶⁴ Thus, in these circumstances, Gabinius could mount his attack without fear of interference from any other power.

It would, indeed, be tempting to see in Gabinius the inspiration for Crassus. It is, however, a temptation which should be resisted. It seems far more plausible to suggest that Crassus had formed his design before Gabinius made his assault and the latter probably just anticipated him. Lucullus and Pompey, we may recall, were the masters Crassus hoped to emulate. We may reasonably assume that he had conceived this hope long before Gabinius arrived on the scene. We may also note that such an ambition made war with Parthia inevitable. It was the only power left in the area whose overthrow would give Crassus *gloria* equal to that of his illustrious models.

Nor should we assume that either Gabinius or Crassus regarded the Parthians as easy prey.⁶⁵ This notion is sufficiently disproved by the fact that both commanded substantial armies.⁶⁶ In addition, if Crassus wanted real *gloria*, he would have to win victories over worthwhile enemies. Cheap triumphs would not suffice.⁶⁷ Whence, then, comes the story that Crassus thought the Parthian war would be easy?⁶⁸ It may owe something to the commonplace that Crassus was an old fool⁶⁹ but, equally, it may be a distorted expression of a very real state of affairs: Crassus never believed the Parthians would be easy foes but, at the moment he attacked, they were a comparatively easy target, since their king was weak. In other words, this, for him, was the most opportune moment to strike.⁷⁰

In one vital respect Gabinius and Crassus do, certainly, resemble each other. Both held the same *provincia* with broadly similar powers and both abused these powers unscrupulously for their own personal

⁶⁴ Keaveney, *op. cit.* 202–12.

⁶⁵ For this view see Dobais, *op. cit.* 242–44.

⁶⁶ On Gabinius' army see above. For Crassus' forces see Marshall, *op. cit.* 143–44.

⁶⁷ Cf. Marshall, *op. cit.* 147.

⁶⁸ See for example App. *B. Civ.* 2.18.

⁶⁹ Well illustrated by Plut. *Crass.* 17.1–2.

⁷⁰ Dio 40.12.1. Cf. Marshall, *op. cit.* 147.

ends. It goes without saying that such behaviour is characteristic of the age in which they lived, an age when individuals possessed more power than the Roman state itself.⁷¹ This may be a commonplace but it is worth stating since we may agree with Ateius that Rome herself was not to blame for this war. The state was pushed into a conflict, not through a decision of her government, but because of the overwhelming ambition of one man, Crassus.

Finally, if, in regard to this war, there was at Rome the kind of clash of wills and authority, which is characteristic of a decaying and enfeebled republic, Parthia, in contrast, since she was ruled by a despot, pursued a simpler and utterly consistent policy. Orodes strove, for as long as possible, to minimise the effects of the conflict with the aim of ultimately saving the relatively harmonious relations his kingdom had enjoyed with Rome in the past. Only when he failed in this objective, did he launch his counter-attack on his enemy.⁷²

ARTHUR KEAVENEY

DARWIN COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF KENT AT CANTERBURY

⁷¹ See the remarks of Ziegler, *op. cit.* 39–40.

⁷² I wish to thank Mr. D. R. Nightingale for discussing one or two points with me.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE VIA NEGATIVA

There are two coincidences which are worthy of note. Firstly, ἀπόφασις (negation) can also mean assertion: ἀπόφασις meaning 'negation' is derived from ἀποφημί, and ἀπόφασις meaning 'assertion' is a shortened form of ἀπόφανσις, from ἀποφαίνω (declare). The second coincidence concerns the alpha privative. It is well known that late Greek theology, both Neoplatonic and Christian, brings a new impetus to the use of the alpha privative: as a prefix it brings a negative sense to a word, and theological Greek in the late period abounds in alpha words: God is said to be unnameable, unspeakable, invisible, unengendered and so on. Side by side with this proliferation of the negating alpha comes the systematic development of the theology of negation, and the two phenomena should be considered together. Thus the second coincidence: alpha can signify both negation and its opposite. The alpha associated with negative theology is described as the alpha στερητικόν (privative), and it denotes the absence of a given quality. Yet the same prefix has another usage, and is labelled the alpha ἀθροιστικόν: the accumulative alpha.¹ The prefix under discussion, therefore, can convey both the removal and the multiplying of characteristics, and this fact must make us alert to the possibility of ambiguities in the connotations of alpha words: we must also beware of word-play.

The name Apollo was always attractive to the Greek mind, which was continually open to the idea that the etymological dissection of names would yield hidden truths about the objects which they designated. The word 'Apollo' was a prime candidate for such etymological

¹ Liddell and Scott distinguish three uses of the alpha prefix: στερητικόν, ἀθροιστικόν and ἐπιτατικόν. The last two could be classified together as being intensive. See also P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968), under ἀ-; G. P. Shipp, *Modern Greek Evidence for the Ancient Greek Vocabulary* (Sydney 1979), under 'Α-, ἀνα-; and E. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik II*. i.i, p. 431 ff. Chantraine suggests that the ἀνα- prefix, an equivalent for the α privative could have replaced the old α before a F. Shipp also notes the equivalence of α- and ἀνα-, commenting on the misunderstanding of ἀρίθμητος as meaning 'unnumbered.' See Shipp, s. ἀπαρθέρευτος, and Chantraine s. ἀνέδνος. Shipp also suggests a category of unmotivated α- (ἀβασκαίνω = βασκαίνω), and this brings to four the possible range of meanings of the alpha prefix.

analysis since Apollo was the patron of wisdom and culture, and since his name contained the alpha prefix, or at least an alpha of sorts. The word was held to be derived from α- and πόλλα, and said to mean 'the absence of many things': 'Apollo' was therefore held to contain a mysterious reference to the absence of multiplicity, and the absolute unity of the highest principle. John Whittaker has listed² a number of allusions to this etymology, most of them coming from the late Greek and Patristic period. Plutarch refers to it in the *De Iside et Osiride*,³ and regards it as a Pythagorean etymology, and this raises the question of how old it was. One generally associates this understanding of Apollo's name with later Platonism, but Boyancé has shown⁴ that Philolaus also used the etymology, which must therefore be of the greatest antiquity.

In my view it can be shown that Plato also knew of this catchword of negative theology, as follows. Plato discusses the practice of etymology in the *Cratylus*, and he also discusses the alpha prefix. The *Cratylus* is known for its irony and playfulness and it is clear that Plato knew of the Apollo etymology and satirised it in 405 B–E of that dialogue: he innocently notes that the alpha often refers to an accumulation of characteristics (τὸ ὁμοῦ), and suggests an etymology which involves 'moving' (the word coined is πόλησις) around the poles (πόλους) of the heavens. In fact, says Plato, Apollo was originally Homopolo, the alpha replacing the ὁμο since it has the same accumulative thrust. Apollo therefore means 'many poles,' and an extra λ was added because Apolo sounded too much of disaster words (ἀπολῶ, for example). The name, he concludes, alludes to all the qualities of the god at once. There is a deliberate reversal of the Pythagorean etymology here, which has generally gone unnoticed. Plato has replaced the alpha privative with the accumulative alpha, and concluded that the name Apollo refers to many things rather than the absence of many things. His satire reveals both that he knows of the Apollo etymology, and that there is room for ambiguity with the alpha prefix.

Later Greek commentators were prone to finding alpha privatives in classical Greek texts, and it appears that similar misunderstandings

² *Classical Quarterly* 19 (1969) 187.

³ 354F.

⁴ *REG* 76 (1963) 91 ff. Referring to Philo's *De Opificio Mundi* (100 et passim), Boyancé reconstructs some of the evidence on Philolaus and in particular his description of the One as ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων (cf. also his discussion of Lydus on Apollo: διὰ τὸ ἀπωθεν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν).

surrounded the use of the alpha prefix to those which apply to the English 'in-'.⁵ The scholiast on Homer's *Odyssey*⁶ also comments on the name Apollo, claiming that the sun is called Apollo because the name means 'not-many,' and that this is appropriate because of the uniqueness of the sun. He notes that there is a case of the alpha privative here, and another late commentator, Eustathius,⁷ also reflects a concern with negative theology by commenting on the phrase ἀάκτον ὕδωρ, and in particular the use of the three entrancing alphas. This phrase is much discussed by Homer scholars, and is usually translated as 'invulnerable water.'⁸ Eustathius takes the derivation of ἀάκτος to be from ἄτη (destruction), though in fact it comes from ἀάω, and he therefore has only two alphas to explain. The second, he says, is the alpha privative, meaning that the water is free from destruction. The first is said to annul this privation, and the cancellation of the privation means that not only is the water not free from destruction, but it is also 'the particular cause of destruction.' Eustathius' interpretation is not that of the modern translator, and it reflects a knowledge of the *via negativa*, and a desire to have it emerge from the Homeric text. Eustathius is referring to the practice of hyper-negation, the two-fold negative manoeuvre characteristic of the second generation of negative theologians. The hyper-negation we do not find in Albinus, Apuleius, Celsus, Plotinus, Justin, Clement or Origen, but we do find it from Proclus onwards, and the *negatio negationis* has various uses in medieval philosophy.⁹

Returning to the first formulations of negative theology, Aristotle, who most of all defined the technical terms of negative theology, perhaps unknowingly, also comments on the meaning of the alpha privative. This is an important passage, both for philologists and for historians of thought, since Aristotle here observes ¹⁰ that a considerable range of meanings can be attached to alpha words: 'stoneless' (ἀπίρη-ovov) may mean 'having rudimentary pips'; 'uncuttable' (ἄτητον) may simply mean 'hard to cut.' This should alert us to the fact that negative

⁵ See Shipp (n. 1) on ἀπίρητος.

⁶ 3.279: ed. W. Dindorf, *Scholia in Homeri Odysseam* (Oxford 1855).

⁷ 12th A.D. *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem et Odysseam, ad fidem exempli Romani*, 7 vols. (Leipzig 1825-30); 976, line 4.

⁸ See Chantraine, *op. cit.*, s.v.

⁹ See W. Beierwaltes, "Negati Affirmatio, or The World as Metaphor," *Dionysius* 1 (1979) 127-59.

¹⁰ *Metaphysics* 1023^a1.

adjectives can have a range of meanings: that saying God is 'unknowable,' for example, might simply be to affirm that knowledge of God is difficult to come by, or that it is dissimilar to any other form of knowledge. An adjective negated by the alpha may suggest various degrees of hyperbole, and the mere use of the alpha privative does not constitute negative theology: the range of meanings permitted by it is too great. A fully-fledged apophatic theology requires a systematic use of the negative, 'not' (οὐκ), thus producing privations which are unambiguous. (One is aware that from Proclus onwards, much will be made of the difference between privation and negation,¹¹ but with Aristotle the situation is not quite so clear, and nor is it clear with the Middle Platonists.) Saying that God is 'inexistent' is looser than saying he is 'not-existent,' and the former form may be found in much popular religion such as that embodied in the Hermetic literature, but the latter is characteristic of a properly developed philosophical theology. The alpha privative belongs more to the language of poetry than of systematic metaphysics.

As is well-known, the passage of the pre-Christian era into the Christian era was marked by a proliferation of alpha privatives in theological language. The Hermetic corpus, elucidated by A-J. Festugière's great and original work,¹² abounds in negative adjectives: The *Asclepius* provides a number in the Latin form, God being said to be *indefinitum* (unlimited), *inconprehensibile* (unable to be grasped), and *inaestimabile* (unable to be conceived).¹³ Gnostic literature is full of negative adjectives. *The Tripartite Tractate*, one of the recently discovered Nag Hammadi documents, has the Father as nameless, unnameable, inconceivable, invisible and incomprehensible.¹⁴ No names apply to him,¹⁵ but the author makes the interesting point that one may still utter these names in order to honour him. Each will utter names according to his capacity, for the *glory* of the Father. Naming is not so much an act of describing, as an honorific gesture; language, though inappropriate to the task, is preserved as an essential human activity.

This proliferation of alphas may be assessed as follows: the negative adjective in the pre-Christian and Christian period shows a ten-

¹¹ See W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos* (Frankfurt 1979) 354.

¹² *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, I-IV (Paris 1949-54).

¹³ *Asclepius* 31.

¹⁴ *Tri. Trac.* 59.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.* 54.

dency to magnify the mystery of God. A further study of alpha privatives in the period would no doubt be able to establish certain patterns in their use, and perhaps even that there were schools of alpha privation, each with different perspectives on what positive concept might be annulled. It is clear however that the accumulation of negative adjectives served to show one's respect for the transcendent, albeit in a loose and ambiguous way. If one accepts Aristotle's linguistic observations, the negative adjective may be better regarded as providing an attenuated affirmation. To say that God is invisible or unknowable may simply mean that he is seen and known only with difficulty, and it is clear that the rather airy use of the alpha privatives in this period suggests little more than a new awe of the transcendent.

It is nevertheless here that the *via negativa* takes its beginnings. Aristotle identifies the use of the alpha privative with the logic of privation, and it is here that negative theology makes its début, despite the refusal of later Platonism to accept the notion of στέρησις in relation to the *via negativa*. The apophatic will later be contrasted with the 'steretic,' but the distinction is not so clearly drawn with Aristotle. In the passage already referred to, he deals with the meaning of privation: "Privation (στέρησις) has as many meanings as there are negations (ἀποφάσεις) by the alpha privative."¹⁶ There are two interesting features of this sentence: firstly, privation is identified as a form of negation, secondly, that the alpha privative is included in the logic of privation. This is an obvious, even tautological point, but it is important to note that negative theology takes its beginnings here. In order to discover the essence of a thing by the negative method, one withdraws a characteristic (say greenness from an apple) and continues along this line until extraneous matter is removed from the conceptual process. What is envisaged is a step by step removal of elements in a composite entity. John Whittaker has argued,¹⁷ against Wolfson, that privation (στέρησις) is a branch of negation (ἀπόφασις) for Aristotle, and he is clearly right about this passage. This is also the position of Zeller,¹⁸ though Ross¹⁹ has difficulties with the identification: he emphasises that privation is said to occur of a substrate which might naturally possess the absent quality, or be capable of possessing it.²⁰ It might be put this

¹⁶ *Metaphysics* 1022^b33.

¹⁷ "Neopythagoreanism and Negative Theology," *SO* 44 (1969) 121.

¹⁸ *Philosophie der Griechen* II. 2^a. 216, n. 7.

¹⁹ Aristotle's *Metaphysics* I, 337.

²⁰ Loc. cit. and see *Met.* 1055^b8: ὥστ' ἔστιν ἡ στέρησις ἀντίφασις τις ἢ ἀδυναμία διορισθεῖσα ἢ συνειλημμένη τῷ δεκτικῷ.

way: Aristotle sees privation as occurring when the absence in question could plausibly be replaced by the presence of such and such a quality. We may only talk of the unequal, where it is possible that equality might be predicated of the entity in question. It is essential that privation should be understood as the absence of a quality from a given substratum or entity, and that it be perceivable as an absence. If we say that a vegetable has no eyes,²¹ then we are referring legitimately to a privation, because whilst it is not natural for a vegetable to have eyes, the latter are in the realm of nature, and the statement that they are missing from one or other of the entities which populate it is informative and comprehensible. On the other hand, Ross provides²² a good example of an absence which cannot be regarded as a privation, and his example could be enlarged thus: a vegetable is not infinite. Infinity cannot be predicated of anything at all so that its absence from the vegetable kingdom cannot be regarded as a privation, but as a negation proper. Yet Aristotle here seems to be speaking loosely, in that he widens the meaning of the term privation to identify it with negation in general, so that the non-infinite vegetable would also be included. This seems to be atypical, and the usual view of privation is that outlined above: one can easily see why Aristotle strayed in the direction of merging the two, since the Greek preposition ἀπό dominated his understanding of negation (ἀπόφασις), as follows. "Assertion is a statement of something in respect of another thing: negation is a statement of something away from (ἀπό τινος) another thing."²³ The element of removal is dictated by etymological considerations.

A tantalising reference to negation should be noted, as it may be crucial to the shift from ἀφαίρεσις to ἀπόφασις in the *via negativa* of the later Platonists. Aristotle denies²⁴ that the substrate is the negation of quantities or of any of the categories which normally characterise matter. He must be responding to a view of how matter might possibly be known and defined, and the suggestion must have been made that matter represented the negation of qualities. This Aristotle denies, and there are many reasons to be drawn from elsewhere in his writings which might lead us to understand why. In my view Aristotle's discussion of the character and epistemology of the substrate is matched in

²¹ *Met.* 1022^b23.

²² *Op. cit.* 337.

²³ *On Interpretation* 17^a25.

²⁴ *Met.* 1029^a25.

later antiquity by discussion of knowledge of the One, and in this passage there is an implied contrast between ἀφαίρεσις and ἀπόφασις: the later Platonists turned to the latter for their formulation of the *via negativa*, whereas the earlier generation had been content with the former. The transition from the one term to the other is one of the crucial elements in the whole story, and has yet to be fully explained.

Part of the explanation will lie in the rich variety of meanings that the word "negation" can receive, most of which surface in Aristotle. There had been a lingering tendency to see negation in terms of opposites: Plato's *Sophist*²⁵ refers to this view, but denies it. The negative, it is said, merely indicates something other than that which is negated. This is the view that negation leaves open all possibilities but one, the element negated. Not Y could mean everything but Y. Aristotle concurs here: he sees the term "not-man" as being an indefinite noun (ὄνομα ἄόριστον).²⁶ We have therefore two possibilities already with the meaning of the pure negative, and in terms of negative theology these would turn out as follows. In the case of opposition the statement "God is not good" would mean that God and goodness were opposed, and in the case of the indefinite the statement would mean that God is anything but good, this being really a positive but indefinite assertion. (In fact Aristotle says that a real negation must apply to the verb, so that one would say "God isn't good," rather than "God is not-good." The verb "is" attributes being, and so a genuine negation must apply to the verb.) These are two of the possibilities open to the Neoplatonists, who sought to replace abstraction by negation.

This notion of abstraction is crucial for the understanding of prototype negative theology, that is that of the generation of the Middle Platonists and the first Christian philosophers. Albinus refers to abstraction, and Clement of Alexandria uses the term ἀνάλυσις as well as ἀφαίρεσις (though the two seem to be equivalent), and the latter is used by Plotinus. Origen discusses the meaning of ἀνάλυσις as well as part of his critique of Celsus, who offers it as an epistemological technique. It is clear that the term is an equivalent for the method of abstraction, which was derived from mathematics.²⁷

What is abstraction? It is a method of conceptual removal, similar to privation, but epistemological rather than ontological, and particu-

²⁵ 257B.

²⁶ *On Interpretation* 16^a31.

²⁷ For references see A.-J. Festugière, (above, note 12) IV, 92-140.

larly associated with mathematical theory. The idea is best approached from the wrong end, through examining the view of reality held by those who advocated the method. The question of how reality was generated was an important one, for it showed what reality was, and most importantly, how it might be known: the Pythagorean view was that reality grew out of numbers, starting from a single unit. "From the monad and the indefinite dyad emerge numbers; from numbers points; from points, lines; from lines, plane figures, from these, solid figures; from solid figures, sensible bodies. . . ." ²⁸ Sensible reality thus grows out of numbers, which in turn spring from the single unit, or monad. The view of reality is incremental, with layer being added to layer until what we recognize as our world is constructed. Aristotle is critical of the Pythagorean view in the *Metaphysics*, ²⁹ and he does not see how qualities such as sweetness and heat could be reduced to numbers; nevertheless the view of reality as an accumulated structure arising from invisible beginnings is acceptable to him. ³⁰ Reality is built on essence (*ousia*), and comes into being as a result of various causes. This incremental view of reality is also given a clear formulation in Plato's *Laws*: ³¹ "What is the state of affairs when generation takes place? Clearly when a starting point (*arche*) receives addition, and comes to the second state, and from this to the next, and on arriving at the third becomes perceptible to the perceiver." This is the Greek view of the generation of reality which underpins the development of negative theology. Material reality is an accumulation of characteristics, attached like barnacles to the hull of essential reality. Reality lumbers its way into its full efflorescence, receiving all sorts of accretions, and acquiring an ever-growing number of characteristics, each accretion attracting others. The "descent" of essence into material reality eventually leads to its concealment: the knowledge of essence, whether it be the one or substance, thus becomes a matter of difficulty. Reality could be said to be conceived by addition (*prosthesis*) and it follows that essence could be said to be discovered by subtraction. It is in order to construct a tool, a metaphysical tool, which will deconstruct the conglomerate mass of sensible reality in the interests of discerning the thin line of continuity which lies within it, that Aristotle interests himself in the technique of abstraction.

²⁸ Diogenes Laertius viii.24.

²⁹ 1092^b 15.

³⁰ 1032^b 15.

³¹ 893C.

There is not much use of the term prior to him, and Plato offers no real analysis of it, though in the *Statesman* it is used a number of times to refer to the technique of removing in order to arrive at definitions.³² The method is usually associated with mathematics, and Clement of Alexandria's statement of the *via negativa* places it in this context. Aristotle knows of this tradition: in the *On Indivisible Lines*³³ he discusses the problem of whether the point can be detached from the line, using the verb ἀφαιρέω. He uses the phrase τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως to mean "abstractions,"³⁴ and makes the following distinction between disciplines: "... the method of mathematics makes statements by abstraction, whereas that of physics proceeds by addition."³⁵ The view seems to be that sensible reality is a matter of accumulation and the multiplication of characteristics, whereas abstract mathematical thought proceeds in an opposite way, by the removal of these accretions. The object of abstraction is the knowledge of quantity (τὸ ποσόν) and continuity (τὸ συνεχές),³⁶ and this is extremely revealing for the history of negative theology in that in its first stages, it aims to discover that which is continuous, as constant in the various gradations of reality. So that Aristotle advocates abstraction as a method of peeling off the various layers of reality in order to return to the essence: he rejects ἀπόφασις in fact,³⁷ claiming that the essence is not simply the negation of size, or other sensible qualities. The logic of apophatic negation did not commend itself for various reasons, and he prefers the method of removal. Some have even denied that abstraction is a form of negation at all,³⁸ and it is true that ἀφαιρέσις is not very far removed from our own concept of abstraction: by "thinking in the abstract" we mean removing from an issue its impermanent and contingent aspects so that we may reflect upon its essential features. This is all Aristotle means, and this is what he advocates as an epistemological tool for the tracking down of the ultimate essence. Abstraction is not a form of negation, but one may also observe that it is very close to privation, which is itself close to negation. By the time of Sextus Empiricus and the Sceptics he reports, the two were treated interchangeably, so that the drawing of a rigid

³² 263C, 268D.

³³ 972^a 13.

³⁴ *Posterior Analytics* 81^b 2.

³⁵ *On the Heavens* 299^a 14.

³⁶ *Metaphysics* 1061^a 33.

³⁷ *Metaphysics* 1029^a 25.

³⁸ See John Whittaker, (above, note 17) 123.

distinction between them may have little value for the study of late antiquity. The resulting method is the same, and amounts to this: in the face of a concept of sensible reality which saw it as a composite structure, evolving into an ever more massive state by the accumulation of layers, the method of abstraction which is borrowed from the mathematicians, seeks to undo the process of accumulation by removing the accretions until the continuous is found.

This is the germ of the great chain of being of the Neoplatonists: it looks like this:

A
BA
BCA
ABCD

The puzzle is to find the continuity, and with that you have the essence, namely A, the most hidden of all the characteristics, and which is the One in the case of the Neoplatonists, and God in the case of the Fathers, existing in attenuated form in all lower levels. When Clement of Alexandria recommends the way of abstraction, he uses the traditional mathematical model: we begin by abstracting the surface, and we are left with the line; we abstract the line, and we are left with the point. Would Aristotle have stopped here? It is not quite clear, but it is clear enough that Clement does not: we abstract the point, or strictly speaking the monad, and we are then precipitated into "the greatness of Christ." Clement's is the first clear statement of the negative method in the Christian tradition and the irony is that what is advocated is strictly speaking not a form of negation at all, but a form of abstraction. This will give way to genuine negation in the Christian tradition, and in the Neoplatonic tradition, but in the first stages negative theology is nothing more than a technique of conceptual removal. Being precipitated into the greatness of Christ means being thrown into a realm which is beyond language, and beyond being as well: it is a transcendental experience.

Beyond being: this is another crucial ingredient to the whole story. Is God within being or outside it? One could put it somewhat more dramatically by asking whether he exists or not, though this is deceptive: in many texts of the period, Platonic, Christian and Neopythagorean, God is formally beyond existence. All kinds of consequences flow from the relationship of God, or The One, to being, and these are all spelt out in Plato's *Parmenides*, which contents itself with

providing a series of problems. One option offered by this work, which became a theological textbook, was that The One was outside being. In this case language about it would be impossible. On the other hand, if the One is within being, language will break it in pieces by its multiplicity of words, and the unity will be lost. These are dilemmas for the Platonists and Christians of late antiquity, but negative theology is rendered more or less radical a method depending on whether God is said to be within being or outside being. The way of abstraction is already an instrument of metaphysics in Aristotle, but it becomes an instrument of transcendental theology in Clement.

RAOUL MORTLEY

MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY

INTERPRETATIONS

THE NAME OF PHILOCTETES: *PHILOCTETES* 670-73

Philoctetes 670-73, part of a brief exchange between the hero and Neoptolemus that precedes the tragedy's only proper *stasimon*, contain an extraordinary linguistic interplay which, to my knowledge, only Clare Campbell¹ has noticed and only in part. This play on words takes the form of a doubly emphatic *etymon* concerning Philoctetes' name, and supplies us with its true meaning:

- ΦΙ. εὐεργετῶν γὰρ καὐτὸς αὐτ' ἐκτησάμην. 670
NE. οὐκ ἄχθομαί σ' ἰδὼν τε καὶ λαβὼν φίλον·
ὅστις γὰρ εὖ δρᾷν εὖ παθῶν ἐπίσταται,
παντὸς γένοιτ' ἂν κτήματος κρείσσων φίλος.

Philoctetes has promised Neoptolemus that, in return for his kindness (Neoptolemus' pledge to convey Philoctetes safely home),² he, alone of men, shall be privileged to handle the bow of Heracles (663-69); for, he explains, it was by a good deed that he himself acquired it (670).³ Neoptolemus replies that he is happy to have found and gained Philoctetes as his friend, because "whoever knows how to render kindness in

For the text I have used R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments* Part IV, *The Philoctetes* (Cambridge 1890).

¹ See "A Theophany," *Theoria to theory* 6 (1972) 81-85. Campbell, 81-82, remarks, "when he [Neoptolemus] is first allowed to touch the bow he utters a crucial line (surprisingly ignored by commentators, line 673) which in Greek plays on the hero's name; *philos* means friend and *-ktetes* is from a root meaning possess." I reached a similar conclusion (in a seminar on Sophocles given by Cedric Whitman in the Spring of 1975) before I had read her article, which P. E. Easterling, "*Philoctetes* and Modern Criticism," *ICS* 3 (1978) 36, n. 21 first drew to my attention.

² Cf. *Phil.* 507-32, esp. . . . ἐς δόμους . . . 517, 524-25, which have Neoptolemus consent to the Chorus' deceptive urging, and 530-31, Philoctetes' joyous response. For the opposite view, that Neoptolemus does not promise to take Philoctetes home, see O. Taplin, "Significant Actions in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*," *GRBS* 12 (1971) 38.

³ Philoctetes alludes here to the assistance he rendered Heracles by kindling his funeral pyre; cf. lines 799-803, which have Philoctetes speak explicitly of this deed, with J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles*, Part VI, *The Philoctetes* (Leiden 1980) n. ad 801-3.

return for kindness must prove a friend better than any possession" (671–73).

It will be noted that the positioning of ἐκτησόμεν and φίλον, the final words in, respectively, lines 670 and 671, is scarcely accidental, inasmuch as their radical elements coalesce to comprise the name of Philoctetes. These lines present the first of two instances lexically accentuating his name;⁴ the second occurs two verses later and employs nearly the same verbal events: κτήματος . . . φίλος (673). The poetic texture, by means of this double emphasis on Philoctetes' name, seems to be reinterpreting its meaning, so that it not only retains its traditional sense "fond of gain," but bears also the connotation "a friend better than any possession," or, more precisely, "the best κτήμα is a φίλος."⁵ In brief, this deliberate, tactical management of linguistic units actively conduces to defining the nature of genuine friendship: the reciprocation of good deeds.⁶

Moreover, verses 670–73 are highly and doubly ironic. For Philoctetes has indeed shown that he is capable of performing a kindness, viz., sailing for Troy with seven ships (*Il.* 2.718–19); he himself says that he sailed of his own accord (1026–27). Yet, despite his voluntary assistance

⁴ κτᾶσθαι or its derivatives also occur at *Phil.* 81, 778, 1281, 1344, 1370. With the possible exception of κτήμα in 81 the remaining instances do not possess the significance that is evident in lines 670 and 673. κτήμα (81) aids in characterizing the attitude of Odysseus with respect to convincing Neoptolemus of the need for deception, if they are to gain the bow of Heracles. It suggests that Odysseus regards not only the bow but also Philoctetes himself as an object to be seized or discarded when it is no longer useful (cp. 1049–52). Further, κτᾶσθαι and κτήμα in lines 670 and 673 have by their association with φίλος a moral force, which Odysseus' use of κτήμα in 81 is entirely lacking—cp. φίλον as predicate object of λαβών in 671 and κτήμα as object of λαβεῖν in 81. Odysseus will and does go to any length to secure possession of the bow, as both his words and actions make clear.

⁵ G. Nagy makes a number of perceptive remarks about this theme in the *Iliad*; see "The name of Achilles: etymology and epic," *Studies in Greek, Italic and Indo-European Linguistics* (Innsbruck 1976) 227–29; further developed in *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore 1979) 103–9.

⁶ εὐεργετῶν (670), with its implicit reference to Heracles, to say nothing of the presence of his bow and its symbolism of active and beneficial engagement in the world of men, seems also to contribute to achieving this result; for Heracles is regularly the type of the εὐεργέτης. See now C. Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization* (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 321–22.

On the sincerity of Neoptolemus in lines 671–73 critics are not universally agreed, but it would be tedious to catalog here all those who have enlisted on opposite sides of this issue. Suffice it to say that scholarly opinion weighs in favor of the view that Neoptolemus' emotion and sympathy are genuine.

to the Greeks' cause, he has fared wretchedly at their hands. Their ingratitude toward him is immediately pointed up by the Chorus' allusion to Ixion (676–80) and his treacherous betrayal of Zeus' kindness. Ixion, as the story goes,⁷ killed his father-in-law Eioneus by throwing him into a pit of flaming coals, when Eioneus came to collect the bridal gifts. As the first murderer Ixion received cleansing from Zeus alone, since no mortal would minister the rites of purification to him. Ixion, then, proved traitorous both to his father-in-law and to Zeus, man and god, and thus became the paradigm of ingratitude and unbridled lust. The thankless treatment of Philoctetes by the Greek host parallels the ingratitude that Ixion displayed toward Zeus; it is in the justness of their fates that a divergence arises, since Ixion deserved his, Philoctetes did not.

If these verses are ironic for Philoctetes, they are perhaps even more so for Neoptolemus. It is only through his association with the suffering Philoctetes and through the inner conflict which he experiences because of this association that Neoptolemus comes to understand fully the burden of his words about friendship. For central both to the development of the play and to Neoptolemus' development as a character are the various changes of heart that he undergoes. This development seems to be poetically marked, at least in part, by the double *etymon* of 670–73.⁸

JAMES DALY

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



⁷ See, e.g., Pind. *Pyth.* 2.21–48 (with scholia).

⁸ A final observation may serve to strengthen this assertion. Philoctetes concludes both the scene and the promise of friendship exchanged between himself and Neoptolemus by personifying his sickness. As he leads Neoptolemus into his cave, he says: . . . τὸ γὰρ/νοσοῦν ποθεῖ σε συμπαραστάτην λαβεῖν (674–75). συμπαραστάτης and its cognate συμπαρασστατεῖν occur only infrequently in classical Greek and solely in contexts associated with divinity, e.g., at Aesch. *PV* 218 of the assistance given by one god to another, and at Ar. *Ran.* 387, *Eccl.* 15, *Plut.* 326 of the help and protection which the gods afford to men. *Eccl.* 15—Praxagora's address to the lamp—is included here, because her entire speech parodies, among other things, prayer forms used in hymns. R. G. Ussher, *Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae* (Oxford 1973) n. *ad loc* shows how Aristophanes presents a comic eulogy of a common object by having the lamp addressed as if it were the sun-god. *Plut.* 326 involves similar parody, since there we find men rendering assistance to the god

STATIUS, *SILVAE* 3.3.149

quam dives in usus
 natorum totoque volens excedere censu
 testis adhuc largi nitor *inde assuetus* Etrusci, 149
 cui tua non humilis dedit indulgentia mores.

For his sons' sake the father spared no expense: 'the splendour that princely Etruscus [one of the sons] has ever *practised since that day* bears witness' (D. A. Slater); 'the *wonted* splendour of Etruscus *from that day* to this bears witness' (J. H. Mozley); c'est ce qu'atteste encore *le goût de l'éclat qu'il encouragea chez le libéral Êtruscus*' (H. J. Izaac); 'sta a dimostrarlo lo splendido tenore di vita, *che da lui prese le mosse divenendo abituale*, del munifico Etrusco' (A. Traglia).¹

As *inde* may bear according to context a spatial, a temporal, or a causal sense, these renderings of *inde assuetus* differ no more than one would expect. By adopting a temporal sense, however, Slater and Mozley make the son's *largitas* begin when he was still enjoying his father's, which seems premature. A causal sense should therefore be preferred; as Calderini puts it in his commentary (Rome 1475), '*assuetus inde: ex liberalitate tua formatus et institutus*'.

Doubts remain. In the first place, *inde assuetus* is less straightforward Latin than *inde natus*, for instance, would be; Traglia's thoughtful translation exposes the difficulty.² Moreover, 'the resultant . . .' has a fussy and prosaic ring alongside *testis*.³

whose saviors they are said to be. Further, the word from which these cognates derive, συμπαρίσταναι, also occurs to denote the favoring presence of a god. Cp., e.g., Soph. *OC* 1340 which has Polyneices entreat his now godlike father to assist him in recovering his crown; Men. fr. 714.1-2 (Sandbach): ἄπαντι δαίμων ἄνδρσι συμπαρίσταται/εὐθὺς γενομένῳ. . . . So, too, in our play the belief that Neoptolemus will bring him to his native land and the friendship implicit in that belief are for Philoctetes like the help which only a god can offer; hence, Neoptolemus' very presence becomes a godlike comfort to him in his misery.

I am grateful to my colleague, Professor J. G. Keenan, and to the anonymous reader of *AJP* for helpful comments on this note.

¹ I quote from Slater's translation (Oxford 1908) 128 and from the Loeb, Budé, and Turin editions (1928, 1944, 1980).

² I waste no words on the view held by many interpreters of *Silvae* that the more awkward the Latin transmitted (in one fifteenth-century manuscript) the more likely Statius is to have written it.

³ For similar uses of *testis* in verse see Tib. 1.7.9-12, Prop. 2.13.53-54, Virg. *Ecl.* 5.21, *Aen.* 9.288-89, Hor. *Od.* 4.4.37-44, Ovid *Fast.* 2.273-76, Lucan 10.221-22.

These infelicities can be removed, and Latin dictionaries augmented, by a conjecture far from bold:

testis adhuc largi nitor *indesuetus* Etrusci.

Once *indēsuētūs* was falsely divided as *indē suētūs*,⁴ it had little hope of surviving. That it occurs nowhere else does not matter: Ovid's *Metamorphoses* alone contain five unique words that begin with *inde-* (*indefletus*, *indeiectus*, *indestrictus*, *indetonsus*, *indevitatus*), and another has been restored by conjecture in Statius himself (*Theb.* 8.87 *indecerptus* Barthius: *interceptus* codd.).

The sense benefits as well as the Latin. The son's lavish display is no longer *assuetus* just to him but *indesuetus* from father to son, two compliments in one.

M. D. REEVE

EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD



BURYING LATIN *CENOTAPHIOLUM*

The sole attestation of *cenotaphiolum* is *CIL* VI.13386: IN HOC CENOTAPHIOLO/ M AUR. STRATONICAE. QUI FACIT/ P. LONG. XXIII. P. LAT. XIII/ LIB. LIBERTABUS. POSTERISQUE/ EORUM. From here, the word has made its way into the *index vocabulorum* of *CIL* VI (E. J. Jory and D. W. Moore [Berlin 1974], Pars 7, fasc. 1, p. 1002); Georges, *Lateinisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch*; and the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*.¹

Why would someone erect a cenotaph (and a small one, at that) for so many potential occupants? We need not tax our ingenuity²: the

⁴ Cf. Manil. 5.63 *inde lassato* codd. for *indelassato*.

¹ It is not included in Lewis and Short nor in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*; the reason for this omission is not clear, but does not seem to rest on a recognition of its spuriousness.

² E.g., by postulating influence of the Pamphylian sense of the word *κενотάφιον* as the tomb building or base as distinct from the sarcophagus set in or on it. See J. and L. Robert, *Bull. Epigr.* 1950, nr. 204 (pp. 203–5) and J. Kubińska, *Les monuments funéraires dans les inscriptions grecques de l'Asie mineure, Travaux du Centre d'Archéologie Méditerranéenne de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences*, tom. 5 (Warsaw 1968) 89.

word is a phantom. It arose from Muratori's mistaken transcription of Boldetti's original publication of the text, which reads: IN HOC CEPOTAPHIOLO/ MAUR. STRATONICAE. QUI. FACIT, etc.³ *Cepotaphiolum* is thus the correct reading; it is twice attested elsewhere (*CIL* VI.2259 and *CIL* VI.19039, which has the same initial phrase: IN HOC CEPOTAPHIO/ LO . . .). *Cenotaphiolum* never existed.⁴

BERNARD FRISCHER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



THE RIGHT WAY TO DRESS (ON ARTEMID. *ONIR.* 3.24)

Ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ περιβεβλησθαι ἢ ὅπως ποτὲ γελοίως καὶ μὴ κοσμίως πᾶσι πονηρὸν καὶ πρὸς ταῖς ἀπραξίαις διασυρμὸν καὶ καταγέλωτα ὑπομεῖναι σημαίνει.

In a recent issue of this journal¹ W. M. Calder III has sought to explicate this sentence, specifically its opening words (ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ περιβεβλησθαι). I quote (p. 89):

'Dressing oneself to the left side,'² apart from neglecting the tense of the infinitive, is a literal translation without meaning in English. 'To be dressed awkwardly'³ makes sense; but I do not think it is what the Greek means. What Ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ περιβεβλησθαι means in English is 'to have dressed backwards'; that is back to front, to have put on a cloak backwards, or a left shoe on the right foot. At *Onirocritica* 3.25 Ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ γράφειν is *to write backwards*, Festugière's *Écrire de droit à gauche*. My interpretation is assured by *Acta Thomae* 92 (111.206.1-4 Lipsius-Bonnet), where after rising and inadvertently putting his left sandal on

³ L. A. Muratori, *Novus Thesaurus Veterum Inscriptionum*, vol. 3 (Milan 1740) 1709 (nr. 10); M. A. Boldetti, *Osservazioni sopra i cimiterj de' santi martiri ed antichi cristiani* (Rome 1720) 446.

⁴ I wish to thank Prof. William Harris for discussing *CIL* VI.13386 with me and for suggesting that I check Mommsen's sources of the text.

¹ "Artemidorus Daldianus, *Onirocritica* 3.24," *AJP* 103 (1982) 88-89.

² The translation of R. J. White, *The Interpretation of Dreams: Oneirocritica by Artemidorus* (Park Ridge 1975) 164.

³ So A. J. Festugière, *Artémidore, La Clef des Songes Onirocriticon* (Paris 1975) 192-93 ("Être vêtu avec gaucherie").

his right foot, Charisius rightly expects the worst: τὸ ἀριστερόν ὑπόδημα εἰς τὸν δεξιὸν πόδα ὑπεδήσατο.

This just will not do. Neither of the examples offered is pertinent,⁴ and in fact the true sense lies in a conflation of the versions of both White and Festugière: "having one's cloak on (there is an ellipsis of ἱμάτιον, *vel sim.*) to the left, *and therefore* gauche." Those interested need only consult the excellent and ample notes of Blaydes at Aristoph. *Birds* 1567 and 1568. He gives numerous apt parallels (including Artemid. *Onir.* 3.24), all conspiring to demand the sense as here given. For the reader's ease I select two of the more colourful. Citing Plato, Athenaeus attests that in the old days men knew how to dress properly (κοσμίως, cf. μὴ κοσμίως at *Onir.* 3.24):

Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ: "πάντα δυναμένους ὀξέως τε καὶ τορῶς διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπισταμένους ἐπιδέξι' ἐλευθερίως."

(Athen. 21 b = Plat. *Theaet.* 175 e)⁵

Gentlemen know on which side to throw the cloak. Not so risible oafs like the Triballian:

(Poseidon) οὗτος τί δρᾷς; ἐπ' ἀριστερ' οὕτως ἀμπέχει;
οὐ μεταβαλεῖς θοῖμάτιον ὧδ' ἐπιδέξια;
τί ᾧ κακόδαιμον; Λαισποδίας εἴ τῇ φύσιν;

(Aristoph. *Birds* 1567–69)

So common was the expression that it seems to have become virtually proverbial; so an instance, not in Blaydes, from Menander (fr. 691 Körte): οἶμά σε τὸν ἐπ' ἀριστερ' ἐμπερονώμενον. Becker has a good (if slightly confusing) synthesis of the matter: "It [the ἐπίβλημα or περίβλημα] was first thrown over the left shoulder, and then round the back to the right side, and then above the right arm or below it, and again brought over the left shoulder or arm. This was called ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀναβάλλεσθαι or ἀμπισχνεῖσθαι; and according to a man's skill or awkwardness in doing it, he was pronounced genteel, or clownish and un-Greek."⁶

RICHARD F. THOMAS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

⁴ Ἐπ' ἀριστερά γράφειν only means "to write backwards" because that is what happens when you write "to the left." At *Acta Thomae* 92, we are dealing with the specific putting of a left shoe on a right foot, and not with the bare phrase ἐπ' ἀριστερά. As will become clear it is this phrase, combined with forms of -βάλλεσθαι, that must be considered.

⁵ In Plato there is the same ellipsis of ἱμάτιον that we claim for Artemidorus.

⁶ Becker, *Charicles* 418–19.

GLŌRIA

Ernout-Meillet s.v. declare "étymologie inconnue," simply mentioning Ribezzo's **gnōria*. Walde-Hofmann s.v. properly find Ribezzo's proposal phonologically complex and unjustified in detail, but they also reject Bezenberger's suggested relation to ON *kalla*, Slavic **golsz* 'voice' **golgolz* 'word' etc. too hastily. It remains true that the semantics of *fāma* is important in the tradition of Indo-European culture, and consequently compelling in our search for a source meaning for *glōria*. Therefore, regardless of whether the final portion is *-*riā* or *-*siā*, the initial part easily resolves itself somehow as **gloH-* or **gleH-* (with colouring from the laryngeal).

Now the Welsh *galw* 'to call' and its Breton cognates could represent **gl̥uo-* and hence could be an anit cognate of the Slavic etyma. However a British Celtic *gal-* could also have arisen from **glH-* before vowel. The details here elude us, but the possible relation is clear.

When we turn to Irish we find a much more suggestive possibility. The entry 2. *glór* (maśc. *o*-stem) is glossed by the *Dictionary of the Irish Language G* (1955) 110 'voice, sound, noise; gabbling.' The couple of instances with possible figurative value 'fame' may here be left out of account as being perhaps chance convergence; note too that the borrowed *glóir* (fem.) ~ *glór* (fem. *ā*-stem) 'glory' is a distinct lexeme. Moreover 2. *glór*, which is not attested particularly early, and hence could have been a neuter, also occurs spelt and riming as *glár*. What this all means is not entirely clear, but two avenues of investigation are immediately suggested:

1. The alternation *glór* ~ *glár* is reminiscent of *mór* ~ *már* 'big.' We therefore may be in the presence of **glā-* and *-*ro-*, although a simple nexus of these would lead us to expect *glár* only. Now of course **glā-* could match Latin **gloH-* perfectly.

2. For both the Irish and the Latin formations a suffix *-*ro-* to form a noun with full grade vocalism is not easily explained; note that both these languages match Greek *δῶρον*=Armenian *tur-k*¹ with **doH₂-no-m*. There is also the residual problem that Lat. *sōl* must somehow reflect **seH_auel* = *sāu₂el*; one wonders whether this may have been revised to **sāu₂l*. > **sāu₂ol*. On the other hand, Irish *glór* ~ *glóir* (which rimes with *cōir*) could have lost an original *-*u-*. These considerations lead us to hypothesize tentatively **glāu₂r* < **gleH_a-u₂r*, an ancient verbal noun¹ to which Latin has added a collective suffix while Irish has

¹ See Benveniste *Origines* (Paris 1935) 110ff.

simply thematized the neuter. In these terms, the Irish could reflect the outcome of **glāuro*-.

Lat. *glōria* would then be a collective in *-iā* formed on the type of Hom. εἶδος, while Ir. *glór* would parallel νεῦπον.

ERIC P. HAMP

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



FIVE-VOWEL AND SEVEN-VOWEL DIALECTS

A recent article in this journal¹ presents, near the end (p. 566), an "analogy from Romance" which seems to be a gross oversimplification. It refers to the French "assibilation" of *k* in Lat. *ke* and *ki*, and mentions some related developments in other Romance languages. But this is the latest stage in a process that began with palatalization in Late Latin, and the analogy is imperfect unless it makes the intermediate stages clear.

I think it can be said that when a phonetic change results in a new sound, i.e. one not previously occurring in the given language or dialect, the immediate effect can take either of two courses: the language (if we may personify it) can, and perhaps usually does, accept the new sound, which then becomes an addition to the phonetic inventory and, commonly with little delay, to the inventory of phonemes—and this is in fact a common method of phonological change; or the language can reject the new sound, as abnormal and unpronounceable, by immediately assimilating it to an already existing sound which it resembles in some way.²

¹ "The dialectological implications of secondary mid-vowels in Greek: a clarification," by G. S. Sheets, *AJP* 100 (1979) 559–67.

² This principle can affect even an individual word, as in colloquial American, where the word *hoodlum* is often abbreviated to *hood*, which would logically have a long vowel and rhyme with *rude*, but is usually or always pronounced short, rhyming with *good*, because it has been assimilated to the previously existing and quite unrelated word *hood*, a head covering. The same result commonly occurs with words borrowed from a foreign language and half-naturalized. This is a common and familiar phenomenon, which is illustrated by the German nickname *Schorsch* or *Schorschl*, for *Georg*, derived from the Fr. *Georges*: the sound [ʃ], occurring twice in the French form, does not exist in Standard German or in most German dialects, and is replaced by the related, but voiceless [ʃ̥].

Both processes evidently occurred in the development of /ke, ki/ in Late Latin, or Proto-Romance. The first stage is palatalization, giving [kje, kji] and then [tje, tji]. Next, in the eastern dialects which became Italian, Roumanian, etc., the new phoneme arose, as /če, či/, which has been preserved for the most part to this day. Meanwhile, in the western dialects, which became French, Spanish, Portuguese, etc., the opposite outcome was achieved: as the Latin language of that period possessed no such sounds as [tʃ], or [ʃ] which it includes, the palatalized consonant was promptly assimilated to the existing *s*-sound, producing [ts]. The further developments, with loss of the element [t], leaving [s] or (in northern Spain) [θ], took place only after a lapse of several centuries.

(Incidentally, there seems to be a misprint, or misstatement, in the suggestion that Roumanian *cetate* begins with [ts-]—should be [tʃ-]; and an incomplete statement where Spanish *ciudad* is given as having [si-], ignoring the Castilian [θi-].)

In Greek, the “seven-vowel system” which Sheets is discussing appears in dialects which have accepted the new phonemes, i.e. new close long vowels resulting from contraction or lengthening. The dialects with the “five-vowel system,” on the contrary, have assimilated the newly formed long vowels to the more open long *e* and *o* previously existing, as described above.

Thus, there is nothing to be gained by arguments about which of these systems is more “archaic” or “conservative.” A close study might show some slight chronological difference, but it would hardly be significant of anything.

R. WHITNEY TUCKER

CHARLOTTE, N. C.



REVIEWS

G. B. KERFERD. *The Sophistic Movement*. Cambridge University Press, 1981. Pp. vii + 184. \$32.50 (hb), \$9.95 (pb).

Professor Kerferd has given us a very useful presentation and defense of the sophistic movement. His book clearly is the fruit of many years of close living with the subject. Throughout it displays his characteristic good sense, wide learning and gift for clear, concise argumentation. In much classical scholarship the operation of a cruel logic dictates that the more scanty the evidence the more voluminous the argumentation about it. But in this case the modest dimensions of this volume give little clue to its masterful handling of an extraordinary range of complex and intensely disputed issues. He has consciously eschewed the "attempt . . . to analyze, or even survey, all of the material that has survived concerning individual sophists and the various doctrines with which they were credited" (173). At the same time the work is remarkably comprehensive, and one finds on virtually every page a concentrated distillation of a vast quantity of contradictory evidence and attempted explication. In at least six instances K. discusses evidence omitted from the vast Diels-Kranz collection of data—a significant clue to the depth of scholarship worn so lightly in this work.

The book is divided into fourteen chapters, many of which are quite short. Chapters 1-5 sketch K.'s own approach in the context of the history of interpretations of the movement, the Greek historical situation, the history of the term sophist and a quick overview of the data for individual sophists. The real meat of the book is contained in chapters 5-13, which examine sophistic argumentation (eristic, antilogic and dialectic), their theory of language, the doctrine of logos in literature and rhetoric, sophistic relativism, the nomophysis controversy, the question whether virtue can be taught, their theory of society, and, finally, their views on religion and the gods. A brief conclusion restates forcefully the basic contentions about the movement set forth in the introduction.

One might almost guess from the order of this impressive range of topics the particular thrust of K.'s approach, if not the central theme of his defense of the movement. Formal "problems" easily recognizable as central to the history of philosophy take precedence over social, political and pragmatic ethical concerns. Not surprisingly, the chief contention of K. about the sophists is that they have been robbed of their legitimate place in the history of Greek philosophy and more precisely their legitimate claim to the title of "philosophers" (cf. 174). Acknowledging the wide range of practical studies to which they applied their form of rationalism, K. offers a defense of his own emphasis on more narrowly philosophic issues which suggests his debt to the British analytic school: "before reason can be applied to the solution of problems it is necessary

first to establish a rational structure or framework within which the problem becomes capable of being approached by the investigator" (ibid.). Given what K. sees as the philosophic naïveté of the sophists' predecessors, he presents the sophists' intellectual achievements almost as a natural accident inherent in the dynamic of thought: "largely unexplored questions of epistemology, logic and metaphysics *seem to interpose themselves* increasingly between the thinker and the immediate subject under discussion" (ibid., emphasis mine).

In line with this perspective K. argues that the doctrine of the two opposed Logoi is "perhaps the most characteristic feature of the thought of the whole sophistic period" (85). (In view of present-day attacks on the Aristotelian logic which descended linearly from this doctrine, K.'s preferred term for it, "antilogic," is somewhat troubling, but I cannot think of a good, one-word alternative). Some of his most painstaking and valuable argumentation is devoted to establishing the distinctions and interrelationships of the associated concepts antilogic, dialectic, eristic and elenchus (chapter 6). The longest and perhaps the most original chapter is concerned with sophistic relativism, where the relation between the man-measure doctrine and the doctrine of the two opposed Logoi is explored with great subtlety and perhaps as much clarity as one could hope for.

K.'s own often persuasive conclusions are never nearly so important to him as his major theme of the "philosophic" respectability of the sophists: "Clearly some of the detailed interpretations suggested here are open to challenge. What I want to suggest is that the evidence is overwhelming in favour of the attempt to interpret Protagoras' doctrine as a *seriously intended* contribution to a *serious philosophic* problem" (93, emphasis mine). So too in defense of Gorgias: "whatever corrections and refinements or *even fundamental alterations* from the above account are still to be made, the *philosophical interest* and *importance* of what Gorgias had to say hardly needs further stressing" (99, emphasis mine).

It would be quite unfair to suggest that K.'s goal leads him to slight the more immediate social and political thought of the sophists. Chapters 10-13 cover a wide range of issues. Together with the chapters on the sophists as a social phenomenon, on language, literature and rhetoric (3, 7 and 8) they represent a fair balance within the limits assumed in the scope of the book as a whole. Yet not infrequently K.'s rather narrowly conceived conception of respectability and his chosen posture as defender of the sophists lead him to unsatisfactory versions of social and political history in the service of the history of philosophy.

K. lays great stress on the association of the sophists with Pericles (esp. 18f., 131) for which there is adequate evidence. He flirts with the hypothesis that their social and political theory provided the rationale for the kind of elite-dominated democracy described by Thucydides as democracy in name, but in fact the rule of one man (cf. 145). On the other hand, K. is well aware that the availability of their services to all those who could pay (25f.) as well as their claim that the virtues of success were not the natural consequence of aristocratic birth but had to be learned (145) implied a severe threat to the hegemony of the great *oikoi* of which Pericles was the most prominent scion. While he notes Cleon's use of sophistic arguments, he prefers to describe the attacks on the

sophists as "political opposition, first to Pericles and then to those who admired and would continue his policies after his death" (165). Who would this be? Shall we see Nicias as the friend of sophists and Alcibiades as their enemy? Should we attribute to Pericles the conscious desire to open the ranks of the strategiate to the likes of Cleon? K. accepts as plausible most of the stories of attacks on the sophists and sees Pericles as their defender and patron (cf. 20-22). Yet difficult as these alleged attacks are to date, the most probable period seems to be just before the outbreak of the war when Pericles himself was under attack and during the last quarter of the fifth century when Pericles was out of the picture. I would suggest that it is more plausible to see Pericles' patronage as an enlightened gamble by elements in the aristocratic elite to retain its status by acquiring skills which were inherently dangerous to its interests when mastered by non-aristocrats. Toward the end of his hegemony, Pericles' strategy vis-à-vis the sophists seems to have backfired, inspiring the ire both of less enlightened aristocrats and of conservative elements in the demos. Thus the more traditional distinction between the older sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias and Hippias and the younger sophists such as Antiphon, Thrasymachus and Callicles—though implicitly rejected by K. (cf. 9)—remains helpful in differentiating the periods, roughly, before and after Pericles' death. It makes some sense out of the seemingly contradictory tendencies in the sophistic defense of democracy and their articulation of a radical individualism. A synchronic view that sees the whole movement as a phenomenon of *Periclean* Athens (176) obscures the dialectical interplay of events and thought.

K.'s treatment of the *nomos-physis* controversy involves a particularly paradoxical consequence of his preference for the history of philosophy over chronology. Rightly locating the period of the intensely conflicting claims for *physis* in the last quarter of the fifth century, he begins with Antiphon, moves on to Callicles and Thrasymachus, takes a look at Thucydides' accounts of the Mytilenaeen debate and the Melian dialogue, *then* turns to Protagoras and the case for *nomos* (125f.). Only in this context does he allude to the "Theory of Progress"—what Havelock more appropriately designates the "anthropology" of the sophists. A very cursory look at Plato's *Protagoras*—it is treated more thoroughly in Chapters 11 and 12—leads right into Anonymus Iamblici and pseudo-Demosthenes XXV, i.e. fourth-century defenders of *nomos*. This arrangement gives the very skewed impression that Protagoras' anthropology and positive conception of democracy and of democratic *nomoi* are somehow a response to Antiphon and Co. We might compare the approaches of Havelock and, in this at least, his unacknowledged follower, Guthrie. The anthropological theories of progress come first and are presented as the fundamental precondition of understanding the *physis-nomos* controversy itself. Protagorean and other sympathetic treatments of the origin and functioning of *nomos* precede discussion of those who appeal to *physis*. Perhaps the disadvantage of this arrangement for K.'s thesis is that it ends with those thinkers who have historically inspired the greatest hostility to the sophists.

K.'s treatment of the sophists' theory of language, literature, and rhetoric are predictably philosophically refreshing and enlightening, but at the price of downplaying any elements which might give ammunition to their detractors. He makes an eloquent, and to me thoroughly persuasive, case for Gorgias'

originality in "raising, by implication and, I would say, to a considerable degree consciously, the whole problem of meaning and reference" (99). At the same time K.'s almost gratuitous apologetic roll seems responsible, in part at least, for his less than satisfactory treatment of Gorgias' rhetorical theory. K. rightly rejects Guthrie's superficial dismissal of Gorgias' "On that which is not or on Nature" (but is the use of humor or irony incompatible with "serious" philosophy?). K. suggests that that fragment clarifies the seeming contradiction in the *Helen* between the speaker's claim to offer the truth and his demonstration that all logos is *apatē*. The "radical gulf between logos and the things to which it refers", which is introduced in *On Nature*, explains "the sense in which every logos involves a falsification of the thing to which it refers" (81). So far, so good. But when K. attempts to explain the claim of one logos to greater truth-value by reference to probability (*eikos*) and "the appropriate time" (*kairos*), one feels a slight *non sequitur* has crept in. The issue of truth seems left behind altogether when K. concludes: "When we put together the doctrines of the Probable or Plausible and the Right moment in Time, in relation to Opinion . . . it is clear that we have already the elements of a theory of rhetoric which can stand comparison with modern accounts of the technique of advertising" (82). Unless we choose to see truth as inherent in advertising, we must conclude that a radical scepticism about the referentiality of language led Gorgias—not without a touch of playful irony—to articulate a subtle theory of the manipulation of logos to heighten the *illusion* of truth. K. wants to claim full credit for this intellectual achievement for his hero, but his argument is so uncharacteristically tortuous here because, I suspect, he is so anxious to dissociate him from the opprobrium traditionally attached to that discovery.

Finally, K.'s goal of establishing the respectability of the sophists within the history of philosophy involves him in a delicate juggling act both in relation to that history and the history of modern treatments of the sophists. His chapters on the meaning of the term sophist and the individual sophists, though they contain much valuable information, fail to come to grips with the difficulty in establishing firm criteria for differentiating "sophists" from other "presocratics." Having made an excellent case for the fundamental continuity between presocratics and sophists (13), he states, somewhat equivocally: "If we exclude thinkers such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus from the ranks of the sophists, then it is true no major theoretical contributions [about physical questions] came from the rest" (39). In practice he usually does exclude these "thinkers" except when he needs to argue for Pericles' closeness to "sophists" (18), the continuity between Empedocles and Gorgias' theory of perception (72) or various overlaps between the work of Democritus and other sophists (41, 45, 68, 106, et passim). Anaxagoras came to Athens, presumably had paying pupils and was said to have been persecuted for "impiety." The exclusion of Democritus, whose career is admittedly obscure, involves a serious lacuna. One of the virtues of Havelock's approach was that he refused to accept distinctions in labels which only serve the interests of Plato and his partisans in denigrating the "sophists" as utterly distinct from true "philosophers."

But of course it is in relation to the role of Socrates and Plato in the history of Greek philosophy that K. has the most delicate task. He sees the chief obstacle to an adequate appreciation of the sophists in the Hegelian heritage

which "set [them] in conflict with the idealist tradition" (11). This is, from K.'s perspective, the problem with Guthrie, whose "own sympathies are . . . with the idealist tradition" (ibid.). On the other hand, defenders of the sophists as "anticipating anti-idealist positions, positivism, liberalism, materialism whether dialectical or otherwise" are scornfully dismissed without so much as being named, because such an approach, K. insists, remains within the Hegelian framework (13). Needless to say, such a sweeping dismissal of the competition facilitates K.'s description of his book as "very much a first beginning" (2).

If it is not exactly that, its brevity, range, and intelligence do make it an excellent place to start the study of the sophists. It lacks the encyclopedic fullness and leisurely range of humanistic allusion which enrich Guthrie's treatment in *HGP*. It lacks the intellectual excitement and breadth of vision in Havelock's much maligned *Liberal Temper*. But particularly for readers whose primary interest is to situate the sophists in relation to Socrates and Plato *qua* philosophers, this is an eminently readable and useful book.

PETER W. ROSE

MIAMI UNIVERSITY OF OHIO

PETER JOHN RHODES. A Commentary on the Aristotelian *ATHENAION POLITEIA*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 795. \$98.00.

In his excellent commentary, R(hodes) uses *AP* to refer both to the work and its (unknown) author: I am not persuaded (see *sub fin.*) and refer to Aristotle. Where clarity demands I cite both R.'s pages and *AP*, chapter and section: otherwise, one or the other.

A. W. Gomme devoted part of the introduction to *HCT* 1 to a discussion of Thucydides' self-imposed limitations, and limitations are discernible in the original text and the new commentary thereto. Jacoby, *Atthis* 211–12, observed that there were three literary genres known as *politeiai*, the political *politeia* (e.g. the *AP* ascribed to Xenophon), the philosophical *politeia* (e.g. Plato's work) and the scientific *politeiai*. This last genre was invented by Aristotle: of 158 *politeiai* attested in Diogenes' catalogue, the genre is represented by one extant example, the *AP*, whose beginning is lost and whose end is mutilated. One upshot of this is that we cannot assess in detail how well the author of the *AP* fulfilled his set task, because we do not know in detail what task he set for himself. In the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, there is but one reference to the *politeiai*: at *NE* 1181B15–23, Aristotle says that the collected *politeiai* will provide material for analyzing the preservation and destruction of *poleis*, for assessing the goodness or badness of regimes and, ultimately, for assisting in the construction of the Best State. Only the first of these ends is fulfilled in the *Politics*, and, since that end is largely historical, the *AP* has been largely ignored by students of ancient philosophy (cf. I. Düring, *s.v.* Aristoteles, *RE* Supplb. 11,311: "Die Problematik der Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία gehört zur Geschichtsforschung und fällt aus dem Rahmen dieses Artikels heraus"). One may, however, distinguish purpose from content, and the gap left by students of philosophy has been

filled by students of history. It is squarely and resolutely within the latter tradition that R. places himself.

The commentary is the first in English and the first thoroughly-ranging commentary in any language since Sandys² of 1912. After an introduction, the body of the work is divided into nineteen sections, each with its own introduction, followed by an appendix listing passages where R. disagrees with Kenyon's OCT, a bibliography of editions, translations, commentaries and other books; select addenda, and indexes (i. passages from Aristotle; ii. inscriptions, papyri and other mss.; iii. general index). The absence of publications in article form from the bibliography is explained and justified by the author's purpose. The work is primarily a work of reference and provides discussion of a passage in its immediate context. In that context, necessary information is given once about an article: in the same context, *op. cit.* is used, and in other contexts, the fuller information is repeated.

In many ways, the commentary is exemplary. R. properly adopts a conservative attitude toward the text (the London papyrus was meticulously scrutinized for him by J. D. Thomas): the documentation is thorough, citation of modern scholarship is generous (frequently overly generous), and the ancient evidence is never pushed beyond reasonable limits. I select only a few passages for comment.

Pp. 86–87, 112: R. is right to believe that ch. 4 is an interpolation, probably wrong that the interpolation replaced a discussion of Draco's *thesmoi*. The homicide-laws excepted, the Athenians stopped using these with Solon, and it is difficult to see what purpose such a discussion would have served. When Solonian laws are cited, it is to prove or illustrate a point (8.1, 3; 9.2). P. 119: it is not clear why the fact that both Plutarch and Aristotle rejected Androtion's view of the *seisachtheia* should entail that their common source in 5–12 "ought not to be Androtion." P. 340 (27.4: ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν): "Conon's making his own resources available to his fellow demesmen is seen as a kind of liturgy." This misses the point: χορηγία is a metaphor for material wealth, coined by Aristotle (e.g. *Pol.* 1255A14; also Theophrastus, *Vat. Frg.* B 55). P. 269: it seems to me slightly perverse to produce an emendation, the intended result of which is garbled Greek. Chambers' attempt (*JHS* 99 [1979] 151–52) to defend τότε πρῶτον in the sense of 'precisely then' is not supported by his parallels, and the Greek for this expression is τότε δῆ. P. 319: R. is one of few to follow Reinach in thinking 25.3–4 a late insertion. P. 349: it is acute of R. to note that the group led by Cimon is appropriately called εἰρηοποί; he could have added that the only occurrence of the term (26.1) occurs in a context which contains Cimon. P. 359: the interpretation of πατρικῶς 'like a father' (28.5) is banal: understand 'as in the old days,' i.e. the days of Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes. Pp. 416–19 have extremely useful tables of parallel sources of the events of the last decade of the fifth century.

My major points of disagreement are on matters literary and historiographical. Sources: R. is reluctant to entertain the possibility that the value-judgments of the author are his own (e.g. 474 on 40.2) or that he adapted source material for his own purposes, although it would seem apparent that some kind of adaptation of historical data for a *politeia* was unavoidable. One example of this is the list of rival politicians in 28.2–5: R. thinks that the

πάρχω 21.3 and 29.2), one, προανακρίνω, is coined, either at 3.5, as I think, or at *Pol.* 1298A31, and two are first used here (προδιασπεύρω 14.4; προεξαλείφω 47.5). In the Greek language there are by my count (for the precise accuracy of which I dare not vouch) 705 such προ-compounds; of these, only 9 percent (78) predate 300 B.C. I assume that a good many of these were coined the first time they are recorded in literature, and some interesting statistics emerge. First recorded in Herodotus are 12, Thucydides 19, Xenophon 7, Isocrates 3, Plato 2, Demosthenes 9, Theophrastus 5 and Aristotle 25. Such coinages came easily to the author of the *AP* and to Aristotle, and well they should have: the two are one.

At the end of his preface, Rhodes thanks those who have encouraged and suffered him in an "obsession which is not yet at an end.": *sono ossessionati anch' altri*.

Corrigenda. A minor blemish in the typesetting is the frequent incidence of a dash under an Arabic numeral. Blank references on pp. 105, 187, 188, 289, 540 are, respectively, to pp. 308, 357, 256, 311, 683. P. 66. (line) 37: the Harp-lemma is wrong. P. 102.12: θεσμός. P. 116.7: ἄρκοῦσα. P. 132.45 (and elsewhere): to cite Harp., Phot. and Sud. together can give the impression that we have three independent sources; almost invariably, Phot. and Sud. are derived from the epitome of Harp. P. 138: on ζευγίται see D. Whitehead, *CQ* N.S. 31 (1981) 282-86. P. 171.44: replace Solon¹ by *AP*. P. 187.14: πεδίον. P. 208.42: separate 'detailed' from 'account.' P. 212.36 (and Index I, p. 771): the *de Audibilibus* and *Problemata* should not be assigned to Aristotle. P. 214.1: Theophrastus' *Nomoi* should now be cited from the edition cum commentary of A. Szegedy-Maszak (New York 1981). P. 216.6: χωρίον. P. 259 n. 23: Raubitschek's article is from 1956. P. 275.3: delete first comma. P. 295: on the Delian League, N. Robertson, *AJAH* 5 (1980) 64-96. P. 333: on Pericles' law, C. Patterson, *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451-50 B.C.* (New York 1981). P. 334: something has gone wrong with the last sentence. P. 477.19: φανερώς. P. 516.6: Mitchel. P. 536.14: replace W. R. Connor by C. W. Fornara. P. 581.45: ἀπογραφή. P. 600.43: βιβλίον. P. 617.20: τίς. P. 618.18: Aristogiton's. P. 622.43: *Dramatic*. P. 623.1: following. P. 627.23: Parke. P. 631.6: πατῶα, πατῶαν. P. 638.5: and which. P. 640.40: περὶ. P. 682.27: ἐπὶ.

JOHN J. KEANEY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

ALBERT SCHACHTER. *Cults of Boiotia*. London, University of London, Institute of Classical Studies, 1981- Vol. 1: Acheloos to Hera. Vol. 2: Index of Inscriptions. No price stated. (*Bulletin Supplement* 38.1 and 38.4)

Greek inscriptions are difficult to deal with for many reasons, not the least of which is that the places in which inscriptions are published can be as difficult to find (more so in some cases) as the stones themselves were when they were in the ground, or wherever else they might have been. In the case of Boiotian inscriptions, *IG* 7 contains over 4,000 inscriptions, the *SEG*, journals and books contribute substantial additional material. One must welcome solid scholarly effort which succeeds in organizing this bulk of evidence into a more readily useable form, especially on some specific topic. This is particularly true.

if one has spent hours searching for that tantalizing but elusive two-line inscription certainly seen last week. What Albert Schachter has done in this revision of his D.Phil. thesis is to gather the evidence from epigraphical, literary, numismatic, artistic, and archaeological sources pertaining to Boiotian cults, and then to arrange this information alphabetically by cult. Cults found at more than one site are then alphabetized by site. The majority of citations are epigraphical in nature. Some entries for the individual cults are very short, with only a few lines of text and commentary. Others (for instance, on Amphiaros, Apollo Ptoios, Apollo at Thebes, Athena at Koroneia, Hera at Plataia) are more like journal articles, with succinct well-documented commentary on the various sources. In this way, Schachter draws together the diverse sorts of historical and social information contained therein. Schachter's work addresses cults, some very localized in nature, of gods, heroes, emperors, and even objects such as the sceptre of Zeus worshipped at Chaironeia. Pseudo-cults and questionable cults are included and labelled as such. Schachter writes clearly and in a straight-forward manner, with a touch of the sort of dry wit often noticeably absent from scholarly works of this sort. At present, only Vols. I and IV are available to us. Vol. I contains the cults indicated by its title, and Vol. IV is the index to the whole work. Vol. II and III are promised in the "not too distant" future, and are presumably now ready, since their index is completed.

Schachter hopes that his audience will approve of his method of indexing, although he knows not everyone will. Scholars can be difficult to please, and deciding upon a method of indexing is never the simple task it seems it ought to be. Schachter has chosen to use a main entry system. A main entry is the title Schachter uses to refer to an inscription throughout the book. In the case of an inscription which has had more than one publication, Schachter has chosen to list the inscription by its corpus number (with *IG* taking precedence) rather than to use a citation in a journal or book. The author worries that this will mean that important re-editions of inscriptions will not appear as main entries. Surely the sensible reader will not mind being sent to a volume of a corpus first, and then proceeding to a subsequent re-edition of a particular inscription. This sort of legwork is innate in epigraphical scholarship. The index represents a monumental amount of labor, checking and re-checking. Naturally in a work of this size and detail the reviewer can verify only so many references, but the two hundred or so I did check were free of error.

I will not dwell upon a few proofreading errors, such as missing parentheses, some breathing marks and accents which are sliding off their vowels (the Greek text has been typed in), as for the most part the book is free of those annoying distractions. One characteristic of the book which should have been avoided is the large empty spaces on some of the pages. With publishing costs as they are, space in books should be used as economically as possible.

Those seriously interested in Greek religion will want to examine *Cults of Boiotia*. One hopes that other scholars will have the fortitude to undertake similar studies for other regions of the Greek world.

LINDA COLLINS REILLY

THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

THOMAS WIEDEMANN. *Greek and Roman Slavery*. Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xvi + 284; 2 maps. \$25.00 hardcover, \$8.95 paperback.

Ancient slavery continues to receive major attention, which has even increased since World War II; all of us, Marxists, Christians, or academic humanists, can unite in condemning the social and ethical evils of human servitude, which, as Wiedemann observes, is commonly taken "as the key principle of social organization." In looking at ancient literature and art, true, one does first and foremost see proud aristocrats as the leaders of society and culture; but the accepted emphasis on slavery is not to be questioned.

No one, however, has produced a book presenting the ancient evidence on the topic in translation; Wiedemann well fills the gap, if gap it be. He gives 243 selections in his own translations, varying from four letters (a slave collar with TMQF, "tene me quia fugio") to several pages. These items are sensibly arranged under twelve topics, the first three, for example, being slaves as property, debt bondage and serfdom, and manumission. Legal quotations, the most numerous sources, contain the rules; snippets from literature and inscriptions show us individual, specific examples. No. 50, thus, is a good illustration of human sentiment; in no. 78 the ex-slave Publilius Syrus to some extent reflects the views of the slaves themselves.

Each item is succinctly but clearly introduced. Wiedemann has a cool, reasonable attitude toward the treatment of slaves, warning the reader that a piece of fiction must not be taken literally, or again comments thoughtfully on the problems of the utility of slaves or the degree of rural slavery among the Greeks. The sources are well described for a layman in an Index of Passages Cited; the bibliography is selective but wide-ranging.

One can always argue about the inclusion or omission of specific items in such a work; I doubt, thus, the utility of a 13-page quotation from Athenaeus and am not certain that no. 73 is relevant. Unfortunately Wiedemann has decided not to repeat anything which is available in Lewis and Reinhold or Austin and Vidal-Naquet, and does not cite Homer and the Attic tragedians. Within his confines, however, he has done a good job in illuminating the manifold variety of slavery in the Greek and Roman worlds. The major problem remains: for whom will this collection, well selected and arranged though it is, be really useful?

CHESTER G. STARR

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

EDWARD CHAMPLIN. *Fronto and Antonine Rome*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. 185. \$14.00

For centuries M. Cornelius Fronto possessed one of the greatest reputations in Roman literary history. Praised by his pupil Marcus Aurelius and by his disciple Aulus Gellius, Fronto's renown was acknowledged over the centuries by Minucius Felix, Macrobius and Sidonius Apollinaris. He was seen as the founder of the school ("Frontoniani") which championed Latin over Greek,

and archaism over silver Latin innovation. But his works had been lost, save for several *sermones* recorded by Aulus Gellius. In 1815 Cardinal Angelo Mai recognized Fronto's correspondence on palimpsests in Milan and in the Vatican Library. Despite the fragmentary state of the palimpsest and the unsatisfactory nature of the early editions, it quickly became evident that the letters were a sore disappointment. Far from learning the *arcana imperii* of Antonine Rome, scholars found neither Cicero's daily political analysis nor Pliny's informative reports. Fronto's discussions of the Latin language and rhetorical theory, his accounts of intellectual intrigue, his vapid letters of recommendation, and his untiring servility towards the Antonine family have all combined to lead modern historians to regard him as merely a pedant and a bore.

Edward Champlin has now subjected Fronto to his first re-examination in English since M. Dorothy Brock's sympathetic and perceptive *Studies in Fronto and his Age* (1911). Champlin has produced a fine book: well organized, clearly argued, and gracefully written. He turns from the linguistic and rhetorical preoccupations of Brock and other Frontonians to "an attempt to locate the man in the society which produced him." The book can be placed alongside other Oxford-inspired works which analyze the historical setting of important writers of second-century Rome: Syme's *Tacitus*, Fergus Millar on Cassius Dio, C. P. Jones on Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom, T. D. Barnes on Tertullian, and G. W. Bowersock on the entire Second Sophistic. Though Fronto might hardly seem the equal of such literary luminaries, Champlin chooses to regard Fronto as "one of the great figures of his century" in his role as advocate, as doyen of Latin literary studies, and as the friend and teacher of emperors.

Champlin has rightly chosen to pass over the details of Fronto's rhetorical and stylistic theories, which are conveniently summarized in the handbooks of G. M. A. Grube and George Kennedy, and are treated more extensively in the monographs of M. D. Brock, F. Portalupi and R. Marache. But he does provide a good account of Fronto's view of the *contubernium* in propagating his ideas. Literary motives dominated all aspects of Fronto's public and private life: his interest in war as a subject for history; his pride in his son-in-law's eloquence; his assessment of poetry as useful to the orator; and his desire to display his love for the emperor in a public address (*actio gratiarum*).

Yet outside the sphere of rhetoric and style, Champlin's careful account shows that Fronto has only minor cultural importance. He was atypically sedentary in an age of peripatetic intellectuals, holding all his offices in Rome save a quaestorship in Sicily. Fronto was resolutely committed to Latin and even confesses a lack of mastery of Greek. Champlin's attempt to find numerous Greek connections for Fronto appears unconvincing. The Greek sophists married philosophy to public life, but Fronto strikes us as an armchair academic wishing to define politics as an offshoot of rhetoric as when he recommends candidates for political or administrative posts on the basis of their eloquence. Despite his later canonization by Latin literati, Fronto was quite remote from the most important intellectual currents of his own time.

As an advocate, however, Fronto was an acknowledged master. Champlin's account of Fronto's forensic career is fascinating for the light it sheds on the social and political background of the Roman bar in the second century. Although Marcus Aurelius was unsympathetic to advocacy, his old master

Fronto became one of the leading legal pleaders of his time. Champlin's discussion of these (lost) speeches is always interesting; his suggestion that Fronto's famous anti-Christian diatribe (referred to in the *Octavius*) was contained in his speech *In Pelopem* is attractive, not least because it dispenses with the elaborate speculations concerning an *Oratio contra Christianos*. Champlin's judicious approach is especially welcome in treating lost works where scholarly caution is so often thrown to the winds.

The political importance of Fronto is a more difficult question. Champlin emphasizes Fronto's position as advocate, senator and friend of emperors and he cautions that his political importance cannot be measured by his cursus. He certainly seems to be at the center of political power, having the evident love of, and access to, his pupils Marcus and Lucius Verus. Yet Champlin's own careful study of the letters shows Fronto as outside the nexus of political decision-making. Though Marcus loved and admired him, the prince had moved on to other masters and other studies. Fronto's antipathy to philosophy did not estrange him from Marcus, but the constant expressions of mutual love in the correspondence does not conceal a certain lack of intimacy. While the orator is acknowledged by Marcus in the *Meditations*, the mention is the briefest of the ten teachers listed. The emotional odyssey is not unfamiliar: the young prince was inspired by Fronto's learning and his personal warmth, but as he came to maturity he found his intellectual stimulation and political advice elsewhere while retaining admiration and even genuine love for his old teacher. Champlin is right to take Marcus' protestations of love at face value. But that would not prevent Marcus from consulting his philosophical comrades and imperial bureaucrats on important matters of personnel and policy. Neither the emperor's love nor his success at the bar gave Fronto any genuine political influence. He is finally a courtier whose personal recommendation might count for honorific posts, but who has left no record of political, military or administrative achievement.

It is on the Antonine age that Champlin's book is particularly illuminating. Whatever our verdict on Fronto himself, Champlin shows that his correspondence remains an indispensable record of the Antonine court and the senatorial elite. Though it has too easily been discarded as pious platitudes, unctuous flattery, and academic pedantry, it must be viewed as an important document of the social history of the age. Champlin has used the letters to subject the denizens of legal and literary Rome to careful prosopographical scrutiny and thus draws an interesting picture of court intrigue in the "happiest age." He also provides interesting material on the civil service, the importance of court ceremony, patterns of patronage, and the somewhat surprising importance of freedmen in the Antonine palace.

My only major reservation is the place of Fronto himself in this book. He is not a Tacitus, a Pliny, a Plutarch or a Dio of Prusa. We are not terribly interested in him or his (non-rhetorical) ideas; we care about him as a source. If Champlin had written *Fronto's Correspondence and Antonine Rome*, he might have been spared the defensive tone and special pleading on behalf of his book's ostensible protagonist. For example, his half-hearted defense of Fronto on historiography is unnecessary—Fronto's failure to write the history of Lucius Verus' conquests hardly changes his views on history expressed in the

Principia Historiae. Champlin agrees with other scholars in condemning the vapidness of the theories there expressed, but he goes on to plead "in Fronto's defense . . . that we do not actually possess any of his historical work" (55). Fortunately, this occasional expression of sentimental loyalty to Fronto does not cloud Champlin's clear historical judgment. But in place on the concern with the person of Fronto, the book would profit from an expanded treatment of the political context of Antonine Rome.

Appendices include Champlin's useful chronology of the letters (essentially the same as that published in *JRS* 64); a convincing discussion of the evidence for Fronto's birth which is placed c. 95 A.D.; and another tilt at the long-vexed question of Fronto's death. Champlin suggests 167 A.D. in opposition to Bowersock's recent argument for 175 as a *terminus post quem*. I slightly prefer the later date, but both arguments have some merit. The current state of the evidence does not permit any more certainty than when Mommsen disputed the matter. I do miss a bibliography in a book that will become the standard treatment of the subject; references are given to bibliographical surveys on Fronto, but these concentrate on his literary contributions.

Despite Champlin's admiration for M. Cornelius Fronto, this book diminishes his importance in Antonine Rome as we see his impact on students and friends to be essentially personal rather than political or intellectual. But Champlin's remarkable skill in dealing with the textually corrupt and politically barren correspondence has established it as a major source for Antonine society. The author's perceptive treatment of monarchs and lawyers, senators and teachers, will make his engaging study required reading for all students of the High Empire.

RONALD MELLOR

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

T. D. BARNES. *Constantine and Eusebius*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. vi + 458. \$35.00.

Over the past decade, a steady stream of articles on the Constantinian period has flowed from the pen of Toronto's T. D. Barnes. In *Constantine and Eusebius* the author now seeks to distill the fruits of these labors into an "interpretative essay." Of all the major scholars who have devoted books to Constantine in the past 100 years, Barnes is the first to have chosen to give equal standing, in title and text, to the emperor's older contemporary, Eusebius of Caesarea, the celebrated "father of Church history." He does so consciously to redress a balance: although Eusebius' *Life of Constantine* inextricably entwines him in the controversy surrounding the methods and motives of the first Christian emperor, the great range of his writings—covering theology, exegesis and apologetics as well as history and chronology—daunts attempts to understand him on his own terms. To undertake not merely to do this, but to join such a study to the entirely different but equally massive problems involved in the study of Constantine's life and career is a Herculean labor—one few scholars other than Barnes would be either able or willing to undertake.

Underlying the study of these two key figures is the story of the rise of Christianity as both a political and an intellectual force in the later Roman Empire, and it is this theme which unites the three parts into which the book is divided. Part I follows the career of Constantine up to the defeat of his co-ruler Licinius in 324. Part II begins anew with Eusebius, studying his intellectual roots in the teachings of Origen and subsequent development of his thought. In Part III, entitled "The Christian Empire," these two currents merge in a study of the emperor's growing involvement in Church affairs during the final third of his reign. The concept is fresh, the treatment predictably bold, erudite, and provocative. But the results are irregular, for Barnes employs a method better suited to the study of an individual who has left a corpus of his own writings than it is to one who is known largely through the writings of others.

To Eusebius, Barnes applies the rare skill, demonstrated so ably in his *Tertullian* (Oxford 1970), for mastering the entire corpus of a prolific author, and combining it with detailed knowledge of his life and setting to achieve new insight and understanding. Barnes has redated, and re-interpreted, much of the Eusebian corpus. He argues skillfully, through careful study of the text, that the first edition of Eusebius' *Church History* was conceived, and at least largely written, before the Great Persecution even began (ch. 8). He also concludes that the first edition of his *Chronicle* lacked the polemic against Porphyry of later editions, and that therefore the work as a whole was not primarily motivated by anything but pure scholarship (p. 113). On the basis of such rethinking, Barnes challenges the modern tendency to interpret Eusebius as primarily an apologist. "Eusebius began as a scholar," he writes, "made himself into a historian, and turned to apologetics only under the pressure of circumstances" (p. 104).

Barnes also challenges the traditional tendency to classify Eusebius as merely a slavish disciple of Origen. "Eusebius was immersed in the Bible and in biblical ways of historical and quasi-historical thinking to a degree which Origen would have found alien and unspiritual," he concludes (p. 97). His study is filled with valuable insights. Of the *Church History*, he writes (p. 136): "Eusebius does not present the early Church as a hated and persecuted minority gradually attaining security and respectability. For him the Christian church normally enjoyed respect and toleration, even in its earliest days. For him it was persecution, not (as for moderns) the triumph of Christianity, which represented an aberration from the predictable course of history and thus required an explanation." Barnes combines this understanding with a critical appreciation of his author's defects and limitations, chiding modern scholars for letting the bishop imply that he was a great confidant of the emperor's (p. 265), and suggesting that one aim of the *Life of Constantine* was to lead his readers "to infer that Constantine shared his own Arian views" (p. 271).

Specialists may continue to take issue with Barnes' conclusions about Eusebius, but the grounds for the argument have at least been clearly laid out. The same might seem to hold true for Constantine as well, for here Barnes is, if anything, even more firm in his conclusions. Challenging the currently fashionable tendency to see the first Christian emperor as a champion of religious toleration who wished to restore unity to an empire sundered by persecution, Barnes projects the picture of a revolutionary and a zealot who "regarded himself as the protector of Christians everywhere" (p. 212), who made Chris-

tianity the "official religion" of the empire (pp. 97, 224), and more: "Constantine's religious policy was coherent and comprehensive," he writes. "He did not merely suppress paganism and establish Christianity as the official religion of the state; he set out to ensure that Christianity replaced the cults which it ousted" (p. 247).

If Barnes himself is to be believed, he arrived at this conclusion solely in response to overwhelming evidence. "More can be done," he writes in the Preface, "but further work will require methods different from those employed here and will necessarily be more speculative. It is advisable to establish the basic framework first, lest hostile critics seize upon the speculations as casting doubt upon the underlying facts themselves." (p. v). And again in the conclusion: "The present study . . . has sought to transcend the terms in which 'the Constantinian question' has traditionally been posed. . . . A broader and less subjective approach has here been essayed: to set in their context and exploit to the full the evidence of contemporary documents and literary works written during Constantine's lifetime . . ." (p. 174).

Barnes has, indeed, worked broadly and deeply in the sources, and his attention to chronological detail—which will be demonstrated even more fully in a companion volume, *The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine*—has brightened many shadows of the period. But the questions surrounding Constantine do not lend themselves so readily to resolution by Barnes' favored method of classical textual criticism: there are simply too many gaps and ambiguities in the evidence. Despite his disclaimers, Barnes himself has had to rely on speculation. Consider, for instance, the following statements: "Constantine might (for all that is known to the contrary) have studied philosophy in his youth" (p. 73); Lucian of Antioch "may have taught in the imperial capital [Nicomedia] for many years. . . . Constantine and his mother may have been among those who heard him teach and expound the Scriptures" (p. 194); Constantine "built a great church in Nicomedia to commemorate the martyrs of that city (many of whom he must have known)" (p. 248). Such statements constitute not merely speculation with a vengeance, but speculation so directed as to indicate Barnes is arguing more of a brief than he is willing to admit. One detailed example will confirm the point.

Central to his thesis of an aggressively anti-pagan Constantine is Barnes' conclusion that the emperor outlawed sacrifice to the gods "under any circumstances" shortly after taking the East from Licinius in 324. Barnes defines this act as "a change so sudden, so fundamental, so total" that it "shocked" pagans, who "probably" responded with complaints and protests (p. 210). The action and response, had they occurred, certainly would go a long way toward justifying the extremist stance which Barnes assigns Constantine. But did they occur?

Barnes method of dealing with the evidence is instructive. First (p. 210) he discusses a letter of Constantine's condemning idolatry and polytheism. This document, he writes, "is not (as commonly supposed) an edict of toleration" even though it forbids compulsion, because "Constantine uses harsh language throughout, continually denounces paganism. . . . and pointedly refrains from mentioning sacrifices." Whether an omission is pointed or not is, of course, always questionable. But Barnes continues, "Against the background of the earlier law, Constantine's silence ineluctably implies that sacrifice

remains totally prohibited." Hence the law justifies reading a pointed silence into the letter.

What is the evidence for this earlier law? Prior to reproducing this letter in his *Life of Constantine*, Eusebius makes the claim that Constantine outlawed idolatry, divination and sacrifice (II.45.1). Against this is the claim later in the century by Libanius that Constantine left ancestral worship unchanged (*Orat.* 30.6). Unfortunately, neither statement is documented. How does one, then, choose between them? Eusebius, as a contemporary, should have preference, but his tendency to see everything through a pro-Christian filter is too well known for a statement this broad and general to be taken at face value. Barnes' method is to banish Libanius to a footnote (n.11, p. 377), there only to dismiss him as "totally misleading." But there are other problems not so easily dispensed with. As n. 15 informs us, Firmicus Maternus' appeal to Constantine's son and successor in the West to suppress sacrifice suggests that the practice had continued at least in that part of the empire. Barnes deals with this problem in the text thus: "He [Constantine] would not risk rebellion or civil disobedience, and in Italy and the West, where he had been emperor long before 324, he made no serious attempt to enforce the prohibition of sacrifice which Eusebius attests for the East." The sweeping force of Constantine's total ban on sacrifice hence now is to be understood as effective only in the East. Yet in the footnote at this point, which cites another work of Eusebius', his *Oration to Constantine*, we find a further concession: "Even in the East, later evidence suggests that enforcement of the prohibition depended largely on local initiative"—a delicate way of saying that there is also evidence for the continuation of sacrifice in the East.

By this point, the alert reader might well be wondering (1) where exactly sacrifice was outlawed in the posited law, and (2) how a letter of Constantine's with such pointed silence ever was misread as an edict of toleration. Eusebius' *Oration* is no help in answering (1), since the chapter referred to (7.1 ff.) says nothing about the outlawing of sacrifices in the East or anywhere else (the sole reference to sacrifice, at 7.6, clearly is to Christians who were "sacrificed" by the persecutors). Reading Constantine's letter in *Life* II.48–60, however, sheds some light on (2). For here one finds, at II.56, the explicit directive, repeated at the conclusion of the letter, II.60, that no one is to be molested in the pursuit of holiness and purity or compelled by fear of punishment to worship otherwise. Harsh words are used, indeed, but one charged with enforcing this edict would find the operative clauses not in the rhetoric but in what sounds very like orders to zealous Christians to leave their pagan neighbors alone.

We are left, then, with a posited law which is used to justify reading new meaning into Constantine's letter, which in turn is used both to dismiss contradictory witnesses such as Libanius and as evidence for the existence of the law itself. Would it not be more economical to conclude that, if such a law ever was issued, it was not as sudden, as fundamental, or as total as Barnes depicts it? But then there is the shock and outrage with which pagans received the law. This reaction, at least, would certainly seem to justify Barnes' reading. Here, again, one must go to the footnote. For n. 11 on p. 377 informs us that the entire reaction is "inferred" from a statement by Iamblichus in *De Mysteriis* on the importance of performing sacrifice. But since *De Mysteriis* was written, as

its formal title tells us, not as a protest to Constantine but as a reply to Porphyry, and since, moreover, Iamblichus is generally thought to have died around the time Constantine conquered the East, the inference may well be unnecessary.

The example can readily be multiplied. Through use of false inference (e.g., p. 50, a threat to raise the taxes of heretical priests is taken as proof that they once had been lowered), arbitrary judgment (e.g., p. 48, Constantine's continued use of pagan imagery shows nothing but "the dead weight of iconographic tradition," unlike "innovations and deliberate actions which reveal his true beliefs"), and circular reasoning (e.g., p. 48, with n. 42, a law redated from 320 to 307 to prove that Constantine's army was officially Christian after 312 on the grounds that, since the army was officially Christian after 312, the law could not have been issued in 320)—all reinforced at critical moments by speculative comments (a law which *may* have been issued, an outcry which *may* have occurred)—Barnes reveals a clear indication to read the evidence in accordance with a priori decisions.

The result, then, is a book of irregular quality, to which it is difficult to do justice in a review. In the case of Constantine, Barnes has adopted a magisterial tone which does not do justice to the ambiguities of the evidence, yet which poses the threat of misleading unwary readers into believing all problems have been resolved by scientific adherence to the rules of textual criticism. Where, as in the case of Eusebius, such rules can legitimately be applied, Barnes shows genuine brilliance and insight which, when combined with his unrivalled ability to coax chronological references out of the widest variety of texts, indeed succeeds in putting study of the period on a firmer footing.

Perhaps the fairest conclusion is that Barnes has claimed at once too much and too little for his work. His interpretation of Constantine, while vigorous, does not rise to the Olympian perspective at which he aimed. But his study of Eusebius, which constitutes more than half the book, is a happy marriage of method, matter and temperament. Together with the companion handbook, it constitutes the most substantive contribution to Constantinian scholarship since the monumental work of Seeck and Schwartz two generations ago.

H. A. DRAKE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

D. A. RUSSELL. *Criticism in Antiquity*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. Pp. viii + 219. \$24.50.

D. A. Russell's brief book (172 pages of text), *Criticism in Antiquity*, is organized for a different audience and in a different fashion than its predecessors in English, such as those by Atkins, Grube, and less directly Harriot or Kennedy. Russell has in mind the modern literary critic and "the needs of literary students whose Greek and Latin is perhaps vestigial." The first chapter to some extent follows, although briefly and sketchily, the author by author chronological survey of ancient literary criticism adopted by earlier scholars. But the book is largely devoted to an exploration of certain major problems in ancient literary

criticism, such as mimesis, poetic inspiration, the educational function of poetry, theories of style and genre, methods in literary history, and the relation between rhetoric and theories of literature throughout antiquity.

Russell is interested in setting out clearly the ways in which ancient critics established the foundations of later literary criticism, and even more in explaining the limitations of formal criticism in antiquity. Russell notes the failure to establish boundaries between scholarship, rhetoric, and morality, and the consequences of allowing rhetoric and the teaching of rhetoric to dominate the development of literary theory. He laments the ways in which the need to defend poetry and rhetoric against philosophical critics stunted the growth of an independent aesthetic theory, and made ancient literary criticism fail to equal the poetic tradition in literary sophistication or to interact sufficiently with it. Literary criticism, in Russell's view, developed little throughout antiquity and remained tied to creating a "comprehensive set of rules for the critical judgment of literature" which united "both rhetorical and moral standpoints." Hence some of the more important and original contributions to ancient literary criticism, such as Aristotle's contribution to the analysis of genre and his distinction between mimetic and non-mimetic arts, were abandoned until the Renaissance or later in favor of less discriminating ideas. Finally, Russell is particularly concerned with how "critics" of the imperial age and especially Longinus came to have the critical assumptions that they did: why the critics treated poetry and prose as a unified corpus, made little differentiation between ethical and rhetorical criteria for literary judgment and focused primarily on stylistic differentiation.

The questions that Russell poses are important ones, and the attempt to organize his study of ancient literary criticism by synthesizing the development of thought on particular issues represents an advance over earlier writers, who tend to describe more than to analyze the tradition. Further, he brings to the task the experience of a scholarly career devoted to ancient literary criticism. The audience for whom the book is designed, however, might have some difficulties in profiting fully from the book. First, the inexperienced reader must have at hand a copy of Russell and Winterbottom's *Ancient Literary Criticism* (supplemented by additional fragments offered in Russell's appendices in *Criticism in Antiquity*). The intentional brevity of *Criticism in Antiquity* precludes the detailed synopses of the ideas of ancient literary critics which are to be found in earlier books (and these books remain valuable for precisely this reason). The ideas of the critics are not placed sufficiently in the context, both social and philosophical, which gave birth to them. Hence Russell uncovers only in part the causes for the development of the attitudes that he finds in imperial critics. Furthermore, many topics treated by Russell, such as mimesis in Plato and Aristotle, remain deeply controversial for classical scholars. Recognition of such debates, both explicitly in the text (Russell tends simply to give his own views) and in terms of more extensive bibliographical suggestions for further reading, would have been helpful.

Finally, the book, regrettably, is so brief that even the treatment of its central issues remains sketchy, unbalanced, and at times inadequate to the complex nuances involved in each issue. Take, for example, the issue of poetic inspiration. For Russell the ancient poet, in his appeal to the Muses, lays claim

to a state of "irrationality" which explains and justifies his art. Yet from Hesiod onward the poet's claim to access to the Muses is as often a sober claim to knowledge, often against the poet's rivals (Hesiod, *Theogony* 26-34; even *Iliad* 2.485-92 contrasts those with *kleos oion* and those who have access to the Muses), as it is an attempt to express the psychology of the poet. The question of poetic inspiration cannot be separated from the poet's views of language, knowledge and truth. Aristotle and Horace, in their emphasis on the *techne* of the poet as a necessary complement to his inspiration, are by no means rare in antiquity (Pindar is a central example), as Russell suggests. Russell's analysis seems to be overly influenced by Plato's attempt to question poetic inspiration at the expense of the poet's claim to authority based on technique. The larger argument of the book is also sometimes lost in the whirlwind review of the major critics of antiquity in the earlier chapters, a review which sometimes borrows the merely descriptive and comprehensive format of earlier books.

Furthermore, the needs of modern literary critics, whether classicists or students of later Western literature, are met in a rather indirect manner. The discussion of mimesis and genre is indeed valuable for Renaissance students and scholars and other later critics; similarly the discussion of poetic inspiration is important for post-enlightenment critics. Yet Russell has chosen to give a classicist's perspective on these issues rather than shape his treatment of them to respond specifically to aspects of the problem emphasized in later tradition. Scholars concerned with twentieth-century literature and literary theory, on the other hand, would be particularly interested in, for example, ancient views on the nature of language, the relation of language to reality and the claims of poetry to truth, the authority of oral versus written literature (see Derrida's discussion of Plato's *Phaedrus* in *The Pharmacy of Plato*), theories of metaphor and other rhetorical tropes (see post-Saussurian theories, especially those of J. Lacan), the relation between ancient theories of psychology and literature, or the relation between poets and their predecessors (the Bloomian "anxiety of influence"). The nature of language and its relation to reality is not only central to twentieth-century artists and theorists, but to ancient philosophers and poets like Plato, Hesiod or Euripides. Ancient parody in its entirety, medical writings, theories of dream, the presentation of persona by lyric poets, the comments of the tragedians on pity, fear and pleasure, to name but a few, all have something to contribute to the history of the issues important to these critics of modern literature. In short, the interests of American students of literature, if not those of their British counterparts, have shifted far more radically than this book has from its predecessors.

In all fairness, Russell's brief passing references to such issues can be attributed to his desire to answer a different set of questions about ancient literary criticism, and to elucidate issues that were explicitly important to ancient critics. On the other hand, while the book is aimed at the modern student, the text and bibliography contain only a few references to contemporary literary criticism, and to none after 1970. The book, valuable as it is, thus raises once again the question of the relation between classical scholarship and the needs of students in other fields. To what extent should we allow our choice of scholarly issues to be dictated by the needs and interests of modern scholarship? For in order to do so we would have to reshape our notion of

ancient literary criticism and include as a major part of it topics which have not previously been considered of central importance. We would have to turn to a much wider range of ancient literature, and more directly to the poets themselves. Russell himself sees the puzzling importance of the gap between formal ancient literary criticism and the sophisticated works of the poets. But he looks primarily to the critics for answers. From my perspective, however, the lack of a particular kind of critical tradition in antiquity might well be explained, at least in part, by the nature of the literary tradition itself; in a tradition so unbroken, in which the response of one poet to another remained continuous even across cultural boundaries between Greece and Rome and prominent in the lives and education of the ancient citizen, literary and aesthetic views logically remain embedded in the shape of the poetic works themselves. An analysis of ancient literary theory which included the questions important to twentieth-century theorists such as those noted above and a greater attention to the perspectives of poets as well as critics would perhaps be impossibly ambitious at this time. And it would have to build on the groundwork laid by Russell, with his new synthetic approach to the issues. Nevertheless, such an approach might meet the needs of modern students of literature, both classicists and non-classicists, more directly. And we might have less cause to lament the peculiar limits that Russell finds in the critical tradition of antiquity.

HELENE P. FOLEY

BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

BOOKS RECEIVED

- BOEFT, J. DEN and A. H. M. KESSELS, eds. *Actus: Studies in Honour of H. L. W. Nelson*. Utrecht, Instituut voor Klassieke Talen, 1982. Pp. xiii + 482. F.fl. 50.
- BRILLANTE, C. et al., eds. *I poemi epici rapsodici non omerici e la tradizione orale*. Atti del convegno di Venezia, 28-30 settembre 1977. Padua, Antenore, 1981. Pp. xiv + 268. No price stated.
- BRIOSÓ SÁNCHEZ, MÁXIMO. *Anacreónticas*. Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1981. Pp. xciv + 66. No price stated.
- CORTE, FRANCESCO DELLA. *La filologia latina dalle origini a Varrone*. Florence, La Nuova Italia, revised 1981. Pp. 236. L. 12.000.
- Elenchos*, vol. 2, fasc. 1 (1981). Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico. Naples, Bibliopolis, 1981. Pp. 239. L. 10.000.
- Elenchos*, vol. 2, fasc. 2 (1981). Naples, Bibliopolis, 1981. Pp. 213. L. 10.000.
- FABIANO, GIANFRANCO and ENRICA SALVANESCHI, eds. *Δεσμός Κοινωνίας: Scritti di filologia e filosofia*. Genoa 1981. Pp. x + 253. L. 15.000.
- FAGLES, ROBERT, tr. *Sophocles: The Three Theban Plays*. New York, Viking, 1982. Pp. 408. \$25.00.
- FLORES, ENRICO, ed. *La critica testuale greco-latina oggi; metodi e problemi*. Atti del convegno internazionale (Napoli 29-31 ottobre 1979). Rome, Ateneo, 1981. Pp. 407. L. 25.000.
- HARRAUER, HERMANN and PIETER SIJPESTEIJN. *Medizinische Rezepte und Verwandtes*. Vienna, Hollinek, 1981. Pp. xv + 56, 18 pl. (insert). No price stated. (*Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der österreichischen Nationalbibliothek*, neue Serie 12)
- JENKYN, RICHARD. *Three Classical Poets: Sappho, Catullus, and Juvenal*. Harvard University Press 1982. Pp. ix + 243. \$20.00.

- JOHNSON, W. R. *The Idea of Lyric: Lyric Modes in Ancient and Modern Poetry*. University of California Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 214. \$22.50.
- KOLENDO, JERZY. *À la recherche de l'ambre baltique: l'expédition d'un chevalier romain sous Néron*. Warsaw, University of Warsaw, 1981. Pp. 115. Zl. 21. (*Studia Antiqua*)
- LEFKOWITZ, MARY. *Heroines and Hysterics*. New York, St. Martin's, 1981. Pp. ix + 96. \$17.95.
- MALONEY, G. and R. SAVOIE. *Cinq cents ans de bibliographie hippocratique, 1473-1982*. St-Jean-Chrysostome, Québec, Les Éditions du Sphinx, 1982. Pp. v + 291. No price stated.
- MANDEL, OSCAR. *Philoctetes and the Fall of Troy: Plays, Documents, Iconography, Interpretations*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1981. Pp. xiv + 256. No price stated.
- Mémoires II*. Saint-Étienne, Université de Saint-Étienne, 1980. Pp. 155. No price stated.
- MICHEL, ALAIN. *La parole et la beauté: rhétorique et esthétique dans la tradition occidentale*. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1982. Pp. 458. No price stated.
- MINADEO, RICHARD. *The Golden Plectrum: Sexual Symbolism in Horace's Odes*. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1982 (distributed by Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.). Pp. 237. \$23.00. (*Studies in Classical Antiquity*, 4)
- O'MEARA, DOMINIC J. *Studies in Aristotle*. Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America, 1981. Pp. viii + 313. No price stated.
- RHOUSOS, EVANGELOS N. *Ἑλεάτες: τὰ κείμενα*. Athens, Deucalion, 1982. Pp. 76. No price stated.
- SCHEPENS, G. *L'autopsie' dans la méthode des historiens grecs du V^e siècle avant J.-C.* Brussels, Paleis der Academien, 1980. Pp. xix + 214. No price stated.
- Scripta Mercaturae*, vol. 14, fasc. 2 (1980). Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. Ostfildern, Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1980. Pp. 96. No price stated. (*Münstersche Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte*, 1)
- SHEPHERD, WILLIAM, ed. and tr. *Herodotus: The Persian War*. Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. 136. \$4.95.

SYNODINOU, KATERINA. "Εοικα-Εἰκός καὶ Συγγενικά ἀπὸ τὸν Ὅμηρο ὡς τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη. Ioannina, University of Ioannina, 1981. Pp. 230. No price stated.


VANGELISTI, GIUSEPPE, tr. *Tragedie greche: Eschilo, I Persiani; Sofocle, Elettra; Euripide, Le Troiane*. Pisa, Giardini, 1982. Pp. 234. L. 27.000.

VERSENYI, LASZLO. *Holiness and Justice: An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro*. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1982. Pp. vi + 157. Cloth, \$19.75; paper, \$9.50.

WOODFORD, SUSAN. *Greece and Rome*. Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. 122. No price stated. (*Cambridge Introduction to the History of Art*)

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

FOUNDED BY BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE, 1880



VOLUME 103 

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

DISKIN CLAY, EDITOR

Georg Luck, James W. Poultney, John Pollini, Michael L. McCormick
Frank Romer, Book Review Editor
Candida Allanbrook, Secretary

Benjamin D. Meritt, *Honorary Editor*

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY • Volume 103 •

ISSN 0002-9475

Copyright © 1982 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

All rights reserved. No portion of this journal may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the formal consent of the editors and publishers. For copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law, the copier must pay a fee of \$1.00 per copy through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, Massachusetts 01970. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. It is the journal's policy to require the assignment of copyright from all authors.

The *American Journal of Philology* publishes original contributions in Classical Studies, particularly in the fields of Greek and Roman Literature, Textual Criticism, Classical Linguistics, Ancient Philosophy, History, and Greek and Latin Epigraphy. It is published quarterly: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. Subscription price: \$36.00 Institutions, \$15.00 Individuals. Foreign postage is \$2.50 additional. Single issues: \$8.00 each.

Subscriptions, address changes, advertising, and other business correspondence should be sent to The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Division, 34th and Charles Streets, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A. Claims for replacements of missing issues must be received within three months (six months for foreign subscribers) following publication of the issue.

Postmaster: please send form 3579 to the above address.

Indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals and in Book Review Index.

Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland, and at additional mailing offices.

Composition by Bet Sha'ar Press, Inc.

The Printers' devices appearing on the front cover of *AJP* have been selected from among the ones especially created in stained glass for the Hutzler Undergraduate Reading Room on the Homewood Campus of The Johns Hopkins University. They represent the devices by Aldus Manutius (Spring), Robert Estienne (Summer), Joannes Frobenius (Fall), and Christopher Plantin (Winter).

INDEX TO VOLUME 103, 1982

Part I: Articles (Authors and Titles)

Part II: Interpretations (Authors and Titles)

Part III: Book Reviews (Authors and Reviewers)

PART I: Articles (Authors and Titles)

Achilles on the Islands of the Blessed: Pindar vs. Homer and Hesiod (Friedrich Solmsen)	19
AHL, Frederick M. Amber, Avallon, and Apollo's Singing Swan	373
The <i>Aisymnēteia</i> : A Problem in Aristotle's Historical Method (F. E. Romer)	25
Amber, Avallon, and Apollo's Singing Swan (Frederick M. Ahl)	373
The Autobiography of Phoenix: <i>Iliad</i> 9.444-95 (Ruth Scodel)	128
Bellerophon in the 'Land of Nod': Some Notes on <i>Iliad</i> 6.153-211 (Jeffrey A. White)	119
Two Blameless Homeric Characters (Frederick M. Combellack)	361
Catullus and the Polemics of Poetic Reference: Poem 64.1-18 (Richard F. Thomas)	144
Cicero, the <i>Megalenses</i> and the Defense of Caelius (Michele Renee Salzman)	299
CLAY, Diskin. Georg Luck and a Decade of <i>AJP</i>	1
CLAY, Diskin. Unspeakable Words in Greek Tragedy	277
COMBELLACK, Frederick M. Two Blameless Homeric Characters	361
CROKE, Brian. The Originality of Eusebius' <i>Chronicle</i>	195
DUBAN, Jeffrey M. Venus, Epicurus and <i>Naturae Species Ratioque</i>	165
EDMUNDS, Lowell. The Latin Invitation-Poem: What is it? Where did it come from?	184
ELDER, Peter. Horace, <i>Ode</i> 3.19	178
The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire (Ramsay MacMullen)	233
The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa (Raoul Mortley)	429
Georg Luck and a Decade of <i>AJP</i> (Diskin Clay)	1
Homeric Ἄρῃ (William F. Wyatt, Jr.)	247
Horace, <i>Ode</i> 3.19 (Peter Elder)	178
Interview and Aftermath: Dream, Fantasy, and Intuition in <i>Odyssey</i> 19 and 20 (Joseph Russo)	4
KANE, Robert L. <i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i> , 1084-85: "I'll not deny my nature?"	137
KEAVENEY, Arthur. The King and the Warlords: Romano-Parthian relations circa 64-53 B.C.	412
The King and the Warlords: Romano-Parthian relations circa 64-53 B.C. (Arthur Keaveney)	412
The Latin Invitation-Poem: What is it? Where did it come from? (Lowell Edmunds)	184
LUCK, Georg. Notes on the Text of Ovid's <i>Metamorphoses</i>	47
MACMULLEN, Ramsay. The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire	233
The Marriage of Rubellius Blandus (Ronald Syme)	62
MAYER, Roland. Neronian Classicism	305

MORTLEY, Raoul. The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa	429
Neronian Classicism (Roland Mayer)	305
Notes on the Text of Ovid's <i>Metamorphoses</i> (Georg Luck)	47
<i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i> , 1084–85: "I'll not deny my nature?" (Robert L. Kane)	137
The Originality of Eusebius' <i>Chronicle</i> (Brian Croke)	195
ROMER, F. E. The <i>Aisymnēteia</i> : A Problem in Aristotle's Historical Method	25
RUSO, Joseph. Interview and Aftermath: Dream, Fantasy, and Intuition in <i>Odyssey</i> 19 and 20	4
SALZMAN, Michele Renee. Cicero, the <i>Megalenses</i> and the Defence of Caelius	299
SCODEL, Ruth. The Autobiography of Phoenix: <i>Iliad</i> 9.444–95	128
SOLMSEN, Friedrich. Achilles on the Islands of the Blessed: Pindar vs. Homer and Hesiod	19
SYME, Ronald. The Marriage of Rubellius Blandus	62
THOMAS, Richard F. Catullus and the Polemics of Poetic Reference: Poem 64.1–18	144
The Translator of the Greek <i>Res Gestae</i> of Augustus (David N. Wigtill)	189
Unspeakable Words in Greek Tragedy (Diskin Clay)	277
Venus, Epicurus and <i>Naturae Speciei Ratioque</i> (Jeffrey M. Duban)	165
WHITE, Jeffrey A. Bellerophon in the 'Land of Nod': Some Notes on <i>Iliad</i> 6.153–211	119
WIGTILL, David N. The Translator of the Greek <i>Res Gestae</i> of Augustus	189
WYATT, Jr., William F. Homeric Ἄτη	247

PART II: Interpretations (Authors and Titles)

Ἄκρα Γυρέων: Geography, Allegory, and Allusion (Archilochus Fragment 105 West) (J. S. Clay)	201
The Anaphora * <i>ei</i> in Latin (Eric P. Hamp)	98
Aristophanes and Sophron? (Lloyd W. Daly)	86
Artemidorus Daldianus, <i>Onirocritica</i> 3.24 (William M. Calder III)	88
Burying Latin <i>Cenotaphiolum</i> (Bernard Frischer)	444
CALDER III, William M. Artemidorus Daldianus, <i>Onirocritica</i> 3.24	88
CALDER III, William M. The Size of Thespis' Chorus	319
CLAY, J. S. Ἄκρα Γυρέων: Geography, Allegory, and Allusion (Archilochus Fragment 105 West)	201
DALY, James. The Name of Philoctetes: <i>Philoctetes</i> 670–73	440
DALY, Lloyd W. Aristophanes and Sophron?	86
DALY, Lloyd W. A Greek Palindrome in Eighth-Century England	95
Five-vowel and Seven-vowel Dialects (R. Whitney Tucker)	448
FRISCHER, Bernard. Burying Latin <i>Cenotaphiolum</i>	444
Frontius <i>Ag.</i> 76.2: An Unnoticed Fragment of Caelius Rufus? (R. H. Rodgers)	333
Glōria (Eric P. Hamp)	447
A Greek Palindrome in Eight-Century England (Lloyd W. Daly)	95
HAMILTON, Richard. The Lament for Ajax: Sophocles' <i>Ajax</i> 628–31	320
HAMP, Eric P. The Anaphora * <i>ei</i> in Latin	98
HAMP, Eric P. Glōria	447
HAMP, Eric P. <i>hic</i> and <i>ibi</i> in Latin	99
HAMP, Eric P. Remnants of the Pronominal Genitive Singular - <i>l</i>	214

<i>hic</i> and <i>ibi</i> in Latin (Eric P. Hamp)	99
The Lament for Sophocles' <i>Ajax</i> 628–31 (Richard Hamilton)	320
LINDERSKI, J. Two <i>Cruces</i> in Seneca, <i>De vita beata</i> 25.2	89
MASLOWSKI, Tadeusz. On the Margin of Cicero, <i>Pro Cluentio</i> 169 and 170	325
MILLS, Michael J. Τύχη in Aristoxenus, Fr. 41, and <i>Eudemian Ethics</i> 9.2	204
The Name of Philoctetes: <i>Philoctetes</i> 670–73 (James Daly)	440
Notes on Two Epigrams of Philodemus (David Sider)	208
On the Margin of Cicero, <i>Pro Cluentio</i> 169 and 170 (Tadeusz Maslowski)	325
Ovid, Empedocles and the Minotaur (J. S. Rusten)	332
Propertius 4.3.94: An Appendix (D. R. Shackleton Bailey)	213
REEVE, M. D. Statius, <i>Silvae</i> 3.3.149	443
Remnants of the Pronominal Genitive Singular <i>-l</i> (Eric P. Hamp)	214
The Right Way to Dress (On Artemid. <i>Onir.</i> 3.24) (Richard F. Thomas)	445
RODGERS, R. H. Frontinus <i>Aq.</i> 76.2: An Unnoticed Fragment of Caelius Rufus?	333
RUSTEN, J. S. Ovid, Empedocles and the Minotaur	332
SHACKLETON BAILEY, D. R. Propertius 4.3.94: An Appendix	213
SIDER, David. Notes on Two Epigrams of Philodemus	208
The Size of Thespis' Chorus (William M. Calder III)	319
Statius, <i>Silvae</i> 3.3.149 (M. D. Reeve)	443
The Text of Isaeus, XI, 2 (Wesley E. Thompson)	322
THOMAS, Richard F. The Right Way to Dress (On Arthemid. <i>Onir.</i> 3.24)	445
THOMPSON, Wesley E. The Text of Isaeus, XI, 2	322
TUCKER, R. Whitney. Five-vowel and Seven-vowel Dialects	448
Τύχη in Aristoxenus, Fr. 41, and <i>Eudemian Ethics</i> 9.2 (Michael J. Mills)	204
Two <i>Cruces</i> in Seneca, <i>De vita beata</i> 25.2 (J. Linderski)	89

PART III: Book Reviews (Authors and Reviewers)

Barnes, T. D. <i>Constantine and Eusebius</i> (H. A. Drake)	462
Bradley, K. R. on Ste. Croix, <i>The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World</i>	347
Buckler, John. <i>Theban Hegemony, 371–362 B.C.</i> (Jennifer Tolbert Roberts)	107
Champlin, Edward. <i>Fronto and Antonine Rome</i> (Ronald Mellor)	459
Chisholm, Kitty and John Ferguson. <i>Rome: The Augustan Age</i> (F. E. Romer)	352
Claudianus, Claudius. <i>Cl. Claudiani De Bello Gothico</i> . Ed. by Giovanni Garuti (Michael McCormick)	226
Clay, J. S. on Griffin, <i>Homer on Life and Death</i>	102
Clay, Diskin on Snyder, <i>Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura</i>	220
P. Cockshaw, M.-C. Garand et P. Jodogne, Eds. <i>Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata MCMLXXIX</i> (Michael McCormick)	227
Drake, H. A. on Barnes, <i>Constantine and Eusebius</i>	462
Ferguson, John see Chisholm, Kitty and John Ferguson, <i>Rome: The Augustan Age</i>	
Foley, Helene P. on Russell, <i>Criticism in Antiquity</i>	466
Garand, M.-C. see Cockshaw, P., M.-C. Garand et P. Jodogne, Eds. <i>Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata MCMLXXIX</i>	
Goldberg, Sander M. <i>The Making of Menander's Comedy</i> (James Tatum)	344
Greenhalgh, Peter. <i>Pompey. Vol. 2: The Republican Prince</i> (Barry R. Katz)	350
Griffin, Jasper. <i>Homer on Life and Death</i> (J. S. Clay)	102

Hamilton, Charles D. <i>Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War</i> (Jennifer Tolbert Roberts)	109
Jodogne, P. <i>see</i> Cockshaw, P., M.-C. Garand et P. Jodogne, Eds. <i>Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata MCMLXXIX</i>	
Kagan, Donald. <i>The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition</i> (Raphael Sealey)	338
Katz, Barry R. on Greenhalgh, <i>Pompey</i> . Vol. 2: <i>The Republican Prince</i>	350
Keaney, John J. on Rhodes, <i>A Commentary on the Aristotelian ATHENAION POLITEIA</i>	454
Kerferd, G. B. <i>The Sophistic Movement</i> (Peter W. Rose)	450
Koniaris, George Leonidas on Papathomopoulos, <i>Nouveaux Fragments d' Auteurs Anciens</i>	112
Luck, Georg on Whitman, <i>Fifteen Odes of Horace</i>	224
McCormick, Michael on Claudianus, <i>Cl. Claudiani De Bello Gothico</i> . Ed. by Giovanni Garuti.	226
McCormick, Michael on Cockshaw, Garand et Jodogne, Eds. <i>Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata MCMLXXIX</i>	227
Mellor, Ronald on Champlin, <i>Fronto and Antonine Rome</i>	459
Nagle, Betty Rose. <i>The Poetics of Exile: Program and Polemic in the Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto of Ovid</i> (S. Georgia Nugent)	224
Nugent, S. Georgia on Nagle, <i>The Poetics of Exile: Program and Polemic in the Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto of Ovid</i>	224
Papathomopoulos, M. <i>Nouveaux Fragments d' Auteurs Anciens</i> (George Leonidas Koniaris)	112
Reilly, Linda C. on Schachter, <i>Cults of Boiotia</i>	457
Rhodes, Peter John. <i>A Commentary on the Aristotelian ATHENAION POLITEIA</i> (John J. Keaney)	454
Roberts, Jennifer Tolbert on Buckler, <i>The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 B.C.</i>	107
Roberts, Jennifer Tolbert on Hamilton, <i>Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War</i>	109
Romer, F. E. on Chisholm and Ferguson, <i>Rome: The Augustan Age</i>	352
Rose, Peter W. on Kerferd, <i>The Sophistic Movement</i>	450
Russell, D. A. <i>Criticism in Antiquity</i> (Helene P. Foley)	466
Scarborough, John on Smith, <i>The Hippocratic Tradition</i>	340
Schachter, Albert. <i>Cults of Boiotia</i> (Linda C. Reilly)	457
Sealey, Raphael on Kagan, <i>The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition</i>	338
Segal, Erich on Zagagi, <i>Tradition and Originality in Plautus: Studies of the Amatory Motifs in Plautine Comedy</i>	217
Smith, Wesley D. <i>The Hippocratic Tradition</i> (John Scarborough)	340
Snyder, J. M. <i>Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura</i> (Diskin Clay)	220
Starr, Chester G. on Wiedemann, <i>Greek and Roman Slavery</i>	459
Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de. <i>The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World</i> (K. R. Bradley)	347
Tatum, James on Goldberg, <i>The Making of Menander's Comedy</i>	344
Whitman, Cedric, Tr. <i>Fifteen Odes of Horace</i> (Georg Luck)	224
Wiedemann, Thomas. <i>Greek and Roman Slavery</i> (Chester G. Starr)	459
Zagagi, Netta. <i>Tradition and Originality in Plautus: Studies of the Amatory Motifs in Plautine Comedy</i> (Erich Segal)	217

Oxford

Now available in one volume...

Oxford Latin Dictionary

Edited by P. G. W. GLARE. Based on thorough scholarship, this comprehensive reference work gives the use and meaning of Latin words from the language's beginning to about 200 A.D. Originally printed in eight paperback fascicles, it is now available in one complete clothbound edition.

From the reviews...

"The appearance of each new fascicle of this dictionary is a welcome event... one calculated to make the student look forward to the time when he can possess the entire book."—*The Classical World*. "Anyone other than a beginner who uses another dictionary will simply use an inferior one."—*American Reference Books Annual*

1982 2,132 pp. \$145.00

A History of the Ancient World

Third Edition

CHESTER G. STARR, *University of Michigan*. This comprehensive, lavishly illustrated survey of history from its beginnings to the fifth century A.D. is an updated, revised version of the book called by *The Classical Journal* "one of the best general ancient histories in print."

January 1983 768 pp.; 32 illus.; 25 maps \$19.95

The Roman Empire, 27 B.C.—A.D. 476

A Study in Survival


CHESTER G. STARR. The Roman Empire survived and flourished for more than five hundred years. This new book focuses on the reasons behind this remarkable longevity which defied all geographical, political, and economic odds. "A masterly synthesis of high clarity and dramatic intensity... a superbly controlled and structured distillation of a lifetime of research, meditation and teaching... It will long be read with profit."—*Meyer Renhold, University of Missouri, Columbia*.

1982 224 pp. cloth \$17.95 paper \$6.95

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016



"A MARVEL OF CRAFTSMANSHIP AND INTELLIGENCE"
—EMILY VERMEULE, Harvard University.

SOPHOCLES The Three Theban Plays

Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus

Translated by **Robert Fagles** (Chairman
of the Department of Comparative
Literature, Princeton University)
Introductions and Notes by **Bernard Knox**
(Director of the Center for Hellenic Studies)

With a harmony rarely found between
scholar-poet and scholar-critic, Robert Fagles
and Bernard Knox have collaborated to
produce the definitive edition of Sophocles'

Theban plays—presented in their actual order
of composition in this elegantly-designed volume. With

the mastery that characterized his acclaimed *Oresteia*, Robert

Fagles renders the surge and majesty of Sophocles' masterwork into
lucid modern English. Illuminating the text are wise and stimulating introductions and
notes by Bernard Knox, one of the world's leading Hellenists.

"A version that is rigorous yet powerful, faithful yet in real English. Bernard Knox's
contributions are invigorating and wide-ranging" —OLIVER TAPLIN, Oxford University.
0-670-69805-9 416 pp. \$25.00



THE VIKING PRESS, College Dept., 625 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022

JOHNS HOPKINS

Letters on Familiar Matters

Rerum familiarum libri IX-XVI

Francesco Petrarca

translated by Aldo S. Bernardo

The first definitive English translation of Petrarch's letters. These 104 selections were
written between 1347 and 1353 to recipients at every level of fourteenth-century society,
from Emperor Charles IV, Boccaccio, and leaders of the Church to teachers, artists, and
others remembered only for their association with one of the most illustrious figures of
their age. \$35.00

also now available from Johns Hopkins

Rerum familiarum libri I-VIII

"Essential to an informed reading of Petrarch, and a monument to the beginnings of
humanism....Petrarch reckoned without the demise of Latin when he looked to posterity;
but translations such as this will help to keep his image alive." — *Times Literary Supplement*

\$35.00

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218



Women's Life in Greece and Rome

edited by *Mary R. Lefkowitz*
and *Maureen B. Fant*

From Hesiod's story of Pandora and Aristotle's reflections on women to obscure letters and funerary inscriptions, these are the most enlightening original accounts of the life of women in the ancient world, translated into English for readers unfamiliar with classical languages.

This revised and expanded edition of *Women in Greece and Rome* includes additional documents about women's occupations, legal status, and religious life.

\$30.00 hardcover, \$8.95 paperback


Religion and Statecraft among the Romans

Alan Wardman

The first detailed examination of the marriage of religion and politics that preserved social stability and allowed the Roman emperors to maintain authority over the diverse and far-flung subjects of their empire.

This book explores the Roman leadership's dependence upon a shifting pantheon of gods—deities that can now be viewed as signposts to Roman thinking about the objectives of the state and the nature of the ideal citizen.

\$20.00



The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

JOHNS HOPKINS

Young Edward Gibbon

Gentleman of Letters

by
*Patricia B.
Craddock*



"This volume is both the life of an extraordinary eighteenth-century gentleman-scholar and an excellent piece of family history.... All the indications are that this will become a standard and authoritative life of a wonderfully fascinating man."

—J.G.A. Pocock, *The Johns Hopkins University*

This perceptive, informative biography sheds new light on the painful childhood, rich self-education, and deep-seated emotional conflicts that shaped the life of Edward Gibbon, author of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* and one of England's premier historians. \$25.00

Available at your bookstore, or from

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

JOHNS HOPKINS

Classics

The Lives of the Greek Poets

Mary R. Lefkowitz

"An exceedingly valuable study...will long be in demand as a standard reference work."—*Diskin Clay, The Johns Hopkins University*

For centuries, classical scholars have based their understanding of ancient Greek poetry, and, to a certain extent, culture, on equally ancient biographies of the poets—biographies which are largely fictional. The author argues that the ancient accounts were derived from popular fantasy and the poems themselves.

\$17.50

History of Classical Scholarship

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

translated by Alan Harris

introduction and notes by Hugh Lloyd-Jones

"The best short history of [classical scholarship]"—*from the introduction by Hugh Lloyd-Jones*

Now available for the first time in English, this path breaking volume, first published in German in 1921, discusses language and literature, archaeology, art history, ancient history, philosophy, epigraphy, numismatics, and papyrology.

\$20.00

Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in the Classical City, 750-330 B.C.

Andrew Lintott

"The author's knowledge of the evidence, and...his scholarship [are] superior."—*J. K. Anderson, University of California, Berkeley*

Assassinations of public figures. Crime in the streets. Civil war. Rioting and mass demonstrations. Andrew Lintott offers a provocative examination of this topical-sounding array of social ills during the final years of classical Greek civilization.

\$25.00

Song and Action

The Victory Odes of Pindar

Kevin Crotty

"An original and substantial contribution to Pindar scholarship. With good sense and good style, Crotty explores the techniques of this most difficult of Greek poets, achieving a synthesis that outdoes any other contemporary treatment. The sweep of the book and its familiarity with the overwhelmingly vast contemporary scholarship makes it the best overall exposé of Pindaric poetry available today."—*Gregory Nagy, Harvard University*

\$15.00

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)		
1. TITLE OF PUBLICATION American Journal of Philology		2. PUBLICATION NO. A. NO. OF ISSUES PUBLISHED ANNUALLY 4 B. DATE OF FILING October 1, 1993
3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE Quarterly		4. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION PRICE \$30.00
5. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION (Street, City, County, State and ZIP Code) (Not printer) The Johns Hopkins University, 121 Gilman, Baltimore, Maryland 21218		
6. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS (Not printer) The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218		
7. FULL NAMES AND COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR (Do not leave blank) (Do not leave blank) PUBLISHER (Name and Complete Mailing Address) The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218 EDITOR (Name and Complete Mailing Address) Dr. Diskin Clay, 121 Gilman, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218 MANAGING EDITOR (Name and Complete Mailing Address) None		
8. OWNER (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, its name and address must be stated.) (Form must be completed)		
FULL NAME The Johns Hopkins University		COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS Baltimore, Maryland 21218
9. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES (If there are none, so state)		
FULL NAME None		COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS None
10. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES (Section 413 & 414 only) The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes (Check one) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (1) HAS NOT CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> (2) HAS CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS (If changed, publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)		
11. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION		AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES (See Form 3501)		1727
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET VENDORS, AND COUNTER SALES 2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS		1727 None 1529
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION (Sum of B1 and B2)		1529
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER, OR OTHER MEANS (SAMPLER, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES)		23
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION (Sum of C and D)		1552
F. COPIES NOT DISTRIBUTED 1. OFFICE USE, LEFTOVERS, UNADVERTISED, SUNKET 2. RETURN FROM NEWS AGENTS		275 None
G. TOTAL (Sum of E, F1 and F2 - should equal and agree with shown in A)		1727
12. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete		SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF EDITOR, PUBLISHER, BUSINESS MANAGER, OR OWNER Marie R. Hansen



NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Contributions and other editorial correspondence should be sent to Diskin Clay, Editor, Department of Classics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A. Contributions should be sent in duplicate, double spaced, with footnotes double spaced at the end of the article. Manuscripts should conform to the style of the journal; a guide to contributors is available from the editor on request. Contributors who want their manuscripts read anonymously should remove their names from the articles they submit but include them in their correspondence with the editor. It is the journal's policy to require the assignment of copyright from all authors.

Books for review and correspondence with the Book Review Editor should be sent to Frank Romer, Department of Classics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A.

Proofs should be returned to the Secretary, Candida Allanbrook, Box 1340, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218, U.S.A.

Authors of articles will receive twenty-five gratis offprints of their articles. Authors of reviews will receive two copies of the complete issue.